

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6)@[\(b\)\(6\).com](#)  
**Subject:** (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 10:56:14 AM

---

**(b)(6)**

My name is Kash, I'm Ric's deputy over here at DNI. He asked me to reach out to you regarding speaking with your brother (b)(6) about national security matters and Africa. I've logged time on in national security in all three branches of government and would be happy to speak with your bother.

Thanks much

kash

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6)@com"  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(6) CV  
**Date:** Monday, May 11, 2020 1:31:37 PM  
**Attachments:** (b)(6)\_cv.pdf  
**Importance:** High

---

Here you go brother. Confirm receipt. thanks



**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Checking in  
**Date:** Friday, May 1, 2020 11:36:40 AM

---

Absolutely, sounds good. Will do for sure. Thanks for understanding.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [REDACTED].com>  
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 11:20 AM  
To: (b)(3) [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: Checking in

Kash,

No worries, thanks for the update. I completely understand. So sorry it's so tough over there and the Covid sure isn't helping things.

I'm still keen to get over there to DNI at some point so I'd appreciate you keeping in play especially during the transition period when Radcliffe gets confirmed.

In the interim, if it's OK with you, I will work with PPO to find a home asap so that I'm helping the President and the country as well as feeding the family.

Take care and keep up the good fight.

Best,

(b)(6)

> On May 1, 2020, at 01:09, KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov> wrote:

>

> Hey (b)(6) im working with ppo. We have not identified a slot for you, and it very slow goings over here. Understand if you have to move on to something else, sorry to hold you up. Thanks again

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From (b)(6) [REDACTED].com>

> Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 1:55 PM

> To: (b)(3) [REDACTED]

> Subject: Re: Checking in

>

> Hey Kash!

>

> Sorry to bother you.

>

> It's been a month or since I checked in last. Hoping all is going well there.

>

> Just an update on my end, (b)(6) [REDACTED]

(b)(6) [REDACTED] I've been updating them with what's supposed to happen with my move back into the Administration. I'm not really sure what to tell them next. I

>

> I understand that things are moving slow over there which is why I've been waiting as patiently as I can. When you told me I was "in" at the end of February I kinda put everything else on hold.

>

> Is there anything else I can do to help? Really sorry to "bleed" on you, I just want to serve and I also need to do

what's best for me and my family.

>

> Best,

>

> (b)(6)

>

>>> On Mar 24, 2020, at 14:11 (b)(6) .com> wrote:

>> Kash,

>> No worries, brother. I completely understand. I heard (b)(6) is starting Monday so that's absolutely fantastic. He will be of immense help. When I get there we'll really be ready to rock and roll. Hang in there and let me know if/how I can help in anyway till I come onboard.

>> All the best,

>> (b)(6)

>>>> On Mar 24, 2020, at 13:58, (b)(3) wrote:

>>> Thanks, we are moving very slowly over here given the environment.

>>> sorry -----Original Message-----

>>> From: (b)(6) .com>

>>> Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 11:58 AM

>>> To: (b)(3)

>>> Subject: Re: Checking in

>>> Hey, Kash!

>>> I can only imagine how busy you must be. It's been a couple weeks so I thought I'd drop you a note to see if things have progressed at all. No worries, of course. There's a ton happening right now and I'd love to help if I can.

>>> Take care and give me an update if you can next time you come up for air.

>>> Best,

>>> (b)(6)

>>>> On Mar 10, 2020, at 12:43 (b)(3) wrote:

>>>> Thanks (b)(6)

>>>> Working on it. Moving slower than id like. Is there a specific slot you'd be interested in?

>>>> kash

>>>> -----Original Message-----

>>>> From: (b)(6) com>

>>>> Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:02 AM

>>>> To: (b)(3)

>>>> Subject: Checking in

>>>> Hi Kash!

>>>> Hope all is well there. I know you're fighting the good fight.

>>>> When we spoke you mentioned me checking back with you in a week or so. Any news?

>>>> Standing by, ready to serve...

>>>> Best,

>>>> (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Application Submitted for Communications Officer - 994607  
**Date:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:29:56 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.png](#)  
[image002.png](#)  
[image003.png](#)  
[image004.png](#)  
[image005.png](#)

---

Is this the one? If so, it closed in January. If its not this one, can you send me the link, like this, for the one you applied to? Thanks

<https://www.dni.gov/icjointduty/vacancies/odni-20-0218u.htm>

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:25 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Application Submitted for Communications Officer - 994607  
It was titled "communications officer—GS-14," I believe  
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 8:24 PM (b)(3) wrote:

What is the job you applied for?

**From:** (b)(6) <[REDACTED].com>

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 11:57 AM

**To:** (b)(3)

**Subject:** Fwd: Application Submitted for Communications Officer - 994607

Kash - Thanks for the call. Here's the email I got a few weeks ago. Just let me know if anything needs changing and I'll jump on it.

(b)(6)


----- Forwarded message -----

**From:** <[noreply@intelligencecareers.gov](mailto:noreply@intelligencecareers.gov)>

**Date:** Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 5:55 PM

**Subject:** Application Submitted for Communications Officer - 994607

**To:** (b)(6) <[REDACTED].com>



Thank you for your interest in working for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Your application has been successfully submitted. Log in to your account to check the status of your application.

Please know that the application process can be lengthy and changes in your status will not be frequent.

Anytime the status of your application changes, you will be able to login to your Dashboard and see your updated status.

Regards,  
ODNI Talent Management Office  
<http://www.intelligencecareers.gov/ODNI>

[Launch my dashboard](#)



For any technical inquiries please contact our Customer Care Team at  
1-844-ICHIRES (1-844-424-4737)  
or email [help@intelligencecareers.gov](mailto:help@intelligencecareers.gov)

--

CDS | Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:**  
**Subject:** RE: (b)(6) follow-up  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 9:52:34 AM

---

Have you seen anything on odni website that is open that you might be interested in?

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(6) .com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 4:59 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: (b)(6) follow-up

Kash,

Now that Director Ratcliffe has been sworn-in, could you and I have a brief conversation to see if my background might possibly fit into your office's future mission?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

> On Apr 1, 2020, at 9:05 AM (b)(3) wrote:

>

> Thanks (b)(6) things are moving really slow right now given covid-19. We will try to move on it soon. Thanks for your patience.

>

> -----Original Message-----

> **From:** (b)(6) .com>  
> **Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 6:39 PM  
> **To:** (b)(3)  
> **Subject:** (b)(6) follow-up

>

> Kash,

> I hope you received my resume, sent March 20. Please let me know what the next step will be.

> Thank you,

> (b)(6)

>

> Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Checking in  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 11:33:27 AM

---

Any time

(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 11:19 AM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Checking in  
Also, what's the best number to reach you at tomorrow?  
Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

On Apr 1, 2020, at 10:45 AM, (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote:

I'm good brother, glad to hear you are as well.  
I had a pretty good talk with security this morning and it sounds like they might be able to get me and (b)(6) in sometime soon to test, so I'm really happy to hear that. Thanks for the help with that if that was you.  
Is there a good time for you tomorrow?  
Thanks again,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

On Apr 1, 2020, at 9:49 AM, (b)(3) wrote:

Great to hear from you and glad things are moving. Im doing well, hopefully it stays that way. How are you?  
Yes, lets chat Thursday. Give me a shout then.  
kash

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 6:38 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Checking in

Hi Kash,  
I hope you're doing well and aren't sick. I just wanted to reach out and let you know that I on-boarded yesterday and am up and running (at least physically) in MI. I was hoping to email you from my new DNI email, but it appears I have to wait to get my CI poly first before I can get on the systems, which is more complicated right now with the reduced staffing due to the virus. I checked out of OVP today, and my (b)(6) is currently disabled, so I'm using my personal email and phone until I get up on DNI systems.  
If you're well enough and not too busy, would it be possible to set up

a brief phone call tomorrow or Thursday? I synced with (b)(6) via phone yesterday, but wanted to touch base with you and make sure I had your guidance/marching orders going forward. A friend introduced me to (b)(6) several weeks ago, so I've been in contact with him and offered to assist with anything he needs from the complex while (b)(3), (b)(6) preps (though they seem to have that pretty well in hand.) Obviously, if there's anything I can do for you while you're in quarantine, please don't hesitate to ask.

Once again, I hope you're doing well and hope to talk to you soon.

Best,

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Compartmentation 100-Day Plan  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 2:54:00 PM

---

Fantastic, beth flipped to high side, we are working it. And look forward to your return from HAAAVARD

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 5:27 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Compartmentation 100-Day Plan

Hi Kash,

To follow-up from our meeting the other week, I put together the attached 100-Day Plan for how we could actually start fixing compartmentation in the IC. As you can probably tell, I'm really excited about this.

The plan starts with what we talked about - consolidating and empowering an office to focus on these issues for the DNI. From there, it's rebuilding the senior-level bodies that are supposed to be tackling these issues, creating a working level group to gather and tee up issues, and then getting to writing policies that will fix these problems that IC officers have to deal with every day. As discussed, this would take a team of around 15 - broken up between policy writing, tech development issues, internal ODNI issues, IC-wide issues, and then CAP/SAP integration with DOD. The team would be busy - but this is do-able.

Please let me know your thoughts on the attached. Happy to talk on the phone or trek back to DC to discuss.

(b)(3), (b)(6)



**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:**  
**Subject:** RE: Connection  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:44:54 PM

---

If you could put together a resume, I need that at this stage before moving forward. thanks

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:42 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Connection

Kash,

I don't have a more detailed resume. I would be delighted to share any further information down to the most minute detail of how my experience would appropriately fit into the mission at hand. I would appreciate an opportunity to share that with you.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 18, 2020, at 2:06 PM, (b)(3) wrote:

Thanks, do you have an actual resume you can send?

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 2:57 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Connection

Kash,

Just now did so. Thanks for your quick response!

If you have a moment, I would enjoy a quick phone visit.

I can be reached any time at

(b)(6)

Thanks again,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 18, 2020, at 1:51 PM, (b)(3) wrote:

Thanks for the sync. Can you shoot me your resume?

---

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 2:47 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:**

**Subject:** Re: Connection

(b)(6)

Thanks for your follow-up re DNI.

You are a great friend—S/F!

Kash,

I would very much appreciate an opportunity to visit with you in regard to my desire to join your team at DNI.

In short, I spent 34 years of active and reserve duty in the Marine Corps intel/counterintelligence field. I have acquired great relationships with Members of the Senate and House over the last four decades, specifically those still serving on the respective intel committees. I believe that I could be quite effective in advancing issues/nominations on the hill.

I have current TS/SCI clearance/access via recent SBI, allowing immediate involvement in the classified arena.

My loyalty to the Trump Agenda has been evident, since the pre-election transition effort to the present day.

Would you have some available time early next week to further discuss any possibilities?

I appreciate your consideration.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 18, 2020, at 12:51 PM, (b)(6)

wrote:

(b)(6)

Setting you up with Kash Patel's DNI email for connection.

Best,

-----

James S. C. Baehr  
Special Assistant to the President  
Domestic Policy Council

(b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 To: (b)(6)  
 Subject: RE: (b)(6)  
 Date: Wednesday, May 27, 2020 9:43:51 AM

Thanks, (b)(6) let me see what I can do

From: (b)(6)  
 Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2020 7:47 PM  
 To: (b)(3)  
 Subject: Re: (b)(6)

Kash I wanted to give you an update. Despite Chris Miller wanting to bring me on that his team, Special Operations and Counter Terrorism, is still capped on schedule c's and WHLO is unable to offer a position there. I'm not super familiar with the processes involved but it sounds like even though they may have someone leaving they won't be able to fill the role in the immediate term. I know it may be a long shot and you've been very helpful already, but I was wondering if you knew anyone in PPO who may be able to take a look, or had any other advice on how to approach the situation. Chris is and I are both pretty enthusiastic about my joining but I don't think unfortunately it will be possible unless something with the billeting were to change.

Thank you in advance for any suggestions you've got and hope you enjoyed the holiday weekend.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E: (b)(6)@.com | C: (b)(6)

On Sat, May 16, 2020 at 6:51 PM (b)(6)@.com> wrote:

Will do, Kash and thanks! Hope you enjoy the rest of your weekend.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent from my mobile

On Sat, May 16, 2020, 08:31 (b)(3) wrote:

No worries (b)(6) and keep it at. A slot will open. Keep me posted. Thanks much

From: (b)(6)@.com>

Sent: Friday, May 15, 2020 2:18 PM

To: (b)(3)

Subject: Re: (b)(6)

Kash, thanks again for the introduction and good word with DASD Miller. I wanted to give you an update on how everything ended up shaking out.

Chris and I had a great call, talked quite a bit about some of my work on (b)(6) policy and subsequent to that he had me talk to a few additional members of his team. All of our conversations went really well, and Chris indicated he wanted to move forward with bringing me on board. Unfortunately the White House Liaison to DOD indicated that they're at their political appointee Schedule C capacity and pending an ongoing

adjudication of hiring actions by USD(P) they won't be able to bring anyone on unless existing positions are vacated or new ones created. Chris thinks he may have a team member leaving at the end of the month so there may be a chance to fill that slot, but we'll have to see how things work out.

Regardless, you were a huge help getting me connected with Chris and I really appreciate it. I'll keep you updated as the job search continues, and if I can be helpful on my end don't hesitate to let me know.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E:(b)(6).com | C:(b)(6)

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:50 AM (b)(6).com> wrote:

Yeah, seems like a super nice guy. I'm excited! I'll keep you posted.

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E:(b)(6).com | C:(b)(6)

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:47 AM (b)(3) wrote:

Easy day, miller is awesome, you'll love working for him. His shop does some pretty sweet stuff.

From: (b)(6).com>

Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 10:29 AM

To: (b)(3)

Subject: Re: (b)(6)

Kash, thanks again for chatting with me yesterday. Really appreciate your help - Chris Miller from SO/CT reached out yesterday and we had a great conversation. He's going to see if he can get the ball moving with WHLO. I will be sure to keep you posted!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E:(b)(6).com | C:(b)(6)

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 2:24 PM (b)(6).com> wrote:

Apologies we didn't have a chance to chat earlier, wanted to make sure I was in a place we could have a conversation. My afternoon is pretty open from here out - looking forward to chatting.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E:(b)(6).com | C:(b)(6)

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 1:51 PM (b)(3) wrote:

Happy to help. Thanks much

From: (b)(6).com>

Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2020 1:17 PM

To: (b)(6)@.com>

Cc: (b)(3)

Subject: Re: (b)(6)

Good afternoon Kash and great to connect with you. I appreciate you reaching out and thank you (b)(6) for the intro.

By way of background, I am currently (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I'm looking to make a career transition. (b)(6) is a great place to work, but as I'm sure you know being a former (b)(6) yourself, you're often a mile wide and an inch deep. Ideally I would love to serve in a role that lets me work more exclusively on (b)(6) whether in the intelligence community or the executive branch. I would love to connect if you have any advice or suggestions. I'm attaching my resume for reference.

Hope to talk further - and hope you're staying healthy amidst all this madness.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Washington, DC 20003

E: (b)(6)@.com | C: (b)(6)

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:29 AM (b)(6)@.com>

wrote:

Hi Kash!

Thank you so much for reaching out and being willing to speak with (b)(6). I've copied him to this email and will let you two take it from here! Hope you stay well.

All the best,

(b)(6)

On Tuesday, April 28, 2020, 10:56:16 AM EDT, (b)(3)

wrote:

(b)(6)

My name is Kash, I'm Ric's deputy over here at DNI. He asked me to reach out to you regarding speaking with (b)(6) about national security matters and Africa. I've logged time on in national security in all three branches of government and would be happy to speak with (b)(6). Thanks much

kash

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:**  
**Subject:** RE: following up  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 11:07:41 AM

---

Just tried you, went straight to vm

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:24 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** Re: following up  
(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 25, 2020, at 9:37 AM, (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote:

Thanks much, what's a good number to reach you (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 12:26 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:**  
**Subject:** Re: following up

Hi! Thank you so much! This went to spam and just saw it. Apologies. I am adding the judge here so she can forward the most current copy. May I ask what you do? So you work with Richard?

Best,

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 24, 2020, at 3:20 PM, KASHYAPP wrote:

(b)(6)

Im following up on behalf of Ric Grenell. Do you have a copy of (b)(6) (b)(6) CV, or can you put us in touch please. Thanks very much.

Regards,

Kash

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Hi, (b)(6) here  
**Date:** Thursday, March 26, 2020 10:59:50 AM

---

Thanks for sending. Full name is Kashyap.  
I tried calling you this morning, let me know when's a good time to chat.

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:02 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Hi, (b)(6) here

Hi Kash ( is that your whole name?). Attached please find my resume, which I expanded for your review, knowing that as because I am a prospective judge, you will want a certain level of detail.

I lead an unusual double professional life. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to hearing from you. (b)(6)  
On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 9:02 PM (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote:

Hey that's my office line, can't call it , can you shoot me your resume and I'll touch base thereafter. Thanks much

---

**From:** (b)(6) <(b)(6).com>  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 at 16:07:01  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) <(b)(6).com>

**Subject:** Hi, (b)(6) here

Hi Kash, I am (b)(6). I believe (b)(6) wrote down the wrong number - when I tried, it was a non- working number. May I have it?

(b)(6) had (b)(6) Thx (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(6).com  
Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Re: Hi  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 5, 2020 5:37:06 PM

---

Great see you soon and you got it

---

**From:** (b)(6) [REDACTED].com>  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 5, 2020 at 16:19:09  
**To:** (b)(3) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Re: Hi

Kash

Thank you.

I'm hoping NLT late May. I've had enough. I'm happy to wear a mask and place red tape on floor in front of my desk.

Oh I'm sure (b)(6) will have a great time telling you all about his razing of RADAR.

Stay well and I do hope to see you again before we transition from Ric to John. Keep my place in que to visit WH one day.

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

> On May 5, 2020, at 1:51 PM, (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote:

>

> Hey (b)(6)

>

> Great to hear from you. we miss you, hope you are keeping healthy and safe. Any idea when you might be back?

>

> I will definitely track down (b)(6) looking forward to that story. Thanks for the note

>

> kash

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: (b)(6)

> Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 8:06 AM

> To: (b)(3), (b)(6)

> Subject: Hi

>

> Hey Kash. Just wanted to drop by to say hello and make sure you are doing ok.

>

> I'm missing everyone immensely, however I know things are a bit slow in comparison. I try to touch base with (b)(6) weekly.

>

> You will have to ask (b)(6) how he pulled off a telephone punk on me last Friday. I fell hook, line and sinker.

>

> Hope to see everyone sooner than later.

>



> Best,

>

> (b)(6)

>

> Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner; (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler; (b)(3)  
**Cc:** James A Smith; Bradley A Brooker; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh; John B Sherman; (b)(6) Kevin P. Meiners; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 7:44:36 PM

Phenomenal, phenomenal work team. Just amazing, thanks you all

**From:** "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3)  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 at 18:46:45  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler" (b)(3)  
(b)(3)  
**Cc:** "James A Smith" <james.a.smith@dni.gov>, "Bradley A Brooker"  
<bradley.brooker@dni.gov>. (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Corin R Stone"  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh" (b)(3) "John B Sherman"  
(b)(3) (b)(6) <.com>, "Kevin P.  
Meiners" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "William Evanina"  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Thanks so much!!

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 at 4:08:13 PM  
**To:** "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3) "Ryan Crumpler" (b)(3)  
(b)(3)  
**Cc:** "James A Smith" <james.a.smith@dni.gov>, "Bradley A Brooker"  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Corin R Stone"  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh" (b)(3) "John B Sherman"  
(b)(3) (b)(6) <.com>, "Kevin P.  
Meiners" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "William Evanina"  
<William.Evanina@ic.fbi.gov>. (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Beth: For P&S, I'd say absolutely. We've inserted additional statement below in bolded blue. Please feel free to edit/enhance, etc. Welcome any additional adds or inputs from colleagues.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

**From:** Beth E. Sanner

**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 3:57 PM

**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; (b)(3)

**Cc:** James A Smith ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone

(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman (b)(6) .com' ; Kevin P. Meiners

**(b)(3), (b)(6)**

**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

(b)(5)

It seems that we are missing the opportunity to say THIS IS WHAT We Do!

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 at 3:09:40 PM

**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" <[ryan.crumpler@dni.gov](mailto:ryan.crumpler@dni.gov)>, (b)(3)

**Cc:** "James A Smith" <[james.a.smith@dni.gov](mailto:james.a.smith@dni.gov)>, "Bradley A Brooker"

<[bradley.brooker@dni.gov](mailto:bradley.brooker@dni.gov)>, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh" (b)(3) "John B

Sherman" (b)(3), (b)(6) .com>, "Kevin P.

Meiners" (b)(3), (b)(6)

**(b)(3), (b)(6)**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

"William Evanina"

**(b)(3), (b)(6)**

**Subject:** RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

**Ryan:** (b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

///////

**(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

//////  
**(b)(3), (b)(6)**

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 12:30 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** James A Smith ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ;  
(b)(6) Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions  
**Ryan, colleagues:** Attached Q&A for “no lead” questions based on existing materials, primarily from DNI Coats’ Prehearing responses.

**(b)(5)**

Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

////////////////////

**(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b) (5)

////////////////////////////////////  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** James A Smith  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 9:00 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions  
**Importance:** High

Sent from Email+ secured by MobileIron

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Date:** Fri, Mar 27, 2020, 8:39 AM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(3)

"Beth E. Sanner"  
Corin R Stone  
,Deirdre M Walsh (b)(3)  
,John B Sherman  
,Dustin Gard Weiss (b)(6) <[com](#)>, "Kevin P. Meiners"  
,James A Smith (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina (b)(3), (b)(6)

CC: (b)(3)

Subject: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Colleagues –

We finally received the policy questionnaire I mentioned a couple of weeks ago when asking if you could identify someone to be on standby to assist with drafting responses for the nominee's review.

**The A/DNI informed me this morning he wants these completed by noon today.** As I mentioned previously, some of these will need to be answered by the candidate himself so we will be working this with him and his team in tandem. Please send out to whomever on your team you think is best to help with responses or anyone I missed in my rush to get this out. Fortunately, all the questions are UNCLASS and answers likely will be too. However, if there is a classified response required we can submit high side answers.

I know that is a tall order with so many people out of the office. Please do what you can and provide answers back to OLA on a rolling basis so we can submit to the nominee for review. Thank you and apologies for this monumental ask! I will be in the office shortly and reachable lowside all day with any questions.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3), (b)(6) Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** John B Sherman; Ryan Crumpler; Bradley A Brooker; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh; (b)(3), (b)(6) Kevin P. Meiners; James A Smith; (b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina; La'Naia J. Jones  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 9:10:13 AM

Thank you Ryan for spearheading this lift on such a short timeline. And thanks to the odni team for working with us on it, especially in these trying times. Y'all are awesome. Please let me know how I can help. Thanks much

Kash

---

**From:** "John B Sherman" (b)(3)  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 at 09:05:05  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" (b)(3) "Bradley A Brooker"  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh"  
(b)(3) "Dustin Gard Weiss" (b)(6) .com>, "Kevin P. Meiners"  
(b)(3) "James A Smith" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**(b)(3), (b)(6)**  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "William Evanina" (b)(3), (b)(6) "La'Naia J. Jones" (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Ryan,

(b)(5)

I'll get to working on this immediately.

John

Sent from Email+ secured by MobileIron

----- Original Message -----

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Date:** Fri, Mar 27, 2020, 8:39 AM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner"

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Corin R Stone

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M Walsh (b)(3)

John B Sherman

(b)(3)

Dustin Gard Weiss (b)(6)

.com>, "Kevin P. Meiners"

(b)(3)

James A Smith (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

William Evanina (b)(3), (b)(6)

CC: (b)(3)

Subject: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Colleagues –

We finally received the policy questionnaire I mentioned a couple of weeks ago when asking if you could identify someone to be on standby to assist with drafting responses for the nominee’s review. **The A/DNI informed me this morning he wants these completed by noon today.** As I mentioned previously, some of these will need to be answered by the candidate himself so we will be working this with him and his team in tandem. Please send out to whomever on your team you think is best to help with responses or anyone I missed in my rush to get this out. Fortunately, all the questions are UNCLASS and answers likely will be too. However, if there is a classified response required we can submit high side answers.

I know that is a tall order with so many people out of the office. Please do what you can and provide answers back to OLA on a rolling basis so we can submit to the nominee for review. Thank you and apologies for this monumental ask! I will be in the office shortly and reachable lowside all day with any questions.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Howdy ho!!!  
**Date:** Friday, May 1, 2020 10:06:46 AM

---

Game time?

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 1, 2020 9:57 AM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Howdy ho!!!

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [.com](#)  
**Subject:** RE: introduction  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 9:21:59 AM

---

Thanks (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6) I've been trying to reach you by phone for the last week or so. Please let me know a time that is convenient for you to speak. Thanks much  
kash

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 8:52 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) [.com](#)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** introduction

Hello (b)(3), (b)(6)

Thank you for your email and update on this process.

Per (b)(6) request, I am looping in Kash from DNI (cc'd here) to help with this process and give you updates/more information on the potential opportunity (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned. Thank you!

Best,

**Jordan Hayley**

External Relations Coordinator | Presidential Personnel

Executive Office of the President

Office: (b)(6) Cell (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:**  
**Subject:** RE: Legislative Affairs Position at ODNI  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:04:25 PM

---

Unfortunately, we are in position to onboard people with active TS/SCI. If and when that changes, I will let you know. Thanks much

kash

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 10:06 AM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Legislative Affairs Position at ODNI

Mr. Patel:

I wanted to follow-up regarding the opening in the Office of Legislative Affairs. Is there an opportunity for us to connect to discuss this role?

Thank you,

(b)(6)

On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 1:50 PM (b)(6) <[redacted].com> wrote:

No, I do not.

On Tue, Mar 10, 2020 at 12:40 PM (b)(3) <[redacted]> wrote:

Thanks, do you have a security clearance?

**From:** (b)(6) <[redacted].com>

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:35 AM

**To:** (b)(3)

**Subject:** Legislative Affairs Position at ODNI

Good Morning Mr. Patel:

I met with (b)(3), (b)(6) at PPO last week to discuss possible opportunities to join the administration. He provided me with your contact information and mentioned that there is currently an opening in the Office of Legislative Affairs at ODNI.

Attached is my resume for your review. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss the open position with you at your convenience.

Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

Best regards,

(b)(6)

[redacted].com



**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Out of office  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 6:04:03 AM

---

Ok, hope you are ok. Please let me know if you need anything.

---

**From:** (b)(6)@...com>  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 at 22:28:57  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Out of office

(b)(3), (b)(6) Kash and (b)(3), (b)(6)

New update guidance from my cardiologist and newest government guidance, along with ODNI leadership/employee notifications, I will be taking WSL this pp at least.

Please keep me posted of any ODNI updates during this unsettling period.

Stay safe!!!

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: (b)(6) Resume and Cover Letter  
**Date:** Friday, March 20, 2020 6:28:24 PM

---

Great, let's touch base next week. Thanks

---

**From:** (b)(6) .com>  
**Date:** Friday, March 20, 2020 at 03:46:25  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: (b)(6) Resume and Cover Letter

Kash -

I submitted the email below and attachments yesterday, per the instructions online. The job number is #28403. Let me know what else you need. Thank you. Be well.

(b)(6)

-----  
(b)(6) .il.com  
(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** (b)(6) .com>  
**Date:** Fri, Mar 20, 2020 at 12:42 AM  
**Subject:** (b)(6) Resume and Cover Letter  
**To:** (b)(3)

Please find attached my resume and cover letter, per the online instructions. I am applying for the role of Director of Communications for the ODNI (job listing #28403). I have requested evaluations from two recent employers, but due to the current business closures I am unable to attach those to my application at this time. I will forward to you as soon as I receive them. Let me know what additional information you require right now. I am happy to provide. Thank you for your kind consideration.

My best,

(b)(6)

-----  
(b)(6) .com  
(b)(6)



**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: (b)(6) Resume and Cover Letter  
**Date:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 9:57:59 AM

---

Thanks (b)(6) yes please apply to the job posting you would like to seek, and then let me know which one that is. Thanks much

kash

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 2:40 AM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** (b)(6) Resume and Cover Letter

Kash -

Thank you for your call earlier today. I appreciate your outreach and am interested in learning more about the role you have in mind. I am happy to provide any additional information you require.

As we discussed, please find attached my resume and a cover letter of application for the DNI Comms Director role which I saw listed online. Do you want me to go ahead and forward this to the email address mentioned on the job posting? Or did you just need me to send it to you? Let me know and I am happy to follow up as directed.

Thanks again for your interest and for your guidance through this process.

My best,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) [.com](#)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Resume  
**Date:** Monday, March 2, 2020 4:01:26 PM  
**Attachments:** [~WRD000.jpg](#)

---

Likewise, thanks much. Let me know what you decide.

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 2, 2020 2:36 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Resume


Kash,

It was a pleasure speaking with you yesterday. Please see attached for my resume.

Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to being in touch soon.

Best regards,

(b)(6)



**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Re: Shout out  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:31:32 PM

---

Ugh, I'm very sorry to hear that. What can I do to assist you going forward?

And yes it was a fun short time together. Thanks for everything.

---

**From:** (b)(6) [REDACTED].com>  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 at 22:03:13  
**To:** (b)(3) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Re: Shout out

I've just been informed Neil Wiley will not retain me for his PE support. I'm disappointed yet I'll be a good soldier.

I'll no doubt not see you before you depart as I will now remain on WSL until we are phased back in.

Thank you for your kindness and ease to help during our very short time together. Stay well.

(b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

On May 13, 2020, at 9:26 PM, (b)(3) [REDACTED] wrote:

Haha, guys been making money off me for years, bout time

---

**From:** (b)(6) [REDACTED].com>  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 at 16:02:10  
**To:** (b)(3) [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Shout out

Look at you - Fox News Trey Gowdy just gave you a shout out.

Sent from my iPhone

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler; (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith; (b)(3), (b)(6) Bradley A Brooker; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh; John B Sherman; Dustin Gard Weiss; Kevin P. Meiners; (b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: UPDATED COB FRI - - HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions  
**Date:** Monday, March 30, 2020 3:45:54 PM

Thanks Ryan and thanks to the team for putting this all together. Ric would like to have the final version to the wh by cob today. I know you all have already done tremendously, but If we can make the last push for the boss, that would be greatly appreciated. Thanks much

Kash

**From:** "Ryan Crumpler" (b)(3)  
**Date:** Monday, March 30, 2020 at 15:36:19  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) "James A Smith" (b)(3) "Bradley A Brooker" (b)(3) "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3) "Corin R Stone" (b)(3) "Deirdre M Walsh" (b)(3), (b)(6) "John B Sherman" (b)(3) "Dustin Gard Weiss" (b)(6) "Kevin P. Meiners" (b)(3), (b)(6) <...@...com>

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) "James A Smith"

**Cc:** (b)(3) (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: UPDATED COB FRI - - HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Colleagues –  
We are close to closing out this questionnaire. OLA just completed incorporating the nominees changes/comments. We still have some gaps. Can you all please see the remaining outstanding items and items for which OLA merged multiple responses (noted by “review changes”) to ensure accuracy? Please note that some of the previously provided responses were replaced by feedback from the nominee. Please provide any inputs or edits via email. Please DO NOT make changes to the questionnaire directly! Thank you again for all your support!

Ryan  
(b)(5)

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 5:17 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; 'Dustin Gard Weiss' ; Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: UPDATED COB FRI - - HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

All –  
Just wanted to say a [huge thank you to each of you and your teams for your help today!](#) It was awesome to see the collective come together! We made monumental progress (~85% completion)



which was incredible given the tight turn and so many working remotely. OLA will continue to collate responses, update the tracker, and de-conflict issues over the weekend and into Monday. I have been informed the new aim point is to have a final draft for WH comment by Monday afternoon. As you can see from the attached we still have a few holes and few places where we received multiple inputs that need to be merged/de-conflicted. Would ask as you are able (likely Monday) help us close these items out so we can do a final legal, classification, and nominee review. Again honored to be part of this team.

Ryan

PS - OLA transmitted our 85% solution to the nominee this afternoon to begin his review and he passed the following:

**From:** (b)(3) Ratcliffe, John

**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 4:44 PM

**To:** Ryan Crumpler

**Cc:** John Ratcliffe; (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Latest

Please express my appreciation and gratitude to everyone involved!

Sent from John Ratcliffe

**From:** Ryan Crumpler

**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 10:54 AM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; Dustin Gard Weiss ; Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** UPDATED DISTRO - - HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

**Importance:** High

All -

To help track questions/responses I have a created a tracker and input (I think) the collective inputs so far but please correct me if I got any of these wrong. Please update as necessary so we can all avoid duplication of effort. Also please use this thread going forward as several folks have been added sporadically. Finally please find attached the questionnaire from Director Coats that might be useful on determining tone, length, etc. Please let me know if you have questions, and again THANK YOU!

Ryan

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 10:05 AM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; Dustin Gard Weiss ; Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(3)

**Subject:** RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 10:02 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; Dustin Gard Weiss ; Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

Happy to refine as necessary and engage on other questions as may be helpful.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 9:52 AM  
**To:** James A Smith ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; Dustin Gard Weiss ; Kevin P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Jim yes (b)(5)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** "James A Smith" (b)(3)  
**Date:** Friday, March 27, 2020 at 9:49:23 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) "Ryan Crumpler" (b)(3) "Bradley A

Brooker" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh" (b)(3) "John B Sherman"  
(b)(3) "Dustin Gard Weiss" (b)(6) .com>, "Kevin P. Meiners"

(b)(3), (b)(6)

"William Evanina"

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3)

Subject: RE: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Thanks! (b)(5)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 9:47 AM

To: Ryan Crumpler ; Bradley A Brooker ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner ; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone ; (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M Walsh ; John B Sherman ; Dustin Gard Weiss ; Kevin  
P. Meiners ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: Re: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Importance: High

Here is what we have tasked out within S&E:

I have reviewed the questions and asked the following Components to immediately review and send answers to LA on the following:

(b)(5)

Cheers,  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent from Email+ secured by MobileIron

----- Original Message -----

From: Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)

Date: Fri, Mar 27, 2020, 8:39 AM

To: Bradley A Brooker (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner"

(b)(3), (b)(6) Corin R Stone

(b)(3), (b)(6) ,Deirdre M Walsh (b)(3) John B Sherman

(b)(3), Dustin Gard Weiss (b)(6) .com>, "Kevin P. Meiners"  
(b)(3), James A Smith (b)(3), (b)(6)

**(b)(3), (b)(6)**

(b)(3), (b)(6) William Evanina (b)(3)

CC: (b)(3)

Subject: HOT HOT HOT: FOR ACTION - DNI Confirmation Prehearing Questions

Colleagues –

We finally received the policy questionnaire I mentioned a couple of weeks ago when asking if you could identify someone to be on standby to assist with drafting responses for the nominee’s review.

**The A/DNI informed me this morning he wants these completed by noon today.** As I mentioned previously, some of these will need to be answered by the candidate himself so we will be working this with him and his team in tandem. Please send out to whomever on your team you think is best to help with responses or anyone I missed in my rush to get this out. Fortunately, all the questions are UNCLASS and answers likely will be too. However, if there is a classified response required we can submit high side answers.

I know that is a tall order with so many people out of the office. Please do what you can and provide answers back to OLA on a rolling basis so we can submit to the nominee for review. Thank you and apologies for this monumental ask! I will be in the office shortly and reachable lowside all day with any questions.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(b)(3)

(b)(3) (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 4:38 PM  
**To:** 'Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC'; Kash Patel (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [AIN] RE: Call from (b)(6)

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

(b)(3) Technical data related to classified networks; no email content.

Thank you, Kash.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

(b)(3) (b)(6)

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Monday, March 09, 2020 4:35 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kash Patel  
**Cc:** (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Call from (b)(6)

Thanks, adding my dni email.

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 3:45 PM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC ; Kash Patel  
**Cc:** (b)(3) (b)(6)

Subject: Call from (b)(6)

Kash ? State Ops just called to say (b)(6) (no last name was given) was trying to reach you. His number is (b)(6) Thanks.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

(b)(3) (b)(6)

**From:** [Kash Patel](#)  
**To:** [Richard Grenell](#)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [AIN] Re: ODNI Schedule for Monday and Public Affairs engagement  
**Date:** Friday, February 21, 2020 7:21:42 PM

---

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

(b)(3) Technical data related to classified networks; no email content.



Me too please. Thanks much  
On Feb 21, 2020, at 18:23, Richard Grenell wrote:

I'd like to receive the alerts.  
On 21. Feb 2020, at 5:57 PM, (b)(6) wrote:

(b)(3)  
Thanks (b)(6) In case Amanda and AMB don't connect right away, please add me to the breaking news alerts distro (if that's how it works). I can monitor while AMB gets settled.

From: (b)(3) (b)(6)  
Date: Friday, February 21, 2020 at 2:47 PM  
To: (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: ODNI Schedule for Monday and Public Affairs engagement

Ambassador, (b)(6) and Kash,

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I wanted to provide a notional Monday schedule for your consideration. We are also working high interest meetings for the rest of the week, which we can review with you on Monday, but at least this will give you an opportunity to manage expectations. Please feel free to provide feedback and we can adjust to meet your needs and preferences. I understand that Kash will be out on Monday-Tuesday and (b)(6) is tentative, but I wanted them to have full visibility and an opportunity to weigh in (I am happy to get them back-briefs on anything needed upon their return).

8:00-8:30 Enroute to (b)(3)  
8:30-8:45 Initial IT Log In  
9:00-9:30 PDB Review w (b)(3) (b)(6) (we are going to try to push

through this quickly to begin to get a rhythm)

10:00-10:30 Mtg w/National Intelligence Managers (this is a bi-weekly mtg with your senior intelligence leaders highlighting priority topics)

11:00-12:00 Ethics Briefing (lawyers providing some administrative guidance for the position/ODNI)

12:00-12:45 Lunch

1:00-1:30 Directors Protective Service (DPS) Update

2:00-2:30 Sync Up w/Deirdre Walsh (she wants to begin reviewing some personnel items and other potentially sensitive topics)

3:00-3:45 5G Deep Dive (rescheduled from Friday)

4:00-5:00 Sr. Staff Mtg (this is the weekly mtg with ODNI senior leaders)

6:00-6:30 Enroute to Residence

We left a few “holes” for you to read, check email, use the facilities, and I will also need to fit in some paperwork processing. Another option during the week is to reserve some time for a quick walk around the building (it may be good to get a feel for the space, to see some of the workforce, and to be seen by the workforce).

I spoke with (b)(6) and we are coordinating on the draft press release and workforce message announcing your arrival at ODNI- we will have that prepared for you soonest.

Finally, I spoke to Amanda Schoch, our head of Strategic Communications and she wanted to see if you were interested in receiving alerts throughout the weekend on breaking media stories. She doesn't want to inundate nor annoy you, but with so many press reports moving quickly, she wanted to be available to provide you with timely support. I would recommend, with your approval, that she reach out to you directly via email to begin that dialogue and see what volume/style of engagement you would like.

I hope you have a restful weekend. I will be available via this email account or my personal account (b)(6). My personal cell phone is (b)(6) (feel free to call or text). I will be local all weekend and flexible to accommodate your needs, so please do not hesitate to reach out.

(b)(3) (b)(6)




**From:** Kash Patel  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [AIN] Re: Thanks team  
**Date:** Saturday, February 22, 2020 7:10:46 PM

---

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

(b)(3) Technical data related to classified networks; no email content.



Thank you  
On Feb 22, 2020, at 17:21, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
wrote:

Kash - you can reach Ryan Crumpler on either of the phones listed below:

(b)(3) (b)(6)

Please let me know if you need anything else.

From: "Kash Patel" >  
Date: Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 2:56:18 PM  
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: Thanks team  
Would you have time for a chat today? If so, best number please. Thanks  
On Feb 22, 2020, at 12:46, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
wrote:

Thank you, Kash. We look forward to helping in any way we can. Safe travels and see you next week. (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3) (b)(6)  
Date: Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 9:49:12 AM  
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) "Deirdre M Walsh" >  
Subject: Fwd: Thanks team

From: "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" >  
Date: Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 9:31:41 AM  
To: (b)(3) (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner" <  
(b)(3) (b)(6)  
(b)(3) (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" >, "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Cc: (b)(6)  
Subject: Thanks team  
Team,

I know we haven't had a chance to sit down at length, but I wanted to reach out and say Thank You. Transitions are always tough, and you and your folks have been total professionals. It is tremendously appreciated. There is such outstanding work being performed by y'all at odni, it is truly humbling. I very much look forward to the time ahead.

For scheduling, I'll be leaving Sunday morning at 8am EST and returning very early Wednesday morning EST. Please know you can reach me via WHSR, both secure and unsecure while I'm on AF1. It is not a bother, call any time with

questions, comments, and updates. I'm here to help you and your teams. Also, this email and cell below will be on at all times. My personal email and cell (b)(6) will be sporadic once I'm wheels up. Look forward to a journey ahead. Thanks much for all you do to safeguard our nation.

PS- I did not mean to exclude anyone, these are the only emails I currently have. Please forward on to your teams.

Regards,

Kash Patel  
Deputy Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism  
(b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 6:56 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Another Ignatius piece

This is why two weeks is too long... this didn't take two hours

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 at 18:40:18  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "Amanda J Schoch" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Another Ignatius piece

Sir -

Ignatius just posted another piece on NCTC. He reached out today and asked to talk to Russ Travers, but NCTC did not make him available or engage with Ignatius for this piece. Ignatius gave our team the impression he would be writing tomorrow, but his timeline appears to have moved up. We'll continue to pursue a WSJ story and Amanda will have an on the record comment for WSJ to share with you in the morning.

