U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

June 3, 2024

MR. JASON LEOPOLD
BUZZFEED NEWS
7TH FLOOR
1630 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20009

FOIPA Request No.: 1432673-000
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-01278
Subject: All 302's of individuals who were questioned/interviewed by FBI Agents working for the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller

Dear Mr. Leopold:

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed. The documents were reviewed under the FOIA/FOIPA, Title 5, United States Code, Sections (s) 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. The checked exemptions used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552		**Section 552a**
☑ (b)(1)	☑ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☐ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☑ (b)(3)	☑ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
50 U.S.C., § 3024 (i)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
	☑ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☑ (b)(4)	☑ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☑ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☑ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

279 pages were reviewed and 22 pages are being released.

☑ The appropriate redactions or deletions were made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Department of Justice, Office of Information (DOJ-OIP); Department of State (DOS); National Security Division (NSD); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); United States Secret Service (USSS); and White House Counsel's Office (WHCO).

In response to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of Bates Stamped documents, FBI (19-cv-1278) 11443-11451; 11459-11561; 11567-11570; 11578-11587; 13295-13313; 13430-13434; 14199-14216; 14267-14269; 14282-14284; 14313-14317; 14744; 14750-14752; 15160-15161; 15306-15322; 15325-15333; 15364-15367; 15449; 15870-15872; 16426-16444; 16678; 18443-18455; 18856-18860; and 18865-18886. The enclosed documents represent the forty-eighth interim release of information responsive to your request.

If you wish to appeal an agency's determination in response to your request, you may administratively appeal to that agency within ninety (90) days of the date of this letter.

Duplicate copies of the same document were not processed.

Please refer to the enclosed FBI FOIPA Addendum for additional standard responses applicable to your request. **"Part 1"** of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. **"Part 2"** includes additional standard responses that apply to all requests for records about yourself or any third party individuals. **"Part 3"** includes general information about FBI records that you may find useful. Also enclosed is our Explanation of Exemptions.

Although your request is in litigation, we are required by law to provide you the following information:

Additional information about the FOIPA can be found at www.fbi.gov/foia. Should you have questions regarding your request, please feel free to contact foipaquestions@fbi.gov. Please reference the FOIPA Request number listed above in all correspondence concerning your request.

If you are not satisfied with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's determination in response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, 441 G Street, NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20530, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA STAR portal by creating an account following the instructions on OIP's website: https://www.justice.gov/oip/submit-and-track-request-or-appeal. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by emailing the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison at foipaquestions@fbi.gov. The subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

Michael G. Seidel
Section Chief
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

FBI FOIPA Addendum

As referenced in our letter responding to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request, the FBI FOIPA Addendum provides information applicable to your request. Part 1 of the Addendum includes standard responses that apply to all requests. Part 2 includes standard responses that apply to requests for records about individuals to the extent your request seeks the listed information. Part 3 includes general information about FBI records, searches, and programs.

Part 1: The standard responses below apply to all requests:

(i) **5 U.S.C. § 552(c).** Congress excluded three categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIPA [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]. FBI responses are limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIPA. Additional information about the FBI and the FOIPA can be found on the www.fbi.gov/foia website.

(ii) **Intelligence Records**. To the extent your request seeks records of intelligence sources, methods, or activities, the FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and as applicable to requests for records about individuals, PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(1), (b)(3), and (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records is itself a classified fact protected by FOIA exemption (b)(1) and/or would reveal intelligence sources, methods, or activities protected by exemption (b)(3) [50 USC § 3024(i)(1)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that any such records do or do not exist.

Part 2: The standard responses below apply to all requests for records on individuals:

(i) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Watch Lists.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of any individual's name on a watch list pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(7)(E), (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that watch list records do or do not exist.

(ii) **Requests for Records about any Individual—Witness Security Program Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of records which could identify any participant in the Witness Security Program pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. §§ 552/552a (b)(3), 18 U.S.C. 3521, and (j)(2)]. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

(iii) **Requests for Confidential Informant Records.** The FBI can neither confirm nor deny the existence of confidential informant records pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F) [5 U.S.C.§ § 552 (b)(7)(D), (b)(7)(E), and (b)(7)(F)] and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C.§ 552a (j)(2)]. The mere acknowledgment of the existence or nonexistence of such records would reveal confidential informant identities and information, expose law enforcement techniques, and endanger the life or physical safety of individuals. This is a standard response and should not be read to indicate that such records do or do not exist.