## The Trump administration makes another disruptive shake-up in the intelligence community

By  
**David Ignatius**  
Columnist

March 18, 2020 at 5:52 p.m. EDT

The Trump administration is continuing its shake-up of the intelligence community with a potentially disruptive change of leadership at the National Counterterrorism Center, the agency that coordinates government efforts to guard the homeland.

The White House [announced its plan](#) to nominate as NCTC director Christopher Miller, a former Army Special Forces officer who had overseen counterterrorism efforts in the Trump White House before moving to a similar position at the Pentagon.

Miller gets solid marks from former colleagues, but the move has increased fears within the intelligence community that the administration has embarked on a politically motivated campaign against career professionals.

The move came hours after [I reported](#) that Richard Grenell, the acting director of national intelligence, had begun a "review" of the NCTC and was weighing staff cuts there and in other parts of

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Congress created both in 2003 as part of its effort to coordinate intelligence activities after the failure to “connect the dots” that allowed the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.

Miller, if confirmed, would take over from Russell Travers, who has been acting director since the departure of Joseph Maguire last August to become acting DNI. Travers, a widely respected career intelligence officer, was told that he could remain as Miller’s deputy, according to a Senate source who had been briefed by the ODNI leadership.

The timing of the proposed change was surprising, since it came as President Trump and most of the country were [focused on the coronavirus threat](#) that has preoccupied the world. But Grenell and the new team overseeing intelligence apparently couldn’t wait. An intelligence source told me that Miller received a call about 10 p.m. Tuesday from the White House, asking if he would take the job.

Travers didn’t learn about the move until Wednesday morning, when he was briefed by an aide, the intelligence source said. Despite Travers’s long record of service, Grenell apparently didn’t notify him personally in advance that the White House had selected someone else for the top job. This treatment of a career officer will grate among his colleagues.

The move will add to concerns within the U.S. intelligence community, and among its partners abroad, that Trump is continuing a purge of what he views as disloyal subordinates at the ODNI, FBI and other spy agencies. This housecleaning began last July with the departure of DNI Daniel Coats; that was followed by the [resignation in August](#) of his deputy, Sue Gordon, after she was passed over for the top job. Then came the ouster last month of Maguire and his senior deputy, Andrew Hallman. “People in the intelligence community are very nervous because of the uncertainty,” said the intelligence source. The political churn is especially upsetting because it comes at a time when there are so many serious global economic and public health issues that require attention. It’s no time, in other words, for political vendettas.



(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 8:23 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch  
**Subject:** Re: Ignatius column

Rgr, thanks for the readout. Appreciate your efforts

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 at 20:21:29  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "Amanda J Schoch" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Ignatius column

Sorry, I have your other email autopopulating in my phone.

We did know it was coming, though we didn't know it would mention you. Per the A/DNI's direction, last Thursday we gave Ignatius the same statement we gave NYT, and Maura provided a few off the record steers about previous hiring pauses and the studies we mention in the statement. We know he talked to NCTC formers for the piece.

**From:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 at 8:08:03 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "Amanda J Schoch" (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Ignatius column

Thanks, adding my dni email, please use that. Also, did we know this was coming ?

On Mar 17, 2020, at 20:05, (b)(3), (b)(6) wrote:

Kash - Just an FYI, you are mentioned in a Wash Post column that came out tonight:

# Trump loyalists take command of the intelligence community

By  
**David Ignatius**  
Columnist

At a moment when Americans have new appreciation for the government professionals who protect against global threats, the Trump administration is weighing cuts in funding and staff for the National Counterterrorism Center, [created](#) after Sept. 11, 2001, to shield the homeland from attack.

The debate about trimming the NCTC, as it is known, is part of a broader examination of intelligence coordination by Richard Grenell, a Trump loyalist who was [named acting director of national intelligence](#) last month. Grenell replaced Joseph Maguire, a 36-year Navy SEAL who had headed the NCTC before he became [acting director of national intelligence last August](#).

A statement from the DNI's office said Grenell and his staff had begun a "careful review" of past studies that "have identified opportunities to refocus or transfer activities at ODNI to eliminate duplication of work with other agencies." While this review is underway, the statement said, Grenell has imposed a "short-term pause in external hiring" at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its components, such as the NCTC.

This "review" of intelligence-coordinating activities has created concern among intelligence professionals that a campaign is beginning against what President Trump and his loyalists view as a "deep state" in the national security community. Foreign intelligence partners share this worry about a Trump-led campaign to control intelligence.

Fear of a purge increased last July, when Daniel Coats was [pushed out](#) as director of national intelligence. His widely respected deputy, Sue Gordon, [resigned in August](#) after she wasn't tapped to replace Coats. Then came the [departures](#) of Maguire and his chief deputy, Andrew Hallman, last month. All four had angered the White House, in part because they supported the intelligence community's findings that [Russia has been meddling](#) in U.S. politics to benefit Trump.

The debate about trimming the NCTC dates back two years, to a "summer study" launched by Coats. Officials say it has accelerated as a more political team has taken over intelligence policy. This group includes [Michael Ellis](#), named this month to a National Security Council post overseeing intelligence, and [Kashyap Patel](#), Grenell's senior adviser at ODNI. Both formerly worked for Devin Nunes (Calif.), the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee and a passionate Trump supporter. The management issue is complicated. Some critics have long argued that the NCTC duplicates some functions of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. Similar complaints have been made about the larger ODNI structure, which duplicates some of the legal, communications and management functions of the [17 agencies](#) it supervises.

The NCTC's biggest problem right now, officials say, is that it is understaffed. Of its roughly 1,000 employees, about 700 are full-time government workers and 300 are contractors. About 30 percent of the government workers are supposed to be loaned by the CIA and other agencies. But a significant number of these interagency transfer positions are vacant, an NCTC veteran said, weakening the cross-government mission. With Grenell's hiring freeze, and the reluctance of the CIA and other agencies to send transfers, the personnel shortage is becoming more severe.

The lack of adequate staff is felt especially at the NCTC's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, which coordinates counterterrorism policy across government agencies. This directorate was mandated by law when the NCTC was created in 2004 to "connect the dots" within government and avoid the catastrophic intelligence-sharing failure that allowed the terrorist attacks of 9/11.



Another key NCTC function that could be affected by the current squeeze is the modernization of its data collection. The current database, the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or **TIDE**, collects names, passport numbers and other biographical information. The agency is building a broader registry that would include biometric and biographical data. But that work has slowed because of lack of resources, potentially leaving the nation vulnerable.

**Russell Travers**, a widely respected career intelligence officer, has been acting director of the NCTC since Maguire left to become acting DNI last year. Travers formerly served as chief data officer for both the NCTC and ODNI, and he's an expert in the data-management techniques that are part of the NCTC's core mission. A half-dozen intelligence veterans told me it is crucial that Travers remain in his job.

The stakes here are immense. The NCTC receives about 8,000 threat-related messages each day. Officials fear there aren't enough people now to input all that information efficiently or to modernize the system.

"This review is not an effort to purge," said the statement from Grenell's office about his plans. Members of Congress and the administration who care about the nation's security should make sure that promise is kept.

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-loyalists-take-command-of-the-intelligence-community/2020/03/17/72518e3e-6884-11ea-9923-57073adce27c\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-loyalists-take-command-of-the-intelligence-community/2020/03/17/72518e3e-6884-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html)

(b)(3); (b)(6)

**From:** Kash Patel (b)(3); (b)(6) on behalf of Kash Patel  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 22, 2020 3:39 PM  
**To:** Amanda J Schoch  
**Subject:** [AIN] Re: Press Updates

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

(b)(3)

Thank you  
On Feb 22, 2020, at 15:29, Amanda J Schoch wrote:

Yes  
Account: (b)(3) hman  
Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3); (b)(6)  
From: "Kash Patel" >  
Date: Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 9:53:18 AM  
To: "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Subject: Re: Press Updates  
Great, thanks. Do we have an nytimes login we can use?  
On Feb 22, 2020, at 09:49, Amanda J Schoch wrote:

These are new stories that include points from our coveraations from last night.  
On the story for this morning we reached out to DB and are pushing for an update. Will share as soon as I have confirmation of the update. Have not seen it picked up anywhere else and no inquiries on it yet this morning.

Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3); (b)(6)  
From: "Kash Patel" >  
Date: Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 9:32:07 AM  
To: "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Subject: Re: Press Updates  
Thanks amanda, are these updated stories?  
On Feb 22, 2020, at 08:30, Amanda J Schoch wrote:

The AP and NYT stories have posted.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/politics/bernie-sanders-russia.html>  
<https://apnews.com/1398cc440971a3f39d95346a875d3726>

Sincerely, Amanda



Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3); (b)(6)

From: "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Date: Friday, February 21, 2020 at 8:38:33 PM  
To: (b)(3); (b)(6) >  
Cc: (b)(3); (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" <  
(b)(3); (b)(6) "Beth E. Sanner" >, (b)(3); (b)(6)  
Subject: Press Updates  
Ambassador -

Closing the loop from this afternoon's meeting. Shelby and I held off the record calls with the AP and NYT. Both outlets had reached out with concerns that their reporting did not accurately reflect what was actually said during the briefing providing a good opportunity to engage. The conversations were productive. Both outlets plan to write and reflect the conversation we had. We negotiated a few lines on background that they will use. For the NYT - we expect it to be part of a larger story that will include the story on election threats that broke on Sanders getting a briefing today (below) and weave through the events of the week including HPSCI election security briefing. I get the sense that the NYT article is going to be comprehensive and likely not positive but that we were able to correct the record and insert some nuance into the reporting. I will share when it hits.

Additionally flagging a couple of stories for you that hit this afternoon. We did not engage on these and I was taken by the level of detail in the NYT article. Full text follows the links.

WP: Bernie Sanders briefed by U.S. officials that Russia is trying to help his presidential campaign

NYT: Richard Grenell Begins Overhauling Intelligence Office, Prompting Fears of Partisanship

Sincerely,  
  
Amanda

Bernie Sanders briefed by U.S. officials that Russia is trying to help his presidential campaign

By Shane Harris , Ellen Nakashima, Michael Scherer and Sean Sullivan

Feb. 21, 2020 at 4:16 p.m. EST

U.S. officials have told Sen. Bernie Sanders that Russia is attempting to help his presidential campaign as part of an effort to interfere with the Democratic contest, according to people familiar with the matter.

President Trump and lawmakers on Capitol Hill have also been informed about the Russian assistance to the Vermont senator, according to people familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence.

It is not clear what form that Russian assistance has taken. U.S. prosecutors

found a Russian effort in 2016 to use social media to boost Sanders' campaign against Hillary Clinton, part of a broader effort to hurt Clinton, sow dissension in the American electorate and ultimately help elect Donald Trump.

"I don't care, frankly, who Putin wants to be president," Sanders said in a statement to The Washington Post. "My message to Putin is clear: stay out of American elections, and as president I will make sure that you do."

"In 2016, Russia used internet propaganda to sow division in our country, and my understanding is that they are doing it again in 2020. Some of the ugly stuff on the internet attributed to our campaign may well not be coming from real supporters."

A spokesperson for the Sanders campaign declined to comment on the briefing by U.S. officials on Russia's attempts to help the Sanders campaign. .

Sanders's opponents have blamed some of his most vocal online supporters for injecting toxic rhetoric into the primaries. At a Democratic candidates debate in Las Vegas on Wednesday, Sanders indirectly blamed Russia, saying it was possible malign actors were trying to manipulate social media

to inflame divisions among Democrats.

"All of us remember 2016, and what we remember is efforts by Russians and others to try to interfere in our elections and divide us up," Sanders said. "I'm not saying that's happening, but it would not shock me."

Also this week, a senior U.S. intelligence official said that Russia had "developed a preference" for Trump in the 2020 campaign – an assessment that infuriated the president. Trump lambasted his acting intelligence director, Joseph Maguire, and DNI staff for sharing that information with lawmakers, believing that Democrats would use it to hurt Trump in the election.

Despite Trump's skepticism of Russian efforts to damage American democracy, officials in his administration have repeatedly warned that Russia has ongoing plans to interfere in U.S. elections and foster divisions among Americans, part of a strategic goal to undermine U.S. standing in the world. Some analysts believe that the Kremlin's goal is to cause the maximum disruption within the United States, and it throws the support of its hackers and trolls behind candidates based on that goal, not any particular affinity for the persons running.

After Sanders's remarks at the debate, some social media analysts were skeptical of the notion that Russians were already masquerading as the candidate's supporters.

"We have seen no evidence in open sources during this election cycle that an online community of Sanders supporters, known as Bernie bros, were catalyzed by what Sanders suggested could be 'Russian interference,'" said Graham Brookie, director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council, which tracks disinformation on social media sites. "Any candidate or public official casually introducing the possibility of Russian influence without providing any evidence or context creates a specter of interference that makes responding to real interference harder."

It now appears, however, that Sanders may have had a reason to suspect Russia was again injecting itself into the U.S. electoral process, repeating some of what occurred in 2016.

In a February 2018 indictment of 13 Russian individuals and three companies that were alleged to have orchestrated the social media scheme, prosecutors alleged that the group "engaged in operations primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about Hillary Clinton, to denigrate other candidates such as Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, and to support Bernie Sanders and then-candidate Donald Trump."

Prosecutors alleged that in February 2016, while Clinton and Sanders were locked in a bitter battle for the Democratic nomination, an internal memo was circulated at the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency, which prosecutors said led the online effort, instructing their paid online trolls to "use any opportunity to criticize Hillary and the rest (except Sanders and Trump—we support them)."

The Internet Research Agency was bankrolled by a Russian oligarch close to President Vladimir Putin, according to U.S. officials.

Richard Grenell Begins Overhauling Intelligence Office, Prompting Fears of Partisanship

The new acting director of national intelligence also asked to see the facts underlying the finding that Russia is interfering in the 2020 election and favors President Trump's re-election.

Feb. 21, 2020, 4:26 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON — Richard Grenell's tenure as the nation's top intelligence official may be short-lived, but he wasted no time this week starting to shape his team of advisers, ousting his office's No. 2 official — a longtime intelligence officer — and bringing in an expert on Trump conspiracy theories to help lead the agency, according to officials.

Mr. Grenell has also requested the intelligence behind the classified briefing last week before the House Intelligence Committee where officials told lawmakers

that Russia was interfering in November's presidential election and that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia favored President Trump's re-election. The briefing later prompted Mr. Trump's anger as he complained that Democrats would use it against him.

Joseph Maguire, the former acting director of national intelligence, and his deputy, Andrew P. Hallman, resigned on Friday. Mr. Grenell told Mr. Hallman, popular in the office's Liberty Crossing headquarters, that his service was no longer needed, according to two officials. Mr. Hallman, who has worked

in the office or at the C.I.A. for three decades, expressed confidence in his colleagues in a statement but also referred to the "uncertainties that come with change."

The ouster of Mr. Hallman and exit of Mr. Maguire, who also oversaw the National Counterterrorism Center, allowed Mr. Grenell to install his own leadership team.

One of his first hires was Kashyap Patel

, a senior National Security Council staff member and former key aide to Representative Devin Nunes, Republican of California and the former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel will have a mandate to "clean house," CBS News reported, citing a person close to the matter.

Mr. Patel was best known as the lead author of a politically charged memo two years ago that accused F.B.I. and Justice Department leaders of abusing their surveillance powers to spy on a former Trump campaign adviser. The memo was widely criticized as misleading, though an inspector general later found other problems with aspects of the surveillance.

Working with Mr. Nunes, Mr. Patel began what they called Objective Medusa to

examine the F.B.I.'s investigation into whether anyone associated with the Trump campaign conspired with Russia's election interference in 2016.

"I hired him to bust doors down," Mr. Nunes told the author Lee Smith

for his book "The Plot Against the President," which chronicles Mr. Patel's investigations on behalf of the Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel was interviewed extensively in the book, which claims without proof that journalists, diplomats, law enforcement and intelligence officials engaged in a vast plot to undermine Mr. Trump's campaign and then bring him down as president.

As acting director of national intelligence, Mr. Grenell has access to any secrets he may want to review. And he has requested access to information from the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, according to two people familiar with the matter.

The revelations about last week's briefing reignited fears about Russia's continuing efforts to interfere in the American election, including in the Democratic primary races.

During the briefing, which was supposed to focus on coordination between government agencies to fight election interference, not the acts themselves, Republicans challenged the intelligence agencies' conclusion that the Russians continue to favor Mr. Trump. Some officials said the briefing was not meant to be controversial and that intelligence officials intended to simply reiterate what they have been telling Congress for months.

Intelligence officials have already documented instances of the Kremlin trying to influence American politics, namely attempts by Russian military intelligence officers to hack

into the Ukrainian energy company that once employed the son of former Vice President Joseph Biden Jr. Officials want to know whether the breach was an effort to help Mr. Trump, whose efforts to persuade Ukraine to announce investigations into Mr. Biden helped prompt his impeachment.

And during the congressional impeachment hearings, Fiona Hill, a former senior White House official who worked on Russia issues, warned about Moscow's continued efforts

to spread disinformation.

Mr. Trump himself wrote in a January letter

accompanying the administration's national counterintelligence strategy that "Russia remains a significant intelligence threat to United States interests — employing aggressive acts to instigate and exacerbate tensions and instability in the United States, including interfering with the security of our elections."

Intelligence officials were scheduled to brief the full House and Senate on election security on March 10, arrangements that were made weeks ago, accounting to congressional aides.

How long Mr. Grenell will be able to stay as the acting director

is an open question. For him to remain past March 11 — a limit imposed by federal law — Mr. Trump must formally nominate someone else for the director of national intelligence post.

Mr. Trump told reporters late Thursday that he was considering Representative Doug Collins of Georgia, the top Republican on the intelligence committee, but Mr. Collins took himself out of the running the next morning.

Mr. Collins, who helped lead the president's impeachment defense, had

received no advance notice that he was under consideration for the top intelligence post. He saw no reason to entertain a job he did not want, especially as he wages a special election battle for a Senate seat in his home state of Georgia.

"I know the problems in our intelligence community, but this is not a job that interests me at this time," Mr. Collins said on Fox Business . "It's not one that I would accept because I'm running a Senate race."

People close to Mr. Collins have speculated that the president might have been trying to entice Mr. Collins out of that election to tamp down a messy intraparty fight that could cost Republicans control of the seat. Party leaders have converged around Senator Kelly Loeffler since Gov. Brian Kemp of Georgia appointed her to fill the state's vacant Senate seat late last year and have made no secret of their disdain for Mr. Collins's refusal to exit the race.

A nomination to a cabinet-level position would have required Mr. Collins to drop out of the race. But given his lack of intelligence experience and political track record, there was little likelihood the Senate would have confirmed him to the post.

With Mr. Collins off the table, Mr. Trump will need another potential nominee. The White House is considering Pete Hoekstra, the former Republican congressman who is now the American ambassador to the Netherlands, according to three officials.

Whether the Senate would be willing to formally consider Mr. Hoekstra is unclear. But if Mr. Trump were to send a nomination to the Senate it would, under federal law, allow Mr. Grenell to serve for at least another six months.

David E. Sanger contributed reporting from Washington, and Maggie Haberman from New York.

Amanda J. Schoch

Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3); (b)(6)

**From:** Kash Patel (b)(6) on behalf of Kash Patel  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 22, 2020 6:49 AM  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner  
**Subject:** [AIN] Re: Press Updates

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

Thanks beth, appreciate all the effort.  
On Feb 21, 2020, at 23:34, Beth E. Sanner wrote:

Thanks for working this, Amanda. I wish they had come out better. But you and Shelby did your best.

Beth

From: "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Date: Friday, February 21, 2020 at 10:04:19 PM  
To: (b)(3); (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(3); (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" <corin.stone@dni.gov >, "SHELBYLP" >, "Beth E. Sanner" >, (b)(3); (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: Press Updates

The AP and NYT stories have posted.  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/politics/bernie-sanders-russia.html>  
<https://apnews.com/1398cc440971a3f39d95346a875d3726>

Sincerely, Amanda

Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
(b)(3); (b)(6)

From: "Amanda J Schoch" >  
Date: Friday, February 21, 2020 at 8:38:33 PM  
To: (b)(3); (b)(6)  
Cc: (b)(3); (b)(6) "Corin R Stone" <(b)(3); (b)(6)>, "Beth E. Sanner" >, (b)(3); (b)(6)  
Subject: Press Updates  
Ambassador -

Closing the loop from this afternoon's meeting. Shelby and I held off the

record calls with the AP and NYT. Both outlets had reached out with concerns that their reporting did not accurately reflect what was actually said during the briefing providing a good opportunity to engage. The conversations were productive. Both outlets plan to write and reflect the conversation we had. We negotiated a few lines on background that they will use. For the NYT - we expect it to be part of a larger story that will include the story on election threats that broke on Sanders getting a briefing today (below) and weave through the events of the week including HPSCI election security briefing. I get the sense that the NYT article is going to be comprehensive and likely not positive but that we were able to correct the record and insert some nuance into the reporting. I will share when it hits.

Additionally flagging a couple of stories for you that hit this afternoon. We did not engage on these and I was taken by the level of detail in the NYT article. Full text follows the links.

WP: Bernie Sanders briefed by U.S. officials that Russia is trying to help his presidential campaign

NYT: Richard Grenell Begins Overhauling Intelligence Office, Prompting Fears of Partisanship

Sincerely,

Amanda

Bernie Sanders briefed by U.S. officials that Russia is trying to help his presidential campaign

By Shane Harris , Ellen Nakashima, Michael Scherer and Sean Sullivan

Feb. 21, 2020 at 4:16 p.m. EST

U.S. officials have told Sen. Bernie Sanders that Russia is attempting to help his presidential campaign as part of an effort to interfere with the Democratic contest, according to people familiar with the matter.

President Trump and lawmakers on Capitol Hill have also been informed about the Russian assistance to the Vermont senator, according to people familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence.

It is not clear what form that Russian assistance has taken. U.S. prosecutors found a Russian effort in 2016 to use social media to boost Sanders campaign against Hillary Clinton, part of a broader effort to hurt Clinton, sow dissension in the American electorate and ultimately help elect Donald Trump.

"I don't care, frankly, who Putin wants to be president," Sanders said in a statement to The Washington Post. "My message to Putin is clear: stay out of American elections, and as president I will make sure that you do.

"In 2016, Russia used internet propaganda to sow division in our country, and my understanding is that they are doing it again in 2020. Some of the ugly stuff on the internet attributed to our campaign may well not be coming from real supporters."

A spokesperson for the Sanders campaign declined to comment on the briefing by U.S. officials on Russia's attempts to help the Sanders campaign. .

Sanders's opponents have blamed some of his most vocal online supporters for injecting toxic rhetoric into the primaries. At a Democratic Candidates debate in Las Vegas on Wednesday, Sanders indirectly blamed Russia, saying it was possible malign actors were trying to manipulate social media

to inflame divisions among Democrats.

"All of us remember 2016, and what we remember is efforts by Russians and others to try to interfere in our elections and divide us up," Sanders said. "I'm not saying that's happening, but it would not shock me."

Also this week, a senior U.S. intelligence official said that Russia had "developed a preference" for Trump in the 2020 campaign – an assessment that infuriated the president. Trump lambasted his acting intelligence director, Joseph Maguire, and DNI staff for sharing that information with lawmakers, believing that Democrats would use it to hurt Trump in the election.

Despite Trump's skepticism of Russian efforts to damage American democracy, officials in his administration have repeatedly warned that Russia has ongoing plans to interfere in U.S. elections and foster divisions among Americans, part of a strategic goal to undermine U.S. standing in the world. Some analysts believe that the Kremlin's goal is to cause the maximum disruption within the United States, and it throws the support of its hackers and trolls behind candidates based on that goal, not any particular affinity for the persons running.

After Sanders's remarks at the debate, some social media analysts were skeptical of the notion that Russians were already masquerading as the candidate's supporters.

"We have seen no evidence in open sources during this election cycle that an online community of Sanders supporters, known as Bernie bros, were catalyzed by what Sanders suggested could be 'Russian interference,'" said Graham Brookie, director of the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council, which tracks disinformation on social media sites. "Any candidate or public official casually introducing the possibility of Russian influence without providing any evidence or context creates a specter of interference that makes responding to real interference harder."

It now appears, however, that Sanders may have had a reason to suspect Russia was again injecting itself into the U.S. electoral process, repeating some of what occurred in 2016.

In a February 2018 indictment of 13 Russian individuals and three companies that were alleged to have orchestrated the social media scheme, prosecutors alleged that the group "engaged in operations primarily intended to communicate derogatory information about Hillary Clinton, to denigrate other candidates such as Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, and to support Bernie Sanders and then-candidate Donald Trump."

Prosecutors alleged that in February 2016, while Clinton and Sanders were locked in a bitter battle for the Democratic nomination, an internal memo was circulated at the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency, which prosecutors said led the online effort, instructing their paid online trolls to "use any opportunity to criticize Hillary and the rest (except Sanders and Trump—we support them)."

The Internet Research Agency was bankrolled by a Russian oligarch close to President Vladimir Putin, according to U.S. officials.

Richard Grenell Begins Overhauling Intelligence Office, Prompting Fears of Partisanship

The new acting director of national intelligence also asked to see the facts underlying the finding that Russia is interfering in the 2020 election and



Feb. 21, 2020, 4:26 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON — Richard Grenell's tenure as the nation's top intelligence official may be short-lived, but he wasted no time this week starting to shape his team of advisers, ousting his office's No. 2 official — a longtime intelligence officer — and bringing in an expert on Trump conspiracy theories to help lead the agency, according to officials.

Mr. Grenell has also requested the intelligence behind the classified briefing last week before the House Intelligence Committee where officials told lawmakers

that Russia was interfering in November's presidential election and that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia favored President Trump's re-election. The briefing later prompted Mr. Trump's anger as he complained that Democrats would use it against him.

Joseph Maguire, the former acting director of national intelligence, and his deputy, Andrew P. Hallman, resigned on Friday. Mr. Grenell told Mr. Hallman, popular in the office's Liberty Crossing headquarters, that his service was no longer needed, according to two officials. Mr. Hallman, who has worked

in the office or at the C.I.A. for three decades, expressed confidence in his colleagues in a statement but also referred to the "uncertainties that come with change."

The ouster of Mr. Hallman and exit of Mr. Maguire, who also oversaw the National Counterterrorism Center, allowed Mr. Grenell to install his own leadership team.

One of his first hires was Kashyap Patel, a senior National Security Council staff member and former key aide to Representative Devin Nunes, Republican of California and the former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel will have a mandate to "clean house," CBS News reported, citing a person close to the matter.

Mr. Patel was best known as the lead author of a politically charged memo two years ago that accused F.B.I. and Justice Department leaders of abusing their surveillance powers to spy on a former Trump campaign adviser. The memo was widely criticized as misleading, though an inspector general later found other problems with aspects of the surveillance.

Working with Mr. Nunes, Mr. Patel began what they called Objective Medusa to examine the F.B.I.'s investigation into whether anyone associated with the Trump campaign conspired with Russia's election interference in 2016.

"I hired him to bust doors down," Mr. Nunes told the author Lee Smith

for his book "The Plot Against the President," which chronicles Mr. Patel's investigations on behalf of the Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel was interviewed extensively in the book, which claims without proof that journalists, diplomats, law enforcement and intelligence officials engaged in a vast plot to undermine Mr. Trump's campaign and then bring him down as president.

As acting director of national intelligence, Mr. Grenell has access to any secrets he may want to review. And he has requested access to information from the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, according to two people familiar with the matter.

The revelations about last week's briefing reignited fears about Russia's continuing efforts to interfere in the American election, including in the Democratic primary races.

During the briefing, which was supposed to focus on coordination between government agencies to fight election interference, not the acts themselves, Republicans challenged the intelligence agencies' conclusion that the Russians continue to favor Mr. Trump. Some officials said the briefing was not meant to be controversial and that intelligence officials intended to simply reiterate what they have been telling Congress for months.

Intelligence officials have already documented instances of the Kremlin trying to influence American politics, namely attempts by Russian military intelligence officers to hack

into the Ukrainian energy company that once employed the son of former Vice President Joseph Biden Jr. Officials want to know whether the breach was an effort to help Mr. Trump, whose efforts to persuade Ukraine to announce investigations into Mr. Biden helped prompt his impeachment.

And during the congressional impeachment hearings, Fiona Hill, a former senior White House official who worked on Russia issues, warned about Moscow's continued efforts

to spread disinformation.

Mr. Trump himself wrote in a January letter

accompanying the administration's national counterintelligence strategy that "Russia remains a significant intelligence threat to United States interests — employing aggressive acts to instigate and exacerbate tensions and instability in the United States, including interfering with the security of our elections."

Intelligence officials were scheduled to brief the full House and Senate on election security on March 10, arrangements that were made weeks ago, according to congressional aides.

How long Mr. Grenell will be able to stay as the acting director

is an open question. For him to remain past March 11 — a limit imposed by federal law — Mr. Trump must formally nominate someone else for the director of national intelligence post.

Mr. Trump told reporters late Thursday that he was considering Representative Doug Collins of Georgia, the top Republican on the intelligence committee, but Mr. Collins took himself out of the running the next morning.

Mr. Collins, who helped lead the president's impeachment defense, had received no advance notice that he was under consideration for the top intelligence post. He saw no reason to entertain a job he did not want, especially as he wages a special election battle for a Senate seat in his home state of Georgia.

"I know the problems in our intelligence community, but this is not a job that interests me at this time," Mr. Collins said on Fox Business. "It's not one that I would accept because I'm running a Senate race."

People close to Mr. Collins have speculated that the president might have been trying to entice Mr. Collins out of that election to tamp down a messy intraparty fight that could cost Republicans control of the seat. Party leaders have converged around Senator Kelly Loeffler since Gov. Brian Kemp of Georgia appointed her to fill the state's vacant Senate seat late last year and have made no secret of their disdain for Mr. Collins's refusal to exit the race.

A nomination to a cabinet-level position would have required Mr. Collins to drop out of the race. But given his lack of intelligence experience and political track record, there was little likelihood the Senate would have confirmed him to the post.

With Mr. Collins off the table, Mr. Trump will need another potential nominee. The White House is considering Pete Hoekstra, the former Republican congressman who is now the American ambassador to the Netherlands, according to three officials.

Whether the Senate would be willing to formally consider Mr. Hoekstra is unclear. But if Mr. Trump were to send a nomination to the Senate it would, under federal law, allow Mr. Grenell to serve for at least another six months.

David E. Sanger contributed reporting from Washington, and Maggie Haberman from New York.

Amanda J. Schoch

Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3); (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:51 PM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-; (b)(3), (b)(6); Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze  
**Signed By:** (b)(3)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION  
=====

Thank you

---

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6); Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3); Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION  
=====

All --

Just to ensure we are all on the same page, I wanted to highlight that the below analysis is (b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Brad

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

(b)(3)  
[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 10:59 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3); Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6); Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3)

**Subject:** RE: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION  
=====

Deirdre,

Thanks for sending. I'm adding the ADNI to the email string, as he would like to have WH counsel review the opinion prior to meeting to discuss. I'll let you know soonest when he receives feedback and is ready to meet.

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted]

---

**From:** Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 9:23 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION  
=====

(b)(3)  
Per the ADNI's request, below is the written legal opinion regarding implementation of the temporary hiring freeze. Happy to discuss when ADNI is available. I'm around all afternoon if he wants to do a call/TB.

As a reminder to the categories in the email below, here are the number of folks in each category:

Thanks much,  
Deirdre

---

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 06, 2020 1:08 PM  
**To:** Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3)  
**Subject:** Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION  
=====


Deirdre,

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]

(b)(5)



(b)(5)



Brad

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

(b)(3), (b)(6)



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); [William R. Evanina-DNI-](#); [Neil R. Wiley-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Notification/ Briefing Wrap-Up and Task List  
**Date:** Friday, May 15, 2020 10:16:22 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
Bill, I assume you will respond to this (b)(5)

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 6:14 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6);  
William R. Evanina-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Neil R. Wiley-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Beth E.  
Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6); Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-  
(b)(3), (b)(6); John L. Lombardi-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Notification/ Briefing Wrap-Up and Task List

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
A/DNI & Colleagues-

Many thanks for the support for and engagement with today's meeting on Notification and outside threat briefings. This is considerable progress in improving the IC posture in this space.

I think we have a good way forward and wanted to share a list of items I am tracking for Bill et al and welcome adds and clarifications. We are hosting a small interagency group (with the +1s from today)


(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)


- a. Looking to schedule in next two weeks (ETE has contact information for campaigns and will work with Bill on scheduling as materials are prepared)
- b. ETE will work with NIC on drafting briefing TPs. TPs/script will be coordinated with agencies and approved by A/DNI (including unclass 'leave behind')

c. Security/NDAs will be worked with NCSC support

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)




b. Looking to schedule in next two weeks (at latest) (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)


(consideration to May holiday)

c. NIC will develop briefing points. Coordinated with community, approved by A/DNI

(b)(3), (b)(5)




(b)(1), (b)(43), (b)(5)




b. NIC will develop briefing points. Coordinated with community, approved by A/DNI

(b)(3), (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)




Hope this captures all of the do outs from today's session and our ongoing discussions. Again, I think this is a huge step forward... and as always, appreciate the patience and support.

Shelby

Shelby L. Pierson  
Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive

(b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6)



--	--

*Check out the* (b)(3)

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** FW: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 11:25:50 AM  
**Attachments:** (b)(3)

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Call me on (b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:19 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Yes, of course. Please see attached.

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)



---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:12 AM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Can we see them?

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:44 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

We have the (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) transcripts.

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:37 AM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Brad, does ODNI have the transcript (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 15, 2020 6:25 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend


Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Sir –

I received a call this evening from HPSCI Minority Counsel


(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)



Just wanted to give you a heads-up.

Thank you,  
Brad

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel



=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====


Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**Cc:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:36:37 AM

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Removing brad and (b)(3), (b)(6) just us. These transcripts don't seem that bad to me. Thoughts?

---


**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:19 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Yes, of course. Please see attached.

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)



---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:12 AM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)



Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Can we see them?

---

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:44 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

We have the (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) transcripts.

---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:37 AM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Brad, does ODNI have the transcript (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

---

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 15, 2020 6:25 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** An issue Nunes may flag for you this weekend


Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
Sir –

I received a call this evening from HPSCI Minority Counsel

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)



Just wanted to give you a heads-up.

Thank you,  
Brad

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

(b)(3), (b)(6)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
=====

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** FW: Gates Request for A-DNI Approval  
**Date:** Monday, April 20, 2020 12:31:09 PM  
**Attachments:** [02-05-20 Memo NSA Special Dissem Reporting 20-00106 S-NF-SIGNED-FINAL.pdf](#)  
(b)(1), (b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36 [Preview.pdf](#)

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Pls review and lets discuss

---


**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 11:59 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Gates Request for A-DNI Approval

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~


Sir –

I hope you had a safe trip and welcome back.


(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)


A large black rectangular redaction box covering the majority of the page's content.

(b)(1); (b)(3) – 18 USC 798, 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36; (b)(5)

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the majority of the page's content.

RECIPIENTS

(b)(3) P.L. 86-36

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the majority of the page's content.

(b)(3) P.L. 86-36



Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.


Brad

Brad Brooker

Acting General Counsel

Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

(b)(3), (b)(6)



=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

ES 2020-00106

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

SUBJECT: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ EYES ONLY: Notification of Dissemination of Special Sensitive National Security Agency Reporting


REFERENCE: (U) Intelligence Community Directive 112, Congressional Notification, 19 January 2017

(U) The Intelligence Community (IC) takes seriously its obligation to protect the identity of U.S. persons. Dissemination of U.S. person identities is governed by long-established IC element procedures, which generally limit dissemination of U.S. person identities unless the information is necessary to understand the intelligence. Dissemination of Congressional identity information is further governed by Annex A of the Reference (commonly known as the Gates Procedures). Under the Gates Procedures, dissemination of Congressional identity information requires my approval and a subsequent Congressional Notification.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Except in the rarest of circumstances, Congressional identity information is only disseminated in response to a specific request for such information and upon approval by my office. However, there may be rare instances where the National Security Agency (NSA) cannot produce actionable intelligence information without including contextually identifiable information relating to Congressional identities, such as details that inherently reveal the identity of the subject.

~~(S//NF)~~

(b)(1); (b)(3) – 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36; (b)(5)



Classified By: ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) EYES ONLY: Notification of Dissemination of Special Sensitive National Security Agency Reporting

(b)(3) P.L. 86-36; (b)(5)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Nothing in this memorandum shall serve as a substitute for the established processes and approvals necessary for notifications made under the Gates Procedures. For questions concerning Gates, your staff may contact the ODNI's General Counsel at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) For questions concerning this intelligence activity, your staff may contact Ms. Shelby Pierson, the Election Threats Executive, at (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)



Joseph Maguire  
Acting Director of National Intelligence




Date



SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) EYES ONLY: Notification of Dissemination of Special Sensitive  
National Security Agency Reporting

Distribution:

(b)(3) P.L. 86-36



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** FW: SSCI report - volume 4  
**Date:** Monday, April 13, 2020 2:31:25 PM  
**Attachments:** [2020-04-10-ICA-Senate.pdf](#)  
[2020-04-10-ICA-PubRel\\_Redacted.pdf](#)

---

Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
Pls read carefully

---

**From:** Corin R. Stone-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) John L. Lombardi-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Travis M. Burrs-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** SSCI report - volume 4

Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====

Sir, as we discussed at the staff meeting, attached are the two versions of volume 4 of the SSCI’s report. This is the latest volume of a 5-volume Report drafted wholly by the SSCI. It is sent to the IC only for classification review – it is not endorsed by, nor a product of, the IC.

By way of background, over the last two years the SSCI created 5 volumes related to its investigation, covering: Election Security, Social Media, the 2017 IC Assessment (ICA) on Russian Active Measures, Policy Response, and Counterintelligence. Since last June, the IC has reviewed for classification and returned to the SSCI the volumes on Election Security, Social Media and Policy Response. Publicly releasable versions of those three volumes are currently available on the SSCI’s website.

Attached is the IC’s classification review of the 2017 ICA on Russian Active Measures, and we have not yet received Volume 5, on Counterintelligence, which is apparently over 1000 pages long.

We were also originally informed that the SSCI would draft three shorter reports on the DNC hacking, the FBI's CI investigations, and the Steele Dossier, that we would need to review for classification. We have not received those reports, nor have we heard anything about current status of those reports.

With regard specifically to Volume 4 on the ICA:

The attached (b)(1), (b)(3) version will go on (b)(3) the classified network we run that is accessible by Congress and can only be viewed by Members and those staff with appropriate clearances.

The attached publicly releasable version, which is heavily redacted, could be released to the public by the SSCI, as they have done with the prior three volumes.

In the past we have not commented on these reports publicly, as they are not our work product. We typically return these reports to the SSCI as soon as practicable upon completion. Please let us know if you have any questions.

cc line – please chime in if I missed any important information.

Thank you,  
Corin

(Email is Unclassified without attachments)

=====  
Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====  
Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Corin R. Stone-DNI-](#)  
**Cc:** [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#); [John L. Lombardi-DNI-](#); [Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-](#); [Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Travis M. Burrs-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6) [Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: SSCI report - volume 4  
**Date:** Monday, April 13, 2020 2:27:12 PM

Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

I will need time to review this

---

**From:** Corin R. Stone-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) John L. Lombardi-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P.  
Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Travis M. Burrs-DNI-  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** SSCI report - volume 4

Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir, as we discussed at the staff meeting, attached are the two versions of volume 4 of the SSCI’s report. This is the latest volume of a 5-volume Report drafted wholly by the SSCI. It is sent to the IC only for classification review – it is not endorsed by, nor a product of, the IC.

By way of background, over the last two years the SSCI created 5 volumes related to its investigation, covering: Election Security, Social Media, the 2017 IC Assessment (ICA) on Russian Active Measures, Policy Response, and Counterintelligence. Since last June, the IC has reviewed for classification and returned to the SSCI the volumes on Election Security, Social Media and Policy Response. Publicly releasable versions of those three volumes are currently available on the SSCI’s website.

Attached is the IC’s classification review of the 2017 ICA on Russian Active Measures, and we have not yet received Volume 5, on Counterintelligence, which is apparently over 1000 pages long.

We were also originally informed that the SSCI would draft three shorter reports on the DNC hacking, the FBI's CI investigations, and the Steele Dossier, that we would need to review for classification. We have not received those reports, nor have we heard anything about current status of those reports.

With regard specifically to Volume 4 on the ICA:

The attached (b)(1), (b)(3) version will go on (b)(3) the classified network we run that is accessible by Congress and can only be viewed by Members and those staff with appropriate clearances.

The attached publicly releasable version, which is heavily redacted, could be released to the public by the SSCI, as they have done with the prior three volumes.

In the past we have not commented on these reports publicly, as they are not our work product. We typically return these reports to the SSCI as soon as practicable upon completion. Please let us know if you have any questions.

cc line – please chime in if I missed any important information.

Thank you,  
Corin

(Email is Unclassified without attachments)

=====  
Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====  
Classification: (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6) [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [AIN] FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI; May 20, 2020 - [Link to Attachment(s)]  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 1:14:29 PM  
**Attachments:** [Grenell\\_VC Warner 20MAY20 converted.pdf](#)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

I want to respond to this – we must hit back on ridiculous letters to show we wont be manipulated by Congress. [REDACTED]

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)

[REDACTED]

**From:** Travis M. Burrs-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 12:58 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [AIN] FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI; May 20, 2020 - [Link to Attachment(s)]

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 12:48 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [AIN] FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI; May 20, 2020 - [Link to Attachment(s)]

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)



AMB ?