Part 3: General Information:

(i) **Record Searches and Standard Search Policy.** The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for reasonably described records by searching systems, such as the Central Records System (CRS), or locations where responsive records would reasonably be found. The CRS is an extensive system of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and general files compiled by the FBI per its law enforcement, intelligence, and administrative functions. The CRS spans the entire FBI organization, comprising records of FBI Headquarters, FBI Field Offices, and FBI Legal Attaché Offices (Legats) worldwide; Electronic Surveillance (ELSUR) records are included in the CRS. The standard search policy is a search for main entity records in the CRS. Unless specifically requested, a standard search does not include a search for reference entity records, administrative records of previous FOIPA requests, or civil litigation files.

a. *Main Entity Records* – created for individuals or non-individuals who are the subjects or the focus of an investigation
b. *Reference Entity Records*- created for individuals or non-individuals who are associated with a case but are not known subjects or the focus of an investigation

(ii) **FBI Records.** Founded in 1908, the FBI carries out a dual law enforcement and national security mission. As part of this dual mission, the FBI creates and maintains records on various subjects; however, the FBI does not maintain records on every person, subject, or entity.

(iii) **Foreseeable Harm Standard.** As amended in 2016, the Freedom of Information Act provides that a federal agency may withhold responsive records only if: (1) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by one of the nine exemptions that FOIA enumerates, or (2) disclosure is prohibited by law (5 United States Code, Section 552(a)(8)(A)(i)). The FBI considers this foreseeable harm standard in the processing of its requests.

(iv) **Requests for Criminal History Records or Rap Sheets.** The Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division provides Identity History Summary Checks – often referred to as a criminal history record or rap sheet. These criminal history records are not the same as material in an investigative "FBI file." An Identity History Summary Check is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization, or military service. For a fee, individuals can request a copy of their Identity History Summary Check. Forms and directions can be accessed at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks. Additionally, requests can be submitted electronically at www.edo.cjis.gov. For additional information, please contact CJIS directly at (304) 625-5590.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
Civil Action No.: 19-cv-1278 / 19-cv-1626
FOIA: 1492006-0; 1432673-0; 1432673-1; 1433273-0
PDF Title:19-cv-1278 Release 48

Total Withheld Pages = 257

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 11443	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11444	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11445	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11446	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11447	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11448	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11449	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11450	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11451	Duplicate
FBI(19cv1278) 11459	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11460	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11461	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11462	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11463	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11464	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11467	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11469	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11470	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11471	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11472	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11473	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11474	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11475	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11476	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11477	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11478	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11479	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11481	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11492	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11493	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11494	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11495	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11496	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI

Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 11497	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11498	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11499	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11500	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11501	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11502	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11503	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11504	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11505	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11506	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11507	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11508	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11509	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11510	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11511	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11541	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11542	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11551	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11552	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI

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Bates Page Reference	Reason for Withholding (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 11555	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11556	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11557	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 11558	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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FBI(19cv1278) 11586	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b8 per OCC
FBI(19cv1278) 11587	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b8 per OCC
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FBI(19cv1278) 13296	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13297	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13298	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13299	b4 per FBI; b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13300	b4 per FBI; b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13301	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13302	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13303	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13304	b4 per FBI; b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13305	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13306	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13307	b4 per FBI; b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13308	b5 per DOJ-NSD; b6 per FBI, DOJ-NSD; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13309	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13310	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13311	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13312	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13313	b6 per FBI, DOJ-NSD; b7C per FBI; b7E per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 13431	b3 per DIA; b6 per FBI, per DIA; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14199	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14200	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14201	b6 per FBI; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14202	b6 per FBI; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14203	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14204	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14205	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14206	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14207	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14208	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14209	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14210	b6 per FBI; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14211	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI

Bates Page Reference	**Reason for Withholding** (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
FBI(19cv1278) 14212	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14213	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14214	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14215	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14216	b6 per FBI, DOS; b7A per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14267	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
FBI(19cv1278) 14268	b6 per FBI; b7C per FBI
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Bates Page Reference	**Reason for Withholding** (i.e., exemptions with coded rationale, duplicate, sealed by order of court, etc.)
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FBI(19cv1278) 18886	b6 per FBI, CBP; b7C per FBI, CBP

[redacted]

From: [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, October 05, 2016 10:17 AM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Meeting?