Please see incoming from VC Warner.

Ryan

From: Llewellyn, Nicolette (Intelligence)

Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 1:05 PM

To: Ryan Crumpler ; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI;  
May 20, 2020

Ryan & All,

Please see the attached letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 20, 2020, regarding:  
May 13, 2020, letter sent to Senators Grassley and Johnson.

Confirm receipt and please pass to Acting Director Grenell.

Thank you,

Nicolette Llewellyn

Deputy Clerk & Security Officer

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

(b)(6)



(b)(3)



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED



JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR., MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, COLORADO

# United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

May 20, 2020

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

I write with several requests regarding your May 13, 2020, letter to Senators Charles E. Grassley and Ron Johnson in which you declassified the identities of executive branch officials who exercised their right, consistent with the law, to understand the identity of an individual in specific intelligence reports.

As you are well aware, there are substantial protections built into the process for requesting that identities of U.S. persons be unmasked in intelligence reports, ensuring that the rights of individual Americans are protected and that unmasking requests are granted only to those who need the information in order to protect U.S. national security. As you also know, there are thousands of such requests each year, each subject to the same process before it is approved. Nor, as you know, is this process unique to a single presidential administration. In fact, according to ODNI's annual transparency reports, between 2017 and 2018, the number of unmasked identities jumped from 9,529 in 2017 to 16,721 in 2018 under the Trump administration. In 2019, the total of unmasked identities reached 10,012.

I ask that you provide the Committee with the underlying intelligence reports in which the identity of the individual was "unmasked" to be Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.).

Additionally, I ask you to provide the rationale for declassifying these unmasking requests, given the potential compromise to sources and methods, and that this declassification occurred well short of the timeline required under Executive Order 13526. Just as Sec 1.7 of that Order prohibits over-classification for inappropriate reasons, selective declassification for political purposes undermines the integrity of our system for protecting classified information, undermines the Intelligence Community's credibility, and erodes public trust in institutions critical to protecting the nation.

Therefore, in order to more fully and properly inform the American people of the events surrounding the unmasking of Lt. Gen. Flynn (ret.), I further request that you declassify and make publicly available any intelligence report concerning conversations between Lt. Gen. Flynn (ret.) and Russian Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak. These calls have been the topic of the multiple investigations, trials, and plea agreements concerning General Flynn and merit being in the public domain, consistent with Executive Order, Sec 3.1(d).

Thank you for your kind attention to these requests. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark R. Warner". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman

Cc: General Paul T. Nakasone, Director, National Security Agency

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); [Travis M. Burrs-DNI-](#); [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: [AIN] Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell - [Link to Attachment(s)]  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 9:05:39 AM

=====  
**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

As discussed, please start on this request asap. It makes sense to me.

---

**From:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 6:29 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Travis M. Burrs-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [AIN] Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell - [Link to Attachment(s)]

=====  
**Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

AMB –

Please find attached incoming from Chairman Johnson on unmaskings.

**Ryan**

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted]

---

**From:** Hernandez Jr., Roland (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:59 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Folio, Joe (HSGAC) (b)(6); Flynn-Brown, Joshua (Finance)  
(b)(6); Wittmann, Scott (HSGAC)  
(b)(6); Downey, Brian (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
Berick, David (Finance) (b)(6); Schram, Zachary (HSGAC)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** [AIN] Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell - [Link to Attachment(s)]

**CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED**

(b)(3)  
[Redacted]

(b)(3)



Good evening, Please find attached a signed letter from Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Senate Committee on Finance to Acting Director Grenell.

Please acknowledge receipt of this message and attachment. Thank you.

Best,

Roland Roland Hernandez Staff Assistant U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Ron Johnson Dirksen 340 | Washington, DC 20510

(b)(3)



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-](#); [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#); [James Treadwell-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: (U) Readout: FY21 Budget HPSCI/SSCI Member Briefs  
**Date:** Thursday, March 5, 2020 11:59:46 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Thank you

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:52 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI](#) (b)(3), (b)(6) [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6) [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [James Treadwell-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** (U) Readout: FY21 Budget HPSCI/SSCI Member Briefs

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir – Below is a quick readout of our FY21 NIP Budget engagements with SSCI and HPSCI members. Please let us know if you have any questions.

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
ODNI Legislative Affairs  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

(U//~~FOUO~~) **BLUF:** This week, IC CFO Trey Treadwell briefed SSCI and HPSCI Members on the FY21 PB for the NIP. Deputy IC CFO (b)(3), (b)(6) IC CHCO (b)(3), (b)(6) and Deputy IC CIO (b)(3), (b)(6) attended as back-benchers and provided key SME support on relevant topics. The engagements facilitated a robust discussion of the FY21 PB for the NIP and remained cordial throughout. Members were complimentary of CFO’s responses, and we received very positive feedback from both Members and staff afterward. We have several due-outs for each brief, and will work to

complete over the coming days.

**SSCI**

(U//~~FOUO~~) SSCI member questions focused on [REDACTED]

(b)(3), (b)(5)

~~(S//NF)~~ Of note for ODNI Leadership:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Chairman Burr opened the meeting with a statement of intent to move quickly on the Ratcliffe nomination. He also requested all members keep an open mind and take a meeting with the nominee (if asked). Vice Chairman Warner indicated member concerns from the first nomination announcement remain unaddressed.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Senator Feinstein noted her continued concern about the IC’s inability to produce a satisfactory unclassified report on the Khashooggi affair. Chairman Burr interrupted and tabled discussion of the topic before she asked CFO a question, deferring the matter to the Acting DNI’s response to the most recent Burr/Warner letter on the topic.

• (b)(1), (b)(3)

**HPSCI**

(U//~~FOUO~~) HPSCI member questions focused on [REDACTED]

(b)(3), (b)(5)

(U//~~FOUO~~) Of note for ODNI Leadership:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Chairman Schiff noted concern with leadership changes at the ODNI during his opening statement. He also gave a longer “closing statement” expanding on those remarks, suggesting IC personnel should be on guard against any politicization of their work.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Rep. Wenstrup noted concern with growth in the ODNI topline. Before CFO could explain the investments, Rep. Wenstrup interrupted and moved onto his next question.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Rep. Speier asked several questions concerning Ambassador Grenell’s ability to serve concurrently as both the Acting DNI and the US Ambassador to Germany. CFO explained that he had only interacted with Ambassador Grenell’s in his capacity as the Acting DNI, and that he had no additional insight on how Ambassador Grenell was dividing his time between both roles.

=====

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: ADNI Actions sheet  
**Date:** Sunday, May 24, 2020 10:54:40 AM

---

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted]

yes

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, May 24, 2020 4:23 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** ADNI Actions sheet

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted]

See attached latest version that Travis reviews for numbers accuracy.

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]

---

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

---

Classification: ~~SECRET~~



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#); [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#)  
**Cc:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); (b)(3), (b)(6) [Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-](#); [John L. Lombardi-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Elections  
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 3:40:52 PM

---

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

(b)(1), (b)(3) And I believe we signaled to the Gang that we would do a larger brief on (b)(1), (b)(3) sometime soon. The next gang of 8 should be on (b)(1), (b)(3) We can signal to the those asking that we have done several (b)(1), (b)(3)

---

**From:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 2:32 PM  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) John L. Lombardi-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Elections

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Beth –

Tracking all and agree. Exec branch gets first cut and we'll certainly want to frame well and get full leadership guidance on whatever we present. However, I will say we will be under immense pressure to provide updates and may not have weeks to wait; members have been off the campaign trail and are nervous about November which will translate into bipartisan/bicameral demand for election security information. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Ryan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 1:53 PM  
**To:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) John L. Lombardi-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Elections

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Kash, Shelby, and I discussed a bit of this today. We'd like to get the NICM—NIC is making revisions based on A/DNI's comments as we speak—to the Oversight Committees and Gang of 8, after we get it to the main Executive Branch principals, hopefully later this week.

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(5)

Kash.

Beth

---

**From:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 04, 2020 11:59 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) John L. Lombardi-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Elections

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Ambassador –

Wanted to alert you to the fact (perhaps Shelby already has) that we are getting multiple requests for (b)(1), (b)(3) from the Hill with members returning this week. Specifically we have

been asked for a full SSCI briefing sometime “in the next couple of weeks.” HPSCI has also asked for (b)(1), (b)(3) calls which we have declined due to limited staffing. Leadership in both chambers have also asked for general updates mostly spurred by recent Gates notifications. We are syncing with Shelby’s team and will seek your guidance before engaging but wanted to flag this for you ASAP. I will also be talking to WH Leg and other IC leg offices today and tomorrow so I can update you on what others may have been asked for.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Redacted]

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#); [Nakasone Paul M GEN NSA D USA USA](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Indent Query Unmasking Requests  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 1:26:42 PM

---

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: (b)(3) [Redacted]  
Derived From: [Redacted]  
Declassify On: [Redacted]

=====

Paul, can you move this forward quickly?

---

**From:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 9:52 AM  
**To:** Nakasone Paul M GEN NSA D USA USA (b)(3) P.L. 86-36 [Redacted] Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Indent Query Unmasking Requests

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By: (b)(3) [Redacted]  
Derived From: [Redacted]  
Declassify On: [Redacted]

=====

General,

Thank you for sending over the IDENT Query spreadsheet. Ric and I have reviewed it. [Redacted]

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5) [Redacted]

(b)(1); (b)(3) – 50 USC 3024(i),  
P.L. 86-36; (b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(1), (b)(3) – 50 USC  
3024(i), P.L. 86-36; (b)(5)

Thanks very much.  
Regards,

kash

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Rep. Speier question at briefing yesterday  
**Date:** Thursday, March 5, 2020 11:59:13 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Thank you

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:58 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Rep. Speier question at briefing yesterday

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Just highlighting the below for you from the CFO SSCI/HPSCI briefing yesterday:

- Rep. Speier asked several questions concerning Ambassador Grenell’s ability to serve concurrently as both the Acting DNI and the US Ambassador to Germany. CFO explained that he had only interacted with Ambassador Grenell’s in his capacity as the Acting DNI, and that he had no additional insight on how Ambassador Grenell was dividing his time between both roles.

I spoke to Trey about this, and he said more specifically his answer was he has no insight into how you do your ambassadorial work, but that he has seen no difference between you and other DNIs in terms of scheduling and engagements with the IC.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:52 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-

(b)(3), (b)(6) James Treadwell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** (U) Readout: FY21 Budget HPSCI/SSCI Member Briefs

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

Sir – Below is a quick readout of our FY21 NIP Budget engagements with SSCI and HPSCI members. Please let us know if you have any questions.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ODNI Legislative Affairs

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

(U//~~FOUO~~) **BLUF:** This week, IC CFO Trey Treadwell briefed SSCI and HPSCI Members on the FY21 PB for the NIP. Deputy IC CFO (b)(3), (b)(6) IC CHCO (b)(3), (b)(6) and Deputy IC CIO (b)(3), (b)(6) attended as back-benchers and provided key SME support on relevant topics. The engagements facilitated a robust discussion of the FY21 PB for the NIP and remained cordial throughout. Members were complimentary of CFO’s responses, and we received very positive feedback from both Members and staff afterward. We have several due-outs for each brief, and will work to complete over the coming days.

**SSCI**

(U//~~FOUO~~) SSCI member questions focused on

(b)(3), (b)(5)

(S//NF) Of note for ODNI Leadership:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Chairman Burr opened the meeting with a statement of intent to move quickly on the Ratcliffe nomination. He also requested all members keep an open mind and take a meeting with the nominee (if asked). Vice Chairman Warner indicated member concerns from the first nomination announcement remain unaddressed.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Senator Feinstein noted her continued concern about the IC’s inability to produce a satisfactory unclassified report on the Khashoggi affair. Chairman Burr interrupted and tabled discussion of the topic before she asked CFO a question, deferring the matter to the Acting DNI’s response to the most recent Burr/Warner letter on the topic.
- (b)(1), (b)(3)


(b)(1), (b)(3)



**HPSCI**

(U//~~FOUO~~) HPSCI member questions focused on

(b)(3), (b)(5)



(U//~~FOUO~~) Of note for ODNI Leadership:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Chairman Schiff noted concern with leadership changes at the ODNI during his opening statement. He also gave a longer “closing statement” expanding on those remarks, suggesting IC personnel should be on guard against any politicization of their work.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Rep. Wenstrup noted concern with growth in the ODNI topline. Before CFO could explain the investments, Rep. Wenstrup interrupted and moved onto his next question.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Rep. Speier asked several questions concerning Ambassador Grenell’s ability to serve concurrently as both the Acting DNI and the US Ambassador to Germany. CFO explained that he had only interacted with Ambassador Grenell’s in his capacity as the Acting DNI, and that he had no additional insight on how Ambassador Grenell was dividing his time between both roles.

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** FW: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020  
**Date:** Monday, April 6, 2020 10:48:50 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Get this to Michael ellis. I am calling RCO on it.

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 9:46 AM  
**To:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6); Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Good morning- here is some additional information:

- (b)(3), 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(6)
- DHS procurement and legal will do their own evaluation (sole source and security eval) so (b)(6) could not commit to any timelines or confirmation
- The (b)(1), (b)(3) was a ceiling for ODNI and was based on our November to November estimate as to when we began this process. If DHS procures the same work (which I think they may want to do more- see below), I would think it would be considerably less.
- DHS' had committed (b)(1), (b)(3), 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121 (d)(9); (b)(5)
- DHS is also interested in more tactical/account-level work as well as training neither of which was part of our original scope. Our work was only to be a 2020 election season bridge until ATHENA STARE kicked in. Now that AS is no longer, I believe we'll (interagency) be relooking within the IC and across the USG as to where this goes (you also have players at the Global Engagement Center and I expect additional language in this NDAA asking this work be done elsewhere).
- I did pass along to (b)(6) that Kash had connected with Michael Ellis to make the WH aware

of this possible work and over to DHS to engage any further.

More to come and I'll keep you apprised of any movement. DHS I&A would hope for a June/ July work start.

Shelby

---

**From:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 04, 2020 3:25 PM  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Total contract is (b)(1), (b)(3)

---

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 2:12 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 03, 2020 2:11 PM  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

(b)(1), (b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(6)

---

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, April 03, 2020 2:09 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020  
**Importance:** High

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 03, 2020 1:32 PM  
**To:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

How much is the DHS contract and who is the lead?

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 11:37 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Neil R. Wiley-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** DNI ETE Update- 3 April 2020

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

=====

A/DNI Grenell & Colleagues-

Happy Friday and hope everyone is healthy and safe!

For context, the election community has three main thrusts at this time:

1. Our consistent interest in threats to infrastructure impacting voting activity and influence issues related to specific races, candidates, campaigns, relevant themes including plans & intentions.
2. Understanding the evolving landscape of the way forward on the remaining primaries, conventions and the general election in light of COVID restrictions and how adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities, potentially changing plans & intentions etc.
3. How, and what adversaries are continuing to push influence campaigns designed to undermine confidence in US institutions (including elections, functioning democracy etc.).


Although many of the staffs across the IC are working at lowest staffing, the community is maintaining a good reporting/production posture on threat actors as I'm sure you've seen over the past couple weeks.

**Primaries Way Forward-** CISA has produced two products (attached)- one gives the current laydown of postponed primaries and activities. The second, is a **very** detailed laydown of what it would take to move entirely to a Vote By Mail (VBM) model for the general election. I only include this to illustrate the enormous scale and effort it would take to make this move to entirely VBM. DHS assesses that there will have to be some level of in-person voting given these challenges in November.

- 2 June is the next "mini Super Tuesday" for many postponed primaries. DHS has asked that we look to increased staffing for that day. We will be discussing at our next Election Executive Sync on Wednesday (8 April), staffing opportunities to support this next milestone.

**Social Media Contract-** Per the ODNI discussions and feedback,

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(5)



**Congressional Deliverables-** the draft ODNI response to the Nunes letter from the HPSCI is at the DMI FO for review (inclusive of legal and OLA inputs). Also, we have a rough draft of the HPSCI QFRs in-work and will engage with OLA (b)(1), (b)(3) on their comments back on responses. No real deadline for either deliverable given the government posture. Also, the NSC is maintaining a spreadsheet of



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: DRAFT Notification Materials for Thursday 5/14 Session  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 4:30:36 PM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)  
[BILLS-116s1790enr 6507 converted.pdf](#)  
[3371c Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed converted.pdf](#)

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

(b)(5) Kash, talk to bill E so that he gets a hold of Shelby on this type of stuff. We also need a new lead attorney because this type of stuff coming from brad is not helpful.

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 3:13 PM  
**To:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** William R. Evanina-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: DRAFT Notification Materials for Thursday 5/14 Session

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Please find the actual legislation attached for details.

**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 1:18 PM  
**To:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** William R. Evanina-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: DRAFT Notification Materials for Thursday 5/14 Session


Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir –

As a follow-up to our discussion this morning,

(b)(5)



Brad

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:13 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** William R. Evanina-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Bradley A. Brooker-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** DRAFT Notification Materials for Thursday 5/14 Session

**Classification:** ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

**Classified By:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

A/DNI-

Good evening, please find initial materials developed to support the Principals' meeting on Thursday. Attached this this note:

- Agenda
- TPs
- Draft slides, if you'd like to use them (or not, if you wanted to simply host a discussion at the VTC).

(b)(5)

Perhaps we can review on the margins of tomorrow's meeting on defensive briefings. Welcome questions, comments, edits etc.

Shelby

Shelby L. Pierson  
Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive

(b)(3), (b)(6)



Check out the (b)(3)

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~



## S. 1790—1010

**SEC. 6507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICES.**

(a) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.**—The term “active measures campaign” means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.

(2) **CANDIDATE, ELECTION, AND POLITICAL PARTY.**—The terms “candidate”, “election”, and “political party” have the meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(3) **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP.**—The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

- (A) The majority leader of the Senate.
- (B) The minority leader of the Senate.
- (C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
- (D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

(4) **CYBER INTRUSION.**—The term “cyber intrusion” means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.

(5) **ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.**—The term “electronic election infrastructure” means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:

- (A) The Federal Government.
- (B) A State or local government.
- (C) A political party.
- (D) The election campaign of a candidate.

(6) **FEDERAL OFFICE.**—The term “Federal office” has the meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).

(7) **HIGH CONFIDENCE.**—The term “high confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.

(8) **MODERATE CONFIDENCE.**—The term “moderate confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

(9) **OTHER APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “other appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(b) **DETERMINATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS.**—The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out

## S. 1790—1011

subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine—

(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and

(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.

(c) BRIEFING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:

(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.

(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.

(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.

(D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.

(2) ELECTRONIC ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE BRIEFINGS.—With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.

(3) PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND METHODS.—This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

**SEC. 6508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD ELECTION SECURITY MATTERS.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to election security.

(b) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—The person designated under subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the following:

(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.

United States Code Annotated

Title 50. War and National Defense (Refs & Annos)

Chapter 45. Miscellaneous Intelligence Community Authorities

Subchapter IV. Collection, Analysis, and Sharing of Intelligence

50 U.S.C.A. § 3371c

§ 3371c. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices

Effective: December 20, 2019

[Currentness](#)

**(a) Definitions**

In this section:

**(1) Active measures campaign**

The term “active measures campaign” means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence operation.

**(2) Candidate, election, and political party**

The terms “candidate”, “election”, and “political party” have the meanings given those terms in [section 30101 of Title 52](#).

**(3) Congressional leadership**

The term “congressional leadership” includes the following:

**(A)** The majority leader of the Senate.

**(B)** The minority leader of the Senate.

**(C)** The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

**(D)** The minority leader of the House of Representatives.

**(4) Cyber intrusion**

The term “cyber intrusion” means an electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure, or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information within such infrastructure.

**(5) Electronic election infrastructure**

The term “electronic election infrastructure” means an electronic information system of any of the following that is related to an election for Federal office:

- (A) The Federal Government.
- (B) A State or local government.
- (C) A political party.
- (D) The election campaign of a candidate.

**(6) Federal office**

The term “Federal office” has the meaning given that term in [section 30101 of Title 52](#).

**(7) High confidence**

The term “high confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that the determination is based on high-quality information from multiple sources.

**(8) Moderate confidence**

The term “moderate confidence”, with respect to a determination, means that a determination is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

**(9) Other appropriate congressional committees**

The term “other appropriate congressional committees” means--

- (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
- (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

**(b) Determinations of significant foreign cyber intrusions and active measures campaigns**

The Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine--

- (1) that on or after December 20, 2019, a significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has occurred or is occurring; and
- (2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity.

**(c) Briefing**

**(1) In general**

Not later than 14 days after making a determination under subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and address, at a minimum, the following:

- (A) A description of the significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may be, covered by the determination.
- (B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
- (C) The desirability and feasibility of the public release of information about the cyber intrusion or active measures campaign.
- (D) Any other information such Directors and the Secretary jointly determine appropriate.

**(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings**

With respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be classified and made available only to individuals with appropriate security clearances.

**(3) Protection of sources and methods**

This subsection shall be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

**CREDIT(S)**

(Pub.L. 116-92, Div. E, Title LXV, § 6507, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2207.)

50 U.S.C.A. § 3371c, 50 USCA § 3371c  
Current through P.L. 116-140.

---

End of Document

© 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: 10 March Primaries IC Posture  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 10:58:40 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Keep me posted and thanks for this

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 12:34 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Amanda J.; Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Ryan P.; Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Deirdre M.; Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** 10 March Primaries IC Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir-

As you know, tomorrow, six states will hold primaries tomorrow (Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota and Washington). I've attached the DHS/CISA overview of the state systems as well as the characterization of the federal (CISA) relationship with them. These relationships and information sharing vary by state and can occasionally impact federal incident response.

The IC election teams will be working normal business hours tomorrow and on-call in the evening as polls close. We have a robust interagency phone tree backstopped with the resources of the IC Watch Offices to make sure we're supporting DHS and FBI.

On a related note, per a meeting with the National Guard, Virginia and Illinois have made formal requests to the Department of Defense for additional support in defending their infrastructure. US CYBERCOM will keep us posted on their formal response. At this juncture, I believe there may be a resource restraint in providing further National Guard federal (non-state) dollars to support these requests particularly out of concern that they could not support additional state interest.

We'll provide updates on all issues as tomorrow unfolds... Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 9:17 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- End-of-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Sir-

As the polls continue to close, BLUF, this was a relatively uneventful day for election infrastructure issues, meaning no events/activity that directly impacted voting activity and voting tallies overall. Of the relatively small activity reported today, **none** of it has been initially characterized as nefarious or foreign sponsored. Here are some additional notes for context & detail:

- California and Arkansas noted the most impactful issues with reports of problems with online voter lookup functions and access to voter registration databases. By the 6pm sync, CISA noted that these were attributed to issues with the applications/vendors and not characterized as a denial of service attack. For context, this type of issue would most likely impact voters seeking to know their voting/poll location.

- (b)(7)(E)

[Redacted]



(b)(7)(E)  
[Redacted]

- Unrelated to intel, but notable, impressive engagement by Tennessee to respond to overnight tornados with extended voting hours and sponsoring additional voting locations for displaced persons.

(b)(5)  
[Redacted]

Appreciate the entire team's support today, Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 12:43 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashvap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Amanda J. Schoch-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- Mid-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

Sir-

We have participated in (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) and overall we have NSTR with regard to threat or any related activity impacting voting today. Here are some additional notes:

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

CTIIC is also tracking.

- There has been press reports of poll workers not reporting for duty due to the Covid-19 concerns. DHS shared that they have no reports from election officials of staffing problems at this time. DHS has directed any questions on topic back to state/local health officials. DHS hopes to host a follow-on engagement with HHS and CDC in the coming week or so with election officials to support any concerns in this area.
- The DHS press call at 11 was well attended and went over the allotted time. We expect Acting Secretary Wolf and Director Krebs to have a press conference between 230 and 330 today. DHS shared that there has been a lot of questions about evidence of foreign interference. We have asked that if there are any prepared remarks or Q&A for the press conference that we are standing by to coordinate on any characterizations that touch IC equities.

Our next sessions are at 1500, 1800, 2100- I'll send a summary after our last session pending anything materially changing during the day that we'll flag.

Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 2:11 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir,

(b)(5)

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(1); (b)(3) – 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36; (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

Welcome any questions, comments.

Shelby

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 9:35 AM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

Sir,

Good morning and wanted to give you a sense of the IC's posture for tomorrow:

- (b)(3), (b)(5)

(b)(5)

*RELATED ITEMS:*

(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(5)

We'll keep up comms with the DNI FO if anything significant comes up. Welcome any questions, comments.



**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) DNI MI NIC FO (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) ; Neil R. Wiley-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: CDC/HHS scanning and Disinfo attack on markets  
**Date:** Friday, March 20, 2020 10:16:04 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.png](#)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Any update on who did this?

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 5:46 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Neil R.  
Wiley-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: CDC/HHS scanning and Disinfo attack on markets

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir –

Would like to update you on the two issues we've been following: the activity against the HHS/CDC sites and the potential disinformation campaign. The community continues to look at both events to determine attribution and to see if the events may be linked, but have nothing conclusive yet.

HHS Office of National Security/Intelligence & Analysis Division today confirmed that this was an attack on the HHS network, not CDC or any other sub-agency of HHS. (b)(1), (b)(3)  
(b)(1), (b)(3)

The incident has been mitigated and is considered closed, however

(b)(1), (b)(3) CISA Integrated Operations Coordination Center indicated it may take as long as a week to sift through the network forensic logs related to the incident. We have not heard anything further from FBI. CTIIC's updated Event Report is attached.


Initial responses from the financial sector indicate that there have been many COVID-19-related phishing emails, but no other targeting of the sector personnel. The FSARC found no reflections of disinformation being directed at the sector or its leadership. We still have not heard back from the broader FS-ISAC.

(b)(7)(E) DHS's Malign Influence Task, but we did ensure they both are aware of our interest so they can work together. The Election Security Team has also reached out to their network of influence experts.

We will continue to pulse the community on both these events. Please let me know if you have questions or concerns.

Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6)



---

From (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 6:39 PM

To: Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Neil R. Wiley-

Subject: RE: Disinfo attack on markets


Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231


=====  
Sir –

It is difficult to assess when we will know attribution of either activity, but CISA indicates that it will likely take a few days to determine the attribution of the spike in CDC network traffic. As far as the disinformation issue, we need to acquire additional information pertaining to the actual correspondences in order to be able to make some kind of assessment. The disinformation issue is particularly challenging as it falls between the cybersecurity community and the operational community. We are seeking to pull the threads in both areas. Our current outreach and the feedback we've gotten so in regards to the disinformation issue is included below.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Financial Sector:

~~(S//NF)~~  
(b)(1), (b)(3)  


(U//~~FOUO~~) FBI Outreach:

~~(S//NF)~~ We've reached out to (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)  


(U//~~FOUO~~) DHS Outreach



CISA's Cybersecurity Directorate has not been following this, however, they do have a Malign Information Task Force in the National Risk Management Center and we will follow up with them tomorrow.

(U//~~FOUO~~) We will continue to work across the IC for reflections.

Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 2:58 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Neil R.

Wiley-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Disinfo attack on markets

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
How long (roughly) will it take to understand where the attacks came from?

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 2:54 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Neil R.

Wiley-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Disinfo attack on markets

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
Sir –

A quick update on the way ahead for both the DDS on the CDC website and the disinformation attack on the markets.

Attached is a CTIIC report on the spike in activity affecting the CDC networks. (b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)

In contrast to the low sophistication level of the DDS, the disinformation campaign is a sophisticated, multi-sector effort and is most likely being done by either a national state or sophisticated cyber criminal organization. We are working across the community, there will be a VTC at 1530, to have Departments and Agencies reach out to private sector entities they currently have under contract to see if they can glean additional information about the following:

- Regarding false rumors about the Stafford Act being invoked for a national quarantine, and related market-panicking disinformation, where is this information trending on social media, and does it appear to originate from foreign sources?
- Have we observed any link by foreign cyber and/or influence programs to the activity in question? This would include either originating the information, or attempting to amplify it, or common use of infrastructure, or links to previous campaigns assessed to have a foreign nexus.
- Do we have any reporting for key US adversaries alleging recent planning for economic warfare and/or other efforts to hurt the US economy?
- Have key foreign adversaries' cyber/influence actors previously used targeted text messaging to the US population, or to other target populations?
  - How are these disinformation messages spreading on Reddit and other user-driven sharing sites? Do any of these accounts have foreign links? What other topics do the message originators, if foreign, attempt to influence?

We are also reaching out, via Department of Treasury, to the Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center (FSARC) to share our thoughts and see what their perspective is.

I've been in touch with Iranga Kahangama from NSC Cyber and this is tracking with their thoughts as well.

We will share any feedback and insights when we get them and will continue to press forward.

Thanks,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 12:16 PM

**To:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Disinfo attack on markets

**Classification:** ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**Classified By:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Derived From:** ODNI CG

**Declassify On:** 20451231

=====

This is important – and so I would like an update on what we know, who is responsible, etc.?

---

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 11:36 AM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Richard A. Grenell-

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: RE: Disinfo attack on markets

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

(b)(3),  
(b)(6)

thanks for this!

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

Please formalize and work w/ CTIIC...in other words...do your thing!!

Beth

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 11:19 AM

To: Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: Disinfo attack on markets

Importance: High

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)


Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231


=====

(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3)



(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(5)



(b)(3), (b)(6)



National Intelligence Officer - Cyber  
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

(b)(3), (b)(6)



*"The spice must flow."*

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#); [Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-](#); [Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-](#)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) [Amanda J. Schoch-](#)  
[DNI-](#)(b)(3), (b)(6) [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#)(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-](#)(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fantastic! Thanks, Shelby! (NT) RE: Super Tuesday- End-of-Day Update  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 9:41:55 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Thank you

---

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 7:09 AM  
**To:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-](#)(b)(3), (b)(6) [Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-](#)(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI](#)(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fantastic! Thanks, Shelby! (NT) RE: Super Tuesday- End-of-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 9:17 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) [Amanda J. Schoch-DNI](#)(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- End-of-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 Derived From: ODNI CG  
 Declassify On: 20451231  
 =====

Sir-

As the polls continue to close, BLUF, this was a relatively uneventful day for election infrastructure issues, meaning no events/activity that directly impacted voting activity and voting tallies overall. Of the relatively small activity reported today, **none** of it has been initially characterized as nefarious or foreign sponsored. Here are some additional notes for context & detail:

- California and Arkansas noted the most impactful issues with reports of problems with online voter lookup functions and access to voter registration databases. By the 6pm sync, CISA noted that these were attributed to issues with the applications/vendors and not characterized as a denial of service attack. For context, this type of issue would most likely impact voters seeking to know their voting/poll location.

- (b)(7)(E)  
 -  
 -

- Unrelated to intel, but notable, impressive engagement by Tennessee to respond to overnight tornados with extended voting hours and sponsoring additional voting locations for displaced persons.

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

Appreciate the entire team's support today, Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 12:43 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Amanda J. Schoch-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- Mid-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

Sir-

We have participated in (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) and overall we have NSTR with regard to threat or any related activity impacting voting today. Here are some additional notes:

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

CTIIC is also tracking.

- There has been press reports of poll workers not reporting for duty due to the Covid-19 concerns. DHS shared that they have no reports from election officials of staffing problems at this time. DHS has directed any questions on topic back to state/local health officials. DHS hopes to host a follow-on engagement with HHS and CDC in the coming week or so with

election officials to support any concerns in this area.

- The DHS press call at 11 was well attended and went over the allotted time. We expect Acting Secretary Wolf and Director Krebs to have a press conference between 230 and 330 today. DHS shared that there has been a lot of questions about evidence of foreign interference. We have asked that if there are any prepared remarks or Q&A for the press conference that we are standing by to coordinate on any characterizations that touch IC equities.

Our next sessions are at 1500, 1800, 2100- I'll send a summary after our last session pending anything materially changing during the day that we'll flag.

Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 2:11 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Amanda J. Schoch-DNI (D)(-), (D)(b)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231


=====  
Sir,

(b)(5)


(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



(b)(1); (b)(3) – 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36; (b)(5); (b)(7)(E)



Welcome any questions, comments.

Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 9:35 AM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG


Declassify On: 20451231

=====


Sir,

Good morning and wanted to give you a sense of the IC's posture for tomorrow:

- (b)(3), (b)(5)




- (b)(5)
- 
- 



*RELATED ITEMS:*

(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(5)




We'll keep up comms with the DNI FO if anything significant comes up. Welcome any questions, comments.

Shelby

[Shelby L. Pierson](#)  
[Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive](#)

(b)(3), (b)(6)





Check out th (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Post- 10 March Primaries Update  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 9:25:07 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Lets discuss

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 9:17 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Amanda J. Schoch-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6); Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Post- 10 March Primaries Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231  
=====

Sir-

Just to close the loop on yesterday's primaries; there were no significant issues yesterday and we worked closely with FBI and DHS on their posture. Some issues of note:

(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9)  
This is another good example where federal relationships with private sector can materially support time-dominant/crisis issues if they arise.

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(5)

As always, appreciate the entire team's support, Shelby

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 9:17 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6); Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6); (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- End-of-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~


Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Derived From: ODNI CG  
Declassify On: 20451231

Sir-

As the polls continue to close, BLUF, this was a relatively uneventful day for election infrastructure issues, meaning no events/activity that directly impacted voting activity and voting tallies overall. Of the relatively small activity reported today, **none** of it has been initially characterized as nefarious or foreign sponsored. Here are some additional notes for context & detail:


- California and Arkansas noted the most impactful issues with reports of problems with online voter lookup functions and access to voter registration databases. By the 6pm sync, CISA noted that these were attributed to issues with the applications/vendors and not characterized as a denial of service attack. For context, this type of issue would most likely impact voters seeking to know their voting/poll location.

(b)(7)(E)



- Unrelated to intel, but notable, impressive engagement by Tennessee to respond to overnight tornados with extended voting hours and sponsoring additional voting locations for displaced persons.

(b)(5)



Appreciate the entire team's support today, Shelby

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 12:43 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Super Tuesday- Mid-Day Update

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====



Sir-

We have participated (b)(3), (b)(7)(E) and overall we have NSTR with regard to threat or any related activity impacting voting today. Here are some additional notes:

(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)(E)

CTIIC is also tracking.

- There has been press reports of poll workers not reporting for duty due to the Covid-19 concerns. DHS shared that they have no reports from election officials of staffing problems at this time. DHS has directed any questions on topic back to state/local health officials. DHS hopes to host a follow-on engagement with HHS and CDC in the coming week or so with election officials to support any concerns in this area.
- The DHS press call at 11 was well attended and went over the allotted time. We expect Acting Secretary Wolf and Director Krebs to have a press conference between 230 and 330 today. DHS shared that there has been a lot of questions about evidence of foreign interference. We have asked that if there are any prepared remarks or Q&A for the press conference that we are standing by to coordinate on any characterizations that touch IC equities.

Our next sessions are at 1500, 1800, 2100- I'll send a summary after our last session pending anything materially changing during the day that we'll flag.

Shelby

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 2:11 PM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====  
Sir,

(b)(5)

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)

(b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(3) – 50 USC 3024(i), P.L. 86-36, (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)

Welcome any questions, comments.

Shelby

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-

**Sent:** Monday, March 02, 2020 9:35 AM

**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** FYSA- IC Super Tuesday Posture

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: ODNI CG

Declassify On: 20451231

=====

Sir,

Good morning and wanted to give you a sense of the IC's posture for tomorrow:

- (b)(3), (b)(5)

- (b)(5)
- 
- 

*RELATED ITEMS:*

(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i) & 6 USC 121(d)(9); (b)(5)



**From:** [Richard A. Grenell-DNI-](#)  
**To:** [Beth E. Sanner-DNI-](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Updated Unclass TPs/Election Security  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:01:44 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

You are a rockstar

---

**From:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:01 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Updated Unclass TPs/Election Security

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

Thanks for this.

Heard from my team that the prep went extremely well...Bill is ready. Kash can weigh in. But I think as prepared as we can be. Glad the team rallied!!

---

**From:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 10:57 AM  
**To:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6) Neil R. Wiley-DNI-  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Updated Unclass TPs/Election Security

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

Thanks. All ok.

---

**From:** Shelby L. Pierson-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:38 AM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6) Kashyap P.

Patel-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6) Beth E. Sanner-DNI (b)(3), (b)(6) Neil R. Wiley-DNI-  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Updated Unclass TPs/Election Security  
**Importance:** High

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
 =====

Amb Grenell-

FBI and the NIC had some analytic concerns regarding the unclass TPs after we received edits from the afternoon prep yesterday. Their edits are reflected in the attached document.

The three updated ticks are as follows:

- (U) We expect that the intent of hostile state actors toward the 2020 election will evolve as the election nears.

- (b)(7)(E)
- 


These statements are seen as more clearly aligned to our analysis and what we can account for in the future (knowing this document will have wide dissemination).

We will proceed with pre-pub clearance and work with OLA on the logistics for getting this to the Hill today. Please advise as to whether you have any questions, comments etc.

Best, Shelby

(b)(3), (b)(6)  
[Intelligence Community Election Threats Executive](#)  
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



Check out the (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

June 15, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 23 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000225 – 000409). Upon review, we have determined that 20 of those documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000225 – 000240, 000242, 000324 – 000326, and 000408 – 000409), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The remaining three (3) documents are being withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000241, 000243 – 000323, and 000327 – 000407), pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6).

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed an additional 123 pages concerning item number one of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

Finally, the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury each withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6). The National Security Council withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6). The Central Intelligence Agency withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and (b)(6):



- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, in addition to the aforementioned statute, Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3507.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,



for

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

**From:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**Sent:**

Tuesday, March 10, 2020 3:07 PM

**To:**

(b)(3)

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted] DNI Email

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

In case you need it for your contacts.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 8:35 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Acting DNI

Kash – they have added a PC at the end of the day – so, right now, we have the Acting downtown all day --- participating in mtgs via VTC.

(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 24, 2020 7:40 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Acting Downtown Today

Hi, Kash – just wanted to give you a heads up – since the Intelligence Briefing was canceled for today and moved to tomorrow – the Acting will spend the day downtown. [Redacted] (b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Friday, May 15, 2020 6:01 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted] KASHYAPP; Amanda J Schoch; [redacted]  
Ryan Crumpler; [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(3) [redacted] dniwatch (b)(6)  
**Subject:** (b)(6) A-DNI contact info for the wknd

The A-DNI is at Camp David this weekend, and he won't have easy access to his cell.

If you need to reach him, contact his agent-in-charge [redacted] (b)(3) As a backup, you can also call [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Travis M. Burrs

[redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:58 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; (b)(3) Amanda J Schoch (b)(3)  
**Subject:** A-DNI Letter to HPSCI Chairman re Transcripts (20-00372)  
**Attachments:** 05-04-20\_ODNI Letter\_Response to Chairman Schiff re HPSCI Transcripts\_20-00372\_U.pdf

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

As requested, soft copy of the subject letter is attached.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Executive Secretary and Chief, Executive Secretariat  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

**MAY 04 2020**

The Honorable Adam B. Schiff  
Chairman  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

Chairman Schiff:

On 28 September 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in unanimous and bipartisan fashion, voted to publicly-release 53 transcripts of witness interviews that your committee conducted during its investigation into foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election. In advance of this public release, in November 2018, your Committee transmitted the 53 transcripts, totaling over 6,000 pages, to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for the purpose of an interagency classification review to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of classified information.


The ODNI-supervised interagency review of 43 (of the original 53) transcripts was completed in June 2019. As of today, the interagency review of the remaining ten transcripts has been completed, as well. Additionally, in your letter of 26 March 2019, you also requested the ODNI, "under no circumstances...share HPSCI transcripts with the White House, President Trump, or any persons associated with the White House or President." Pursuant to your guidance, these transcripts have not been shared with the White House.

All of the transcripts, with our required redactions, can be released to the public without any concerns of disclosing classified material. In the interests of transparency and accountability, I urge you to honor your previous public statements, and your Committee's unanimous vote on this matter, to release all 53 cleared transcripts to all Members of Congress and the American public as soon as possible. I am also willing to release the transcripts directly from the ODNI, as to ensure we comply with the unanimous and bipartisan vote to release the transcripts.

Thank you for affording the Intelligence Community the opportunity to review the transcripts. If you have any questions, your staff may contact Legislative Affairs at

(b)(3)

Sincerely,



Richard A. Grenell  
Acting Director

Cc:

The Honorable Devin Nunes

UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 7:58 PM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker; KASHYAPP; Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** All set for Tuesday

I've notified DPS, Protocol, Security, HR, and CIO. Everybody will do their part to support the swearing in on Tuesday and EOD both Ratcliffe and Carmack effective 26 May.

**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 6:36 PM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** Can you call me?

I don't have your number

[Redacted]

(b)(3)



[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:14 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** (b)(3) [Redacted] ODNI  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) [Redacted] ODNI

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
[Redacted]  
*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*  
[Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**Full Name:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**Last Name:**

**First Name:**

**Job Title:**

Executive Assistant to ADNI

**Company:**

ODNI

**Business:**

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

**Home:**

**Mobile:**

**E-mail:**

**E-mail Display As:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 21, 2020 5:26 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Automatic reply: Calendar/Schedule

I will respond to your message upon my return. If you need to reach the DNI front office, please contact [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

If you need to reach Kash Patel, please contact him [Redacted] (b)(3)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 6, 2020 4:31 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Automatic reply: Meeting Request: TOC

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 15, 2020 7:29 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Automatic reply: Space blanket (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

I am out of the office and not monitoring this email account. Please call [redacted] with any time critical issues.

Thank you,  
[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 9:57 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Beth Sanner - ODNI  
**Attachments:** Beth Sanner - ODNI

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted]  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Full Name:** Beth Sanner  
**Last Name:** Sanner  
**First Name:** Beth  
**Job Title:** DMI  
**Company:** ODNI

**Business:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Home:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Mobile:** [Redacted]

**Email:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Email Display As:** Beth E. Sanner

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**Sent:**  
**To:**  
**Subject:**

Friday, February 28, 2020 10:54 AM  
KASHYAPP  
Beth's email

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Thank You, (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Kash Patel [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 12:27 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [Redacted] Resume.docx  
**Attachments:** [Redacted] Resume.docx  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 8:59 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: DNI Nominee SSCI Questionnaire  
**Attachments:** Ratcliffe Policy Questionnaire 4-8-20.docx

**From:** Parker, Nathaniel A. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 5:17 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Cc:** Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO ; Swonger, Amy H. EOP/WHO ; Telle, Adam R. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** DNI Nominee SSCI Questionnaire

Ryan,

Attached is final.

Thank you,  
Nate

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
From: (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:48 PM  
To: KASHYAPP  
Subject: FW: MEETING re: [Redacted] TODAY @1PM (b)(5)

Kash – here is the new email. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
Executive Assistant to the DNI  
[Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(3)  
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2020 12:44 PM (b)(6)  
To: [Redacted] 'Loyet, Cynthia J'; [Redacted] (b)(6) [Redacted]  
(b)(6) [Redacted]@treasury.gov; [Redacted]@treasury.gov; KARENS7; Thurston, Eliza C.  
EOP/WHO; Hutchinson, Cassidy J. EOP/WHO; BRANDYSL; Director-Staff; Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC; Lair, Kate E.  
EOP/WHO; Claver-Carone, Mauricio J. EOP/NSC [Redacted]@treasury.gov;  
(b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Cc: DL NSC NSA FO Staff; DL NSC WHSR Watchfloor  
Subject: MEETING re: [Redacted] TODAY @1PM (b)(5)

Updated guidance:

(b)(5)  
This will now be a [Redacted] in-person meeting in the White House Situation Room at 1:00PM chaired by DNSA Pottinger.

- Requested Participants:  
DOD (Esper)  
DOD (Milley)  
State (Pompeo)  
DOJ (Barr)  
DNI (Grenell)  
CIA (Haspel)  
Treasury (Mnuchin)  
WH Chief of Staff  
WH Counsel (Cipollone)  
NSC Legal (Eisenberg)  
NSC WHA (Claver-Carone)

Please confirm [Redacted] participation.  
(b)(5)

From: Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(3)  
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 10:59 AM (b)(6)  
To: [Redacted] 'Loyet, Cynthia J'; [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)@treasury.gov'; [Redacted]@treasury.gov'; [Redacted] Thurston,  
1 (b)(6) (b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

Eliza C. EOP/WHO ; Hutchinson, Cassidy J. EOP/WHO [redacted] Director-Staff ; Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC ; Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO ; Claver-Carone, Mauricio J. EOP/NSC (b)(3)  
Cc: DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; DL NSC WHSR Watchfloor (b)(6)  
Subject: SECURE CALL re: [redacted] TODAY @1PM (b)(5)

Good morning, (b)(5)

[redacted] TODAY, May 5<sup>th</sup> at 1:00 p.m.  
Please confirm participation to the NSC Front Office Staff [redacted] ASAP – no additional attendees.

Requested Participants:

- DOD (Milley)
- State (Biegun)
- DOD (Norquist)
- DNI (Grenell)
- CIA (Haspel or Bishop)
- Treasury (Muzinich)
- WH Chief of Staff
- WH Counsel (Cipollone)
- NSC Legal (Eisenberg)
- NSC WHA (Claver-Carone)

(b)(6)

Please reach out to the White House Situation Room [redacted] or [redacted] to coordinate comms.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Thank you,

**James Skinner**  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
Desk [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Ryan Crumpler  
Wednesday, April 8, 2020 8:53 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Questionnaire  
**Attachments:** Ratcliffe Policy Questionnaire 4-8-20.docx

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 5, 2020 11:07 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_  
**Cc:** (b)(3) \_\_\_\_\_; Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; Stephanie L Sherline  
**Subject:** FW: SECURE CALL re: \_\_\_\_\_(b)(5) TODAY @1PM

(b)(3) Nicole – the Acting will be at DIA for that Hayman call – is Beth able to participate in this call?

(b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_

Executive Assistant to the DNI  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 05, 2020 10:50 AM  
**To:** \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6); 'Loyet, Cynthia J'; \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6); \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6)@treasury.gov; \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6)@treasury.gov; \_\_\_\_\_; Thurston, Eliza C. EOP/WHO ; Hutchinson, Cassidy J. EOP/WHO ; \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6) Director-Staff ; Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC ; Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO ; Claver-Carone, Mauricio J. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
**Cc:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; DL NSC WHSR Watchfloor (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** SECURE CALL re: \_\_\_\_\_(b)(5) TODAY @1PM (b)(3)

Good morning, \_\_\_\_\_(b)(5)

\_\_\_\_\_ TODAY, May 5<sup>th</sup> at 1:00 p.m.  
Please confirm participation to the NSC Front Office Staff \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6) ASAP – no additional attendees.

- Requested Participants:
- DOD (Milley)
  - State (Biegun)
  - DOD (Norquist)
  - DNI (Grenell)
  - CIA (Haspel or Bishop)
  - Treasury (Muzinich)
  - WH Chief of Staff
  - WH Counsel (Cipollone)
  - NSC Legal (Eisenberg)
  - NSC WHA (Claver-Carone)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

Please reach out to the White House Situation Room \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6) or \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6) to coordinate comms.

Thank you,

**James Skinner**  
 Office of the National Security Advisor  
 Desk: \_\_\_\_\_(b)(6)

Cell:   
(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

February 21, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 48 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request. Upon review, we have determined that 27 documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000056 – 000103), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The remaining 21 documents are being withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000103 – 000157), pursuant to the above FOIA exemptions.

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 225 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

Finally, the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security each withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6). The Department of Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget each withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6).



If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

*for*  


Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

# **Enclosure 1**

28 APR 2021

---

**From:** Jason Leopold <jasonleopold@gmail.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 27, 2021 2:48 PM  
**To:** DNI-FOIA  
**Subject:** Request for records under the Freedom of Information Act

This is a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. This request should be considered under both statutes to maximize the release of records.

#### REQUESTER INFORMATION

Name: Jason Leopold  
Affiliation: Senior Investigative Reporter/BuzzFeed News  
Address: 1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210  
Email: [jasonleopold@gmail.com](mailto:jasonleopold@gmail.com)  
Phone: 213-270-4334

#### RECORDS SOUGHT

I request disclosure from the Office of Director of National Intelligence the following records:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Reasonably Foreseeable Harm. The FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 amended the FOIA as follows (5 USC 552(a)(8)):

(A) An agency shall—

(i) withhold information under this section only if—

(I) the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption described in subsection (b); or

(II) disclosure is prohibited by law; and

(ii) (I) consider whether partial disclosure of information is possible whenever the agency determines that a full disclosure of a requested record is not possible; and

(II) take reasonable steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt information. . . .

DNI should not fail to meet the requirements of Section 552(a)(8) when processing my request and release responsive records to me in full or at least in part.

#### INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING SEARCH

1. Request for Public Records:

Please search for any records even if they are already publicly available.

2. Request for Electronic and Paper/Manual Searches:

I request that searches of all electronic and paper/manual indices, filing systems, and locations for any and all records relating or referring to the subject of my request be conducted. I further request that the agencies conduct a search of its "soft files" as well as files in its locked cabinets.

3. Request regarding Photographs and other Visual Materials:

I request that any photographs or other visual materials responsive to my request be released to me in their original or comparable forms, quality, and resolution. For example, if a photograph was taken digitally, or if the agencies maintains a photograph digitally, I request disclosure of the original digital image file, not a reduced resolution version of that image file nor a printout and scan of that image file. Likewise, if a photograph was originally taken as a color photograph, I request disclosure of that photograph as a color image, not a black and white image. Please contact me for any clarification on this point.

4. Request for Duplicate Pages:

I request disclosure of any and all supposedly "duplicate" pages. Scholars analyze records not only for the information available on any given page, but also for the relationships between that information and information on pages surrounding it. As such, though certain pages may have been previously released to me, the existence of those pages within new context renders them functionally new pages. As such, the only way to properly analyze released information is to analyze that information within its proper context. Therefore, I request disclosure of all "duplicate" pages.

5. Request to Search Emails:

Please search for emails relating to the subject matter of my request.

6. Request for Search of Records Transferred to Other Agencies:

I request that in conducting its search, the agencies disclose releasable records even if they are available publicly through other sources outside the agencies, such as NARA.

FORMAT

I request that any releases stemming from this request be provided to me in digital format (soft-copy) on a compact disk or other like media.

FEE CATEGORY AND REQUEST FOR A FEE WAIVER

I am the senior investigative reporter for BuzzFeed News and formerly senior investigative reporter and on-air correspondent for VICE News. Additionally, my reporting has been published in The Guardian, The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, Salon, CBS Marketwatch, The Los Angeles Times, The Nation, Truthout, Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera America.

I request a complete waiver of all search and duplication fees. If my request for a waiver is denied, I request that I be considered a member of the news media for fee purposes.

Under 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(A)(iii), "Documents shall be furnished without any charge ... if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." Disclosure in this case meets the statutory criteria, as the records sought to detail the operations and activities of government. This request is also not primarily in my commercial request, as I am seeking the records as a journalist to analyze and freely release to members of the public.

If I am not granted a complete fee waiver, I request to be considered a member of the news media for fee purposes. I am willing to pay all reasonable duplication expenses incurred in processing this FOIA request.

I will appeal any denial of my request for a waiver administratively and to the courts if necessary.--

--

## **BuzzFeed News**

Jason Leopold | **BuzzFeed News** | [Senior Investigative Reporter](#) | (213) 270-4334 | [@jasonleopold](#)  
6824 Lexington Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90038

Signal: (213) 270-4334 and (646) 379-1975

Send me documents and tips, anonymously and securely: [tips.buzzfeed.com](https://tips.buzzfeed.com)

[My personal PGP](#)

My BuzzFeed PGP fingerprint: 46DB 0712 284B 8C6E 40FF 7A1B D3CD 5720 694B 16F0

# **Enclosure 2**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) Amanda J Schoch  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Friday, May 15, 2020 2:43 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Background information on NCTC changes to use with Reporters

Sir –

We worked with NCTC and built out the below to use to shape stories and answer questions after the NCTC announcement goes out. Let me know if you have any concerns with what is below or would like us to foot-stomp anything as we field calls after the release goes out. Lora is comfortable with us using the quotes attributable to her if they help as we respond the inquiries.

Thanks,  
Amanda

**Quotes:**

“We are facing a time in our nation’s history where the threat picture is far broader than terrorism, and the IC needs to shift resources to address a wide range of sophisticated adversaries,” said Shiao.

“This reality does not alter the no-fail mission before us at NCTC, but it adds a driving impetus to be as smart and efficient as possible with our resources. In consultation with our entire NCTC senior leadership team, Executive Director Clare Linkins and I will be shifting some elements within NCTC to address previous studies and recommendations, and we will work in collaboration with our IC partners to best position NCTC and the wider CT community for the future.”

“Combatting violent extremism remains one of the nation’s top challenges, one which NCTC is uniquely positioned to support by virtue of its post 9/11 mandate to bridge the gap between foreign and domestic intelligence. This access allows us to provide dynamic support to customers within and beyond the IC, including state, local, tribal, foreign, and private sector partners.”

**General Background Points**

- These were recommendations made by the entire NCTC leadership team to the A/DNI
- These changes are based on multiple studies over the last few years
- The goal is to ensure that NCTC can be laser focused on what it is uniquely postured to do – bridge the gap between foreign and domestic CT intelligence
- This will cumulatively reduce NCTC by about 15%
- Some vacant positions will be eliminated or realigned, but no one on staff is losing their job or being sent back early from their current JDAs
  - Detailees are a critical component of the NCTC workforce. The center is working with its partners to make sure that it has the right balance of skills and expertise.
- Changes will be implemented this summer

**Explanations of the changes on background** (b)(3)

- DSOP will be smaller
  - Missions will be realigned to [Redacted] to drive efficiently and eliminate redundancy
  - (b)(3) ○ The [Redacted] mission will be realigned to the [Redacted] and collapsed back to its original intent with a focus on better supporting IC partners (b)(3)

(b)(3)

- [redacted] mission will be enhanced with expertise in identity discovery, entity resolution, and vetting in support of protecting the nation from foreign terrorist entry and to support the National vetting enterprise
  - Increase will come from realignment of positions currently dedicated to tactical analysis in the [redacted] (b)(3)
- Shared services – having ODNI support functions support the Center vice having organic support within the center
- Working with partners to ensure that there is a ready ability to surge CT resources in response to a threat or event.

**Potential big picture questions:**

Was Congress properly notified of this announcement?

A - ODNI notified Congressional oversight committees in advance of this announcement.

Is this the end of the staffing changes that A/DNI is planning to make?

A - A/DNI and the ODNI leadership team is embracing reforms to improve mission outcomes, serve the country and better support the work of the IC. Reforms will be implemented when warranted.

When is A/DNI planning to depart?

A- A/DNI Grenell has said repeatedly he is not in the job permanently and looks forward to the Senate's action on Congressman Ratcliffe's nomination.

Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[redacted]

(b)(3)

# **Enclosure 3**



[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Glawe, David [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Brian Murphy Senior DHS Detailee to ODNI

Hello Kash:

I hope you and Ambassador Grenell are staying healthy-we are in a challenging times.

I wanted to touch base if there is anything else we need to do on Brian's detailee to the ODNI.

My understanding the staff is working the final draft MOU and I am ready to sign off from my end.

Please let me know if I can assist on any matters.

Please stay healthy-Dave

David J. Glawe  
Under Secretary & Chief Intelligence Officer  
Department of Homeland Security  
Office of Intelligence and Analysis

# **Enclosure 4**

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)

[Redacted]

@hq.dhs.gov>

(b)(6)

**Sent:**

Monday, March 30, 2020 8:54 AM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Call

Kash

Please let me know when you may have a few minutes to chat.

Thanks

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Principal Deputy Under Secretary

DHS

O

C

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

# **Enclosure 5**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** (b)(3) [Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov> (b)(6)  
**To:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 11:28 AM  
**Subject:** KASHYAPP  
Characteristics

Kash,

Can you provide a list of characteristics of the position your looking for (including rank, i.e., GS15, SES, etc?). It would help us here.

Even just a quick email would help.

Ken Cuccinelli II  
Acting Deputy Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security



**Homeland  
Security**

# **Enclosure 6**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
From: (b)(6)

[Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov> (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:49 AM

To: KASHYAPP

Subject: China PPE and COVID

Attachments: book\_(U--FOUO) RA - Trade Data Provides Indicators China Stockpiled Medical Supplies in January.pdf

Kash

Trade practices from China regarding the hoarding of PPE prior to announcing COVID could be of interest

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Principal Deputy Under Secretary

DHS

C [Redacted]  
C [Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

# **Enclosure 7**



[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 5:27 PM

**To:** KASHYAPP

**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner

**Subject:** Compartmentation 100-Day Plan

**Attachments:** [Redacted].pdf

(b)(5)

Hi Kash,

[Redacted] (b)(5)

[Redacted] As you can probably tell, I'm really excited about this.

The plan starts with what we talked about [Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(5)

[Redacted] The team would be busy - but this is do-able.

Please let me know your thoughts on the attached. Happy to talk on the phone or trek back to DC to discuss.

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

# **Enclosure 8**

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:**

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**Sent:**

Monday, March 16, 2020 1:01 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

(b)(6)

Confirming number for today's call with A/S Billingslea

Please dial [Redacted] and they will connect you with A/S Billingslea  
Feel free to reach out should there any issues with connecting!

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary  
Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes  
U.S. Department of the Treasury

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

# **Enclosure 9**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:**

Stigall, Dan (NSD)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**Sent:**

Friday, February 28, 2020 3:15 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

CV\_Stigall\_8\_2019.pdf

**Attachments:**

CV\_Stigall\_8\_2019.pdf; ATT00001.txt

# **Enclosure 10**

**DAN E. STIGALL**  
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**Professional Experience:**

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
WASHINGTON DC  
November 2009 - present

*Counselor for International Affairs*  
Office of the Assistant Attorney General  
National Security Division  
February 2019 – present

Serves as Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division (NSD) on matters relating to international affairs. Supports international aspects of NSD investigations, prosecutions, and policy matters. Coordinates and integrates NSD's international activities with broader U.S. and DOJ international efforts. Coordinates across NSD to shape global engagements and works closely with foreign partners and international organizations on matters relating to the work of NSD. Builds and maintains productive relationships with foreign partners and international organizations with whom NSD regularly engages on national security issues. Provides advice and counsel to other NSD leadership on international matters as needed.

*Director for Counterterrorism*  
National Security Council  
The White House  
November 2017 – February 2019

Detailed to the Counterterrorism Directorate of the National Security Council. Served as lead author and interagency coordinator for the United States National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and lead coordinator for U.S. policy regarding detained terrorists. Also responsible for the formulation, coordination, and implementation of various additional aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy. Worked with interagency colleagues to plan, direct, coordinate, and analyze the effects of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including the integration and synchronization of instruments of national power to address complex and rapidly evolving challenges. Assisted the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and other senior leaders in developing and advancing U.S. counterterrorism policies and objectives.

*Trial Attorney*  
Counterterrorism Section  
National Security Division  
November 2016 – November 2017

Assisted in prosecution and litigation of counterterrorism cases for the U.S. Department of Justice. Worked with agents from the FBI, the Regional Antiterrorism Coordinators within DOJ, and the Anti-

Terrorism Advisory Council Coordinators and terrorism prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys' Offices throughout the country to support investigations, review intelligence, and assist in the resulting criminal litigation. Developed policies, plans, operations and initiatives to promote the enforcement of terrorism statutes.

*Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General (Counterterrorism Policy)*  
Office of the Assistant Attorney General  
National Security Division  
November 2015 – November 2016

Responsible for providing advice to senior leaders in U.S. government – including the National Security Council (NSC) and senior leaders in the Department of Justice – regarding a broad array of issues related to counterterrorism law and policy. Represented the Department of Justice at meetings of the NSC Counterterrorism Security Group. Responsible for facilitating a wide variety of law enforcement and management initiatives for the National Security Division at the direction and under the supervision of the Assistant Attorney General and other senior leaders.

*Trial Attorney & Coordinator for International Security Affairs*  
Criminal Division  
Office of International Affairs  
November 2009 – November 2015<sup>1</sup>

Responsible for facilitating formal law enforcement cooperation between the United States and countries throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Coordinated with U.S. prosecutors and international counterparts on issues related to mutual legal assistance and fugitive return. Assisted in litigation of issues relating to international law, extradition, and mutual legal assistance. Responsible for management of the OIA Global Central Authorities Initiative and coordinating a variety of issues related to national security for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.

UNITED STATES ARMY  
EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, UNITED STATES  
Judge Advocate (JAG) 2001 – 2009

Served in various assignments in Europe, the Middle East, and throughout the United States, including extensive service as a military prosecutor. Also served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia and in the Western District of Kentucky. Prosecuted a wide array of offenses, ranging from larceny to war crimes – both at courts-martial and in U.S. District Court.

Representative military assignments included the following:

- *Special Assistant U.S. Attorney (Civil)*, Eastern District of Virginia
- *Litigation Attorney*, Civilian Personnel Branch, U.S. Army Litigation Division
- *Special Assistant US Attorney (Felony and Misdemeanor)*, Western District of Kentucky
- *Trial Counsel (Military Prosecutor)*, 1st Infantry Division, Germany

---

<sup>1</sup> Also served (from February – September 2014) as Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, providing advice to executive leadership in the Criminal Division and other senior leaders in the Department of Justice regarding a broad array of issues related to international law and policy.



**Education:**

LL.M., 2009 (with highest honors)  
International & Comparative Law  
The George Washington University Law School  
Washington D.C.

J.D., 2000  
Louisiana State University  
Paul M. Hebert Law Center  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

B.A., 1996  
Major: English Literature / Minor: French  
Louisiana State University  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

**Notable Awards:**

Civilian awards include the Assistant Attorney General (National Security Division) Award (2013) and the ABA Outstanding Young Military Service Lawyer Award (2004). Military awards include the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, and the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal.

**Relevant Professional Training:**

Professional training includes an array of U.S. government training relating to law, national security, and international affairs, including the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course; the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course; the U.S. Department of Justice Basic Trial Advocacy Course; the U.S. Army Federal Civil Litigation Course; the U.S. Army Criminal Law Advocacy Course; and the U.S. Army Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course.

**Miscellaneous:**

- Bar Membership: Louisiana (Bar No.: 27097)
- Foreign Languages: French (advanced)
- Clearance:
- Continued Military Service: Currently a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army JAG Corps Reserves and assigned as an attorney for the Defense Logistics Agency.

(b)(6)

**LIST OF PUBLICATIONS:**

Books:

THE SANTILLANA CODES: THE CIVIL CODES OF TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND MAURITANIA (2017)

COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE COMPARATIVE LAW OF INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION (2009)

Articles in Law Reviews and Journals:

*The Syrian Detention Conundrum: International and Comparative Legal Complexities*, Harvard National Security Journal, *forthcoming*

*The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism: A Synoptic Overview*, American University National Security Law Brief (co-authored with Chris Miller and Lauren Donatucci), *forthcoming*

*India's Distressed Justice Sector: A Matter of U.S. National Security Concern*, Harvard National Security Journal (online content), September 14, 2017

*Counterterrorism, Ungoverned Spaces, and the Role of International Law*, Johns Hopkins SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 36, Number 1, Winter-Spring, pp. 47-60 (2016)

*Non-State Armed Groups and the Role of Transnational Criminal Law During Armed Conflicts*, 48 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 1 (2015) (co-authored with Professor Christopher L. Blakesley)

*The French Intervention in Mali, Counterterrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict*, 223 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2015)

*Law and the Lodestar: Tunisian Civil Law and the Task of Ordering Plurality in the Aftermath of the Jasmine Revolution*, 7 J. Civ. L. Stud. 1 (2014)

*The Civil Codes of Libya and Syria: Hybridity, Durability, and Post-Revolution Viability in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring*, 28 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 283 (2014)

*Ungoverned Spaces, Transnational Crime, and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial Enforcement Jurisdiction in International Law*, 3 Notre Dame J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1 (2013)

*International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law*, 35 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 323 (2012)

*The Thickest Grey: Assessing the Status of the Civilian Response Corps Under the Law of International Armed Conflict and the U.S. Approach to Targeting Civilians*, 25 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 885 (2010)

*An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") over Civilians and the Implications of International Human Rights Law*, 17 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 59 (2009)

*Refugees and Legal Reform in Iraq: The Iraqi Civil Code and International Standards for the Treatment of Displaced Persons*, 34 Rutgers L. Rec. 1 (2009)

*Human Rights and Military Decisions: Counterinsurgency and Trends in the Law of International Armed Conflict*, 30 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 1367 (2008) (co-authored with Christopher L. Blakesley and Chris Jenks)

*A Closer Look at Iraqi Property and Tort Law*, 68 La. L. Rev. 765 (2008)

*The Rule of Law: A Primer and a Proposal*, 189 Mil. L. Rev. 92 (2007)

*Comparative Law and State-Building: The "Organic Minimalist" Approach to Legal Reconstruction*, 29 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2007)

*The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 39 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 1 (2007) (co-authored with Professor Christopher L. Blakesley)

*Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Sundering*, 16 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 1 (2006)

*Prosecuting Raskolnikov: A Literary and Legal Look at "Consciousness of Guilt" Evidence*, 27 Army Law. 54 (December 2005)

*Courts, Confidence, and Claims Commissions: The Case for Remitting to Iraqi Civil Courts the Tasks and Jurisdiction of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC)*, 2005 Army Law. 28 (March 2005)

*From Baton Rouge to Baghdad: A Comparative Overview of the Iraqi Civil Code*, 65 La. L. Rev. 131 (2004)

*Wings for Talons: The Case for the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Sexual Exploitation of Children through Cyberspace*, 50 Wayne L. Rev. 109 (2004) (co-authored with Professor Christopher L. Blakesley)

#### Other Contributions:

"David Santillana." in *Oxford Bibliographies in Islamic Studies* (ed. Natana DeLong-Bas) New York: Oxford University Press, *forthcoming*

UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (2018) (lead author and interagency coordinator)

*Agir Contre La Convergence: Les « Autorités Centrales » Et Le Réseau Mondial De La Lutte Contre La Criminalité Transnationale Et Le Terrorisme (Countering Convergence: 'Central Authorities' and the Global Network to Combat Transnational Crime and Terrorism)*, Air and Space Power Journal - Afrique & Francophonie, 1er trimestre (2016)

"The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is ..." Global Brief (Fall/Winter 2014): 61-61

Redactor of chapter entitled *The Law of Armed Conflict Across the Conflict Spectrum* in U.S. ARMY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (2014)

Redactor of chapter entitled *Comparative Law* in U.S. ARMY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (2013, 2014)

*Book Review:* THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH, 213 Mil. L. Rev. 227 (2013)

*Refugees and legal reform in Iraq: The Iraqi Civil Code, international standards for the treatment of displaced persons, and the art of attainable solutions* in LAND AND POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING (Routledge 2012)

# **Enclosure 11**

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) [Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov>  
**To:** Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Delay?

Matt,

Can I ask why the TOC meeting for this Thursday got pushed back to next week? In terms of material prep, I don't remember a meeting at this level that already had as much substantive review before it occurred, i.e., we were already ahead of where we usually are from a 'prep' standpoint, why delay?

Thx,

Ken Cuccinelli II  
Acting Deputy Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security



**Homeland  
Security**

# **Enclosure 12**

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:33 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** DOJ Email

[Redacted] (b)(6)



# **Enclosure 13**

(b)(3)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(b)(6) (b)(3)  
**From:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Monday, March 16, 2020 3:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_ KASHYAPP; Beth E. Sanner  
**Cc:** \_\_\_\_\_ Amanda J Schoch; \_\_\_\_\_ Corin R Stone  
**Subject:** Draft Op Ed (b)(3)  
**Attachments:** COVID 19 Op Ed v5.0.docx (b)(6)

Sharing same version just sent on high side (v5.0).

Thanks,  
Maura

Maura Beard  
Public Affairs Chief  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
703.275.3700

# **Enclosure 14**

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



**From:** Steinman, Joshua M. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 11:52 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: [WT-116-201] Due 04/17/2020 Friday at 10:00 AM -- OMB Request for Views on Cyber-related Legislative Proposals  
**Attachments:** 1.4.1 Codify Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.docx; 2.1 New Assistant Secretary of State.docx; 2.1.4a&b Admin subpoena authority for MLAT and LE.docx; 2.1.5 Codify EO 13848 Sanctions for Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections.docx; 3.2 Continuity of the Economy.docx; 3.3 Cyber State of Distress Proposal ACB.docx; 3.3.5 Biennial National Cyber Table Top Exercise.docx; 4.1.1 Critical Technology Security Centers Legislative Proposal.docx; 4.4 Cyber Insurance FFRDC.docx; 4.5 Establishing Cloud Security Certification.docx; 4.5.1 Incentivize the Uptake of Secure Cloud Services.docx; 4.5.2 Develop a Strategy to Secure Foundational Internet Protocols and Email.docx; 4.5.3 Strengthen Botnet Takedown Legislative Proposal.docx; 4.6 ICT National Strategy.docx; 5.1.1 - Increase Intelligence Support to the Private Sector Leg Proposal ACB.docx; 5.1.2 Codify Processes for Identifying Private-Sector Cyber Intel ACB v2.docx; 5.2 Joint Collaborative Environment (ACB).docx; 5.2.3 PRTT -- Legislative Proposal.docx; 5.3 CISA Integrated Cyber Center.docx

**From:** Kahangama, Iranga A. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 11:44 AM  
**To:** Steinman, Joshua M. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** FW: [WT-116-201] Due 04/17/2020 Friday at 10:00 AM -- OMB Request for Views on Cyber-related Legislative Proposals

DNI should send responses to the solarium legislative proposals to Will Thomas (Willie Thoma [redacted]) by Friday 4/17 for inclusion/consolidation. Just Copy/Paste the subject of this email in a note to Will with agency views/edits. This will ensure we receive them at EOP. (b)(6)

Thanks,

Iranga

**From:** Thomas, Will III EOP/OMB  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 5:44 PM  
**To:** 'COMMERCE' ; 'DEFENSE' ; 'JUSTICE' ; 'HOMELAND SECURITY' ; 'Office of the Director of National Intelligence' ; 'STATE' ; 'TREASURY' ; 'ENERGY'  
**Cc:** Yaworske, Jason A. EOP/OMB ; Sugarman, AJ J. EOP/WHO ; McIntyre, Natalie M. EOP/OMB ; Vaeth, Matt J. EOP/OMB ; Leon, Bryan P. EOP/OMB ; DL OMB OGC ; Schneider, Grant M. EOP/OMB ; Telle, Adam R. EOP/WHO ; Fike, Hugh D. II EOP/OMB ; Conley, Alyson M. EOP/OMB ; Abbott, Christopher J. EOP/WHO ; DL NSC Cyber ; Keller, Christopher S. EOP/OMB ; Burris, Jordan C. EOP/OMB ; Newman, Kim A. EOP/OMB ; Turner, Austin F. EOP/OMB ; Kan, Derek T. EOP/OMB ; Blum, Mathew C. EOP/OMB ; McCrary, Jeremy P. EOP/OMB ; Sandy, Mark S. EOP/OMB ; McConnell, Doc P. IV EOP/OMB ; DL-WHO-WHGC-LRM ; Ortega, Denis A. EOP/OMB ; Kahangama, Iranga A. EOP/NSC ; MacMaster, Ryan J. EOP/OMB ; Crow, Rose C. EOP/OMB ; DL NSC Legal ; DL NSC Defense ; DL NSC Legislative ; DL NSC STRATPLAN ; Herms, Kevin W. EOP/OMB ; Seehra, Jasmeet K. EOP/OMB ; Cutshall, Charles R. EOP/OMB ; DL OMB STAFF OIRA-LRM ; Moncada, Kirsten J. EOP/OMB ; Gonzalez, Oscar EOP/OMB ; Ventura, Alexandra EOP/OMB ; Hayes, Bradley F. EOP/OMB

; Hunt, Alex T. EOP/OMB ; Fraser, Nicholas A. EOP/OMB ; Lira, Mathew L. EOP/WHO ; Cerrato, David E. EOP/OMB ; DL OMB NSD ; DL OMB NSP IAD

**Subject:** LRM: [WT-116-201] Due 04/17/2020 Friday at 10:00 AM -- OMB Request for Views on Cyber-related Legislative Proposals

**DEADLINE: 10:00 AM Friday, Apr 17 2020**

Please find attached [redacted]

(b)(5)

Provide your agency's top-line views by the deadline above. NOTE: These [redacted]

Thanks. [redacted]

(b)(5)

LRM ID: WT-116-201

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Legislative Liaison Officer - See Distribution

FROM: León, Bryan (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

SUBJECT: LRM: [WT-116-201] Due 04/17/2020 Friday at 10:00 AM -- OMB Request for Views on Cyber-related Legislative Proposals

OMB CONTACT: Will Thomas(OMB)

E-Mail: willie\_thomas [redacted]

(b)(6)

PHONE [redacted]

FAX: (202) 395-5691

In accordance with OMB Circular No. A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for the purposes of the Statutory Pay-as-You-Go Act of 2010.

# **Enclosure 15**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 11:28 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: CNN email

Let's discuss

(b)(3)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 6:36 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch  
**Subject:** CNN email

Sir:

We wanted to give you a heads up that Alex Joel [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] now forward-deployed as an Adjunct  
Professor at American University, published this piece today in his professor capacity:  
<https://www.justsecurity.org/69706/seek-and-speak-the-truth/>

Alex Marquardt with CNN has reached out to ask if Alex Joel is still an ODNI employee. Alex Joel's American University bio makes it clear that he is and we do not plan to engage with CNN. We wanted to make sure you are aware of the piece and CNN's interest in it.

-Susan

# **Enclosure 16**



[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(3) [Redacted] <[Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov> (b)(6)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Thursday, February 27, 2020 5:44 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Congrats

Kash – think I sent this to the wrong address. Hope all is well!

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 26, 2020 5:48 PM  
**To:** kashyap.patel@dni.gov  
**Subject:** Congrats

Hey man, hope all has been well. Been a long time since UR. Congrats on the new position. I'm over at DHS Intel working for our Under Secretary as Deputy Chief of Staff (on paternity leave now). Would love to catch up sometime when you get settled in!

# **Enclosure 17**

[Redacted]


**From:** (b)(3) Amanda J Schoch (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Friday, May 29, 2020 4:11 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] KASHYAPP; [Redacted] Ryan Crumpler; Bradley A Brooker  
**Cc:** (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: DNI Ratcliffe Statement on Declassification of Transcripts

Statement is out.

Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2020 4:02 PM  
**To:** dni-pao-newmedia  
**Subject:** DNI Ratcliffe Statement on Declassification of Transcripts



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
ODNI News Release No. 23-20  
May 29, 2020


**DNI Ratcliffe Statement on Declassification of Transcripts**

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** – Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Ratcliffe today released the following statement:

“As I stated throughout the confirmation process, transparency is vital to allowing the American people to have confidence in the Intelligence Community. As the Director of National Intelligence, it is my obligation to review declassification requests with the overarching priority of protecting sources and methods, while also providing transparency whenever possible. Accordingly, today the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declassified transcripts concerning Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn.”

###

[Unsubscribe or update preferences](#) Need assistance? [subscriberhelp.govdelivery.com](mailto:subscriberhelp.govdelivery.com)

 [Follow ODNI on Facebook](#)

This service is provided to you by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

This e-mail was sent to [dni-pao-newmedia@dni.gov](mailto:dni-pao-newmedia@dni.gov).

This email was sent to [dni-pao-newmedia@dni.gov](mailto:dni-pao-newmedia@dni.gov) using GovDelivery Communications Cloud on behalf of:  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence · Office of the Director of National Intelligence · Washington, DC  
20511 · 703-733-8600



# **Enclosure 18**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 3:48 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Evanina statement for review

FYI ☺

(b)(3)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 2:13 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Amanda J Schoch [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Evanina statement for review

Looks good. Thanks.

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Wednesday, 6. May 2020 at 11:56:53 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted] "Amanda J Schoch"  
[Redacted]  
**Subject:** Evanina statement for review

Sir –

As you know, the Senate will vote on Bill Evanina’s nomination this afternoon. Typically the DNI sends out a statement following the confirmation of one of our Senate-confirmed positions. We’ve prepared the statement below for your review. Can you let us know your thoughts?



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
ODNI News Release No. 13-20  
May 6, 2020

**Acting DNI Grenell Applauds Senate Confirmation of NCSC Director Bill Evanina**

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell today issued the following statement:

“I am pleased that the U.S. Senate today confirmed Bill Evanina as director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC). With more than 30 years of distinguished federal service, including nearly six years of leading NCSC, Evanina’s confirmation is overdue and well-deserved.

“Under Evanina’s leadership, NCSC has become America’s premier source for advancing counterintelligence and security expertise and a trusted mission partner in protecting the nation from foreign and other adversarial threats. He helped lead the development of the President’s critical National Counterintelligence Strategy 2020-2022, which outlines forward-thinking approaches to counterintelligence to address modern, evolving threats. The most recent strategy was issued in January 2020.

“NCSC, the IC and America’s entire national security apparatus are stronger with Bill Evanina firmly in place.”

Director Evanina’s full biography is available [here](#).

###

---

Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

# **Enclosure 19**



[redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:47 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: FYI - Andy McCarthy column

Lets discuss

[redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:20 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch [redacted]  
**Subject:** FYI - Andy McCarthy column (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

## Andrew McCarthy: Flynn unmasking standoff – Who 'owns' classified info? Who gets to make it public?

By [Andrew McCarthy | Fox News](#)  
**Published** 19 mins ago

Fox News is reporting that there may be some tension between Justice Department officials and Richard Grenell, the acting Director of National Intelligence, regarding the declassification of information related to “unmasking” – i.e., the revelation of the identity of Americans incidentally intercepted during our spy agencies’ collection of foreign intelligence.

I suspect that there may be less friction here than confusion, probably on ODNI’s part, and probably about Justice Department rules and procedures.

In the government, classified information “belongs” to the executive branch, whose intelligence agencies collect and analyze it. That is why the president is the ultimate authority, having the power to declassify any such information.

Beneath the president, intelligence officials may review specific classified information if they have a “need to know” and sufficiently high-level security clearances. But the information “belongs” to the intelligence agency that collected or created it.

A concrete example. If an FBI agent had a security clearance high enough to authorize access to a file of top-secret intelligence collected by the CIA, that agent would be permitted to see that information. But neither that agent nor the FBI would be authorized to declassify it so it could be shared more widely. Only the CIA could do that. In terms of equity, it would be the CIA’s information.

To grasp what’s going on with the unmasking issue, we also need to distinguish the declassification of information from the publication of that information.

The vast majority of information held by the government is not classified. Yet, most of it is also non-public. The government has the power to compel people to produce various categories of information, and it may store and analyze that data. There is a trade-off, though: To protect people's privacy (among other reasons), the government may not disseminate information publicly in the absence of a lawful reason.

In particular, the Justice Department does not disclose information just to disclose it, or just because the public might find it fascinating. DOJ must have a legal reason for publicizing previously non-public information.

We saw that last week, when DOJ moved to dismiss the case against Michael Flynn. Appended to the motion were exhibits that included non-public FBI reports, some portions of which may have been classified at some point. That information had been kept under wraps for years. But until the Justice Department filed a legal submission in a public court proceeding, to which these documents were relevant, no classified portions were declassified, and none of the information was made public.

Classified and other sensitive information relevant to the Trump-Russia investigation is of immense public importance. President Trump has said that he'd like to see the information made public. This has been frustrating for those of us closely watching the story because the president has the power to declassify and publicize. Yet, he obviously does not want to be accused of harming national security. (By definition, information is classified because its publication would harm national security.) Nor does he want to be accused of compromising investigations, which can be undermined if information that is sensitive is prematurely publicized.

On the other hand, history and common sense teach us that the intelligence agencies' authority to stamp information "classified" creates great temptation to exploit that authority to hide information that could be embarrassing or even incriminating. They chide us that insisting on disclosure somehow imperils national security or endangers intelligence sources.

Clearly, Grenell's job at ODNI includes breaking this disclosure barrier. The president is frustrated by the resistance he has gotten from intelligence agencies, who never want to disclose anything. Grenell, an ardent Trump supporter who had been serving as U.S. ambassador to Germany, has been sent to ODNI, in part, to ensure that information related to the Trump-Russia investigation is disclosed unless there is a truly compelling reason to keep it concealed.

The unmasking controversy is of great public interest. Obama officials unmasked an unusually large number of Americans, reportedly including many connected to Donald Trump. Several Obama officials were apparently involved. We should know which officials. We should know why they included some, such as U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power, who had little or no need to know the identities of Americans intercepted in foreign intelligence collection. On paper at least, Power was responsible for hundreds of unmaskings.

Grenell has reportedly declassified this information, which he was apparently empowered to do because ODNI has equity over it. Now, he wants it publicized. He realizes it is relevant to DOJ's investigation into the genesis of the Obama administration's Trump-Russia probe. Grenell thus seems to have figured that transmitting this now-declassified information to DOJ was the best way to get it released publicly.

Again, however, the Justice Department must have a lawful purpose to publish information. DOJ is still investigating, and investigators virtually never want evidence to become public until their investigation is concluded. DOJ is no doubt very interested in the information Grenell has provided; but it has no immediate legal need or strategic desire for public disclosure.

That said, the usual rules apply. Therefore, if the classified information belongs to ODNI, then ODNI has the power to declassify it. And if ODNI has declassified the unmasking information, and believes it has a legitimate

reason to disclose that information publicly, it may do so ... though Grenell will have to brace himself for the uproar from critics who will claim ODNI has acted politically, and potentially to the detriment of national security.

If the Justice Department's investigation is to be regarded as good-faith law-enforcement rather than politics, then DOJ cannot be perceived as declassifying and publicizing information for political purposes. From DOJ's perspective, the unmasking information need not be disclosed unless and until there is a legitimate law-enforcement reason for doing so.

By contrast, if the unmasking information belongs to ODNI, then DNI Grenell has the authority to declassify it, and perhaps to disclose it. But he would have to be able to explain why doing so was an appropriate exercise of discretion in the public interest, rather than an abuse of power for political advantage.

<https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/flynn-unmasking-standoff-who-owns-classified-info-andrew-mccarthy>

---

Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

 (b)(3)

# **Enclosure 20**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:43 AM  
**To:** [Redacted] KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: FYI - Grenell tweet

Fyi

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:41 AM (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**To:** Amanda J Schoch ; Bradley A Brooker ; Ryan Crumple; [Redacted] (b)(6) Corin R Stone [Redacted] Nancy E. Morgan  
**Subject:** FYI - Grenell tweet

<https://twitter.com/RichardGrenell/status/1263856362133520385>

---  
Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted] (b)(3)

# **Enclosure 21**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Amanda J Schoch  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) [Redacted] KASHYAPP; [Redacted] Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** FW: Heads up - COVID19 / security clearances

Sir –

I wanted to flag the below for you on a statement that NCSC put out yesterday regarding questions about financial hardships from COVID-19 impacting security clearances. I have shared with Leg given the letter from Warner and believe that they are working with NCSC to make sure the letter is aligned with what NCSC put out publicly.