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

Good morning Sir,

During our meeting last month, you mentioned an event that may occur when you traveled to New York the following week, [redacted] and I were wondering if the event had occurred? If so, when would you to meet with us again?

[redacted]

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property

Case ID:

On (date) 9/20/17

item (s) listed below were:
- [ ] Collected/Seized
- [x] Received From
- [ ] Returned To
- [ ] Released To

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

(Name) [redacted]

(Street Address) 200 MACDILL BLVD

(City) WASHINGTON DC 20340

Description of Item (s): (1) PAGE HANDWRITTEN NOTES: [redacted]

[redacted]

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

Received By: [redacted]
(Signature)

Printed Name/Title: [redacted]
SPECIAL AGENT

Received From: [redacted]

Printed Name/Title

DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE
IN DEFENSE OF THE NATION

[redacted]

Defense Intelligence Agency
200 MacDill Blvd.
Washington, DC 20340-5100

[redacted]

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

(U) On 14 Sep 2016, the undersigned was instructed to contact [redacted] USA Retired, who had indicated he wanted to make a report in person.

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI
b7E per FBI

(U) [redacted] at this place of business, [redacted] He advised as follows: He as planning to go to [redacted] On 19 Sep 2016, he planned to meet with the [redacted] in New York at the [redacted] He was not questioned about any past foreign contacts or travel since his military retirement as it was believed that matter was covered during his recent background investigation, and it was not the reason he contacted DIA on this occasion.

(U) [redacted]

b7E per FBI

[redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

b1 per DIA
b3 per DIA
b6 per DIA

(U) In Feb 2017, I was asked regarding his foreign travel reporting. At that time, I did not recall his brief mention of the [redacted] because all emphasis in discussions was on Russia.

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI, per DIA
b7C per FBI

[redacted] 3/21/2017

b3 per DIA
b6 per DIA

Classified By: [redacted]
Derived Fm: ~~DO SCG 20110927~~
Declassify On: ~~50X1-HUM~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Department of State
Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Counterintelligence Division

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

b7E per DOS

Case number [redacted]

Name and Position: [redacted] **Foreign Service Officer, Department of State**

Clearance: **TOP SECRET**

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI, per DOS

Date/Time of Interview: **31 August 2017 //**

Interviewing Agent(s): [redacted] **(DS),** [redacted] **(FBI)**

Interview Location: **Harry S. Truman Building, Washington, D.C.**

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI, per DOS

Summary:

(SBU) On August 31, 2017 Diplomatic Security (DS) Special Agent (SA) [redacted] (Reporting Agent, RA) and FBI SA [redacted] interviewed Department of State (DOS) Foreign Service Officer (FSO) [redacted] was [redacted] (herein after referred to as SUBJECT) and [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI, per DOS

Detailed Synopsis:

(SBU) On August 31, 2017 RA and SA [redacted] interviewed [redacted] was [redacted] works in the [redacted] at the [redacted] RA believes [redacted]

(SBU) [redacted]

b6 per FBI, b6 per DOS
b7C per FBI

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) [redacted]

(SBU) [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) [redacted]

b6 per FBI, b6 per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) Initially, [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

(SBU) [redacted] recommended SAs speak with DOS colleague [redacted]

b6 per FBI, per DOS
b7C per FBI

DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

COMMITTED TO EXCELLENCE
IN DEFENSE OF THE NATION

[redacted]

[redacted]

Comm: [redacted]
Mobile:
JWICS
NIPR: [redacted]

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

U-113,254/SEC-3 14 February 2017

TO: LTG (Ret) Michael T. Flynn

SUBJECT: Notification of Access Suspension

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has suspended your access to classified information until the DIA Office of Security assesses your compliance with applicable Intelligence Community directives that govern security clearances. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation, once complete, will inform a thorough review to determine your continued eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) with DIA.

2. In the interim, you are reminded of your continued obligation to protect classified information, sensitive compartmented information, and intelligence sources and methods from disclosure to unauthorized or uncleared personnel, under the provisions of Sections 793 and 794 of title 18, United States Code and/or the appropriate articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. **The time limit for safeguarding such intelligence never expires.**

3. This correspondence is marked "~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,~~" solely for your own protection. There is no restriction on your use or disclosure of the information.

[redacted]

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

~~*PERSONAL DATA*~~
~~*To Be Treated in a Confidential Manner*~~

RTQ – LTG Flynn Security Clearance Status

February 14, 2017

Q. Does LTG Flynn still have access to classified information?

A. LTG's Flynn's access to classified information has been suspended pending a review. This is standard when a question arises concerning an individual's compliance with IC security clearance directives.