Sincerely,  
Amanda

Amanda J. Schoch  
Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
[Redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 10:03 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Heads up - COVID19 / security clearances

Folks,

In response to queries from media and others today about whether security clearance holders and applicants could suffer adverse consequence (such as having clearances denied, etc) due to financial problems (such as loan defaults, bankruptcies, etc) suffered as a result of COVID-19..... we issued a statement today clarifying that clearance holders and applicants would not suffer such consequences

In short, we noted that existing SEAD 4 policies ensure that security clearance applicants and holders will not be unduly penalized in the security clearance process for financial hardships over which they have no control. Existing policy provides for mitigation of potential economic difficulties impacting clearance holders and applicants.

Senator Warner had written a letter to OPM and ODNI about this last week I believe. Our folks had also received some queries from INSA and others. I heard today from ClearanceJobs and some other media outlets who cover security clearance reform.

To help clarify the situation quickly, we put out the statement via our Twitter and LinkedIn accounts, noting the existing policy. See: <https://twitter.com/NCSCgov/status/1242166775409774594>

Thus far some good feedback. INSA's Larry Hanauer tweeted out our statement. See <https://twitter.com/LarryHanauer/status/1242175403747393537> DOD also thanked us for clarification, as did several in industry.

There likely will be an article or two in the security clearance trade pubs.

Dean

Sent from Email+ secured by MobileIron



# **Enclosure 22**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 5:02 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

fyi

**From:** CALKINS, AARON  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 4:59 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

CISA has let the committee know that they will not be doing the briefing tomorrow.

Aaron L. Calkins  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
Office of Legislative Affairs  
Department of Homeland Security

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 1:08 PM  
**To:** CALKINS, AARON  
**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

Please just confirm when you have informed them that we are pulling out of tomorrow's briefing.  
Thx

**From:** CALKINS, AARON  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 12:42 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Krebs, Christopher ; Glawe, David (b)(6)  
**Cc:** ALFONSO-ROYALS, ANGELICA ; Gountanis, John  
**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

I will follow up with CISA leg affairs on this.

Aaron L. Calkins  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
Office of Legislative Affairs  
Department of Homeland Security

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 12:22 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Krebs, Christopher ; Glawe, David  
**Cc:** CALKINS, AARON ; ALFONSO-ROYALS, ANGELICA ; Gountanis, John  
**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

(b)(6)

Aaron,

I assume you would be on point to pull this back to coordinate with the other elements (currently next week), correct?  
Can you please do that right away please?

Thx,  
Ken

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 12:19 PM

**To:** [redacted] Krebs, Christopher ; Glawe, David (b)(6)

**Cc:** CALKINS, AARON

**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

Agree fully

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 12:10 PM

**To:** Krebs, Christopher ; Glawe, David ; [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** CALKINS, AARON

**Subject:** RE: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

I agree with Chris here. Dave, [redacted] thoughts? (b)(6)

And I assume this is a staff briefing... if so, I REALLY think we should beg off tomorrow.

Ken

**From:** Krebs, Christopher

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 11:48 AM

**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** CALKINS, AARON

**Subject:** Re: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

Yes, that is the plan as of now, alongside I&A. I understand that the FBI was supposed to attend, but withdrew yesterday due to emerging intelligence and they'd prefer the DNI join, which means a delay of a week or so, assuming the DNI will join.

Based on these developments, I'm of the mind that we similarly delay, as i dont want my people as the only targets, particularly since we're not an intelligence agency, we just brief on preparedness measures.

I think we need to loop Glawe, [redacted] in, too, as I'm not sure of their position.

(b)(6)

Thanks,  
Chris

Christopher C. Krebs  
Director  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

(b)(6)

From:

Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 11:39:28 AM

To: Krebs, Christopher

Cc: CALKINS, AARON

Subject: Is CISA currently planning to brief a house committee tomorrow?

Ken Cuccinelli II  
Acting Deputy Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security



**Homeland  
Security**

# **Enclosure 23**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]@hq.dhs.gov> (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 4:31 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: ODNI detailees  
**Attachments:** ODNI Detail Data Call Sheet.xlsx

As requested.

Working the other request.

**From:** ALFONSO-ROYALS, ANGELICA  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 3:27 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] Gountanis, John  
**Subject:** ODNI detailees

(b)(6)

As discussed

# **Enclosure 24**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 8:24 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Transcripts

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 7:52 AM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** Fwd: Transcripts

Once you get the redacted version, I can work to get the boss to review and we can autopen the declassification memo. He wants this done today...

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 at 12:17:44 PM  
**To:** "Travis M Burrs" [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** "Bradley A Brooker" [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Transcripts

Travis,  
Can you please lead the team on the declassification process for the transcripts (Brad can provide more details) to be completed today.

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 at 12:06:10 PM  
**To:** "Bradley A Brooker" [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Transcripts

Brad,  
The ADNI is hearing that the transcripts that you sent are only partial... can you verify?  
He would like to work the declassification process on the ones we have. Would appreciate if you could be engaged in that to ensure we appropriately protect sources and methods. He would like to declassify today.  
Thanks

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



# **Enclosure 25**

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:09 PM  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Amanda J Schoch [Redacted] (b)(3)  
FW: Twitter pushback on ODNI account

Kash and Ryan,

FYI below FYSA. Several media outlets are incorrectly reporting that A/DNI backed out of today's hearing.

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:02 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Amanda J Schoch  
**Subject:** Twitter pushback on ODNI account

Sir –

FYI, we just posted the following tweets from the ODNI account:

@ODNIgov

Several media outlets are erroneously reporting that Acting DNI Grenell backed out of participating in today's Congressional briefings on election security. ODNI did not communicate to Congress at any point that Acting DNI Grenell would participate in election security briefings.  
11:56 AM · Mar 10, 2020

@ODNIgov

FBI and DHS are the lead in charge of securing our elections, and the IC is participating in today's briefings in support of that mission. The IC is focused on detecting and countering foreign election-related threats. ODNI will be represented by NCSC Director Bill Evanina.  
11:56 AM · Mar 10, 2020

@ODNIgov

As part of its counterintelligence mission, NCSC has contributed to the federal government's election security efforts for years and works closely with the Election Threats Executive, FBI, DHS, and other partners.  
11:56 AM · Mar 10, 2020

---  
Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

# **Enclosure 26**

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 24, 2020 4:16 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Washington Examiner

(b)(3)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 24, 2020 3:48 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch ; [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Washington Examiner

# Exclusive: Adam Schiff blocking release of key Russia investigation witness transcripts, officials say

by Jerry Dunleavy  
 Updated Apr 24, 2020, 02:38 PM

The House Intelligence Committee voted unanimously in the fall of 2018 to release dozens of witness interview transcripts from its investigation into Russian interference, but the transcripts have not been made public.

The declassification process by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was expected to take just a few weeks or months, but nearly two years later, some administration officials, as well as ranking Republican member Devin Nunes, are blaming Chairman Adam Schiff for the delay.

“Adam Schiff is thwarting the will of the House Intelligence Committee as expressed in the bipartisan vote in September 2018 to make these transcripts public,” one senior intelligence official told the *Washington Examiner*. “He has appointed himself arbiter of what the public should see and has refused to allow the White House to review its own equities, making declassification of 10 of the transcripts impossible. It’s difficult to imagine any motive other than Schiff is still trying to control the narrative on Russia collusion.”

Forty-three of the 53 transcripts have gone through the declassification process and were returned to Schiff over half a year ago, but he has not released them, despite promising last fall to make them public quickly. *Just The News* reported on aspects of this controversy earlier this week.

A sticking point with the remaining 10 transcripts is the desire by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to allow the White House to review them as part of the declassification process.

In March 2019, under then-Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, ODNI staffers briefed the House Intelligence Committee that some of the interviews implicated “White House equities” and that the top spy office “looked for mention of interactions or communications with current or former [White House] and [National Security Council] officials either during transition or after descriptions of policies or direction established within the [White House] and [NSC]” as part of the declassification process, according to a letter

Schiff sent to the ODNI obtained by the *Washington Examiner*. The ODNI said some of the witness testimony “could be privileged” and that a determination like that “can only be made by” the White House.

Schiff rejected the request from Coats a week later.

“Under no circumstances shall ODNI, or any other element of the Intelligence Community, share any HPSCI transcripts with the White House, President Trump, or any persons associated with the White House or the President,” Schiff wrote. “Such transcripts remain the sole property of HPSCI, and were transmitted to ODNI for the limited purpose of enabling a classification review by IC elements and the Department of Justice.”

Coats left the ODNI in August 2019. He was succeeded by Joseph Maguire, who, after the Ukraine impeachment controversy, was replaced by Richard Grenell, the U.S. ambassador to Germany.

The *Washington Examiner* has learned that at least two of the 10 disputed transcripts do not contain classified information and that Schiff could release them, along with the 43 other declassified transcripts.

Nunes told the *Washington Examiner* that Schiff should make the already declassified transcripts public immediately.

“HPSCI Democrats opposed every Republican document request and subpoena that helped to expose malfeasance in the FBI’s Russia collusion probe. And now, by refusing to publish the witness transcripts or the transcript of the committee’s briefing with former [intelligence community Inspector General] Michael Atkinson, the Democrats are blatantly continuing to hide documents that expose their own mistruths,” Nunes said. “There is no reason for keeping these documents secret except that they want to hide what’s in them.”

In January, an official from Schiff’s committee staff claimed to the *Washington Times* that Atkinson’s testimony about his controversial handling of the Ukraine whistleblower complaint was not conducted in conjunction with the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Oversight Committee, the two other House panels helping lead the impeachment effort, and so, it did not technically count as a deposition. The unnamed official argued that “contrary to what has been said, the chairman does not have the ability unilaterally to classify or declassify [an Intelligence Committee] transcript.”

Schiff’s office did not respond to the *Washington Examiner’s* multiple requests for comment about Atkinson’s closed-door testimony transcript, nor about why the 53 Russia investigation witness transcripts have not been released.

The 10 transcripts that Schiff blocked the White House from viewing and therefore stalled the declassification process on are interviews of Trump son-in-law and White House senior adviser Jared Kushner, former chief executive for the Trump campaign Steve Bannon, former Obama deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes, former Attorney General Loretta Lynch, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power, former Obama national security adviser Susan Rice, former Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, former White House deputy assistant Keith Schiller, and Mary McCord, a former assistant attorney general for national security who was involved in the FBI’s Russia investigation.

Among the 43 other witness interviews included testimony by former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Donald Trump Jr., White House adviser Hope Hicks, longtime Trump friend and recently convicted “fixer” Roger Stone, former Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, and former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe. Perkins Coie lawyers Michael Sussman, a former DOJ lawyer who passed along alleged details about Russian interference to former FBI general counsel James Baker, and Marc Elias, the chairman who was the Clinton campaign’s general counsel and hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the campaign, were also among them.

One senior Trump administration official familiar with the declassification process told the *Washington Examiner*, “There is no excuse for Adam Schiff personally controlling the release of information that the Intelligence Committee voted 19 months ago to release and that the intelligence community has declassified.” The official said of Schiff: “If he was interested in transparency, as he has claimed, he would make all of these transcripts public.”

Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee said they never expected it to take this long for the Russia investigation witness transcripts to be made public. In mid-September of 2018, then-Chairman Nunes told Fox News he hoped that, in the interest of “full transparency,” the transcripts would be released “in the next few weeks” and hopefully “before the election.”

In late September 2019, Schiff suggested to the House Intelligence Committee that he intended to release dozens of the transcripts.

“They have been released, yes. They have been returned to us with either redactions or with the attestation that there is nothing classified in them. There are, I think, a couple others that they have not returned to us, but they have said are unclassified, and since we possess them, it is our intention to release those as well,” Schiff said. Of the 10 transcripts in dispute, he added, “But all we are asking the ODNI is to tell us what is classified. So, we will be releasing them as expeditiously as we can when we get the redactions back.”

Schiff accused the White House of “hijacking” the process in an interview with *Politico* at the time, claiming that the 10 transcripts that the ODNI wanted the White House to be able to review, including two without classified information, had been held “hostage.” The report said that the “ODNI has returned 43 of the 53 transcripts to the committee with classified information redacted” and that “Schiff still intends to release the bulk of the Russia transcripts in the near future.”

This is not the first clash between Schiff and Nunes on the House Intelligence Committee. When Nunes led the committee in March 2018, it released a report on Russian interference concluding that Russia had interfered in the election but found no evidence of collusion. Schiff and the Democrats released their own report, arguing that Trump-Russia collusion was likely. In a brush over the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Nunes argued government surveillance powers were abused to target the Trump campaign, while Schiff defended the FBI’s actions.

Special counsel Robert Mueller’s 448-page report, released in April 2019, found the Russians had interfered in the 2016 election in a “sweeping and systematic fashion” but “did not establish” any criminal conspiracy between the Trump campaign and Russia.

DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz’s lengthy December report criticized the Justice Department and the FBI for 17 “significant errors and omissions” related to the FISA warrants against Trump campaign associate Carter Page and for the bureau’s reliance on British ex-spy Christopher Steele’s unverified dossier. Steele put his research together at the behest of Glenn Simpson’s opposition research firm *Fusion GPS*, funded by Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and the Democratic National Committee through the Perkins Coie law firm.

U.S. Attorney John Durham, who was selected by Attorney General William Barr, recently expanded his investigative team as he looks into the origins of the Trump-Russia investigation and reviews the actions taken by law enforcement figures and the intelligence community.

Recently declassified footnotes from the Horowitz report indicate the FBI was aware that a Russian disinformation campaign may have affected Steele’s dossier.

<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/exclusive-adam-schiff-blocking-release-of-key-russia-investigation-witness-transcripts-officials-say>

---

Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

# **Enclosure 27**



**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** Travis M Burrs (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Washington Times  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 11:13:01 AM

Travis:

Here is it .... From the WP

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 11:09 AM (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**To:** [redacted] Ryan Crumpler [redacted] Corin R Stone ; [redacted]  
**Subject:** Washington Times

## Grenell rejects Schiff's bid to control national intelligence

By Rowan Scarborough - The Washington Times - Tuesday, April 21, 2020

Acting-Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell has dinged Rep. Adam Schiff in a new letter, expressing surprise the Trump foe didn't praise the appointment of two women to head counter-terrorism unit and rejecting the congressman's belief that lawmakers control the DNI's day-to-day management decisions.

Mr. Schiff, California Democrat and chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, had written to Mr. Grenell on April 7 questioning his legal authority to reorganize the Office of National Intelligence and its National Counter Terrorism Center.

In an April 20 reply obtained by The Washington Times, Mr. Grenell called Mr. Schiff's ideas "suggestions."

The exchange of letters promises to be a running battle between the congressman who led the campaign to impeach and remove President Trump and the person Mr. Trump picked in February to direct national intelligence, including the CIA.

"I must disagree with your proposals to divest the DNI of managerial competence and personnel decision-making authority, and to replace your committee's mandate for Intelligence Community (IC) oversight with a mandate for IC administration," Mr. Grenell wrote, staking out his claim to power.

Mr. Grenell also rebutted Mr. Schiff's allegation that a secret intelligence briefing on Russia in March was cooked.

"I must also speak on behalf of the career intelligence officers at ODNI, whom your letter accuses of politicizing the briefing to Members of Congress of March 10th," Mr. Grenell said. "As the Acting DNI, I am compelled to defend these career officers from unsubstantiated indictments of their motivations and judgment. Many are offended by the accusations that they did not share unvarnished assessments. If you share with me the reports you believe provide

evidence for these claims, I can promise you that I will review them with the seriousness such accusations demand.”

And Mr. Grenell took issue with Mr. Schiff’s criticism of the change in counter-terrorism leadership.

“I must begin by voicing my surprise that your four-page letter said nothing about the historic appointment of the first female Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),” Mr. Grenell said. “Instead, you expressed concerns regarding the retirement of the former male Director. You erroneously cast judgement on the reason of his departure while ignoring the accomplishments of NCTC’s new leadership, two highly qualified female officers serving as the Acting Director and Acting Deputy Director. Diversity of the IC workforce should always be celebrated, and I am proud that we increased diversity within the ODNI’s senior ranks, to include more women and members of the LGBT community.”

Mr. Grenell is in the process of downsizing headquarters and the NCTC to free up more positions for operational agencies in the field and posts abroad.

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/apr/21/richard-grenell-rejects-adam-schiffs-bid-control-n/>

---

Matt Lahr  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence



(b)(3)

# **Enclosure 28**

[REDACTED]

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6) Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [REDACTED] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 2:34 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: White House Pushes to Recover Americans Held Overseas

---

Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [REDACTED] (b)(6)  
Cell: [REDACTED]

---

**From:** Vincent, Grayson K. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 12:22 PM  
**To:** DL NSC CT ; DL NSC MENA  
**Cc:** DL NSC STRATCOM  
**Subject:** NYT: White House Pushes to Recover Americans Held Overseas

Adam Goldman article is out.

**From:** PA Press Clips  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 12:19 PM  
**To:** PA Monitoring Group  
**Subject:** NYT: White House Pushes to Recover Americans Held Overseas

White House Pushes to Recover Americans Held Overseas

The president's interest in the case of Austin Tice, a journalist who went missing in Syria in 2012, prompted the C.I.A. to renew its focus on finding him.

By Adam Goldman and Julian E. Barnes  
March 13, 2020

WASHINGTON — Last year, administration officials briefed President Trump on a hostage whose case he has taken an interest in: Austin Tice, a former Marine missing in Syria. The C.I.A. pledged to ramp up efforts to learn where he is being held and why Syria refuses to negotiate his release.

The C.I.A.'s renewed focus on Mr. Tice, who was working as a journalist when he was captured in 2012, reflects a broader push by the Trump administration to focus more intently on Americans being held hostage abroad.

The administration has helped free Americans held in Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan and is trying to win Mr. Tice's freedom as well as working to find Mark R. Frerichs, a former Navy diver kidnapped last month in Afghanistan. The White House wants him freed before American troops leave the country in a peace deal with the Taliban, an urgent deadline for the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to locate Mr. Frerichs.

Returning American hostages is Mr. Trump's "top priority," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said this week in a statement marking the 13th anniversary of the disappearance inside Iran of Robert A. Levinson, a former F.B.I. agent and C.I.A. contractor.

For the American military, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, focusing more on hostages is a way to show an often mercurial commander in chief that the government is responding to the priorities he has set. The appointment of the former top envoy for hostage negotiations, Robert C. O'Brien, as national security adviser has also elevated the issue, and the National Counterterrorism Center is leading a review of hostage recovery efforts.

Mr. Trump's interest in seeing American hostages brought home is a reflection of his us-versus-them worldview that often puts foreign policy issues in stark terms, a senior administration official said, adding that the president takes it personally when adversaries illegally detain Americans.

Mr. Trump invited to the State of the Union the parents of Kayla Mueller, who was taken captive in August 2013 before being killed by the Islamic State in early 2015. The military mission last year to kill the group's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was named after Ms. Mueller's birthday.

"America's warriors never forgot Kayla — and neither will we," Mr. Trump said during the address last month.

Before the speech, Ms. Mueller's parents were given a tour of the White House and met briefly with Mr. Trump and Vice President Mike Pence. They also spoke with both Mr. O'Brien and Kashyap Patel, then a senior counterterrorism official who was handling hostage issues.

The killings of Ms. Mueller and of the journalist James Foley in 2014, another American in Syria, helped prompt President Barack Obama to make wholesale changes in how the government dealt with hostages and their families. The Obama administration established a Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell and created a special presidential envoy for hostage affairs, the post Mr. O'Brien held.

The Trump administration's look at hostage operations is part of a five-year review of the Obama directive.

While he was the hostage czar, Mr. O'Brien pushed hard to figure out a way to free Mr. Tice. He cited the case to Ms. Mueller's parents when they visited the White House as one of several the administration was trying to resolve.

Based on a mosaic of intelligence, officials believe Mr. Tice, now 38, remains alive and is being held by the Syrian government, according to former and current officials. Questions remain about why the Syrian government has neither admitted to holding him in the nearly eight years since he was abducted nor negotiated his release, and why it has released other Americans who were captured after him.

The Trump administration has pushed unsuccessfully to win Mr. Tice's release. Early in his 15-month tenure as C.I.A. director, Mike Pompeo tried to set up back-channel talks with Ali Mamlouk, Syria's powerful intelligence chief who is close with President Bashar al-Assad. The effort fizzled but also prompted concerns among some administration officials that the C.I.A.'s outreach might have left the mistaken impression with the Syrians that Mr. Tice was a spy.

In August 2018, the C.I.A. dispatched another top senior agency official with expertise in the Middle East to meet with Mr. Mamlouk in Damascus, former American officials said. During the meeting, the C.I.A. official brought up Mr. Tice, the former officials said. What came of the meeting is not clear.

The administration has also tried without success to engage both the United Arab Emirates and the Vatican to assist with the Tice case. The Emiratis, who played a key role in 2019 in freeing Danny Burch, an American oil worker who had been held hostage in Yemen, reopened its embassy in Damascus in 2018.

As the hostage czar, Mr. O'Brien embraced the idea of traveling to Damascus to negotiate with the Syrian government. Mr. Pompeo, now the secretary of state, nixed the proposal for security reasons, though some administration officials were skeptical that Mr. O'Brien's life would have been in danger. Other administration officials viewed such a trip as a mistake because a visit by a high-ranking American official could bolster the Assad government while probably doing little to prompt it to release Mr. Tice.

Mr. Tice's family has sought to keep public attention on his case to pressure the government to continue working for his release. Debra Tice, Mr. Tice's mother, has held news conferences and granted interviews in which she praised Mr. Trump's focus on the case of her son and other hostages.

She recently told the Fox News host Tucker Carlson that the Syrian government had invited an American official to talk about her son's case but accused "neocons at the State Department" of intervening to stop the trip. It was unclear whether she was referring to Mr. Pompeo. Ms. Tice declined through a spokesman to comment.

Critics have accused the Trump administration of missing opportunities to win Mr. Tice's release. It has made concessions to the Assad government without demanding Mr. Tice's release or anything else in return, including when administration officials announced in 2017 that they would no longer pursue Mr. Assad's ouster, and again last year when Mr. Trump abruptly pulled back American forces fighting the Islamic State, essentially giving up much of the land in Syria that the military had seized from the group back to Mr. Assad's government.

Mr. Frerichs's case is similarly caught up in delicate geopolitical negotiations. As the military begins to withdraw its personnel from Afghanistan as part of a deal with the Taliban, the White House has stepped up its pressure on the Defense Department to get home hostages still held there, according to a senior official.

Mr. Frerichs, the former Navy diver who was working as a contractor in Afghanistan, was captured in February, and officials believe he is being held by the Haqqani militant network in Afghanistan. Some officials expressed concern that if Mr. Frerichs is not found quickly, he could be smuggled into Pakistan, making a rescue by American commandos more difficult because of the political sensitivities and potentially treacherous terrain.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

July 14, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 24 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000410 – 000543). Upon review, we have determined that one (1) of those documents may be released to you in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000418 – 000419). Additionally, 19 of those documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000410 – 000413, 000416 – 000431, 000436, 000531 – 000534, and 000538 – 000543) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The remaining four (4) documents are being withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000414 – 000415, 000432 – 000435, 000437 – 000530, and 000535 – 000537), pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6).

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed an additional 175 pages concerning item number one of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

Finally, the National Security Council withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6).

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Koch", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right. The signature is written in a cursive style.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Friday, May 22, 2020 1:32 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted] Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

All – I went ahead and reached out to the Badge Office for Tuesday – they had two appts left – one at 1030 and one at 1130. They are hoping to get both the DNI and [redacted] done at 1030 – but, if they can't, [redacted] might have to come at 1130 (this is all due to COVID restrictions). Again, everything might go up in smoke if a WH swearing in is scheduled. By the way, we still have not gotten confirmation the [redacted] will be dropped on Tuesday. (b)(3)  
(b)(5) (b)(3) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)  
Executive Assistant to the DNI (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**From:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 1:00 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO ; Travis M Burrs ; [redacted] ; KASHYAPP ; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [redacted] (b)(3)

Good Afternoon, All, (b)(6)

The receipt and processing of both DNI Ratcliffe's and CoS [redacted] badging paperwork has been confirmed by the Secret Service Pass Office. Please go ahead and schedule them each appointments to be badged, as they are not accepting walk-ins at this time. Let me know if you have any questions, or need anything else at all!

Best,

**Ken Carroll**  
White House Management Office

O: [redacted] (b)(6)  
C: [redacted]

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:48 PM (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO ; Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO ; Travis M Burrs ; [redacted] ; KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [redacted] (b)(3)

Thank you for your assistance. (b)(6)

Best

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

On May 21, 2020, at 1:14 PM, [redacted] wrote:

(b)(3) Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief  
(b)(6) of Staff, [redacted] We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI  
Ratcliffe will be formally sworn in on Tuesday, 26 May. Thank you.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 6:25 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Follow-up

Contact the below. They'll get him a 24 hour turn around on testing.

**From:** Stone, Alexandra E. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 6:24 PM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** RE: Follow-up

Jesse Schönau, MD  
LCDR MC USN  
Deputy Director, Medical Evaluation Treatment Team (METT)  
Chief of Executive Medicine  
White House Medical Unit  
Email: [Redacted]  
Office: [Redacted]  
Mobile: [Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 6:22 PM  
**To:** Stone, Alexandra E. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: Follow-up

Just tried you, too. Look forward to connecting.

**From:** Stone, Alexandra E. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 6:03 PM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Follow-up

Alex-

I just tried you to discuss a WHMU question you had earlier. If you could give me a call back, my number is [Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] I can provide you with the best POC for a COVID-19 test.

Best,  
Alex Stone

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Williams, Tom M. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:03 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: [Redacted] Resume  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) [Redacted] Resume 031020.docx

Kash,

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
Here is the resume for [Redacted] He's eager and available to join your staff at DNI. Give me a ring if you'd like to chat.

V/r,  
Tom  
-----

Dr. Thomas Williams  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Senior Director for European Affairs  
National Security Council

[Redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 2:43 PM  
**To:** Williams, Tom M. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** [Redacted] Resume (b)(6)

Thanks, Tom.

For situational awareness of other readers: I officially retire [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
Director for European Affairs  
National Security Council  
(office) [Redacted]  
(cell) [Redacted] (b)(6)





RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN  
MARK R. WARNER, VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR, MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, COLORADO

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

April 20, 2020

MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:


Recent media reporting has discussed the existence of Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs), described as classified documents created by the Executive Branch that include draft proclamations, executive orders, and proposals for legislation to be deployed during an emergency. As reported, no PEADs appear to have ever been invoked, but past documents have purportedly contemplated the suspension of habeas corpus, the detention of U.S. citizens without requisite suspicion of criminal activity, the execution of warrantless searches and seizures, and the imposition of martial law, all of which would raise significant constitutional concerns if implemented.

The President has declared an emergency in light of the coronavirus. In addition, Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 3312 requires that the Director of National Intelligence submit to the congressional intelligence committees any "covered policy document," which is defined to include any presidential directive or other document that "assigns tasks, roles, or responsibilities to the intelligence community or an element of the intelligence community." However, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has not been advised of the existence or substance of any current PEADs, including any PEADs that relate to the Intelligence Community or require classification due to urgent national security concerns.

In our democratic system, emergency powers not expressly enumerated in the Constitution are only available to a president pursuant to statutory authorization by Congress, and these authorities and their exercise are subject to scrutiny by the Courts. If these emergency powers are being contemplated, they should be transparent and made available for Congressional oversight. Accordingly, we request that, at the soonest possible date, you or a designated senior staff member produce to and brief the Committee on the existence and substance of any such PEADs, or, if none exist, that you so state, in accordance with your obligation to keep the Committee fully informed.


Thank you for your attention to this request. We look forward to scheduling this briefing at the soonest possible date.

Sincerely,


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Angus S. King, Jr.


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Michael F. Bennet


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Kamala D. Harris

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Martin Heinrich

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Dianne Feinstein

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Ron Wyden

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Susan M. Collins

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Jack Reed



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Friday, May 15, 2020 3:50 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Making Contact

Do you know this guy at NSC? He's interested in a job at ODNI.

-----Original Message----- (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 15, 2020 11:50 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Making Contact

Hi [Redacted] -- I wanted to touch base because I'm back in the office today and would gladly swing by, if convenient for you, to share my resume or provide background on my career objectives as my NSC tour draws to a close.

Cheers. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 6:35 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Making Contact (b)(6)

Hi [Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

As mentioned in passing today, would greatly appreciate some time on your schedule in the next few days to initially discuss options at DNI as I wrap up my NSC tour.

Please let me know how you prefer to proceed and note that I'm scheduled to telework tomorrow and Thursday this week.

Cheers,  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

Senior Director for Information Statecraft National Security Council

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:02 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: Meeting Tomorrow (b)(6)

Kash - As I mentioned, the AMB called Pottinger's office --- and they understand it will be just you. Did you wish for me to tell them how you would like to participate this afternoon (1400) – by phone or in person?

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 Executive Assistant to the DNI (b)(6)  
 [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 8:18 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Travis M Burrs ; [Redacted] ; KASHYAPP ; [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Meeting Tomorrow (b)(6)

Sir – I did write back to Brandon stating that your calendar had changed for today and that you asked Kash to take the mtg. They came back this morning asking if you could also attend with Kash and they would adjust the mtg time to accommodate your schedule. Please let me know what your wishes are. Thanks

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 Executive Assistant to the DNI (b)(6)  
 [Redacted]  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 8:14 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Travis M Burrs ; [Redacted] ; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Meeting Tomorrow

Kash should do this (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** Tuesday, 12. May 2020 at 7:40:50 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** (b)(3) [Redacted] "Travis M Burrs" [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) [Redacted] "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov> [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Meeting Tomorrow

Sir - per the email below - Matt Pottinger would like to talk to you by secure phone tomorrow at 1400 - to include Julia Nesheiwat and Michael Ellis. I believe this is a follow up to a discussion you had recently w/Ms. Nesheiwat. Please let me know if you would like to take the call at the CP or participate in person at the WH. Thanks.

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 7:18:21 PM  
**To:** "Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC" [redacted]  
**Cc:** "DL NSC NSA FO Staff" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Meeting Tomorrow

Hi, Brandon - would you mind giving me a call - 703-635-6950. Thank you.

**From:** "Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 7:03:15 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "DL NSC NSA FO Staff" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Meeting Tomorrow

Hi [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

APDNSA Pottinger would like to schedule a discussion ahead of Thursday's DC meetings. Is AMB Grenell available for a meeting or secure call at 2:00pm tomorrow?

Many thanks,  
Brandon

**Brandon T. Holt**  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
D: [redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 12:43 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Deirdre M Walsh; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: New Hire

Ambassador - (b)(6) (b)(3)

Deirdre mentioned you wanted to see the incoming email from SSCI about [Redacted] hire. Please find it below from around midnight Friday. [Redacted] frequently asks us about very tactical issues at the ODNI. I have not responded, letting your letter to Chairman Schiff on managing the workforce speak for itself. I only flagged for Deirdre because on occasion, when I do not respond, staff will reach out to her as the former OLA Director and I wanted to ensure she and I took similar approaches. Please advise if you would like us to change course and respond.

Ryan

(b)(6) (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** [Redacted] (Intelligence) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 01, 2020 11:49 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (Intelligence) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** New Hire (b)(6)

I understand that [Redacted] is joining ODNI as a deputy COO. Can you please provide the particulars on his hire — was the job posted on USAJOBS with a competitive selection process, is he being hired as HQE or term hire or Schedule A/B/C, at what grade, etc.?

Many thanks (b)(6)  
(b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:25 PM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Novartis / [Redacted] Follow Up (b)(6)

Just so you are tracking [Redacted] Know you had  
talked to someone in Novartis previously [Redacted]  
(b)(6)

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:23 PM  
**To:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC  
**Cc:** Cotter, John M. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Novartis / [Redacted] Follow Up (b)(6)

Some context to the email from Poblete re: Novartis.

[Large Redacted Block]

(b)(6)

Thanks!

Dustin

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:53 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Novartis [Redacted] Follow Up (b)(6)

FYI for you. Give me a call at your numbers to discuss if you're interested. [Redacted] (b)(6)

Joe

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:23 PM  
**To:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC  
**Cc:** Cotter, John M. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Novartis [Redacted] Follow Up (b)(6)

Some context to the email from Poblete re: Novartis.

[Large Redacted Area]

(b)(6)

Thanks!

Dustin

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 4:30 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Nunes letter

Fysa.

[redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** Corin R Stone (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 08, 2020 4:28 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] Bradley A Brooker  
**Cc:** [redacted] James A Smith ; Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** Re: Nunes letter

Terrific, thank you!

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 at 4:14:57 PM  
**To:** "Corin R Stone" [redacted] "Bradley A Brooker"  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
"James A Smith" [redacted] "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Nunes letter (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(6)

We discussed this a bit today and [redacted] Ryan and [redacted] have waiting tomorrow a rough outline of an approach I am suggesting. We will want to make sure the response tracks with how the issues raised on page two the letter are addressed in materials being prepared for confirmation hearings. Some of the questionnaire answers prepared last week provide good fodder for the response to this tasker.

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Corin R Stone (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 08, 2020 3:59 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] Bradley A Brooker  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Nunes letter (b)(6)

Thanks [redacted] a lot of people will want to help frame the response, including OGC, I suspect. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted] can someone on your team (might be SP vice IMD, or both) take the lead for engaging with the relevant ODNI players to draft a short reply? (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(Your team may have already received this on other system but wanted to make sure you're aware.)

Thanks,

Corin

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 at 1:18:22 PM  
**To:** "Corin R Stone" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: Nunes letter (b)(6)

Fysa. We originally tasked this as NCSC lead, but they (NCSC) suggested SE/ID take the lead given the declassification request.

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 08, 2020 1:17 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Nunes letter

Copy. Will do.

I've tasked this to Corin's group (the classification experts) with input from/collaboration with Leg Affairs and NCSC (Bill Evanina).

R/ [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 08, 2020 12:30 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Nunes letter (b)(6)

Can you include this in the package tomorrow?

**From:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Wednesday, 8. April 2020 at 10:51:33 AM  
**To:** [redacted] "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Nunes letter (b)(3)

Yes we do. Attached for reference.

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 07, 2020 9:48 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Nunes letter

I think we have a Nunes letter to answer. Correct?



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 9, 2020 2:37 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: PPO Outreach

(b)(6)

I actually really liked [Redacted] I'll take a more in-depth look at things at DoD (with the DUSD having been picked)... But let me know if he may have application at ODNI.

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 8, 2020 3:28 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Re: PPO Outreach

Hi Troup.

At home this week as my outfit on an A team B team alternate week schedule.

Just re-painted the pantry:)

Thought I would check in.

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 10:05 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** IncomingPPODocs  
**Subject:** RE: PPO Outreach

Phenomenal. Thank you, [Redacted] more soon.  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 10:00 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Cc:** IncomingPPODocs  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Re: PPO Outreach

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 3:43 PM

**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: PPO Outreach

[redacted] (b)(6)

Enjoyed the discussion. Here are the mentioned forms – thanks for the time.

(Would recommend PW protecting the bio sheet, and sending it in a separate email, or can take over the phone)

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel  
Mobile: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Office: [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 12:14 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Re: PPO Outreach

Sounds good, thanks!

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 12:12 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: PPO Outreach (b)(6)

Thank you for your prompt response- confirming 1030 Monday.

Here is the dial-in:  
Participant Dial-In: [redacted]  
Participant Code [redacted] (b)(6)

Have a great weekend.

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 9:02 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Re: PPO Outreach

Mr. Hemenway:

I am very much willing to serve as needed. Monday at 1030 works fine. Look forward to discussing.

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO

**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 8:39 PM

**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** PPO Outreach

[redacted] (b)(6)

As a brief introduction, I work on the National Security portfolio in Presidential Personnel – to include the Department of Defense.

Your resume was shared with me, along with an indication of your interest to serve in the Trump Administration. If that is the case, I'd like to discuss your background and areas of interest. How do you look Monday at 1030? If that works, I'll send an invitation with some dial-in information.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Respectfully,

Troup Hemenway

Presidential Personnel

Mobile: [redacted] (b)(6)

Office: [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 3:05 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(6) Annual Evaluation  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) 2020 PDF DS-5055.pdf

Kash,

I wanted to make sure you got my annual evaluation. It is mostly complete unless you have any questions or changes.

If you have no issues, then I plan on electronically signing for myself, you and the APNSA and submitting to the State Department on May 5<sup>th</sup>, ahead of next Friday's deadline.

v/r

(b)(6)  
From: (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 10:25 AM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** (b)(6) Annual Evaluation

Kash,

Good morning. I wanted to make sure that you got a copy of my annual foreign service evaluation.

I have listed you as my rater and (b)(6) as my reviewing officers. I have completed all sections of it as it is due next week.

I won't require a "wet" signature from the (b)(6) as the State Department understands that with the COVID-19, obtaining hard signatures this year may be too difficult.

Are you ok with me submitting to the State Department with electronic signatures for you and (b)(6)? I am happy to make any changes that you like too.

Hope all is well and great seeing you last week.

Best,

(b)(6)

**National Security Council – The White House**

**Unclass** (b)(6)  
**Cell** (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 6:12 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Ratcliffe Questionnaire  
**Attachments:** Ratcliffe Policy Questionnaire 3-30-20 600PM.pdf

FYSA

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 6:11 PM  
**To:** 'Amy.H.Swonger [redacted]' 'Telle, Adam R. EOP/WHO'  
**Cc:** Erin E Wilson (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Ratcliffe Questionnaire

Amy / Adam –

My leadership has instructed me to ship over the Ratcliffe policy questionnaire as it currently stands. [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please let me know if you have questions.

**Ryan P. Crumpler**  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
[redacted] Liberty Crossing 2 (b)(3)  
McLean, VA 22102  
[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Thursday, May 21, 2020 10:22 AM  
**To:** [redacted]; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: SHIFTED/PREVIEW [redacted] Schedule: Friday, May 22 - Friday, May 29, 2020 (b)(5)

All – please see below – they have shifted the Oval to earlier tomorrow. And we have tentative dates for next week.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Clemens, Nick J. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 10:16 AM  
**To:** Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO ; Luna, Nicholas F. EOP/WHO ; Michael, Molly A. EOP/WHO ; DL Chief of Staff Office ; OVPSchedule [redacted] Director-Staff ; DNI-Oval-Intel-Briefings ; DDIR-Staff ; DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; Ellis, Michael J. EOP/NSC ; Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO ; Balatan, Joseph A. EOP/NSC ; Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Cc:** DL WHO Scheduling [redacted]  
**Subject:** SHIFTED/PREVIEW - [redacted] Schedule: Friday, May 22 - Friday, May 29, 2020 (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Hi all, (b)(5)

The [redacted] scheduled for tomorrow has **SHIFTED** to **Friday, May 22, 2020 at 12:30 PM.**

Below is the updated [redacted] schedule, which includes a **PREVIEW** of next week. (b)(5)

- Friday, May 22, 2020: 12:30 PM**
- Monday, May 25, 2020: N/A
- Tuesday, May 26, 2020: 12:00 PM**
- Wednesday, May 27, 2020: N/A
- Thursday, May 28, 2020: N/A
- Friday, May 29, 2020: 11:30 AM**

Thank you,

Nick Clemens  
Office of Presidential Scheduling

[redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 11:04 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: SHIFTED/PREVIEW [Redacted] Schedule: Friday, May 22 - Friday, May 29, 2020 (b)(5)

Thank You, (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** Clemens, Nick J. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 10:16 AM  
**To:** Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO ; Luna, Nicholas F. EOP/WHO ; Michael, Molly A. EOP/WHO ; DL Chief of Staff Office ; OVPSchedule ; [Redacted] Director-Staff ; DNI-Oval-Intel-Briefings ; DDIR-Staff ; DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; Ellis, Michael J. EOP/NSC ; Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO ; Balatan, Joseph A. EOP/NSC ; Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC ; [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** DL WHO Scheduling (b)(3)  
**Subject:** SHIFTED/PREVIEW [Redacted] Schedule: Friday, May 22 - Friday, May 29, 2020 (b)(6)  
 [Redacted] (b)(5)

Hi all, (b)(5)

The [Redacted] scheduled for tomorrow has **SHIFTED** to **Friday, May 22, 2020 at 12:30 PM.**

Below is the updated [Redacted] schedule, which includes a **PREVIEW** of next week.  
 [Redacted] (b)(5)

- Friday, May 22, 2020: 12:30 PM**
- Monday, May 25, 2020: N/A
- Tuesday, May 26, 2020: 12:00 PM**
- Wednesday, May 27, 2020: N/A
- Thursday, May 28, 2020: N/A
- Friday, May 29, 2020: 11:30 AM**

Thank you,

Nick Clemens  
 Office of Presidential Scheduling

[Redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)

---

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 3:36 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: So nice to meet you!  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) [redacted] Resume 2020.docx; ATT00001.htm

Did I ever send this to you? We can discuss if you don't remember.

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 8:07 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** So nice to meet you!

HI Richard!

(b)(6)

It was so nice to meet you and your better half Saturday night. It was nice to be with such an intimate group of friends and family which is so rare these days. If you are back in [redacted] again, and want to have dinner , let me know when. We are having dinner with [redacted] (b)(6) this weekend if you are around?

[redacted] (b)(6)

BTW...I have said the T word and B word many times since we met and waiting for a knock at the door! LOL!

Hope you are safe and sound and have lots of Purell!

Love,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** January 23, 2020 at 4:12:10 PM EST  
**To:** Caroline Wren [redacted] (b)(6)





(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) [redacted] Thursday, May 28, 2020 8:50 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Trump Campaign Briefing...

FYI and awarnes....fella. Per below, Cannot get them here earlier. I have offered to go up to NJ as well. I think there is much risk here if we have a two week gap. But maybe we can mitigate it. I am personally calling [redacted] (b)(6) today. I don't trust anyone else for message on criticality. Keep you updated.

Also , contact made with [redacted] at Chief's office for scheduling with CoS.  
 I will call you tonite. (b)(6)

Cheers

Bill (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 28, 2020 8:37 AM  
**To:** 'bill evanina' ; [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Trump Campaign Briefing... (b)(6)

Boss, The briefing for the Trump Campaign will be on 11 June at 1000. We have just learned that the attendees will be:

[redacted] (b)(6)

V/r, [redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

NCSC Executive Officer  
 [redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 4:48 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP; (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Bradley A Brooker; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Update on CNs and Briefs?

Kash (and others) –

This the line of questioning I mentioned earlier in the week on hires, etc. Did you have a chance to talk to the AMB on the way forward? Thanks!

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** (Intelligence)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 4:26 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Cc:** (Intelligence) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Update on CNs and Briefs?

I think these all the questions/requests that have been posed over the last two weeks:

1. Written CN on the reorg announced last Friday
2. Written CN on COO reassignment, to include its date of effectiveness, designation of an acting COO, the workorce message that was dissemantead and follow-in assignment for the COO
3. Written CN appointment of a new PE, to include data effectiveness and whether he will simultaneously serve as C/NIC
4. Written answers to RFI regarding hires into ODNI under non-competitive methods (b)(3)
5. Written answer specifically as to the non-competitive method by which (b)(6) was hired (b)(6)
6. Written answer to RFI regarding number of and detailees brought over during Acting DNI Grenell's tenure
7. Briefing on reorganization cited above
8. Briefing on personnel matters cited above

I'd also like to make a 9th request: how many ODNI hires or detailees have occurred during Acting DNI Grenell's tenure with an exception, waiver, or condition under ICD 704, Sec. F, regardless if it was made by DNI, CIA, or another IC element?

Can you please provide us a status update on these requests so we can keep Committee Members informed?

Thanks,

(b)(6)

*Minority Budget Director  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 10:11 PM  
**Subject:** KASHYAPP  
Fwd: [EXTERNAL] You da man

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [Redacted] // C: [Redacted]

Secure: [Redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Date:** May 21, 2020 at 20:41:27 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC"  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] You da man

Kash (b)(6) (b)(6)

Thank you so much for the fast response, you are da man [Redacted] POC is the Deputy Director for White House fellows....her name is [Redacted] (I believe I have the spelling correct??)

Any help you can provide is greatly appreciated.... [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6) [Redacted] take care, please stay safe and tell the boss I said Hi!!

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

(b)(6) **From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
(b)(6) **Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 8:28 AM  
(b)(6) **To:** [Redacted]  
(b)(6) **Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] You da man (b)(6)

(b)(6) [Redacted]  
Great to hear from you my friend. I enjoyed catching up. Can you please send me the poc [Redacted] has been working with at wh so that I can call them directly? [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
I'll tell the boss bs says what's up.

(b)(6)

On May 20, 2020, at 20:04, [Redacted] wrote:

Kash

It was awesome talking with today, hopefully you can take some well deserved time off and visit us in NC....I promise, you will have a ball!!!! (b)(6)

On to business, (b)(6)

Obviously, I would never send a name your way which would not be top notch. Please take care, stay safe and healthy and please tell my President that (b)(6) says hi and keep up the good fight....cause, we in Eastern NC Ain't quitin'. (b)(6)

Take care, talk with you soon

(b)(6)

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

**From:** (b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 6:56 AM

**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC

**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] You da man

Kash

(b)(6) I hope this email finds you well and healthy! I left you a voice mail, you can reach me at

(b)(6) I have a few telecons this morning, if I don't answer, please leave a message and I will give you a call.

Take care and talk to you soon

(b)(6)

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 6:50 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] You da man (b)(6)

What is your number, or can you call me at (b)(6) thanks

On Mar 23, 2020, at 20:23, (b)(6) wrote:

Kash

(b)(6)

That is great news, so happy to hear you are safe and sound....I had someone test positive in (b)(6) on my floor, so I moved everyone to 100% telework, actually, our productivity has soared. We left the swamp on Wednesday, and I am hunkered down at the beach enjoying fresh clean air. Stay safe and healthy and I am in hope that we get to see (and drink) with you in the very near future

(b)(6)

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC

**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 6:05 PM

(b)(6)

**To:** (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] You da man  
Doing wel (b)(6) thanks for checking in. How are you guys?

(b)(6)

On Mar 22, 2020, at 11:54, [redacted] wrote:

(b)(6)

Kash

Just a quick note to check on you, I hope are safe and healthy!!

(b)(6)

[redacted]

Sent from Mail for Windows 10

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Friday, January 3, 2020 4:36 PM

**To:** [redacted]

**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] You da man

(b)(6)

[redacted]

great to hear from you. Lets connect next week for sure. And thanks. Win for 'Murica

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]

**Sent:** Friday, January 3, 2020 11:30 AM

**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC

**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] You da man

I am in NC currently, will be back in DC next week. Let me know when you have some time and we will have lunch. I hope all is well...and by the way, great job

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC"

Date: 12/11/19 10:43 (GMT-05:00)

(b)(6)

To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] You da man

(b)(6)

[redacted]

An honor to have yall visit, we will make sure next time you remember the hat. I had a blast

I'm at [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(6)

I am free next week, and would love to sync. Lets find a date/time that works. Looking forward to it. Thanks much

Kash Patel

Senior Director for Counterterrorism

National Security Council

(b)(6)

O [redacted] / C [redacted]

Secure: [redacted]

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From [redacted]

Sent: Tuesday, December 10, 2019 5:20 PM


To: Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
Subject: [EXTERNAL] You da man

Kash

I want to thank you for the wonderful tour on Sunday, it truly was very special! I haven't taken off my TRUMP 2020 hat since we returned to the apartment.

Please send me your home address when you have a free moment...also, let me know if you have any free time next week, I have a few questions for you and need your sage advice. I'm meeting with a few Congressmen and PSM's (HASC & SASC) after the first of the year.

Take care, be safe and talk with you soon

 (b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

April 17, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request was being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of fifty-seven (57) documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request. Upon review, we have determined that eleven (11) of documents being release to you in full (Bates Pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000144 – 000146, 000148 – 000151, 000158, 000160 – 000162, 000164, 000175 – 000178, 000180, 000182 – 000183, 000185, 000193 – 000194, and 000202 – 000205). Further, forty-two (42) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000126 – 000130, 000136 – 000143, 000147. 000152 – 000157, 000159, 000163, 000165 – 000174, 000179, 000181, 000184, 000186 – 000192, 000195, 000197 – 000201, and 000206 – 000208) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statue 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.


The remaining four (4) documents are being withheld in full (Bates Pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000131– 000135 and 000196).

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 236 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.



If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

*for* 

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(S)(U)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 6:05 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** call me pls asap

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2 (b)(3)

McLean, VA 22102

(S) [Redacted] | (U) [Redacted]  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**Sent:**

Friday, May 22, 2020 3:17 PM

(b)(6)

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Call this weekend?

If you get the chance, my number is

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

*Office of Legislative Affairs*

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

S [Redacted]

| U: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 2:16 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Can you give me a buzz ASAP

A few updated for you and haven't been able to catch you

Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[redacted] Liberty Crossing 2 (b)(3)

McLean, VA 22102

(S) [redacted] (U) [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**

**Sent:**

Saturday, May 16, 2020 2:30 PM

**To:**

(b)(3)

**Cc:**

(b)(6)

KASHYAPP; Ryan Crumpler

**Subject:**

CONFIRMED: NS2 Meeting at 5PM Monday with A-DNI and Senators Cruz/Shahen

Hi (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Ref our conversations and sometimes yesterday, I've now received final confirmations today from the Senators' offices for the Ambassador's NS2 meeting with Senators Cruz and Shaheen on Monday at 5pm in Rm SVC-217 (Office of Senate Security) at the Capitol. Senator Cotton also plans to join, and we're still working a couple others (those that had cosponsored the related sanctions legislation).

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) and I are tracking the prep materials on high side that (b)(6) in NIM-ET worked on yesterday. I'll pass clearances Monday am on high side and will need the Ambassador's info to complete that (sametime fine). I'll arrange separate transportation for (b)(6) from OLA unless Amb will be departing for Hill from LX vs downtown, and wants (b)(6) to ride with him. Otherwise, we'll plan to meet Amb upon his arrival with DPS on Senate side.

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Hope the rest of your weekend is pleasant and relaxing.

(b)(6)

Best regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**Sent:**

Friday, May 22, 2020 11:49 AM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

(b)(6)

Couple of Additional Resumes

(b)(6)

**Attachments:**

Resume [Redacted] 2020\_v1.pdf; [Redacted] Resume\_2020.pdf; Resume - [Redacted].pdf

(b)(6)

Morning Kash,

Hey, I just had a couple of other resumes of folks that JLR wanted to keep in mind for possible positions at ODNi that we may want to discuss when we have an opportunity [Redacted] was our national security/intel fellow at came over from DIA a couple of years ago. Amazing guy and who has high interest in helping JLR in any capacity and has all the clearances, etc. needed to rotate in either on joint duty or in another manner.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) [Redacted] is currently at a private law practice but worked for JLR for several years here on the Hill. Whip smart lawyer that JLR trusts but would possibly be a good addition as well and has also expressed interest to myself and JLR.

(b)(6)

I've had a few other folks reach out as well and press resumes our way including [Redacted] who was the counsel over at Judiciary that got shifted over to OGR after [Redacted] took over. I haven't spoken to JLR about him yet but he expressed interest in the GC office to be of assistance if there was possibilities and wanted to put on radar.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff

Congressman John Ratcliffe (TX-04)

223 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, D.C. | Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**

Ryan Crumpler

**Sent:**

Friday, March 27, 2020 1:31 PM

**To:**

(b)(3)

Amanda J Schoch;

KASHYAPP

**Cc:**

COVID-19 Supplemental

(b)(3)

**Subject:**

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

AMB –

The COVID-19 supplemental just passed the House by voice vote avoiding a massive delay by having to bring back members to DC for a recorded vote. The bill is now on its way to POTUS for signature.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(S)

(U)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**Sent:**

Tuesday, May 26, 2020 4:00 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

[Redacted] meet with DNI

(b)(6)

Can they meet Thursday morning at 0930 or 1000?

It will be [Redacted] and me.

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6)



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6)

Ryan Crumpler

**Sent:**

Monday, May 4, 2020 8:15 PM

**To:**

[Redacted] (b)(3)

**Cc:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Evanina

AMB-

This evening Leader McConnell filed cloture on Evanina's confirmation. This starts the overall clock. Without getting into all the gritty details of process this all means we will likely see Bill come to a vote middle of next week. [Redacted] Will keep you appraised.

(b)(5)

Ryan

Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2  
McLean, VA 22102

(b)(3)

(S) [Redacted]

(U) [Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:**

(b)(6)

Ryan Crumpler

**Sent:**

Wednesday, May 6, 2020 2:13 PM

**To:**

[Redacted] (b)(3)

**Cc:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Evanina

AMB –

Final approval vote for Bill just started. He will be confirmed shortly.

Ryan

ADNI/LA

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 28, 2020 5:29 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Friday

Let's try and catch up tomorrow. Have a few things to share.

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
*Office of Legislative Affairs*  
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
 (b)(3) Liberty Crossing 2  
 [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 s: [Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(6)  
 (b)(6)  
 (b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**Sent:**

Friday, May 22, 2020 12:15 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Friday

Hey Kash,

Are you still in the building today? I wanted to swing by.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

*Office of Legislative Affairs*

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

Liberty Crossing 2

[Redacted]

S:

[Redacted]

U:

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 29, 2020 4:06 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Friday

Stopped by your office when I get back. Are you still around today?

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

*Office of Legislative Affairs*  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) [Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

S: [Redacted] U: [Redacted]

(b)(6)  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 2, 2020 1:29 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; [Redacted] Beth E. Sanner  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes)  
**Attachments:** 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes).pdf

AMB –

Please see incoming letter from Chairman Grassley. Will send high side attachment once received.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(b)(3)

(S) [Redacted] (U) [Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance) (b)(3)

**Sent:** Thursday, April 02, 2020 1:13 PM (b)(6)

**To:** [Redacted] Ryan Crumpler

(b)(6)

**Cc:** CEG; [Redacted] (Finance); [Redacted] (HSGAC)

(b)(3)

**Subject:** 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes)

(b)(6)

[Redacted] and Ryan,

Please see the attached letter from Chairmen Grassley and Johnson. Senate Security will be sending you the classified letter referenced in the attached letter today. Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel

Chairman Charles E. Grassley

U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED

**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 2, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Dear Ambassador Grenell:

On January 28, 2020, we sent a classified letter to Attorney General Barr requesting that he declassify four footnotes that we identified after reviewing the Justice Department Inspector General's classified report on the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.<sup>1</sup> In the unclassified cover letter, which we have attached hereto, we explained that this classified information provides insight essential for an accurate evaluation of the entire investigation, and the public interest in the disclosure of the information outweighs the need to protect it.


Since sending that letter, we have had very fruitful discussions with the Justice Department. We very much appreciate Attorney General Barr's focus on transparency and his understanding that this important information ought to be public. However, there are several sections of the footnotes that certain members of the Intelligence Community are concerned about declassifying. Accordingly, we are forwarding you our classified letter to Attorney General Barr, and we request that you ensure that all the footnotes are declassified to the fullest extent possible so that the American people have a full understanding of what transpired during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

If you have any questions about this request, please contact Joshua Flynn-Brown of Chairman Grassley's staff at (202) 224-4515 or Joseph Folio of Chairman Johnson's staff at (202) 224-4751. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf>.

UNCLASSIFIED

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000144

[REDACTED]  
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 28, 2020

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Attorney General Barr:

(U) The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Finance are continuing oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its Crossfire Hurricane investigation. We have reviewed the classified report of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) with regard to the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation, and we are deeply concerned about certain information that remains classified.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, we are concerned that certain sections of the public version of the report are misleading because they are contradicted by relevant and probative classified information redacted in four footnotes. This classified information is significant not only because it contradicts key statements in a section of the report, but also because it provides insight essential for an accurate evaluation of the entire investigation. The American people have a right to know what is contained within these four footnotes and, without that knowledge, they will not have a full picture as to what happened during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Congress and the Executive Branch should not be the only custodians of this information and the public interest in the disclosure of the information outweighs the need to protect it.

(U) Consequently, we are writing to respectfully request that you, pursuant to the declassification authority delegated to you by the President over matters related to this investigation, fully declassify the four footnotes to ensure that this information is made available to the American people.<sup>2</sup> We are enclosing a classified letter that identifies these four footnotes and explains the importance of this information to a complete understanding of the OIG report and the underlying Crossfire Hurricane investigation.

---

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum on Agency Cooperation with Attorney General's Review of Intelligence Activities Relating to the 2016 Presidential Campaigns (May 23, 2019), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-agency-cooperation-attorney-generals-review-intelligence-activities-relating-2016-presidential-campaigns/>.

[REDACTED]  
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)



[REDACTED]  
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

(U) Should you have any questions, please contact Joseph Folio of Chairman Johnson's staff at (202) 224-4751 and Joshua Flynn-Brown of Chairman Grassley's staff at (202) 224-4515.

(U) Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Finance Committee

Encl: Classified Letter to Attorney General Barr

cc: The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Ron Wyden  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz  
Inspector General

[REDACTED]  
(UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:01 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** RICHARDG  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Amanda J Schoch; [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: Chairman Schiff Letter to Acting DNI Grenell  
**Attachments:** 20200407 - CHM Letter to Acting DNI.pdf; ATT00001.htm

Ambassador – below is the transmission email per your request.

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 1:14 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler; [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Chairman Schiff Letter to Acting DNI Grenell

Ryan -

Please find attached a letter from Chairman Schiff to Acting Director Grenell. Please confirm receipt for ODNI.

We look forward to ODNI's cooperation.

Best, (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

General Counsel  
 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)  
 Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

ADAM B. SCHIFF, CALIFORNIA  
CHAIRMAN

TIMOTHY BERGHEEN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
(202) 225-7690  
www.intelligence.house.gov



ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

DEVIN NUNES, CALIFORNIA  
RANKING MEMBER

ALLEN SOUZA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

**Permanent Select Committee  
on Intelligence  
U.S. House of Representatives**

April 7, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

I am writing to express my concern that you are pursuing organizational and personnel changes at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) without consulting and seeking authorization from Congress and in a manner that undermines critical intelligence functions. This effort appears to be proceeding despite the Coronavirus pandemic and amid indications, exemplified by a March 10 briefing to Members of Congress, of political interference in the production and dissemination of intelligence. These developments call into question both your commitment to ensuring that the Intelligence Community's (IC) work on behalf of our nation is not inappropriately influenced by political considerations, as required by law and that the IC will continue to speak truth to power.

Consistent with Congress' longstanding, bipartisan commitment to ensuring the independence of the IC, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the Committee) will undertake additional oversight of the following intelligence activities:

- 1. Reorganization of ODNI.** Congress has neither authorized organizational changes at ODNI, nor appropriated funds for that purpose. Additionally, ODNI has not communicated to the Committee any intelligence rationale for potential changes to ODNI's staffing and structure, including reductions to the staff of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or in the overall number of IC personnel detailed to ODNI in support of core functions. The Committee is concerned, moreover, by the removal or departure of every Senate-confirmed official at ODNI, as well as of other senior officials across ODNI's leadership team, including NCTC Acting Director Russell Travers and Acting Deputy Director Peter Hall.

President Trump did not nominate you for confirmation as permanent DNI, and it would be inappropriate for you to pursue any additional leadership, organizational, or staffing changes to ODNI during your temporary tenure. Any effort, moreover, to remove or otherwise initiate personnel actions against apolitical career officers based on their perceived loyalty to the President would contravene civil service protections.

To inform the Committee's oversight, you are requested to provide by **April 16, 2020**: (a) a detailed written explanation for all potential organizational and personnel changes at ODNI, including, but not limited to, NCTC, under active consideration; (b) a list of all third parties with whom you or your staff consulted regarding the potential organizational changes; and (c) all internal communications and records, including any with the White House, pertaining to the removal of Russell Travers as Acting Director of NCTC and the departure of Peter Hall as Acting Deputy Director.

- 2. Termination of the IC Inspector General (IC IG).** Late in the evening of April 3, President Trump announced that he was firing Michael Atkinson, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG). The next day, the President confirmed publicly that he had fired Mr. Atkinson because Mr. Atkinson had sought to transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a credible whistleblower complaint of urgent concern—one that implicated the President himself and was required by law to be transmitted to Congress.<sup>1</sup> President Trump's remarks leave no doubt that his firing of Mr. Atkinson was politically motivated reprisal. As Mr. Atkinson himself observed on April 5, "it is hard not to think that the President's loss of confidence in me derives from my having faithfully discharged my legal obligations as an independent and impartial Inspector General, and from my commitment to continue to do so."<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Atkinson acted with the highest integrity and remarkable professionalism, even as he was falsely attacked by the President and his supporters in Congress for staying true to his oath. Your predecessor, then-Acting DNI Joseph Maguire, confirmed this when he testified before the Committee in September 2019 that Mr. Atkinson's handling of the Ukraine whistleblower matter was fully consistent with the law and established procedures. Consequently, the Committee is reviewing the circumstances of Mr. Atkinson's dismissal, including whether his termination was intended to curb any ongoing investigations or reviews being undertaken by his office.

Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 5033(f), you are hereby requested to confirm in writing to the Committee by **April 16, 2020**, whether you have ever exercised your authority to prohibit Mr. Atkinson, or recently named Acting IC IG, Thomas Monheim, from "initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review" and, if so, the nature of the investigation(s) prohibited and the reasons for the exercise of such authority.

The Committee also requests that you provide by **April 16, 2020**, a written certification from the Acting General Counsel of ODNI that officials, yourself included, will not permit

---

<sup>1</sup> The White House, *Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Briefing* (Apr. 4, 2020) (Remarks of President Trump) ("I thought he [Mr. Atkinson] did a terrible job. Absolutely terrible. He took a whistleblower report, which turned out to be a fake report — it was fake. It was totally wrong. It was about my conversation with the President of Ukraine. He took a fake report and he brought it to Congress, with an emergency. Okay? Not a big Trump fan — that, I can tell you."), available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-19>.

<sup>2</sup> Statement by Michael Atkinson, April 5, 2020.

retaliation or reprisals against anyone who has made, or in the future makes, protected disclosures of misconduct to Congress or Inspectors General.

Finally, you are also reminded of your legal obligation under 50 U.S.C. § 5033(k)(1) to submit to the Committee **on or before May 30, 2020** the IC IG's semi-annual report for the six-month period ending March 31, 2020. By law, that report must contain, among other things: (1) a "list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted during the period covered by such report"; (2) a "description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities of the intelligence community within the responsibility and authority of the [DNI]"; and (3) a "certification of whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General."<sup>3</sup>

- 3. Election Security.** Reports indicate that one or more members of your staff may be inappropriately interfering with the production and briefing of intelligence information on election security to Congress, including information that was briefed to all Members on March 10.<sup>4</sup> If accurate, this politicization of intelligence would constitute a grave breach of your duty as Acting DNI to preserve the independence of the IC, protect the integrity of U.S. elections, and keep the Congress fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, including by providing national intelligence that is "independent of political considerations."<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, it calls into doubt whether Congress and the American people can trust that the IC will continue producing unvarnished intelligence assessments on foreign interference efforts as the 2020 presidential election approaches. The Committee will be undertaking vigorous oversight of these matters and expects that ODNI will refrain from seeking to influence or otherwise interfere in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, including to Congress.

As part of the Committee's oversight, you are requested to produce to the Committee by **April 16, 2020**, any and all communications regarding the participation of the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center in the March 10 briefing, as well as any and all communications regarding the assessment that he presented at the briefing. Further, the next elections security quarterly update to House committees from the Intelligence Community Executive and Leadership Board is due in May. It is critical that Congress remain apprised of activities surrounding the security of the 2020 presidential election,

<sup>3</sup> 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(1)(B).

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., *Intelligence Officials Temper Russia Warnings, Prompting Accusations of Political Influence*, N.Y. Times (Mar. 10, 2020), online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/politics/election-interference-briefing-trump.html>.

<sup>5</sup> 50 U.S.C. §3024(a)(1) and (2). ("(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided—(A) to the President; (B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch; (C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders; (D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof; and (E) to such other persons as the Director of National Intelligence determines to be appropriate. (2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, *independent of political considerations*, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities." (emphasis added)).

especially during the Coronavirus pandemic. Accordingly, the Committee requests a written elections security update by **May 30, 2020**.

The Committee expects ODNI's full cooperation on these and other matters, consistent with the statutory obligation, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 3091, to keep the Committee "fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States," and also in furtherance of the constructive relationship that has existed between the Committee and your office under prior DNIs. I also look forward to your appearance before the Committee at the earliest practicable opportunity.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Adam B. Schiff". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "A" and "S".

Adam B. Schiff  
Chairman

Cc: The Honorable Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:06 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [Redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: Crawford letter regarding EO INT  
**Attachments:** 4.7.20 Crawford EOINT letter.pdf; ATT00001.htm

Ambassador –

Please see incoming correspondence addressed to you just received from Rep. Crawford of the HPSCI.

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:00 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** Crawford letter regarding EO INT

Ryan,

I hope you're doing well. I have attached a letter to DNI from Congressman Crawford regarding explosive ordnance intelligence.

V/r,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Legislative Assistant  
Congressman Rick Crawford

(b)(3) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) (b)(6)

---

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 6:41 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: DGN meet with DNI

Kash – sorry, meant to copy you.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 8:38 PM (b)(6)

(b)(3) **To:** George.Pappas (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) **Cc:** [redacted] DNI-Protocol ; Ryan Crumpler [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: DGN meet with DNI (b)(6)

[redacted] would Congressman Nunes be available to meet w/DNI Ratcliffe on Thursday, 28 May, at 9:30, at our McLean HQs?

**From:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov> (b)(3)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 at 6:48:08 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: DGN meet with DNI (b)(6)

Please reach out to [redacted] and schedule congressman nunes to visit with John as below. Thanks

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 at 16:00:05  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** DGN meet with DNI

Can they meet Thursday morning at 0930 or 1000?

It will be DGN and me.

Sent from my iPhone



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Bradley A Brooker (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 10, 2020 1:21 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Beth E. Sanner; KASHYAPP; Ryan Crumpler; [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Farewell

Just in case you were not tracking.

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 10, 2020 1:15 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Farewell

IC Colleagues,

As some of you may have heard, today is my last day at HPSCI. Starting Monday, I transition to the White House to serve as Principal Deputy Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the NSC. While I am excited about this new opportunity, it is a bittersweet time and I will miss working on the Hill.

(b)(6)

Moving forward, [Redacted] (cc'd) will serve as the interim minority staff director on HPSCI. [Redacted] (also cc'd) is the minority's new general counsel.

Best,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Republican Staff Director & General Counsel  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

[Redacted] (b)(6)

*This email and any related documents, notes, draft legislation, recommendations, reports, or other materials generated or received by the Members or staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence are congressional records and remain subject to the Committee's control, and are entrusted to your agency only for use in handling this matter. Any such documents created or compiled by an agency in connection with any response to this Committee document or any related Committee communications, whether made by phone, email, or document, including any replies to the Committee, are also records of the Committee and remain subject to the Committee's control. Accordingly, the aforementioned documents are not "agency records" for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act or any other law, and should be segregated from agency records.*

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) [Redacted]  
**To:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 11:40 AM  
**Subject:** KASHYAPP  
 FW: House drops plan to return to Washington next week

**Importance:** High

House is not returning next week .... Will impact our nominee and other meetings schedules.

**From:** POLITICO Pro (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 28, 2020 11:36 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** House drops plan to return to Washington next week

**House drops plan to return to Washington next week**

By Heather Caygle

04/28/2020 11:15 AM EDT

House leadership has reversed course and will not bring the chamber back into session next week.

House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer made the announcement this morning, citing advice from the Capitol physician and a continuing increase in coronavirus cases in the Washington, D.C., area.

"We made a judgment that we will not come back next week but that we hope to come back very soon," Hoyer said.

*To view online:*  
<https://subscriber.politicopro.com/ehealth/whiteboard/2020/04/house-drops-plan-to-return-to-washington-next-week-3979887>

**You received this POLITICO Pro content because your customized settings include: Disease Prevention, Infectious Diseases. To change your alert settings, please go to <https://subscriber.politicopro.com/settings>.**



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

This email alert has been sent for the exclusive use of POLITICO Pro subscriber [Redacted]. Forwarding or reproducing the alert without the express, written permission of POLITICO Pro is a violation of copyright law and the POLITICO Pro subscription agreement.

Copyright © 2020 by POLITICO LLC. To subscribe to Pro, please go to [politicopro.com](https://politicopro.com).

This email was sent to  by: (b)(3)  
POLITICO, LLC (b)(6)  
1000 Wilson Blvd.  
Arlington, VA 22209  
USA

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 7:49 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fw: Letter for Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** RM ltr to AG & A-DNI re DOJ IG Redactions - 8 April 20.pdf

FYSA.

[Redacted] (b)(6)

Republican Budget Director & Investigations Coordinator  
United States House of Representatives  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
Capitol Visitor Center, HVC-304  
Washington, DC 20515

O: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
C: [Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)

**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 19:48

**To:** Ryan Crumpler

**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** Letter for Acting Director Grenell

Ryan,

Attached please find a letter from Ranking Member Nunes for Acting Director Grenell.

Best,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

Republican Budget Director & Investigations Coordinator  
United States House of Representatives  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
Capitol Visitor Center, HVC-304  
Washington, DC 20515

O: [Redacted]  
C: [Redacted] (b)(6)

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

April 8, 2020

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Rick Grenell  
Director of National Intelligence (Acting)  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell:

After careful review and in concurrence with requests made by Senator Grassley and others, I write to urge the declassification of redacted information contained in the December 2019 report by Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz, which detailed abuses related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

It is my strong belief that information redacted from the Inspector General's public report provides compelling evidence necessary to fully understand the severity of the misconduct. As such, additional transparency is of the highest public interest. Declassification is also necessary to expose actions, including possible criminal wrongdoing, by former officials and certain senior Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials.

In light of the magnitude of these abuses, as many redactions as possible should be removed from the Inspector General's report, with the proper attention paid to protecting legitimate sources and methods.

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

Sincerely,



Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

UNCLASSIFIED

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000158

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler  
 Friday, March 27, 2020 4:47 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Letter for Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** RM ltr to Acting DNI Grenell re Safeguarding of Materials - 27 Mar 20.pdf

Ambassador –

Please find attached incoming correspondence just received from RM Nunes. Thank you!

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 4:34 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Letter for Acting Director Grenell

Ryan,

Attached please find a letter from Ranking Member Nunes for Acting Director Grenell.

Best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Republican Budget Director & Investigations Coordinator  
 United States House of Representatives  
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
 Capitol Visitor Center, HVC-304

Sent from my iPhone

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

March 27, 2020

The Honorable Rick Grenell  
Director of National Intelligence (Acting)  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Ambassador Grenell:

I write to express my concerns with respect to the inadequate safeguarding of classified information shared with the House of Representatives, specifically, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI or the Committee) of which I serve as Ranking Member.

Since the election of President Trump, secret innuendo and selective leaks of classified information have been used by the Administration's opponents to undermine the President and advance partisan political interests. Unfortunately, several sources of alleged leaked information have been attributed to closed door intelligence briefings and hearings held by HPSCI.

In addition to leaks associated with Committee events, there is a risk of leaks of information associated with intelligence information provided to HPSCI, such as serialized intelligence reports. This risk is clearly evident upon examination of document production requests from the Committee to the Intelligence Community (IC) during the House Majority's 2019 impeachment inquiry. As you know, impeachment is a purely political exercise, and an evaluation of the numerous partisan requests transmitted from HPSCI to the IC leads to the singular conclusion that information is being sought by the Committee for political and not legitimate oversight purposes.

For example, the Committee sought intelligence reports on named foreign persons who are themselves legitimate foreign intelligence targets but, most importantly, are believed by the Chairman to have been in contact with one of his political opponents—a U.S. person. The classified document requests are best characterized as a political fishing expedition and an abuse of power by the Chairman.

The use of the IC to advance a personal vendetta against political opponents is abhorrent. The fact that these requests are shrouded in the cloak of "legitimate Congressional oversight" does not alter this fundamental fact. Any information produced as a result of these requests may be selectively leaked, which is the only logical motivation for such activity.

As a former Chairman of the Committee, I must underscore that requests for documents and other material from the IC has been an important part of lawful Congressional oversight

**UNCLASSIFIED**

work. The Committee has a legitimate oversight need to review such information. What is unprecedented and improper is the political nature of such requests.

Committee Republicans have directly confronted the Chairman about the number of leaks that are directly or likely related to Committee activity. There are numerous mechanisms that have long been in place to ensure proper safeguarding of classified information by the Committee. However, the effectiveness of these measures is largely dependent on the commitment of the Committee's Chairman. They include:

- **Executive Session:** The Committee conducts the majority of its work, including unclassified business, in executive session. This establishes an additional requirement of a full committee vote prior to the release of any transcripts or documents.
- **Secrecy Oath:** Members of Congress must sign a secrecy oath as a condition of receiving classified information. This is documented in the Congressional record.
- **Committee Oath:** Members and staff must sign an additional secrecy oath maintained by the Committee.
- **Non-Disclosure Agreements:** Committee staff sign non-disclosure agreements prior to receiving access to classified information. For the more sensitive programs and activities, additional non-disclosure agreements are required and the number of staff with access is limited.
- **Security Clearances:** Committee staff are required to maintain, at minimum, a Top Secret security clearance, pursuant to applicable laws and policy, and are subject to periodic re-investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation every five years.
- **Committee Rules:** Members and staff are prohibited from discussing or disclosing the classified substance of the work of the Committee, any information received in executive session, any classified information from any source, the substance of any hearings that was closed to the public. The Chairman is responsible for the supervision and direction of security and nondisclosure of classified information.
- **Federal Laws:** The Espionage Act and other federal laws apply to Members of Congress and staff.

As previously noted, the above mechanisms are dependent on the Committee Chairman's commitment to safeguarding classified information. That commitment is no longer evident. The resulting impact on national security has been very serious, in some instances threatening the lives of intelligence assets and blinding our nation to streams of information needed to protect the American people from foreign threats. Due to the justifiable need to protect sources and methods, the real damage of these leaks remains classified. However, in the absence of prosecutions, political activists throughout the government are emboldened to commit their own criminal disclosures.

The significance of the problem, as well as the cavalier attitude of some Members of Congress toward secrecy, was plainly evident during a February 13, 2020 election security briefing. During that classified briefing, a Democratic Member of the Committee made a statement suggesting the need of Members to discuss the content of the classified briefing. The

**UNCLASSIFIED**

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000161



**UNCLASSIFIED**

Member's statement was not itself evidence of a leak, but it demonstrates that the secrecy of Committee proceedings is not respected by all Members.

During my tenure as Chairman, I frequently admonished Members and staff not to discuss any Committee business with the media, whether classified or not. In fact, most Committee events were noticed in a manner which sought to minimize publicity for the topics under examination. I frequently engaged with Members, House Leadership, and the Administration with my concerns related to leaks—chief among them the fact that the volume of leaks associated with Congressional oversight activities had risen sharply under President Trump. Some of these leaks were documented in the Committee's March 2018 Report on Russian Active Measures.

The identification of those responsible for leaks, particularly without the cooperation of Congress, may be challenging. Leaks could be from Administration officials, Committee Members, staff, or a combination thereof. Others within the IC could also be responsible, timing their leaks to coincide with publicly announced Committee events. However, the direct association of leaks with Committee oversight activity suggests that Congressional oversight is being used to shield criminal disclosures.


As Acting Director of National Intelligence, I urge you to consider the imposition of access limitations for categories of information likely to be leaked for political purposes. To accomplish this, you could leverage appropriate mechanisms, such as Gang of Eight restrictions, which protect the legitimate oversight functions of Congress.

In addition, engagements with the House of Representatives should be carefully evaluated on the basis of security until a bipartisan consensus can be reached that information will be properly safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure. I am confident you can achieve improved security against leaks while preserving necessary Congressional oversight, particularly if engagement and access by Members and staff follow the longstanding policy of "need to know."

You can be assured of my support for such action, and I am confident you will receive the support of House Republicans and all Americans who share a desire to prevent the intentional unauthorized disclosures of classified information for political purposes.

I thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

Copy to: Mr. Robert O'Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**UNCLASSIFIED**

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000162

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 8:55 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Letter for Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** RM ltr to AG & A-DNI re DOJ IG Redactions - 8 April 20.pdf

Ambassador –

Please find attached recently received letter from RM Nunes to you and AG Barr.

Ryan

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 7:48 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter for Acting Director Grenell

Ryan,

Attached please find a letter from Ranking Member Nunes for Acting Director Grenell.

Best,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

Republican Budget Director & Investigations Coordinator  
 United States House of Representatives  
 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
 Capitol Visitor Center, HVC-304  
 Washington, DC 20515

O: [Redacted]  
 C: [Redacted] (b)(6)

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

April 8, 2020

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Ave, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Rick Grenell  
Director of National Intelligence (Acting)  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell:

After careful review and in concurrence with requests made by Senator Grassley and others, I write to urge the declassification of redacted information contained in the December 2019 report by Department of Justice Inspector General Michael Horowitz, which detailed abuses related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

It is my strong belief that information redacted from the Inspector General's public report provides compelling evidence necessary to fully understand the severity of the misconduct. As such, additional transparency is of the highest public interest. Declassification is also necessary to expose actions, including possible criminal wrongdoing, by former officials and certain senior Intelligence Community and law enforcement officials.

In light of the magnitude of these abuses, as many redactions as possible should be removed from the Inspector General's report, with the proper attention paid to protecting legitimate sources and methods.

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

Sincerely,



Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

UNCLASSIFIED

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000164

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:01 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** 2020-05-19 RHJ CEG Letter to ODNI (Unmaskings Follow up).pdf

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:59 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance); (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell

Good evening,

Please find attached a signed letter from Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Senate Committee on Finance to Acting Director Grenell.

Please acknowledge receipt of this message and attachment. Thank you.

Best,

(b)(6)

Staff Assistant  
U.S. Senate Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs Committee  
Chairman Ron Johnson  
Dirksen 340 | Washington, DC 20510

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 19, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Dear Ambassador Grenell:

On May 13, 2020, you provided us with declassified information related to the “unmasking” of Lt. General Michael Flynn, and we very much appreciate your continued commitment to transparency.<sup>1</sup> We write now both to reiterate our request for the declassification of additional information related to the unmasking of Americans around the time of the 2016 election, but also to expand the scope of our request to include information as early as January 2016. Based on our investigation and recent press reports, we are increasingly concerned that the surveillance of U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign began earlier than the opening of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation in late July 2016.<sup>2</sup>

As we explained in our May 12, 2020, letter to you, one of the most significant unanswered questions about what occurred during the 2016 election is how many Americans were “unmasked,” at whose request, and for what purpose.<sup>3</sup> It has become evident that the FBI, and possibly members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, were focused on U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign in early 2016, if not even earlier.<sup>4</sup> One example is that, in April 2016, FBI headquarters directed its New York Field Office to open a counterintelligence investigation of Carter Page, which on August 10, 2016, became part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Richard A. Grenell, Acting Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Charles E. Grassley and Chairman Ron Johnson, May 13, 2020.

<https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20%28Unmasking%29.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Andrew McCarthy, *Unmasking? The Real Story Is When Flynn Was Not Masked in the First Place*, Nat’l Review, May 16, 2020, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/michael-flynn-unmasking-real-story-is-when-he-was-not-masked-in-the-first-place/>.

<sup>3</sup> Ron Johnson, *We need answers to questions mainstream media won’t ask about Democrats*, The Hill, Oct. 10, 2019, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/465241-we-need-answers-to-questions-mainstream-media-wont-ask-about>; Letter from Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, Senator Graham, Senator Whitehouse to Director Coats (May 27, 2017); Letter from Chairman Grassley to Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell (May 12, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> McCarthy, *supra* note 1 (alleging that “several strands of the Trump-Russian probe ... trace back to 2015”).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation 62-63 (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf>.

Again, the best way to resolve these issues is to determine the truth, and to make clear to the American people what did and did not occur. For these reasons, we respectfully request that you make available to us, as soon as possible, all information regarding the "unmasking" of U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign requested by members of President Obama's administration from January 2016 through January 2017. If this request needs to be responded to in tranches, we would appreciate receiving unmasking information relating to the period of April through June 2016 first. (b)(6)

Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of Chairman Johnson's staff at [redacted] and [redacted] of Chairman Grassley's staff at [redacted]. Thank you for your attention to this matter. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Finance Committee

cc: The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Ron Wyden  
Ranking Member

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:12 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** 2020-05-12 RHJ, CEG Letter to ODNI re Unmaskings.pdf

**From:** (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 10:47 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Ron Johnson); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance)  
**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell (b)(6) (Finance)

Good evening,

Please find attached a signed letter from Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Senate Committee on Finance to Acting Director Grenell.

Please acknowledge receipt of this message and attachment. Thank you.

Best,

(b)(6)

Staff Assistant  
U.S. Senate Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs Committee  
Chairman Ron Johnson  
Dirksen 340 | Washington, DC 20510

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 12, 2020

**VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION**

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice

Dear Ambassador Grenell and Attorney General Barr:

Based on recent press reports, it is our understanding that you conducted a classification review and declassified information related to numerous requests to “unmask” the names of U.S. persons who appeared in certain intelligence reporting around the time of the 2016 election through January 2017.

We wholeheartedly agree that transparency is needed more now than ever. One of the most significant unanswered questions about what occurred during the 2016 election is how many Americans were “unmasked,” at whose request, and for what purpose.<sup>1</sup> Your recent decision to declassify dozens of footnotes from the report of the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General about the investigation of the Trump campaign;<sup>2</sup> the declassification and disclosure of transcripts of related interviews by the House Intelligence Committee; and the disclosure of exculpatory information related to the prosecution of Lt. General Michael Flynn, paint a more and more troubling picture of the conduct that we have been investigating since 2017. However, we firmly believe that the best way to resolve these issues is to determine the truth, and to make clear to the American people what did and did not occur.

For these reasons, we respectfully request that you make available to us, as soon as possible, all information regarding the “unmasking” of U.S. persons requested by members of President Obama’s administration around the time of the 2016 election through January 2017.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ron Johnson, *We need answers to questions mainstream media won't ask about Democrats*, The Hill, Oct. 10, 2019, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/465241-we-need-answers-to-questions-mainstream-media-wont-ask-about>; Letter from Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, Senator Graham, Senator Whitehouse to Director Coats (May 26, 2017); Letter from Chairman Grassley to Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell (May 12, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Press Release, IG Footnotes: Serious Problems with Dossier Sources Didn't Stop FBI's Page Surveillance (Apr. 15, 2020), <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ig-footnotes-serious-problems-with-dossier-sources-didnt-stop-fbis-page-surveillance->.