Q. Is the recent public disclosure of contacts with the Russian Ambassador and concerns whether they were appropriate the reason for this review?

A. Personnel security clearance matters are privacy-protected information. DIA Is reviewing whether he did or did not comply with applicable security requirements.

Q. Does the DIA director still consider LTG Flynn part of his advisory board?

[Information provided previously to the media on multiple occasions is that DIA holds the clearances of all former DR's so they can serve as advisors to the incumbent]

A. Yes. His knowledge and expertise remains valuable if called upon by the current director. His participation will be situation/topic dependent and limited to unclassified consultations if called upon, pending the outcome of the review that is focused on compliance with IC security clearance directives.

DIA maintains the clearances for all former directors so the incumbent can leverage their knowledge and expertise if/when needed.

Q. Is LTG Flynn a threat to National Security?

A. LTG Flynn has faithfully served this nation with distinction for more than three decades. This is a question of whether he followed the appropriate directives and how to resolve the matter if he didn't.

b3 per DIA
b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

DRAFTED: [redacted]

REVIEWED: [redacted]

The Atlantic

Russian Anti-Sanctions Campaign Turned to California Congressman

U.S. diplomats were concerned about Russian outreach to House Republican Dana Rohrabacher while on a trip to Moscow last year.

Aaron Bernstein / Reuters

ROSIE GRAY

JUL 18, 2017 | POLITICS

Updated on July 19, 2017

The trip was two months before the now-infamous Trump Tower meeting between Trump campaign officials and a Russian lawyer and lobbyist. Representative Dana Rohrabacher, perhaps the most Russia-friendly member of the GOP caucus, led a congressional delegation to Moscow in which he was handed materials critical of the Magnitsky Act, the 2012 bill imposing sanctions on Russian officials. Rohrabacher has said that the documents were given to him by Russian prosecutors.

Rohrabacher's 2016 Moscow meeting has been revisited in recent days because of the document's connection to the anti-Magnitsky campaign that formed part of the Trump Tower meeting. Last week, Donald Trump Jr. acknowledged that he met with Natalia Veselnitskaya, a Russian attorney he believed was prepared to hand him compromising information on Hillary Clinton as part of a broader Russian government effort to help his father's candidacy. During the meeting, Trump Jr. said that Veselnitskaya was focused on repeal of the Magnitsky Act.

But even at the time, Rohrabacher's 2016 Moscow trip raised eyebrows among U.S. officials, particularly at the State Department. According to two sources with close knowledge of the events, officials at the Embassy in Moscow expressed doubts about the people they were meeting with and had warned the delegation that FSB presence was constant while the members were in Moscow. During the trip, the group was briefed by the U.S. Ambassador, John Tefft.

One of the officials on the ground, Alamanda Gribbin, an embassy control officer, said she had seen the document given to Rohrabacher before, according to one of the sources. The document is marked "confidential" at the top and is full of accusations against Sergei Magnitsky, the Russian lawyer who died in prison in 2009 and for whom the act is named, and Bill Browder, the Hermitage Capital CEO for whom Magnitsky worked and who has been one of the key people behind the legislation.

State was "really concerned" about whom Rohrabacher was meeting with, another source with knowledge of the trip said. "They were under the impression they were FSB agents."

Rohrabacher aide Paul Behrends, this source said, "was telling people they were from the prosecutors' office in Moscow." The *FT* reported that the person who gave Rohrabacher the document was Viktor Grin, a top aide to Yuri Chaika, the Russian prosecutor general with whom Veselnitskaya, the lawyer in the Trump Tower meeting, told the *Wall Street Journal* she was in contact.

One of the sources familiar with the trip said that neither Rohrabacher nor Behrends appeared to take the warning seriously and said it was Behrends who was setting up the meetings.

"Paul was present as the on-the-scene coordinator for Rep. Rohrabacher, nothing more," said Ken Grubbs, Rohrabacher's press secretary. Grubbs said that Behrends "almost certainly was at the congressman's side" for the meeting.

Grubbs did not dispute that a warning had been given, but said the conversation with the prosecutors had been "nothing substantive."

"The congressman chairs the relevant subcommittee for Russia and a codel is a fact-finding mission," Grubbs said. "He was asked by a Russian parliamentarian if he would accept documents from the prosecutors and said yes. He later in the day accepted the documents and the conversation with prosecutors was brief and formal, nothing substantive. He is always aware that when he speaks with representatives of foreign governments that intelligence ops may be at play and is accordingly wary. As a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives he does not, however, take direction from the State Department."