(b)(6)

Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of Chairman Johnson's staff  
at [redacted] and [redacted] of Chairman Grassley's staff at [redacted]  
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sincerely,

(b)(6)



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Finance Committee

cc: The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Ron Wyden  
Ranking Member

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:02 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** 2020-05-19 RHJ CEG Letter to ODNI (Unmaskings Follow up).pdf

AMB –  
Similar incoming letter from Sen. Johnson just received on unmaskings.

Ryan  
**Ryan P. Crumpler**  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) Liberty Crossing 2  
McLean, VA 22102 (b)(3)

**From:** (b)(3) (HSGAC) (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:59 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (HSGAC); (b)(6) (Finance); (b)(6) (HSGAC)

**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell

Good evening,  
Please find attached a signed letter from Chairman Ron Johnson of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Senate Committee on Finance to Acting Director Grenell.

Please acknowledge receipt of this message and attachment. Thank you.

Best,  
(b)(6)

Staff Assistant  
U.S. Senate Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs Committee  
Chairman Ron Johnson  
Dirksen 340 | Washington, DC 20510

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 19, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Dear Ambassador Grenell:

On May 13, 2020, you provided us with declassified information related to the “unmasking” of Lt. General Michael Flynn, and we very much appreciate your continued commitment to transparency.<sup>1</sup> We write now both to reiterate our request for the declassification of additional information related to the unmasking of Americans around the time of the 2016 election, but also to expand the scope of our request to include information as early as January 2016. Based on our investigation and recent press reports, we are increasingly concerned that the surveillance of U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign began earlier than the opening of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation in late July 2016.<sup>2</sup>

As we explained in our May 12, 2020, letter to you, one of the most significant unanswered questions about what occurred during the 2016 election is how many Americans were “unmasked,” at whose request, and for what purpose.<sup>3</sup> It has become evident that the FBI, and possibly members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, were focused on U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign in early 2016, if not even earlier.<sup>4</sup> One example is that, in April 2016, FBI headquarters directed its New York Field Office to open a counterintelligence investigation of Carter Page, which on August 10, 2016, became part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Richard A. Grenell, Acting Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Charles E. Grassley and Chairman Ron Johnson, May 13, 2020.

<https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20%28Unmasking%29.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Andrew McCarthy, *Unmasking? The Real Story Is When Flynn Was Not Masked in the First Place*, Nat’l Review, May 16, 2020, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/michael-flynn-unmasking-real-story-is-when-he-was-not-masked-in-the-first-place/>.

<sup>3</sup> Ron Johnson, *We need answers to questions mainstream media won’t ask about Democrats*, The Hill, Oct. 10, 2019, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/465241-we-need-answers-to-questions-mainstream-media-wont-ask-about>; Letter from Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, Senator Graham, Senator Whitehouse to Director Coats (May 27, 2017); Letter from Chairman Grassley to Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell (May 12, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> McCarthy, *supra* note 1 (alleging that “several strands of the Trump-Russian probe ... trace back to 2015”).

<sup>5</sup> U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation 62-63 (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf>.

Again, the best way to resolve these issues is to determine the truth, and to make clear to the American people what did and did not occur. For these reasons, we respectfully request that you make available to us, as soon as possible, all information regarding the "unmasking" of U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump campaign requested by members of President Obama's administration from January 2016 through January 2017. If this request needs to be responded to in tranches, we would appreciate receiving unmasking information relating to the period of April through June 2016 first.

(b)(6)

Should you have any questions, please contact [redacted] of Chairman Johnson's staff at [redacted] and [redacted] of Chairman Grassley's staff at [redacted]. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sincerely,

(b)(6)



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Finance Committee

cc: The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Ron Wyden  
Ranking Member

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
 Thursday, May 21, 2020 4:49 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [Redacted] Travis M Burrs [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Schiff to Acting DNI Grenell  
**Attachments:** 20200521 - HPSCI CHM Letter to DNI on Unmaskings and Flynn.pdf; ATT00001.htm

AMB –

Please see incoming from CHM Schiff re: Unmaskings.

Ryan

**From:** Bitar, Maher (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 4:30 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; Bradley A Brooker [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Schiff to Acting DNI Grenell

Ryan –

Please find attached a letter from Chairman Schiff to Acting Director Grenell regarding the Acting Director’s recent declassification related to “unmaskings.” This letter includes requests for the public release of information, as well as production to the Committee.

Please confirm receipt for ODNI.

Thank you,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

General Counsel-(Majority)  
 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)  
 HVC-304 - The Capitol

[Redacted] (b)(6)

ADAM B. SCHIFF, CALIFORNIA  
CHAIRMAN

TIMOTHY BERGREEN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
(202) 225-7690  
www.intelligence.house.gov

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS

DEVIN NUNES, CALIFORNIA  
RANKING MEMBER

ALLEN SOUZA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR



**Permanent Select Committee  
on Intelligence  
U.S. House of Representatives**

May 21, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

Consistent with Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark Warner's May 20, 2020 letter to you, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("Committee") also requests that you produce the intelligence reports and additional information pertaining to your May 8 declassification, and May 13 release to Senators Ron Johnson and Charles Grassley, of the identities of executive branch officials who lawfully submitted U.S. person identity requests to better understand specific intelligence reports containing masked U.S. person information.

The Intelligence Community ("IC") protects the identities of Americans who are referenced in intelligence obtained from lawful collection against authorized foreign targets that it disseminates to its customers through intelligence reports. IC elements do so by "masking" the U.S. person information in the intelligence report in a manner that protects those U.S. persons' privacy. U.S. officials who are authorized recipients of these intelligence reports and who are charged with protecting national security may request, through a standardized process and with an appropriate and validated justification, the underlying U.S. person information that has been replaced by a generic descriptor (such as "U.S. person 1"). The IC elements review those requests to validate the requester's need to know this sensitive information before releasing that U.S. person information to the requester.

As you must now be aware, authorized U.S. officials make these requests so they can better understand specific intelligence reports and properly evaluate threats to our national security. The established procedures for doing so safeguard the privacy of Americans, while at the same time enabling U.S. officials to protect national security by requesting the U.S. person information that reveals who may be in harm's way, who may be engaged in acts that threaten the country, or who, wittingly or unwittingly, may be acting to further the interests of foreign adversaries and, therefore, pose a counterintelligence risk or threat.

In late 2016 and early 2017, as the scope of Russia's sweeping and systemic interference in our election was coming into focus, dozens of officials from across the U.S. government were

briefed on intelligence reports on foreign actors that contained masked U.S. person information. As the list you declassified shows, these officials, either directly or through their IC briefers, submitted requests to understand who the U.S. person or persons were who were referenced in these reports on foreign targets. The masked U.S. persons referenced in these reports were revealed to be Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael Flynn, who served as an advisor to candidate and then President-elect Donald Trump—even as Lt. Gen. Flynn was working as an unregistered agent of a foreign government seeking to influence U.S. policy through at least mid-November 2016.<sup>1</sup>

National Security Agency (“NSA”) Director General Paul Nakasone’s May 4, 2020 response to your request, which you declassified, confirmed that each of the U.S. officials who requested the masked U.S. person information was “an authorized recipient of the original report” and the requests to reveal the masked U.S. person information were “approved through NSA’s standard process, which includes a review of the justification for the request.”<sup>2</sup>

As detailed in charging documents and Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election*, during this timeframe, the IC also became aware of Lt. Gen. Flynn’s communications with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak regarding, among other things, sanctions that the United States had recently imposed on Russia as a penalty for its interference in the 2016 presidential election.<sup>3</sup> Lt. Gen. Flynn did not disclose these communications with the Russian Ambassador to the outgoing administration, despite the long-established principle that the United States has only one government at a time.<sup>4</sup>

In January 2017, Lt. Gen. Flynn lied about the content of these communications to Vice President-elect Mike Pence and—after he began serving as President Trump’s National Security Advisor—to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).<sup>5</sup> This created a clear and untenable counterintelligence and national security risk for the United States.<sup>6</sup> As witnesses testified to the Committee, the Senate, and to Special Counsel Mueller, Lt. Gen. Flynn’s readily provable lies provided the Russians leverage over the new National Security Advisor because they knew he

<sup>1</sup> See Special Counsel Robert S. Muller, III, *Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election* (March 2019), available at: <https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf> (“Mueller Report”), Vol. I, at 183; Statement of Offense ¶ 5, *United States v. Flynn*, No. 17 Cr. 232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017) (“Flynn Statement of Offense”); see also Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Registration for Flynn Intel Group, Inc. (Mar. 7, 2017), available at: [https://3A%2F%2Ffile.fara.gov%2Fdocs%2F6406-Registration-Statement-20170307-1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2IphCrV\\_yCfl\\_PsABSPWcX](https://3A%2F%2Ffile.fara.gov%2Fdocs%2F6406-Registration-Statement-20170307-1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2IphCrV_yCfl_PsABSPWcX).

<sup>2</sup> General Paul M. Nakasone, Director, National Security Agency, Memorandum For Director of National Intelligence (May 4, 2020), as released to Senators Ron Johnson and Charles Grassley by Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, available at: <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20%28Unmasking%29.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 26; see also *id.*, Vol. I, at 168-73 (detailing Flynn’s communications with Kislyak).

<sup>4</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. I, at 172 (“Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy.”).

<sup>5</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 29-30; see also Flynn Statement of Offense ¶¶ 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 31.

was lying about the substance of his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak. Lt. Gen. Flynn, himself, later pleaded guilty under oath—twice—to lying to the FBI about these communications. Even President Trump publicly explained at the time, “I had to fire General Flynn because he lied to the vice president and the FBI.”<sup>7</sup>

Your decision to declassify the list of executive branch officials that you requested NSA compile, and then asked that NSA revise to your specification, is without precedent. It was a transparent political act—in an election year and during a pandemic, no less—in which you used the authorities of your position to insinuate wrongdoing by officials who acted appropriately in requesting the identity of masked U.S. persons to better understand foreign intelligence reports.<sup>8</sup> This is inconsistent with the oath and obligations of an acting Director of National Intelligence. Selective declassification for political purposes is inappropriate, corrupt, and undermines public confidence in the IC as an apolitical pillar protecting the country regardless of the political affiliation of its Executive Branch customers.

To ensure a transparent and complete public record free of political manipulation, the Committee therefore requests that you or your successor:

1. Declassify and make publicly available any intelligence report or transcript concerning conversations between Lt. Gen. Flynn and former Russian Ambassador Kislyak. These communications have been the subject of thorough law enforcement investigation and criminal proceedings, and no national security rationale remains to suppress these records on classification grounds.
2. Produce to the Committee in full, consistent with 50 USC §3092(a)(2),<sup>9</sup> the underlying intelligence reports that were the subject of U.S. person identity requests revealed in General Nakasone’s May 4, 2020 memorandum to you, as well as the rationale for your decision to request and then declassify the list of officials.
3. Declassify and make publicly available, with appropriate redactions to protect sensitive sources and methods, these same underlying intelligence reports, so that the public can understand why so many U.S. officials from across the government independently sought to learn the identity of a masked American, who would turn out to be Lt. Gen. Flynn, who was communicating with or referenced by lawful targets of foreign intelligence collection.

---

<sup>7</sup> Salvador Rizzo, *Fact Checker: Understanding the Twists and Turns in the Michael Flynn Case*, Wash. Post (May 7, 2020), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/07/understanding-twists-turns-michael-flynn-case> (quoting @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 Tweet).

<sup>8</sup> As noted in Chairman Warner’s letter, according to ODNI’s annual transparency reports, the number of unmasked identities increased during the Trump administration, from 9,529 in 2017, to 16,721 in 2018 and 10,012 in 2019.

<sup>9</sup> See 50 USC §3092(a)(2) (The Director of National Intelligence shall “furnish the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities (including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted), other than covert actions, which is within their custody or control, and which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”)



The Committee appreciates your prompt attention to these requests, which are in the public interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Adam B. Schiff". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Adam" and last name "Schiff" clearly legible.

Adam B. Schiff  
Chairman

Cc: The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Honorable General Paul M. Nakasone  
Director, National Security Agency

The Honorable Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 1:12 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; [Redacted] Bradley A Brooker  
**Subject:** FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner; April 9, 2020  
**Attachments:** Grenell\_VC Warner\_09APR20.pdf

Ambassador --

Please find attached incoming correspondence from VC Warner about the ICIG.

Ryan

(b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted] (Intelligence) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 12:57 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (Intelligence) [Redacted] (Intelligence)  
**Subject:** Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner; April 9, 2020

Ryan & All, (b)(6)

Please see the attached letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated April 9, 2020, regarding: involvement in President Trump's decision to fire Mr. Michael K. Atkinson.

Confirm receipt and please pass to Acting director Grenell.

We will not be sending a hard copy of this letter via courier at this time.

Thank you,

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
 Deputy Clerk & Security Officer  
 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
 Direct: [Redacted]  
 Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
 Fax: [Redacted]

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN  
MARK R. WARNER, VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR., MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNETT, COLORADO

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

MITCH M. CONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES H. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

April 9, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

I write to understand your involvement in President Trump's decision to fire Mr. Michael K. Atkinson as the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG). In your recent March 23, 2020 letter to Chairman Burr and myself, you explicitly committed to us that you were undertaking a review of ODNI, but that we should "[Re]st assured that this review is not an effort to purge ... the ODNI, as some have erroneously suggested." However, a mere 10 days later, that is exactly what is occurring. I therefore ask you answer the following questions:

1. Did President Trump either consult with or inform you that he would be firing Mr. Atkinson at any time prior to the decision being made public on April 3, 2020?
2. If the President consulted with or informed you of the firing prior to the announcement, what reasons did the President provide for the firing? Have you been made aware of any concern the President may have with the actions of ICIG Atkinson that does not involve the handling of the whistleblower complaint that led to the President's impeachment?
3. Do you concur with the decision to fire Mr. Atkinson?
4. By his actions and the reforms he had undertaken at the office of the ICIG, Mr. Atkinson demonstrated an unwavering commitment to empower those who witness potential waste, fraud, or abuse, to come forward. His firing now leaves no Senate-confirmed leaders in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. What message do you believe this conveys to the American people in terms of the importance of leading and overseeing intelligence in support of our national security?

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 12:48 PM (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Travis M Burrs;  
**Subject:** FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI; May 20, 2020  
**Attachments:** Grenell\_VC Warner\_20MAY20.pdf

AMB -

Please see incoming from VC Warner.

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** (Intelligence)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 12:39 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (Intelligence)  
**Subject:** Letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, SSCI; May 20, 2020

Ryan & All, (b)(6)

Please see the attached letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 20, 2020, regarding: May 13, 2020, letter sent to Senators Grassley and Johnson.

Confirm receipt and please pass to Acting Director Grenell.

Thank you,

(b)(6)  
Deputy Clerk & Security Officer  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
**Direct:** (b)(6)  
**Cell:** (b)(6)  
**Fax:**

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN  
MARK R. WARNER, VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARC RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR., MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, COLORADO

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES M. RHODES, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

May 20, 2020

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

I write with several requests regarding your May 13, 2020, letter to Senators Charles E. Grassley and Ron Johnson in which you declassified the identities of executive branch officials who exercised their right, consistent with the law, to understand the identity of an individual in specific intelligence reports.

As you are well aware, there are substantial protections built into the process for requesting that identities of U.S. persons be unmasked in intelligence reports, ensuring that the rights of individual Americans are protected and that unmasking requests are granted only to those who need the information in order to protect U.S. national security. As you also know, there are thousands of such requests each year, each subject to the same process before it is approved. Nor, as you know, is this process unique to a single presidential administration. In fact, according to ODNI's annual transparency reports, between 2017 and 2018, the number of unmasked identities jumped from 9,529 in 2017 to 16,721 in 2018 under the Trump administration. In 2019, the total of unmasked identities reached 10,012.

I ask that you provide the Committee with the underlying intelligence reports in which the identity of the individual was "unmasked" to be Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.).

Additionally, I ask you to provide the rationale for declassifying these unmasking requests, given the potential compromise to sources and methods, and that this declassification occurred well short of the timeline required under Executive Order 13526. Just as Sec 1.7 of that Order prohibits over-classification for inappropriate reasons, selective declassification for political purposes undermines the integrity of our system for protecting classified information, undermines the Intelligence Community's credibility, and erodes public trust in institutions critical to protecting the nation.

Therefore, in order to more fully and properly inform the American people of the events surrounding the unmasking of Lt. Gen. Flynn (ret.), I further request that you declassify and make publicly available any intelligence report concerning conversations between Lt. Gen. Flynn (ret.) and Russian Ambassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak. These calls have been the topic of the multiple investigations, trials, and plea agreements concerning General Flynn and merit being in the public domain, consistent with Executive Order, Sec 3.1(d).

Thank you for your kind attention to these requests. I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark R. Warner". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman

Cc: General Paul T. Nakasone, Director, National Security Agency

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 29, 2020 10:47 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Amanda J Schoch  
**Subject:** FW: Letter to President  
**Attachments:** Consultation.POTUS.03.27.20 - Signed.pdf (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Ambassador -

Please find attached a letter from House/Senate Democratic leadership to the President received overnight on which you were cc'd. Thanks!

Ryan

**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20510

March 27, 2020

President Donald Trump  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, as members of the "Gang of Eight," write to reiterate your obligations to consult Congress prior to taking military action overseas. Recent attacks in Iraq, ongoing violence in Syria, and dynamics in Libya, among other events, highlight dynamic threats to U.S. interests that could involve the U.S. military. Further, recent media reports indicate that the administration has actively considered, and may still be considering, direct action against Iran due to actions by Iranian-sponsored militias in Iraq.

While there are well-understood and narrow self-defense exceptions, the Constitution and U.S. law require you to consult with Congress before engaging in military action or actions likely to lead to war. This Administration has largely failed to fulfill this legal obligation, including in the case of your decision to strike Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qassim Soleimani earlier this year.

We appreciate the Intelligence Community's ongoing efforts, consistent with its legal obligations, to keep us, and Congress more broadly, informed about threats to the United States and our interests. However, intelligence briefings required by the National Security Act of 1947 do not constitute or substitute for consultations about policy responses and the use of force. We expect you and your administration to adhere to constitutional and legal requirements to consult with Congress prior to any decision about the use of military force.

Sincerely,




Nancy Pelosi  
Speaker of the House  
US House of Representatives



Charles E. Schumer  
Democratic Leader  
US Senate



Adam B. Schiff  
Chairman  
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence



Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Cc: Honorable Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense  
Honorable Richard A. Grenell, Acting Director of National Intelligence  
General Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:27 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: new Schiff letter

Fyi (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:26 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** RE: new Schiff letter

Here's the link to it (from HPSCI website) -

<https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/052120chmdni.pdf>

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:22 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler ; Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** new Schiff letter  
**Importance:** High

Have either of you received a new Schiff letter today? [Redacted] (b)(5)

[Redacted] Thanks! Regards, [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**Sent:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
Wednesday, May 6, 2020 1:56 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Politico: HPSCI statement inquiry

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
(b)(3) (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 1:51 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Amanda J Schoch [Redacted] Ryan Crumple (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Politico: HPSCI statement inquiry

Sir:

Kyle Cheney from Politico is asking for comment on the HPSCI letter. [Redacted] (b)(5)

Here is what went out today from HPSCI:

"The Committee received a letter yesterday from ODNI stating that 'as of today, the interagency review of the remaining ten transcripts has been completed,' and providing new redactions. After more than a year of unnecessary delay, the ODNI has finally concluded its protracted classification review of the Committee's transcripts, and it also appears the White House has now abandoned its improper insistence on reviewing key transcripts, which the Committee appropriately rejected.

"We are now reviewing the proposed redactions from ODNI based on classification, law enforcement sensitivity or items ODNI requests be for official use only. Given the overtly political role now played by the acting DNI, including the leak of his letter, this committee and the public can have little confidence that his determinations are made on the merits. This process had already taken far too long, most notably because the ODNI improperly held up the declassification review and release of several transcripts at the request of the White House.

"Our review of ODNI's newly proposed redactions will be as expeditious as possible given the constraints of the pandemic, and we look forward to releasing these transcripts, which relate to misconduct by the Trump campaign and the president himself."

Let me know if you concur and thank you!



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 2:01 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Politico: HPSCI statement inquiry

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511 (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 1:58 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] Amanda J Schoch; [Redacted] Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** Re: Politico: HPSCI statement inquiry

Say nothing.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Wednesday, 6. May 2020 at 1:51:07 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3) "Amanda J Schoch" [Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) "Ryan Crumpler" [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Politico: HPSCI statement inquiry

Sir:

Kyle Cheney from Politico is asking for comment on the HPSCI letter. [Redacted] (b)(5)

Here is what went out today from HPSCI:

"The Committee received a letter yesterday from ODNI stating that 'as of today, the interagency review of the remaining ten transcripts has been completed,' and providing new redactions. After more than a year of unnecessary delay, the ODNI has finally concluded its protracted classification review of the Committee's transcripts, and it also appears the White House has now abandoned its improper insistence on reviewing key transcripts, which the Committee appropriately rejected.

"We are now reviewing the proposed redactions from ODNI based on classification, law enforcement sensitivity or items ODNI requests be for official use only. Given the overtly political role now played by the acting DNI, including the leak of his letter, this

committee and the public can have little confidence that his determinations are made on the merits. This process had already taken far too long, most notably because the ODNI improperly held up the declassification review and release of several transcripts at the request of the White House.

“Our review of ODNI’s newly proposed redactions will be as expeditious as possible given the constraints of the pandemic, and we look forward to releasing these transcripts, which relate to misconduct by the Trump campaign and the president himself.”

Let me know if you concur and thank you!



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) Deirdre M Walsh  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Monday, March 30, 2020 12:35 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: questions

**Importance:** High (b)(5)

Hey – see below...

[Redacted]

**From:** Corin R Stone  
**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 12:29 PM  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh ; Beth E. Sanner  
**Subject:** FW: questions  
**Importance:** High

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 11:45 AM  
**To:** Corin R Stone  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: questions (b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

**From:** Corin R Stone  
**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 11:39 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** questions (b)(6)

Ryan [Redacted] thanks for the info back on where we stand on the SSCI questions. [Redacted]

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

Thanks, (b)(3) (b)(5)  
Corin (b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 4:17 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [Redacted] Travis M Burrs (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: Request for information (b)(6)  
**Attachments:** SRP DNI Letter .pdf

AMB –

Please see incoming from Sen Paul.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2 (b)(3)  
McLean, VA 22102  
[Redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** [Redacted] (Paul) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 4:12 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** Request for information

Good afternoon Ryan,

Please find attached a letter with a request from Senator Rand Paul.

Many thanks!

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Office of Senator Rand Paul, M.D.  
[Redacted]

(b)(6)

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN  
MARK R. WARNER, VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR., MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, COLORADO

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES H. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
NELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

April 30, 2020

The Honorable Michael J. Rigas  
Acting Deputy Director for Management  
Office of Management and Budget  
Acting Director  
Office of Personnel Management  
Washington, D.C. 20503

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

The Honorable Joseph Kernan  
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security  
5000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301-5000

Dear Acting Director Rigas, Ambassador Grenell, and Under Secretary Kernan:

I write to ask you as the principal members of the Performance Accountability Council to ensure the robustness of the background investigative capacity to support the security clearance process during the current pandemic.

The coronavirus is exposing the potential fragility in our background investigation infrastructure. Departments and agencies have slowed hiring for government employees and contractors, leading to fewer requests of authorized investigative service providers for background investigations. A reduced caseload poses several risks. Background investigator firms may no longer remain financially viable without a sufficient caseload. The reserve in the working capital fund at the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), which provides 95 percent of the government's background investigations, may drop below a level necessary to sustain its operations. Finally, a drop in cases now will lead to a surge of investigations once the pandemic recedes, leading to another backlog and unavoidable delays in processing.

In sum, without proper attention to background investigation capacity and the workforce that supports it, we risk recreating the crisis we experienced in 2014 and the years that followed: a spike in the inventory and processing timelines nearly triple the targets established in law.



We must ensure departments, agencies, and their industry partners continue to submit background investigation requests on hired personnel, assess appropriate measures to sustain the background investigative workforce during a slowdown, and preserve or supplement DCSA's working capital fund.

I look forward to working with you on these matters as we continue to implement Trusted Workforce 2.0 to transform our personnel vetting enterprise.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark R. Warner". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Mark R. Warner  
Vice Chairman

Cc: Mr. William Evanina, Director, National Counterintelligence and Security Center  
Mr. William K. Lietzau, Director, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency  
Ms. Lisa Loss, Suitability/Fitness and Credentialing Executive Agent, Office of  
Personnel Management

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 5:53 PM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Response to Rep Schiff re HPSCI Transcripts  
**Attachments:** Rep Schiff re HPSCI Transcripts.pdf

Brad, the A-DNI made changes to the draft. Final version attached. Please review sonnest for OGC top 3. Thank you.

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)


[Redacted]

Executive Secretary and Chief, Executive Secretariat Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



---

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Rick Crawford eod letter  
**Attachments:** 4.7.20 Crawford EOINT letter.pdf

**RICK CRAWFORD**  
1ST DISTRICT, ARKANSAS

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
CHAIRMAN OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON FARM,  
COMMODITIES AND RISK MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION  
AND INFRASTRUCTURE

PERMANENT SELECT  
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

**Congress of the United States**  
House of Representatives  
2122 Rayburn Building  
Washington, DC 20515

WASHINGTON, DC  
2122 RAYBURN HOB  
WASHINGTON DC 20515  
PHONE: 202-225-4078  
FAX: 202-225-5602

JONESBORO  
2400 EAST FISH AND  
SEAFT 300  
JONESBORO, AR 72401  
PHONE: 870-203-0540  
FAX: 870-203-0542

CABOT  
112 SOUTH FISH - SUITE 1  
CABOT, AR 72623  
PHONE: 501-843-3043  
FAX: 501-843-4955

MOUNTAIN HOME  
1001 HIGHWAY 62 EAST  
SUITE 9  
MOUNTAIN HOME, AR 72653  
PHONE: 870-424-2075  
FAX: 870-424-3149

WWW.CRAWFORD.HOUSE.GOV

April 7, 2020

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

Director Grenell,

The ability of the United States to modernize our military forces to overmatch our adversaries requires intelligence support. Intelligence is needed to understand and anticipate foreign doctrine and the intent of foreign leaders, prevent tactical and operational surprise, and ensure that U.S. capabilities are not compromised before they are fielded. In addition, virtually all modern weapon systems depend upon data derived from scientific and technical intelligence.

In February of last year, myself and Members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) received a briefing regarding a gap of the US render safe capabilities against near peer competitors and regional adversaries regarding the development of render safe capabilities of foreign ordnance which we acknowledge as explosive ordnance intelligence (EO INT). There is no formal process addressing the US gap; furthermore, weapons and weapons system technical intelligence (TECHINT) does not address fuzing, firing and render safe of foreign explosive ordnance (EO). We agree with the concept that the US IC/DIE lacks explosive ordnance, render safe subject matter experts (SME) who understand all aspects of fuzing, firing systems and disassembly of foreign ordnance. We believe that embedded render safe SMEs (EOD) need to be full members of the IC/DIE similarly as geospatial engineering technicians are used (former topographic engineering).

The working definition of EO INT is a subcategory of TECHINT focused on processing, production, dissemination, integration, exploitation, evaluation, feedback and analysis of explosive ordnance that utilizes the skills, techniques, principles and knowledge of EOD personnel on fuzing, firing systems, ordnance disassembly and development of render safe techniques, procedures and tools, publications, and applied technologies.

This concept also utilizes EO Open Source Intelligence (EO OSINT) data/information which is not currently captured, shared or analyzed as necessary. The concept uses various open source render safe, explosive ordnance identification currently developed by various NGO UXO/Demining organizations especially in areas where the US is not the lead.

The Committee recognizes the importance of this concept and supports it moving forward and desires to work with your office in crafting necessary legislative authorities for Fiscal Year 2021 within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Additionally, we observe that this capability is not just a DOD intelligence capability but crosses and integrates foreign, military and domestic intelligence in defense of the homeland and of United States interests abroad for render safe activities against explosive ordnance.

Request that your Office assist as follows:

- Assist in the establishment of objectives and priorities for collection, analysis, production and dissemination of explosive ordnance intelligence.
- Ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence explosive ordnance information within the Intelligence Community.
- Ensure the most accurate analysis of explosive ordnance intelligence is derived from all sources to support national security needs.
- Formally designate the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible lead on Render Safe / Explosive Ordnance Intelligence future years defense program and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence responsible lead for oversight of the Render Safe / Explosive Ordnance Intelligence program.

I urge that the Office of Director of National Intelligence to identify funding and devote resources in Fiscal Year 2020 for the Explosive Ordnance Intelligence (EO INT) concept and its continued efforts to reduce and close the gap of US render safe capabilities against near peer competitors and regional adversaries regarding the development of render safe abilities of foreign ordnance.


(b)(6)

My point of contact is [redacted] who can be reached at [redacted] or

[redacted]  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sincerely,



Rick Crawford  
MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

[redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:28 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: Schiff letter (b)(6)  
**Attachments:** 052120chmdni.pdf (b)(6)

Fyi (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

[redacted]  
 Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
 Director of National Intelligence  
 Washington, DC 20511 (b)(6)  
 [redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:22 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Schiff letter

FYI below (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:21 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Schiff letter

Sir -

We received a letter today from Rep. Schiff asking you for a things, including to declassify transcripts of calls between Gen. Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak. I've attached the letter and you can also access it from the link below.

We've heard from a few outlets asking if we have a response. Anything you want us to share? Happy to ignore or decline comment.

Thanks, [redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Bruggeman, Lucien C.  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 11:05 AM  
**To:** DNI-Media  
**Subject:** RE: abc news

Hi there,

I'm sure you've seen, but Adam Schiff is now calling on A/DNI Grenell to "declassify and make publicly available" the Flynn-Kislyak transcripts (among other things.)

For reference: <https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/052120chmdni.pdf>

I understand you all referred my previous inquiry to the Justice Department, but let me know if you all plan to respond to Schiff – or if you can share a response with ABC. As always, feel free to call my cell to discuss:

(b)(6)

Thanks –  
Luc

Lucien Bruggeman  
ABC News

(b)(6)

**From:** Bruggeman, Lucien C.  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:22 AM  
**To:** DNI-Media  
**Subject:** abc news

Hi all –

Several former Obama administration officials have called on ODNI to release the unredacted transcripts of Michael Flynn's phone calls with former Russian Amb. Kislyak during the transition period in late 2016/early 2017.

For reference:  
[https://twitter.com/erin\\_pelton/status/1262875136065183745](https://twitter.com/erin_pelton/status/1262875136065183745)  
<https://twitter.com/brhodes/status/1262829163355926528>  
<https://twitter.com/nedprice/status/1262545932106838019>

Do you all plan to release those transcripts? Have there been discussions about doing so? Feel free to call if easier:

(b)(6)

Thanks,  
Luc

Lucien Bruggeman  
ABC News

(b)(6)

ADAM B. SCHIFF, CALIFORNIA  
CHAIRMAN  
TIMOTHY BERGREEN, STAFF DIRECTOR  
(202) 225-7690  
www.intelligence.house.gov



ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS  
DEVIN NUNES, CALIFORNIA  
RANKING MEMBER  
ALLEN SOUZA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

**Permanent Select Committee  
on Intelligence  
U.S. House of Representatives**

May 21, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:

Consistent with Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chairman Mark Warner's May 20, 2020 letter to you, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ("Committee") also requests that you produce the intelligence reports and additional information pertaining to your May 8 declassification, and May 13 release to Senators Ron Johnson and Charles Grassley, of the identities of executive branch officials who lawfully submitted U.S. person identity requests to better understand specific intelligence reports containing masked U.S. person information.

The Intelligence Community ("IC") protects the identities of Americans who are referenced in intelligence obtained from lawful collection against authorized foreign targets that it disseminates to its customers through intelligence reports. IC elements do so by "masking" the U.S. person information in the intelligence report in a manner that protects those U.S. persons' privacy. U.S. officials who are authorized recipients of these intelligence reports and who are charged with protecting national security may request, through a standardized process and with an appropriate and validated justification, the underlying U.S. person information that has been replaced by a generic descriptor (such as "U.S. person 1"). The IC elements review those requests to validate the requester's need to know this sensitive information before releasing that U.S. person information to the requester.

As you must now be aware, authorized U.S. officials make these requests so they can better understand specific intelligence reports and properly evaluate threats to our national security. The established procedures for doing so safeguard the privacy of Americans, while at the same time enabling U.S. officials to protect national security by requesting the U.S. person information that reveals who may be in harm's way, who may be engaged in acts that threaten the country, or who, wittingly or unwittingly, may be acting to further the interests of foreign adversaries and, therefore, pose a counterintelligence risk or threat.

In late 2016 and early 2017, as the scope of Russia's sweeping and systemic interference in our election was coming into focus, dozens of officials from across the U.S. government were



briefed on intelligence reports on foreign actors that contained masked U.S. person information. As the list you declassified shows, these officials, either directly or through their IC briefers, submitted requests to understand who the U.S. person or persons were who were referenced in these reports on foreign targets. The masked U.S. persons referenced in these reports were revealed to be Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael Flynn, who served as an advisor to candidate and then President-elect Donald Trump—even as Lt. Gen. Flynn was working as an unregistered agent of a foreign government seeking to influence U.S. policy through at least mid-November 2016.<sup>1</sup>

National Security Agency (“NSA”) Director General Paul Nakasone’s May 4, 2020 response to your request, which you declassified, confirmed that each of the U.S. officials who requested the masked U.S. person information was “an authorized recipient of the original report” and the requests to reveal the masked U.S. person information were “approved through NSA’s standard process, which includes a review of the justification for the request.”<sup>2</sup>

As detailed in charging documents and Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s *Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election*, during this timeframe, the IC also became aware of Lt. Gen. Flynn’s communications with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak regarding, among other things, sanctions that the United States had recently imposed on Russia as a penalty for its interference in the 2016 presidential election.<sup>3</sup> Lt. Gen. Flynn did not disclose these communications with the Russian Ambassador to the outgoing administration, despite the long-established principle that the United States has only one government at a time.<sup>4</sup>

In January 2017, Lt. Gen. Flynn lied about the content of these communications to Vice President-elect Mike Pence and—after he began serving as President Trump’s National Security Advisor—to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).<sup>5</sup> This created a clear and untenable counterintelligence and national security risk for the United States.<sup>6</sup> As witnesses testified to the Committee, the Senate, and to Special Counsel Mueller, Lt. Gen. Flynn’s readily provable lies provided the Russians leverage over the new National Security Advisor because they knew he

---

<sup>1</sup> See Special Counsel Robert S. Muller, III, *Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election* (March 2019), available at: <https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf> (“Mueller Report”), Vol. I, at 183; Statement of Offense ¶ 5, *United States v. Flynn*, No. 17 Cr. 232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017) (“Flynn Statement of Offense”); see also Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) Registration for Flynn Intel Group, Inc. (Mar. 7, 2017), available at: [https://3A%2F%2Ffile.fara.gov%2Fdocs%2F6406-Registration-Statement-20170307-1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2lpHCrV\\_yCfl\\_PsABSPWcX](https://3A%2F%2Ffile.fara.gov%2Fdocs%2F6406-Registration-Statement-20170307-1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2lpHCrV_yCfl_PsABSPWcX).

<sup>2</sup> General Paul M. Nakasone, Director, National Security Agency, Memorandum For Director of National Intelligence (May 4, 2020), as released to Senators Ron Johnson and Charles Grassley by Acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell, available at: <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05-13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20%28Unmasking%29.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 26; see also *id.*, Vol. I, at 168-73 (detailing Flynn’s communications with Kislyak).

<sup>4</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. I, at 172 (“Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy.”).

<sup>5</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 29-30; see also Flynn Statement of Offense ¶¶ 1-3.

<sup>6</sup> See Mueller Report, Vol. II, at 31.

was lying about the substance of his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak. Lt. Gen. Flynn, himself, later pleaded guilty under oath—twice—to lying to the FBI about these communications. Even President Trump publicly explained at the time, “I had to fire General Flynn because he lied to the vice president and the FBI.”<sup>7</sup>

Your decision to declassify the list of executive branch officials that you requested NSA compile, and then asked that NSA revise to your specification, is without precedent. It was a transparent political act—in an election year and during a pandemic, no less—in which you used the authorities of your position to insinuate wrongdoing by officials who acted appropriately in requesting the identity of masked U.S. persons to better understand foreign intelligence reports.<sup>8</sup> This is inconsistent with the oath and obligations of an acting Director of National Intelligence. Selective declassification for political purposes is inappropriate, corrupt, and undermines public confidence in the IC as an apolitical pillar protecting the country regardless of the political affiliation of its Executive Branch customers.

To ensure a transparent and complete public record free of political manipulation, the Committee therefore requests that you or your successor:

1. Declassify and make publicly available any intelligence report or transcript concerning conversations between Lt. Gen. Flynn and former Russian Ambassador Kislyak. These communications have been the subject of thorough law enforcement investigation and criminal proceedings, and no national security rationale remains to suppress these records on classification grounds.
2. Produce to the Committee in full, consistent with 50 USC §3092(a)(2),<sup>9</sup> the underlying intelligence reports that were the subject of U.S. person identity requests revealed in General Nakasone’s May 4, 2020 memorandum to you, as well as the rationale for your decision to request and then declassify the list of officials.
3. Declassify and make publicly available, with appropriate redactions to protect sensitive sources and methods, these same underlying intelligence reports, so that the public can understand why so many U.S. officials from across the government independently sought to learn the identity of a masked American, who would turn out to be Lt. Gen. Flynn, who was communicating with or referenced by lawful targets of foreign intelligence collection.

---

<sup>7</sup> Salvador Rizzo, *Fact Checker: Understanding the Twists and Turns in the Michael Flynn Case*, Wash. Post (May 7, 2020), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/07/understanding-twists-turns-michael-flynn-case> (quoting @realDonaldTrump 12/2/17 Tweet).

<sup>8</sup> As noted in Chairman Warner’s letter, according to ODNI’s annual transparency reports, the number of unmasked identities *increased* during the Trump administration, from 9,529 in 2017, to 16,721 in 2018 and 10,012 in 2019.

<sup>9</sup> See 50 USC §3092(a)(2) (The Director of National Intelligence shall “furnish the congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities (including the legal basis under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted), other than covert actions, which is within their custody or control, and which is requested by either of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities.”)

The Committee appreciates your prompt attention to these requests, which are in the public interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Adam B. Schiff". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "A" and "S".

Adam B. Schiff  
Chairman

Cc: The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Honorable General Paul M. Nakasone  
Director, National Security Agency

The Honorable Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
 Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:52 PM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs; [Redacted] KASHYAPP; Deirdre M Walsh;  
 [Redacted] Beth E. Sanner; [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: 1 April Schedule (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

All - this is what I just sent the Acting for tomorrow.

One addition for the hard copy Travis will send out - timing for the to and from the [Redacted] Please see below:  
 (b)(5)

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 at 4:43:59 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** 1 April Schedule (b)(6)

Sir - listed below is tomorrow's schedule:

Wednesday, 1 April (b)(3) (b)(5) (b)(6)  
 10:00-11:00 - VTC [Redacted] Prep w/Beth [Redacted] (Residence)

11:15/11:30 - Enroute to [Redacted] (b)(5)

11:45-12:15 - [Redacted] (b)(5)

12:30 - Enroute to Residence

1:00-1:30 - VTC - Brief, re: Original Classification & Declassification Authorities w/Greg Koch,  
 (b)(3) [Redacted] & Corin Stone (Residence)  
 (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 2:30-3:00 - VTC w [Redacted] (Residence) (b)(6)

Please note the A/S Reeker Conference Calls originally scheduled on Monday, Wednesday & Friday through April - will now be held on Monday and Friday only.

Thanks, [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Tuesday, March 31, 2020 7:01 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) KASHYAPP; (b)(3) Deirdre M  
 (b)(6) Walsh; Beth E. Sanner; (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: 1 April Schedule (b)(3)  
 (b)(5) (b)(6)

All - with the [redacted] time shift, I sent a revised schedule to the Acting [redacted] is aware and has made the changes to the hard copy schedule that will go out to the Acting as well.

(b)(3)  
**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 at 6:47:02 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: 1 April Schedule (b)(5)

Sir - they have just shifted the [redacted] tomorrow to a start time of 12:00. So, we have made the following adjustments - please see below:

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 at 4:43:59 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 1 April Schedule

Sir - listed below is tomorrow's schedule:

Wednesday, 1 April (b)(5) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)  
 10:00-11:00 - VTC - [redacted] Prep w/Beth & [redacted] (Residence)

11:30-11:45 - Enroute to [redacted] (b)(5)

12:00-12:30 - [redacted] (b)(5)


12:45-1:00 - Enroute to Residence

(b)(3) 1:30-2:00 - VTC - Brief, re: Original Classification & Declassification Authorities w/Greg Koch,  
 (b)(6) [redacted] & Corin Stone (Residence)

2:30-3:00 - VTC w [redacted] (Residence) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

Please note the A/S Reeker Conference Calls originally scheduled on Monday, Wednesday & Friday through April - will now be held on Monday and Friday only.

Thanks



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

May 15, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request was being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of ten (10) documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request. Upon review, we have determined that one (1) document is being release to you in full (Bates Pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000210 – 000211). Further, nine (9) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000209 and 000212 – 000224) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statue 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The Department of Defense withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6). The Department of State and the National Security Council each withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6):

- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges.