A State Department spokesperson did not immediately return a request for comment.

Past Rohrabacher visits to Moscow have also been objects of controversy. A 2013 trip that enlisted Steven Seagal as a fixer also included a meeting with top FSB officials and a dinner with deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin. The trip ended with an aborted plan to fly to Chechnya and meet the authoritarian Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov. On the same trip that he received the anti-Magnitsky Act documents, Rohrabacher met with Russian Railways chief Vladimir Yakunin, who had been added to the Treasury Department's sanctions list in 2014.

Trump Jr., Jared Kushner and Paul Manafort's meeting last year with Veselnitskaya, was, at least in part, part of a broader Russian effort to lobby against the Magnitsky Act. The Act is a law passed in 2012 that places sanctions on Russian officials connected to the death of Magnitsky; Magnitsky had been investigating tax fraud.

Veselnitskaya, the lawyer in the meeting, has been deeply involved in the anti-Magnitsky Act effort in the U.S. as part of a group called the Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative Foundation that has lobbied in Congress against the legislation. So has another attendee at the meeting, Rinat Akhmetshin, a Russian-American lobbyist whose involvement in the anti-Magnitsky Act campaign included a screening of a documentary critical of the Magnitsky Act at the Newseum a few days after the Trump Tower meeting.

In April 2017, Akhmetshin, a former Soviet military counterintelligence officer, met with Rohrabacher in Berlin and discussed the Prevezon money-laundering case with him, according to CNN.The case involved allegations of money laundering involving real estate company Prevezon and was brought in the Southern District of New York. It was settled in May. Veselnitskaya was a lawyer for Prevezon owner Denis Katsyv.

House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Ed Royce's office signs off on trips such as Rohrabacher's, but doesn't always have the full picture of what he is doing.

"There are plenty of things that don't get included on those public disclosures," said a GOP congressional aide. "That's where some of the concerning meetings are taking place."

An itinerary for the Rohrabacher trip that included the Berlin meeting, which has not yet been made public, details several agenda items for the Berlin leg, but makes no mention of a meeting with Akhmetshin. And the itinerary for the April 2016 trip to Moscow does not list a meeting with the prosecutors.

"There have been instances where the chairman has gone to Mr. Rohrabacher and said this itinerary needs to change, or this trip as a whole is not a smart idea at this time," the GOP aide said. In response to a recent itinerary submitted by Rohrabacher for a trip to Spain, Royce told Rohrabacher that he could not take meetings in Barcelona on Catalonian separatism without also meeting with government officials in Madrid. Royce also nixed a trip Rohrabacher planned to take to Russia earlier this year.

According to a senior House GOP aide, Rohrabacher earlier this year asked to travel to Moscow in the weeks following the Trump inauguration, and Royce told him no in a conversation on the House floor.

Browder filed a complaint last year with the Justice Department arguing that several of the participants in the anti-Magnitsky Act efforts, including Akhmetshin, are legally required to register under the Foreign Agent Registration Act. In March, Senate Judiciary Committee chairman Chuck Grassley named Akhmetshin in a letter about unregistered foreign agents working for Russia, citing Browder's complaint. A Senate Judiciary Committee hearing about FARA enforcement was scheduled for Wednesday, until it was postponed by Grassley on Tuesday.

Rohrabacher has long been an outlier in the Republican caucus for his pro-Russian stance, but in the Trump era his views are no longer so unusual. He said in November that he had been told he was under consideration for Secretary of State. Rohrabacher has reportedly been warned by the FBI in the past that Russian intelligence was attempting to recruit him.

Several sources pointed to Rohrabacher aide Behrends, a controversial figure on the Hill, as part of the reason for the congressman's idiosyncratic views on Russia. Other congressional staffers who have worked with or around Behrends see him as egging on Rohrabacher's worst instincts. Behrends did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

"Paul here is the key figure, not Dana," said one Hill staffer. "Paul is the instigator here."

"He's nudging it along, encouraging it," said another Hill source. "And he pushes Dana to follow what he would normally want to do but gives him that encouragement and that support."

Behrends worked for Rohrabacher in the 1990s before becoming a lobbyist, most famously for Blackwater; Behrends is close with Blackwater founder Erik Prince. He at one point worked for the Alexander Strategy Group, the firm connected to disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Lobbying records show that he represented a wide variety of clients from 1999 to 2014, including at certain points The Prince Group, Blackwater, a defense contractors' trade association, and other entities.

"If you were going to cast a lobbyist for a movie, that's how you'd picture him," one of the Hill staffers said.

He re-entered Rohrabacher's office in 2014 and is a shared staffer between his office and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Several sources said that Behrends is only in the office one or two days a week; Rohrabacher spokesman Grubbs denied this, saying "Paul comes to the office every day."

Behrends reportedly took Akhmetshin around to other congressional offices, a move that raised eyebrows among other congressional staffers, who viewed it as more akin to what a lobbyist does, rather than a staffer. It's not the only time Behrends has done this: One source with knowledge of the incident said that Behrends last year had called someone in Arizona Senator John McCain's office and offered to bring over some defense contractors.

"It's not unusual to have meetings with defense contractors," Grubbs said. "Paul often escorts people on the Hill. That is not special treatment. He does that all the time for lots of people."

Akhmetshin, who is currently in Europe, said in an email that there was one instance involving Behrends walking with former Democratic Congressman Ron Dellums, who was also part of the lobbying effort, to the office of the ranking Democrat on Rohrabacher's subcommittee. Behrends "did not take me around different offices on the hill—this suggestion is false," Akhmetshin said. "On one occasion he walked Dellums to his subcommittee-ranking D's counterpart office because he was going there himself, little courtesy to an 80-year-old ex-chairman of House Armed Services Committee and fellow ex-marine."

Emails show that at least one Rohrabacher aide has expressed concerns about Behrends's relationships with the pro-Russian lobbyists who have become a subject of controversy.

Veselnitskaya's and Akhmetshin's presence at last year's House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing has been well-documented; less well-known is that Akhmetshin was also present at the bill markup in which Rohrabacher offered an amendment to strike Magnitsky's name from the act.

Behrends reportedly asked Andrei Nekrasov, the director of the anti-Magnitsky film, to testify at the hearing that took place the day after the screening at the Newseum. Nekrasov ended up submitting a statement for the record.

Veselnitskaya told Russian outlet Sputnik last year that she had submitted a "report" to Congress; "The representatives of one of U.S. House subcommittees attended the screening last night, and told me that if I have something to say, I could file a report as a Russian lawyer," Veselnitskaya is quoted as saying.

"Paul does not ask people to submit things for the record. She requested to the subcommittee to submit a statement for the record but we denied her request," Grubbs said.

Rohrabacher at one point had requested to screen the anti-Magnitsky film in Congress and was turned down by Royce.

The *Daily Mail* reported that an intern in Rohrabacher's office sent out emailed invitations to a screening of the anti-Magnitsky film in June 2016 at the Newseum, where both Akhmetshin and Veselnitskaya were in attendance and which took place days after the Trump Tower meeting. Several sources said they thought the intern had done this at Behrends's request.

"That intern didn't do it on her own," said one of the Hill sources. "Obviously someone, and I think it could only have been Paul, asked her to invite people to the screening."

"This was all Paul's baby," said another congressional aide who knows Behrends.

"We have no record of an intern sending out any invitation to the Nekrasov film," Grubbs said. "There was no request from Paul for any invitations to the film to be sent out."

Rohrabacher at one point had requested to screen the film in Congress and was turned down by Royce.

"That conversation took place between Chairman Royce and Dana Rohrabacher," the GOP aide said. "Chairman Royce made clear that the use of committee space would not be appropriate for the screening."

This story has been updated with comment from Rinat Akhmetshin.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROSIE GRAY is a staff writer at *The Atlantic*.

Twitter

In December 2012 U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act. The adoption of the law was preceded by a 3-year lobbying campaign by Browder and the financial structures, for whose interests he acted.

The only legal ground which made the Congress adopt this Law was the evidence provided in the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the former U.S. citizen, and now a British subject (who changed his citizenship due to high taxes in the United States) - William Browder, but his evidence appeared to be false.

However, the same story was used as the ground for the draft Global Magnitsky Act which being considered by the Congress.

The change of the attitude of the Congress to the Magnitsky story, the obtaining of reliable knowledge of the actual events and personal motives of the those who had been behind the lobbying of this disastrous Act, in view of the pre-election political situation, might improve today's difficult relations between the two states.

The motive of Browder, and likewise of a number of American financial structures who lobbied his interests on Capitol Hill and at the White House was to be ahead in forming in a Western society a predetermined distorted view through presenting in media of intentionally false information and further perpetuating the negative image of the Russian institutions of state power by the adoption of a legislative act in the United States and thereby to divert attention and escape the criminal prosecution in the U.S.A. and in Russia.

Being aware of the real threat of exposure to the law enforcement authorities of both countries, Browder's "companions" who acquired the assets of OAO "Gazprom" in Russia in 2007, stole the funds (taxes) from the Russian budget, trying to create "an alibi" of non-involvement in this stealage by imitating the theft from the organizations controlled by the Hermitage Fund (HSBC) of three Russian companies that bought OAO "Gazprom" shares. Later the death in a remand prison of one of Browder's financial consultants – Sergei Magnitsky, detained on quite different charges and grounds (under the criminal case initiated as far back as in 2004, in respect of Browder and his accomplices on the facts of non-payment of taxes) was used by Browder to create an image of the "fighter against corruption" who was politically persecuted by Russia, making Magnitsky to appear as "a lawyer who has revealed the theft of budgetary funds, who was tortured and killed and later allegedly posthumously convicted".

As can be seen from the available documentary evidence and witness statements collected by the investigative authorities of the Russian Federation, and in the civil case examined by the United States Court for the Southern District of New York, William Browder, the Executive Director of Hermitage Capital Management (Guernsey) and financial consultant of the hedge fund Hermitage (an HSBC-backed vehicle which existed before 2013), who lived in Russia for ten years on a tourist visa, implemented in the Russian territory, within 1999-2006, a scheme of illegal purchase of OAO "Gazprom" shares by foreign companies by circumventing a prohibition on direct foreign investments in OAO "Gazprom" shares without the approval of the Russian government.

The applied scheme of acquiring shares not only allowed to buy them at the prices 1.5 lower than through the American depository receipts, but made it possible for the investors and their consultants to escape state control and monitoring of the source of the capital and its movements, and also to evade taxes in the United States with regard to the investment activity.

One of such major client-investors of Browder, apart from the Hermitage Foundation was the American group of companies of Ziff brothers - "Ziff Brothers Investments".

Within the period from late 1999 to 2004, the two companies owned by the said American investors and registered in New York "Speedwagom Investors 1 and 2" through three Cyprus companies "Giggs Enterprises Limited", "Joda Limited", "Peninsular Heights Limited" illicitly bought more than 133 million of "Gazprom" shares for the Russian companies "Camea", "Lory", "Escalibur", "Sterling Investments" for over 80 million U.S.dollars.

Once Browder's activities had come to the attention of the law enforcement bodies of Russia, in January 2006 all the assets controlled by "Ziff Brothers Investments" were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The income of "Ziff Brothers Investments" exceeded 800 million U.S. dollars, including in the form of 66 million shares of OAO "Gazprom" received as "dividends". According to the preliminary estimate the damage caused to the budget of the Russian Federation in the form of underpaid taxes on this activity amounted to more than 40 million U.S. dollars. And there are all grounds to believe that this investment activity was not declared and not included in the account reports provided to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, and the American companies did not pay the taxes on the profits from the turnover of the shares of Russian companies.

If the Representatives of the U.S. Congress are willing to use legislative mechanisms to verify whether the evidence earlier provided by Browder in the Committee on Foreign Relations is true, the documents can be provided which contain the facts described and found by the United States Court for the Southern District of New York (U.S. v Prevezon Holdings).

The competent authorities of the Russian Federation are also prepared to provide the relevant documents corroborating the above information, both directly to the members of this Committee of the United States House of Representatives and to the relevant American competent authorities within the framework of international legal cooperation, in the form of the Russian request, with a view to checking the aforesaid information in the U.S.territory, or by collecting and forwarding the materials of the criminal case in order for the identified guilty persons and company owners (including "Ziff Brothers Investments") be brought to criminal responsibility in the United States.

FD-597 (Rev 8-11-94)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized

File # ______________________

On (date) September 25, 2017 @6:30p

item(s) listed below were:
- [ ] Received From
- [ ] Returned To
- [ ] Released To
- [x] Seized

(Name) [redacted]

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI
b7E per FBI

(Street Address) [redacted]

(City) [redacted]

[redacted]

Description of Item(s): [redacted]

nothing else

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

Received By: [redacted]**ed From:** X no signature
(Signature)