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 293 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg M Koch". The signature is written in a cursive style. To the left of the signature, the letters "FOIA" are written vertically in a smaller, less legible hand.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures



(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 3:23 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [REDACTED] KASHYAPP; Travis M Burrs; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 20.5.7 Senator Murphy  
**Attachments:** 20.5.7 Final signed Venezuela Letter.pdf

AMB –

Please see incoming letter from Sens. Murphy, Kaine, and Udall on Venezuela addressed to you, SECSTATE, and the AG.

Ryan

C06969125

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 7, 2020

The Honorable Michael Pompeo  
Secretary of State  
U.S. Department of State  
2201 C Street NW  
Washington, DC 20520

The Honorable William Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20530

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

Dear Secretary Pompeo, Attorney General Barr, and Acting Director Grenell,

We write today to express alarm regarding recent reports of an attempted raid on Venezuela allegedly orchestrated by a group of Venezuelan military defectors and two American citizens. These developments raise a number of concerns regarding U.S. policy and questions about potential violations of U.S. law.

Jordan Goudreau, a former U.S. Army Green Beret and founder of the private security firm Silvercorp USA, has claimed responsibility for a failed amphibious assault on May 3<sup>rd</sup> aimed at capturing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Venezuelan authorities have stated that eight people were killed and two Americans were captured in the operation.

This recent attack is reportedly the product of an effort by former Venezuelan military officers and Goudreau to organize dozens of deserters from Venezuela's security forces in Colombia, in order to stage a cross-border incursion into Venezuela to capture Maduro. News of Goudreau's thwarted amphibious operation follows the seizure by Colombian police in March of a truck transporting a cache of weapons and tactical equipment worth around \$150,000, including scopes, night vision goggles, radios, and 26 American-made assault rifles. Fifteen helmets manufactured by High-End Defense Solutions, a Miami-based military equipment vendor, were also seized by Colombian authorities. Cliver Alcalá, a former Venezuelan officer and associate of Goudreau's, claimed ownership of the confiscated arms. Notably, to demonstrate his ties to the opposition, Goudreau has produced what he alleges is a \$213 million contract for unspecified "general services" signed by members of Juan Guaidó's "Strategy Committee."

Either the U.S. government was unaware of these planned operations, or was aware and allowed them to proceed. Both possibilities are problematic. As you know, the *VERDAD Act*, which President Trump signed into law on December 20, 2019, states that "it is the policy of the United States to support diplomatic engagement in order to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution to Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian crisis." Armed raids, even if they are carried out by independent actors, run counter to that policy. Moreover, such incursions harm the prospects for a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela by insinuating that an armed intervention is a viable option to resolve the crisis, potentially undermining the willingness of

C06969125


hardline opposition actors to negotiate, while simultaneously allowing Maduro to rally support to his side, strengthening his hand.

To address our concerns, we request answers to the following questions. We understand that some information may need to be provided in classified form.

- Was the administration aware, either directly or through the Venezuelan or Colombian government, of the plans by Jordan Goudreau to instigate an armed attack inside Venezuela, and of his communication with advisors to Juan Guaidó in Miami?
- If the administration was aware of Goudreau's plans, did you take any steps to prevent it from moving forward? Did the U.S. government provide, directly or indirectly, any financial, material, training, intelligence, or other kinds of support to this operation?
- Goudreau has claimed that he is aware of additional forces in and around Venezuela ready to be activated as part of his effort to oust Maduro; what is the intelligence community's assessment of the extent of his operation?
- What steps is the administration taking to secure the release of the two American citizens that have been captured by Maduro's forces during the attack?
- Does the intelligence community assess the contract that Goudreau claims was signed by Juan Guaidó, or members of his "Strategic Committee," is legitimate? If so, were steps taken to ensure that U.S. funds were not implicated in this contract?
- Has the U.S. government ever provided, directly or indirectly, financial, material, training, intelligence, or any other type of assistance to opposition-aligned actors seeking to carry out an armed operation in Venezuelan territory?

Maduro is a dictator, and the Venezuelan people deserve to live in a democracy again, but that will only be achieved through vigorous and effective diplomacy, not martial adventurism. We hope you agree, and look forward to receiving answers to these questions.

Sincerely,



Christopher S. Murphy  
United States Senator



Tim Kaine  
United States Senator



Tom Udall  
United States Senator

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 2:40 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office (b)(3), (b)(6) KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CONFIRMED: Secure Phone Call w/ODNI Special Advisor

(b)(6)

Let's go with Monday, 9Mar @1300-1320. I'll have Kash call (b)(6)

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 04, 2020 2:34 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** OSD Pentagon OUSD Intel - Sec List Front Office  
**Subject:** RE: [Non-DoD Source] REQUEST: Secure Phone Call w/ODNI Special Advisor

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Monday works best for Mr. Kernan...1200-1330, 1400-1430...let me know what works for you...thanks.

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:56 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [Non-DoD Source] REQUEST: Secure Phone Call w/ODNI Special Advisor

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

---

(b)(6)

Kash Patel, Special Advisor to Acting DNI/Ambassador Ric Grenell would like to schedule a 15-20 min phone call with Director Kernan. The purpose of the phone call is an initial "hello".

Please let me know if this might be doable Fri 6Mar between 1030-1200 noon or 1415-1445. If Friday is not doable, Mon 9Mar is open.

Thank you,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*Caution-mailto:* (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:15 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** From the Acting DNI: By Name Request -- Non-Reimbursable Detail for (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Attachments:** 03-10-20\_ODNI Memo\_By Name Request for a Non-Reimbursable Detail Assignment\_20-00233.pdf

(b)(6)

Hope you're doing well. Please find the subject memorandum attached.

The Acting DNI requests expedited handling of this request, as he'd like to get (b)(6) onboard here at ODNI asap. Please provide a timeline once you've had the opportunity to discuss the request with the relevant SMEs.

Thanks much.

R/

Travis M. Burrs  
Executive Secretary and Chief, Executive Secretariat  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

ES 2020-00233

MEMORANDUM FOR: (b)(6)  
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense

VIA: (b)(6)  
Deputy Liaison, Department of Defense


REFERENCE: Department of Defense Instruction 1000.17, Detail of DoD Personnel  
Outside of the Department of Defense, 30 October 2013

SUBJECT: By Name Request: Non-Reimbursable Detail for (b)(6)

I would like to formally request that (b)(6) be detailed to a position at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The detail will be non-reimbursable for a period of up to one year, with the option to extend or terminate at any time, as agreed upon by both parties. The detail will be in accordance with the provisions of Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 1000.17 (Reference).

(b)(6) brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise to the ODNI and will be an integral member of the General Counsel team. His ability to provide DoD-specific intelligence guidance and oversight will further bolster the partnership between the ODNI, DoD, and the larger Intelligence Community. Details supporting the ODNI are authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, and Executive Order 13355, as amended.

If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Ms. Deirdre Walsh, our Chief Operating Officer, at (b)(3)

  
Richard A. Grenell  
Acting Director

10 MARCH 2020  
Date

UNCLASSIFIED



(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40 PM  
**To:** Grenell, Richard A; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

FYI

---

**From:** Ulyyot, John L. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:33 PM  
**To:** Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO ; Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

FYI Matt/Alex – please flag for the Boss – (b)(5)

Thanks,

John U.

**From:** Julian Barnes  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:18 PM  
**To:** Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC  
**Cc:** Ulyyot, John L. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

Eddie,

We haven't met, but I worked with Mike often and I know John from gigs long past. I want to alert you to a story in the works and see if you guys want to engage or comment. My number is (b)(6)

This weekend we are going to do a story that discusses the President's Daily Brief, his briefer Beth Sanner, and looks more in depth at the intelligence warning, or lack thereof, that the president received on Jan 23. The peg for the story is Mr. Trump's discussion of the Jan 23 briefing last Sunday and the ODNI release of information on Monday.

The story will mention, in passing, Mr. O'Brien.

I wanted to see if there was anything that the White House/NSC wanted to comment on in the story.

Specifically:

\*Was the President blaming his briefer or the Intelligence agencies for getting it wrong in Jan 23 brief where he says they said it wasn't that deadly?

\*story asserts that President Trump rarely, if ever, reads the PDB, instead relying on his briefings done 2 or 3 times a week--which makes the role of Beth Sanner particularly critical. Do you want to push back on that idea?

\*Story asserts in a Jan 28 m White House meeting O'Brien and Pottinger said intelligence agencies were underestimating the threat of the coronavirus. Do you want to engage on that?

Please call me and we can discuss further. (b)(6)



Julian

Julian E. Barnes  
The New York Times  
(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:43 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: APA (Internal) (b)(5)

Kash – making sure you saw this.

---

**From:** Office of Presidential Scheduling  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:35 AM  
**To:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff  
**Cc:** DL Outer Oval  
**Subject:** RE: APA (Internal) (b)(5)

All – please be prepared to begin this meeting early (potentially as soon as **11:15 AM**).

---

**From:** Office of Presidential Scheduling  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:46 PM  
**To:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff  
**Subject:** APA (Internal) (b)(5)

This email is to inform you that an (b)(5) has been **APPROVED** and added to the (b)(5) schedule. Information regarding your event is below.

**PROJECT OFFICER:** Robert O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**DATE/TIME/LENGTH OF PARTICIPATION:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 at 11:45 AM (30 min)

**LOCATION:** (b)(5)

**EVENT FORMAT/PROGRAM:** Briefing

**PRESS:** Closed

**INTERNAL PARTICIPANTS:**

Mark Meadows, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff

Director Gina Haspel, Central Intelligence Agency

Robert O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Pat Cipollone, Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President

LTG Keith Kellogg, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President

John Eisenberg, Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, and Legal Advisor to the NSC

Kash Patel, Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence

Beth Sanner, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration

(b)(3), (b)(6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3), (b)(6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Please review this information to ensure accuracy. Any updates regarding your event must be shared with the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling. It is the responsibility of the Project Officer or his/her designee to finalize all details of the approved activity.

Thank you,

Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:43 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: APA (Internal) (b)(5)

[Thank You,](#)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

[Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration](#)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

---

**From:** Office of Presidential Scheduling  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 10:35 AM  
**To:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff  
**Cc:** DL Outer Oval  
**Subject:** RE: APA (Internal) (b)(5)

All – please be prepared to begin this meeting early (potentially as soon as **11:15 AM**).

---

**From:** Office of Presidential Scheduling  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:46 PM  
**To:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff  
**Subject:** APA (Internal) (b)(5)

This email is to inform you that an (b)(5) has been **APPROVED** and added to the (b)(5) schedule. Information regarding your event is below.

**PROJECT OFFICER:** Robert O'Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**DATE/TIME/LENGTH OF PARTICIPATION:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 at 11:45 AM (30 min)

**LOCATION:** (b)(5)

**EVENT FORMAT/PROGRAM:** Briefing

**PRESS:** Closed

**INTERNAL PARTICIPANTS:**

Mark Meadows, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff  
Director Gina Haspel, Central Intelligence Agency  
Robert O'Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Pat Cipollone, Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President  
LTG Keith Kellogg, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President  
John Eisenberg, Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs, and Legal Advisor to the NSC

Kash Patel, Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Beth Sanner, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration

(b)(3), (b)(6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
(b)(3), (b)(6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Please review this information to ensure accuracy. Any updates regarding your event must be shared with the Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling. It is the responsibility of the Project Officer or his/her designee to finalize all details of the approved activity.

Thank you,

Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 11:11 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Appointed 5 26 20

For SA – paperwork is in order.

---

**From:** Thomas, Edwin R. III EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 11:03 AM  
**To:** DL-WHO-Exec Clerk ; Ferrer Piran Basualdo, Austin G. EOP/WHO ; Garell, Mason W. EOP/WHO ; Harris, Shane M. EOP/WHO ; Bacon, James A. EOP/WHO ; McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO ; Keller, Catherine B. EOP/WHO ; Lyons, Derek S. EOP/WHO ; Burley, Michael N. EOP/WHO (Associate) ; Nieves, Brian D. EOP/WHO ; Porter, Madison F. EOP/WHO ; Toland, Scott R. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Appointed 5 26 20

On Tuesday, May 26, 2020, POTUS appointed the following person:

John L. Ratcliffe, of Texas, to be Director of National Intelligence, vice Daniel Coats, resigned.

*Edwin R. Thomas*  
*Office of the Executive Clerk*  
*The White House*  
(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 9:53 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(5), (b)(6)

Send to Ric!!

**From:** Brechbuhl, Thomas U  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 9:34 AM  
**To:** McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO  
**Cc:** Pedrosa, Nilda R  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(5), (b)(6)

John,

I trust you had a good weekend.

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Ulrich

T. Ulrich Brechbühl  
The Counselor  
United States Department of State  
[BrechbuhlTU@state.gov](mailto:BrechbuhlTU@state.gov) | 202-647-8038



**From:** Nieves, Brian D. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 12:10 PM  
**To:** Helfman, Tara J. EOP/WHO (b)(6) Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO

(b)(6)

**Subject:** (b)(5), (b)(6)

Good afternoon,

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Best,

Brian D. Nieves

Office of Presidential Personnel

Office: (b)(6)

Cell: (b)(6)



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

17 January 2024

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of documents responsive to both items of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001408 – 001713). In response to item number one of your request, one (1) document is being released to you in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-000201) 001427). Additionally, twenty-four (24) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001408 – 001409, 001413 – 001420, 001424, 001426, 001428 – 001443), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

We have determined that three (3) documents must be denied in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001410 – 001412, 001421 – 001423, and 001425), pursuant to the aforementioned FOIA exemptions.

In response to item number two of your request, we have determined that 269 pages full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001444 – 001713) must be withheld in full, pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5). Exemption (b)(1) applies to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c);

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory M. Koch". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

for  
Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**  
**Subject:**

(b)(6)  
Monday, March 2, 2020 8:38 PM  
KASHYAPP  
Connecting

(b)(6)  
Chief of Staff  
Rep. John Ratcliffe

(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** Kash Patel [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 7:55 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [Redacted] CV\_10 Mar 2020.pdf  
**Attachments:** [Redacted] CV\_10 Mar 2020.pdf  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:16 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Deirdre M. Walsh - ODNI  
**Attachments:** Deirdre M. Walsh - ODNI

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[redacted]  
*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:05 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** DNI Protocol - ODNI  
**Attachments:** DNI Protocol - ODNI

Protocol will process any and all visitors into LX compound if they are meeting w/the DNI or PDDNI.

(b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*  
[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Full Name:** DNI Protocol  
**Last Name:** Protocol  
**First Name:** DNI  
**Company:** ODNI

**Business:**  
**Business 2:**

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

**E-mail:**  
**E-mail Display As:**

(b)(3)

DNI-Protocol

(b)(3) Chief of Protocol

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:01 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** DNI Watch Office - ODNI  
**Attachments:** DNI Watch Office - ODNI

If you ever need to reach someone and you do not have their contact information, call the WO and they 'should' have the information.

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**Full Name:** DNI Watch Office  
**Last Name:** Office  
**First Name:** DNI  
**Job Title:** After Hours Contact  
**Company:** ODNI

**Business:** [Redacted]  
**Home:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Mobile:** [Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:**

**Sent:**

**To:**

**Subject:**

Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:00 PM

KASHYAPP

DNI watch

Can you send me the DNI watch phone number?

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Beth E. Sanner  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 4, 2020 3:04 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** EODs

I think you have the list of EODs to approve. (b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(3)

My PDB deputy [redacted] is on there. He is a no brainer. A total catch [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] And really knows how to run a program like a business.  
Very fungible skills for us. Also if there is an apocalypse, I call him to be on my team. He can fix anything,  
very handy. ☺ (b)(3)

(b)(6)  
Not sure who  
Else is on there, but he is my priority. Also he hit 25 yrs of federal service this week, so it would be a nice  
reward.

B

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** Kash Patel [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 7:57 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [Redacted] Resume\_05 01 2019 pdf.pdf  
**Attachments:** [Redacted] Resume\_05 01 2019 pdf.pdf  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** Kash Patel [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 1, 2020 4:27 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [redacted] One Page Resume.pdf  
**Attachments:** [redacted] One Page Resume.pdf  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** Deirdre M Walsh  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 11:19 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Appointment Resignation Letter  
**Attachments:** John Sherman IC CIO Appointment Resignation Letter.pdf

Can I ask your assistance with getting this to WH Personnel?

**From:** John B Sherman  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 3:49 PM  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh (b)(3)  
**Cc:** kevin.meiners [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Appointment Resignation Letter

Deirdre,

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Attached is my appointment resignation letter. Big thanks to Brad for reviewing it for content, and to [redacted] for getting it formatted. If it passes muster with you, I'd be obliged if you could pass it to Kash so he can forward it to the White House Personnel Office. Thanks!

John

UNCLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

19 April 2020

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President,

It has been a great honor to serve as the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer for the last three years. I have had the opportunity to work with and lead an outstanding group of interagency colleagues as we have modernized our information technology and cybersecurity posture. We have accomplished much in terms of building on our cloud computing, interoperability between organizations, and ability to secure our classified systems and data. Most importantly, we have enabled our intelligence officers to capitalize on the latest and best technology to achieve their mission.

I learned recently that I have been selected to serve as the Principal Deputy Chief Information Officer at the Department of Defense. The team there has made great strides with digital modernization and I am eager to use my Intelligence Community experiences to help enable their next steps. I am also very grateful for you appointing me to my current position in 2017, and will carry on with the same enthusiasm and drive for results that has marked my tenure in this job. Now my focus will be on an even larger enterprise, with contributions to our nation's warfighters being my main priority. I can think of no greater opportunity!

The effective date of my resignation as Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer will be June 8, 2020. Thank you again for the chance to serve.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'JBS', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

John B. Sherman

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Deirdre M Walsh  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 4:56 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: can we (b)(6)

FYI below – it’s teed up with the FO.

☺

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 4:49 PM  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh ; Amanda J Schoch  
**Cc:** (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: can we (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) took the press release and turned it into a WFM. She sent it to (b)(6) and we hope to send it out in the morning. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Thanks!

**From:** Deirdre M Walsh  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 3:58 PM  
**To:** Amanda J Schoch ; (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: can we (b)(6)

Thanks!!

**From:** Amanda J Schoch  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 3:54 PM  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh ; (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: can we

We just put out the press release. I’ll have the team turn that into a WFM.

**From:** Deirdre M Walsh  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 3:53 PM  
**To:** Amanda J Schoch (b)(3)  
**Cc:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: can we (b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(6)

Amanda,  
See below – can your team pull together a quick congrats? Maybe (b)(6) has something already done?



**From:** KASHYAPP

**Sent:** Wednesday, May 06, 2020 3:47 PM

**To:** Deirdre M Walsh ; [REDACTED] (b)(3)

**Subject:** can we (b)(6)

Queue up an internal congratulatory email for bill's confirmation that Ric would send to the work force? Thanks

kash

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 6, 2020 2:06 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Amanda J Schoch; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Durham investigation

Kash –

Just an FYI on the media request below. Per the A/DNI's guidance, we have no comment.

Thanks,  
Matt

**From:** Hosenball, Mark J. (Reuters)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 06, 2020 11:46 AM  
**To:** DNI-Media  
**Subject:** FW: Durham investigation

Hello again. . It is my understanding that the prosecution team led by Connecticut U.S. Attorney John Durham, who has been assigned by Attorney General Bill Barr to investigate the roots of 2016 investigations into allegations that President Trump and his campaign were linked to or influenced by Russia, recently approached former British intelligence officer and "dossier" author Christopher Steele for an interview. It is my understanding that Durham's team were told to go away because Steele is not interested in talking to them. I did report some time ago <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-steele/british-ex-spy-will-not-talk-to-u-s-prosecutor-examining-trump-probe-origins-source-idUSKCN1SY20K> that Mr. Steele was expected/likely to reject any interview request from Durham or his team and now I know this has happened. I am now going to report that Steele actually rejected an approach from Durham's team. It is also my understanding that in 2018, when he was working as a counsel for House Intelligence Committee chairman Devin Nunes, Kashyap Patel, who I understand now will be a top aide to acting DNI Richard Grenell, also sought an interview with Steele for HPSCI, which approach also was rejected. His comment on any or all of this would be most welcome. Many thanks mh

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Thursday, May 7, 2020 5:45 PM  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted] KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: HPSCI transcripts

Here's the link. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 07, 2020 5:43 PM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:**

<https://intelligence.house.gov/russiainvestigation/>

(b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Deputy Assistant DNI for Strategic Communications  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 3:53 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: ODNI Hiring Freeze Legal Opinion  
**Attachments:** ODNI Hiring Freeze- Legal opinion.docx

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:55 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** ODNI Hiring Freeze Legal Opinion

Sir,

Please find attached the requested unclassified email string regarding the ODNI Hiring Freeze Legal Opinion.

[redacted]  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 10:59 AM (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI [redacted] Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] Kashyap P. Patel-DNI [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] Bradley A. Brooker-DNI [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze (b)(3)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
~~ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION~~  
=====

Deirdre,

Thanks for sending. I'm adding the ADNI to the email string, as he would like to have WH counsel review the opinion prior to meeting to discuss. I'll let you know soonest when he receives feedback and is ready to meet.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)  
Sr. EA to the DNI (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**From:** Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 9:23 AM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Kashyap P. Patel-DNI [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
~~ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION~~  
=====

(b)(3)  
(b)(6) [redacted]  
Per the ADNI's request, below is the written legal opinion regarding implementation of the temporary hiring freeze.  
Happy to discuss when ADNI is available. I'm around all afternoon if he wants to do a call [redacted] (b)(3)

As a reminder to the categories in the email below, here are the number of folks in each category:


Thanks much,  
Deirdre

(b)(3)  
**From:** Bradley A. Brooker-DNI [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 06, 2020 1:08 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI [redacted]  
**Subject:** Legal Risk Associated with Temporary Hiring Freeze


Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

~~ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT/ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION~~

=====




(b)(5)



(b)(5)

(b)(5)



Brad

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel



(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 9:02 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Deirdre M Walsh  
**Subject:** FW: Onboarding

Kash –

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(5)  
(b)(6)

Thanks,  
Brad (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 9:31 PM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Subject:** Onboarding

Brad: (b)(6)

I've spoken to the powers that be [Redacted] and they indicate that I am cleared on their end to start at ODNI. Kash Patel asked me to reach out to you in order to further facilitate the onboarding process. I believe that the idea is that I would start as early as this Wednesday, 18 March. Please tell me what I need to do next and where I need to report at ODNI. Thanks much.

Best  
[Redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 8:37 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** FW: Ratcliffe Nominated

Looks like the nomination was formally sent forward last night.

(b)(3)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 03, 2020 8:34 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Cc:** Bradley A Brooker [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Ratcliffe Nominated

PN1615 — 116th Congress (2019-2020) — **John L. Ratcliffe** — **Office of the Director of National Intelligence**  
John L. Ratcliffe, of Texas, to be Director of National Intelligence, vice Daniel Coats, resigned. **Date Received from President:**  
03/02/2020 **Committee:** Intelligence **Latest Action:** 03/02/2020 - Received in the Senate and referred to the Select Committee on  
Intelligence. (All Actions) (b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
Chief, Ethics & Administrative Law  
Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Monday, April 20, 2020 8:28 AM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** Rita M Sampson; Beth E. Sanner; Bradley A Brooker  
**Subject:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
FW: Security Clearances (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
and Rita, (b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)

**From:** "RICHARDG"  
**Date:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 at 9:32:49 PM  
**To:** "Beth E. Sanner"  
(b)(3)  
"Bradley A Brooker"  
(b)(6)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6) "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** Security Clearances

A few weeks ago I spoke to the President of IC Pride to brainstorm about ways we could improve the security clearance process for the lgbt community.

There were several ideas - and I articulated my desire to make sure we work on the legal and regulatory issues and NOT confuse those with issues that actually require changing hearts and minds. While hearts and minds are important to change, that must be done through education - not a regulatory change.

We had a follow up call that included Rita and she may also have some ideas to explore.

But I am wondering if you all have any ideas of how to approach this issue and who will the key audiences for trying to make changes?

I welcome your suggestions.

Ric

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 11:27 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Tweet by Epoch Times Opinion on Twitter

Let's discuss

**From:** Richard Grenell  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:24 PM  
**To:** RICHARDG  
**Subject:** Tweet by Epoch Times Opinion on Twitter



**Epoch Times Opinion**  
[redacted]@EpochOpinion [redacted]



On July 27, 2017, [redacted]@DevinNunes [redacted], sent a letter to the [redacted]@ODN|gov [redacted] Dan Coats regarding the ongoing #Leaks of classified information and the need for new #Unmasking legislation to address the problem.

Nunes's letter specifically pointed out officials within the #Obama administration: [pic.twitter.com/vzcCwhjiG5](https://pic.twitter.com/vzcCwhjiG5)  
19.04.20, 11:15 AM

Download the Twitter app

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:15 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call me when you can. Thx.

Brad Brooker  
Acting General Counsel  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Kash Patel [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 2, 2020 11:05 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Beth E. Sanner  
**Subject:** China

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/us/politics/cia-coronavirus-china.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage>

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Amanda J Schoch  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 5:35 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [Redacted] (b)(6)

Hi Kash –

(b)(6)

I'm still trying to hunt this down. I have not found an application against one of my positions from [Redacted] Talent Management and ICIG are checking to see if they can find anything. Will let you know as soon as I hear back.

Sincerely  
Amanda

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Friday, 3 April 2020  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 3:34:18 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Friday, 3 April 2020.docx

---

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 03, 2020 3:32 AM  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Friday, 3 April 2020

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Friday, 12 June 2020  
**Date:** Friday, June 12, 2020 3:25:33 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Friday, 12 June 2020.docx

---

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 12, 2020 3:22 AM  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Friday, 12 June 2020

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**   
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Friday, 17 April 2020  
**Date:** Friday, April 17, 2020 3:54:22 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Friday, 17 April 2020.docx

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Monday, 2 March 2020  
**Date:** Monday, March 2, 2020 4:25:12 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Monday, 2 March 2020.docx

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

=====  
FYSA.  
=====

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Monday, 04 May 2020  
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 3:23:21 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Monday 04 May 2020.docx

---

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 04, 2020 3:19 AM  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Monday, 04 May 2020

[redacted]  
DIR/OPA [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted]

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** DNI WATCH WORLDWIDE INTELLIGENCE UPDATES  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Thursday, 09 April 2020  
**Date:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 3:25:33 AM  
**Attachments:** Media Highlights for Thursday 09 April 2020.docx

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 09, 2020 3:24 AM  
**Subject:** Media Highlights for Thursday, 09 April 2020

[Redacted]  
DIR/OPA [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted]

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** got a second?  
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 7:27:33 PM

---

(b)(6) I am in my office a while longer and then in my car. My personal cell (Bluetooth enabled) is [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] Or if you send me your cell and a good time, I will call then if I can. Thanks

John A. Eisenberg  
Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President,  
and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council

Office: [redacted] (direct), [redacted] (main)

Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

Secure (WW): [redacted]

Secure (EEOB): [redacted]

**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** How can I reach you for a quick question?  
**Date:** Monday, April 6, 2020 12:19:10 PM

---

thanks

John A. Eisenberg  
Office: [REDACTED]  
Cell: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** I am back in my office for a bit  
**Date:** Friday, May 8, 2020 6:19:07 PM

---

Are you around? Sorry I missed you earlier.

John A. Eisenberg  
Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President,  
and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council  
Office: (b)(6) (direct), (b)(6) (main)  
Cell: (b)(6)  
Secure (WW): (b)(6)  
Secure (EEOB)



**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** I am in  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 5, 2020 2:31:56 PM

---

As you likely gathered from my appearance at the VTC.

John A. Eisenberg  
Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President,  
and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council

Office: [redacted] (direct), [redacted] (main)

Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

Secure (WW):

Secure (EEOB) [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** India Trip  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 11:25:48 AM


---

I submitted your voucher!!!

Jenny Sanderson  
Counterterrorism Directorate  
National Security Council

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:**   
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** "Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC"  
**Subject:** Interesting piece on Iran  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 8:00:59 AM

---

<https://justthenews.com/government/security/exclusive-iran-aims-disrupt-2020-elections-cyberhack-intelligence-insiders-say>

**From:** Hayley, Jordan A. FOP/WHO  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** introduction  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 8:52:25 AM

---

Hello [redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you for your email and update on this process.

Per John McEntee's request, I am looping in Kash from DNI (cc'd here) to help with this process and give you updates/more information on the potential opportunity O'Brien mentioned. Thank you!

Best,

**Jordan Hayley**

External Relations Coordinator | Presidential Personnel  
Executive Office of the President

Office: [redacted] Cell: [redacted]  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** Ellis, Michael J. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Souza, Allen R. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** LX access tomorrow  
**Date:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 6:25:13 PM

---

Kash, as discussed, I'm connecting you with Allen so you can help with building access for him tomorrow.

Thanks,  
Michael

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** "Ludwig, Michael E. COL USA WHMO/WHMU"; KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** "Haidet, Michael B. EOP/WHO"; "DL WHMU Members COVID"; "Burrows, Christin S. Maj USAF WHMO/WHMU"; "Perry, Joshua A. MAJ USA WHMO/WHMU"; "Holbrook, Brian J. LT USN WHMO/WHMU"; "Burrows, Christin S. Maj USAF WHMO/WHMU"  
**Subject:** Medical Screening for Friday's [redacted] (b)(5)  
**Date:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 9:59:53 AM

---

Hello,

Kashyap Patel will attend tomorrows [redacted] (b)(5)

I would like to get him tested for COVID-19 tomorrow at 10:30am.

Beth Sanner will come at 9:00am. Please let me know if that time works.

Thank You, (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration

[redacted] (desk) | [redacted] (mobile)  
(b)(3) (b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** "Ludwig, Michael E. COL USA WHMO/WHMU"; KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** "Haidet, Michael B. EOP/WHO"; "DL WHMU Members COVID"; "Burrows, Christin S. Maj USAF WHMO/WHMU"; "Perry, Joshua A. MAJ USA WHMO/WHMU"; "Holbrook, Brian J. LT USN WHMO/WHMU"; "Burrows, Christin S. Maj USAF WHMO/WHMU"  
**Subject:** Medical Screening for Wednesday's [redacted] (b)(5)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:27:32 PM

---

Hello,

Kashyap Patel will attend tomorrows [redacted] (b)(5)

I would like to get him tested for COVID-19 tomorrow at 10:30am. Please let me know if that time works.

Thank You, (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration

[redacted] (desk) | [redacted] (mobile)

(b)(3) (b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3)  
From: [redacted] (b)(6)  
To: "RASCHER, MALLORY"  
Cc: KASHYAPP; [redacted]; "Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC"; "Hennessey, Millicent S. EOP/NSC"  
Subject: Meeting Request: [redacted]  
Date: Friday, March 6, 2020 2:30:06 PM (b)(5)

---

Mallory,

As a follow-up to my voicemail I just left for you, Kash Patel (cc'd) and Matt Pottinger, would like Ken C. to attend a meeting next Thursday, 12Mar@4PM in Matt's office to discuss [redacted] (b)(5)

I am also cc'ing Matt's front office team on this message.

Please confirm Ken's attendance.

v/r

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)



**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Meeting with WHCO  
**Date:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 12:54:52 PM

---

Hi Kash,

Looking to set up a meeting with yourself, Amb. Grenell, Pat Cipollone and Mike Purpura before the end of the week. Let me know if you guys have a good time you can come over either later this afternoon or tomorrow. Additionally, if there's somebody else I should be reaching out to schedule with y'all, let me know – I hate to bother you!

Thanks,  
Kate

**From:** [Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC](#)  
**To:** [KASHYAPP](#)  
**Subject:** Monheim  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 11:51:06 PM  
**Attachments:** [20200403210131642.pdf](#)  
[ATT00001.htm](#)

---


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS A. MONHEIM

General Counsel of the National Geospatial  
Intelligence Agency

Pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 3345(a) of title 5, United States Code, you are directed to perform the functions and duties of the office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, until the position is filled by appointment or subsequent designation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M. A. Monheim', written in a cursive style.

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Net Assessment  
**Date:** Sunday, May 17, 2020 9:02:18 AM

---

(b)(5) [redacted] If you have a minute to connect on this Monday.... Trying to figure out [redacted] (b)(5)

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel  
Mobile: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Office: [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** ODNI Leg Org chart?  
**Date:** Saturday, April 25, 2020 1:44:04 PM

---

Kash –

Have had a few resumes sent to me at this point (SES to mid-SKC).

Trying to look how they may be plugged, prior to talking with folks. Do you have an org chart you can share?

And thanks again for the assists.

Respectfully,

Troup Hemenway

Presidential Personnel

Mobile:  (b)(6)

Office:

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** On-boarding scheduled for Monday  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 24, 2020 9:57:59 AM

---

Hi Kash,

I just had another good call with HR, they've got me all set and scheduled to on-board and start on Monday morning. I'm going to out-process OVP in a couple of days so my personal cell is below in case you need to reach me during that time.

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Really looking forward to getting started, thanks again for everything.

Best,

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO  
**To:** (b)(6) KASHYAPP  
**Subject:**   
**Date:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 9:32:51 AM  
**Attachments:**  Resume -- Feb. 2020.pdf

---

I'm looking for his DOJ contact. (b)(6)

**From:** [Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC](#)  
**To:** [KASHYAPP](#)  
**Subject:** (b)(6)   
**Date:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 11:25:24 AM

---

Has she started yet?

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House



**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Hemme, Jake W. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Per the boss  
**Date:** Saturday, March 14, 2020 1:36:22 PM

---

(b)(5)

Can you set up an [redacted] for this week [redacted] Each gets a plus 1, I'll be there with Ric for odni. Please let me know how else I can assist. This one will be in person. Thanks

Kash (b)(5)

**From:** Steinman, Joshua M. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** quick call  
**Date:** Monday, May 18, 2020 11:17:18 AM

---

Got a minute?

Joshua Steinman  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
National Security Council -- Cyber  
The White House

**From:** Grenell, Richard A  
**To:** Gray, Alexander; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.  
**Date:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:43:29 PM

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

Ric Grenell

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:40:08 PM  
**To:** Grenell, Richard A [Redacted] (b)(6); KASHYAPP [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

FYI

**From:** Ulliyot, John L. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:33 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO [Redacted]; Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

(b)(6)

FYI Matt/Alex [Redacted] (b)(5)

Thanks,

John U. (b)(6)

**From:** Julian Barnes [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:18 PM  
**To:** Vasquez, Eddie J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Ulliyot, John L. EOP/NSC [Redacted]  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] NYT story on intel briefings.

Eddie,

(b)(6)

We haven't met, but I worked with Mike often and I know John from gigs long past. I want to alert you to a story in the works and see if you guys want to engage or comment. My number is [Redacted]

This weekend we are going to do a story that discusses the President's Daily Brief, his briefer Beth Sanner, and looks more in depth at the intelligence warning, or lack thereof, that the president received on Jan 23. The peg for the story is Mr. Trump's discussion of the Jan 23 briefing last Sunday and the ODNI release of information on Monday.

The story will mention, in passing, Mr. O'Brien.

I wanted to see if there was anything that the White House/NSC wanted to comment on in the

story.

Specifically:

\*Was the President blaming his briefer or the Intelligence agencies for getting it wrong in Jan 23 brief where he says they said it wasn't that deadly?

\*story asserts that President Trump rarely, if ever, reads the PDB, instead relying on his briefings done 2 or 3 times a week--which makes the role of Beth Sanner particularly critical. Do you want to push back on that idea?

\*Story asserts in a Jan 28 m White House meeting O'Brien and Pottinger said intelligence agencies were underestimating the threat of the coronavirus. Do you want to engage on that?

Please call me and we can discuss further. [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Julian

Julian E. Barnes  
The New York Times

[REDACTED]  
(b)(6)

**From:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: aaron  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 9:52:28 AM

---

Ok, will do!

(b)(3)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 9:47 AM  
**To:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** aaron

If he ever comes by asking to use my office, please let him do so, any time. He's my colleague from here and may occasionally need work space. Thanks much

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

22 April 2024

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 22 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of documents responsive to item one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002207 – 002332). Upon review, one (1) document is being released in full (Bates Page: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002306). One-hundred (100) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-000201) 002207 – 002305 and 002307 – 002332), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute. Specifically, in this case, that statute is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Additionally, The National Security Council withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6). Exemption (b)(1) pertains to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526. Exemption (b)(5) pertains to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges.

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 229 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

*for* 

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 01 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Sunday, March 1, 2020 8:23:14 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U)** White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) **National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**March 01, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]  
[redacted] Please direct any  
questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~ **Coronavirus:** Chinese government efforts to contain spread of virus. Global government responses to reports of COVID-19 deaths and increasing number of cases, public reactions. Impact to U.S. citizens traveling abroad to include mandatory quarantine.

[redacted] (b)(1)



[Redacted]

(b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 9:15 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Wednesday, April 1, 2020 4:03 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 1 April 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 12:07:34 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.jpg

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 1 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Wednesday, April 1, 2020 8:31:45 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 1, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) (WHSR)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 1, 2020 1:37 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 May 2020 0100 EST SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 1, 2020 9:29 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 May 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 1, 2020 3:29 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 May 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 1 May 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Friday, May 1, 2020 12:04:17 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



(b)(3)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 1 May 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Friday, May 1, 2020 8:23:42 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U)** White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) **National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**May 1, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 2, 2020 9:45 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 2 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 2, 2020 4:24 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 2 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 2 April 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Thursday, April 2, 2020 12:09:48 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.jpg

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
Subject: 2 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Thursday, April 2, 2020 8:49:50 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 2, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

(b)(1)





(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ] ~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 2 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Monday, March 2, 2020 9:03:55 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 2, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: Chinese government efforts to contain spread of virus. Global government responses to reports of COVID-19 deaths and increasing number of cases, public reactions. Impact to U.S. citizens traveling abroad to include mandatory quarantine.

[redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 2, 2020 9:09 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 2 May 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 2, 2020 3:36 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 2 May 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

From: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 2 May 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Saturday, May 2, 2020 10:14:48 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted]  
(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
May 2, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 2-4 May 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 12:06:31 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 9:21 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 3 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 3 April 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 12:11:15 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).




[Redacted]

(b)(3)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 3 March 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 12:05:02 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).




(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)



NCTC Operations Center  
Threat Management Team Lead

 (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 3 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:04:52 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 3, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(1)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: Chinese government efforts to contain spread of virus. Global government responses to reports of COVID-19 deaths and increasing number of cases, public reactions. Impact to U.S. citizens traveling abroad to include mandatory quarantine.

[redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, May 3, 2020 9:08 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 3 May 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, May 3, 2020 3:57 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 3 May 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 3 May 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Sunday, May 3, 2020 8:14:00 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
May 3, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====



Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Saturday, April 4, 2020 3:27 PM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 4 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 4 March 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 12:04:50 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.jpg](#)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

NCTC Operations Center  
Threat Management Team Lead

[Redacted] (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 5, 2020 3:38 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 5 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 3:53 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 6 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 2:15 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 7 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 7 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 9:54:25 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 7, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

(b)(1)

[Large redacted area]

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 2:28 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 8 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 09 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Thursday, April 9, 2020 7:26:59 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 9, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)



(b)(1)

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3) (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 3:32 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Subject:** 9 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 11, 2020 1:28 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 11 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 11, 2020 8:31 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 11 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 12, 2020 1:43 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 12 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 12, 2020 8:27 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 12 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(3)  
From: [redacted]  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 12 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Sunday, April 12, 2020 8:36:11 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 12, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 2:06 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 13 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 8:27 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 13 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** 13 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Monday, April 13, 2020 9:51:48 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 13, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

[Redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:18 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 14 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 3:48 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 14 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 14 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:33:24 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** Webster Stephen EOP USA GOV [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 8:30 AM  
**To:** #NSC-WHSR-NATSEC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 14 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities

(b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**April 14, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)



(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 1:14 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 15 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 8:54 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 15 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 4:14 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 15 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 1:28 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 16 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 9:15 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 16 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 16 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Thursday, April 16, 2020 9:29:04 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 16, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)



CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 1:42 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 17 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 8:26 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 17 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 17 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Friday, April 17, 2020 9:12:55 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[redacted]  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 17, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5)  
(WHSR) [redacted]

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted]  
(b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 1:25 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 18 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 8:47 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 18 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 3:19 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 18 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(3)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 18 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 8:33:44 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

-----  
**From:** Webster Stephen EOP USA GOV [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 18, 2020 8:30 AM  
**To:** #NSC-WHSR-NATSEC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 18 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities

(b)(3)  
**CLASSIFICATION:** ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

(U) White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 18, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(S//NF)~~ **COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

[Redacted] (b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:15 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 18 March 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:19 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 19 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 19 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 8:50:45 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** Webster Stephen EOP USA GOV [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, April 19, 2020 8:36 AM  
**To:** #NSC-WHSR-NATSEC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 19 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities

(b)(3)  
**CLASSIFICATION:** ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room** [redacted] **National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**April 19, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)



(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 1:26 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 19 March 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 9:47 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 19 March 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 1:32 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 20 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 20, 2020 9:42 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 20 March 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 1:43 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 21 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 21, 2020 1:33 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 21 March 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

From:

To:

Subject:

Date:

21 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Saturday, March 21, 2020 9:46:50 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 21, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (b)(5) (WHSR)

Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations.

(b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(3)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 22 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:51:56 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[redacted]

**From:** Webster Stephen EOP USA GOV [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:42 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** #NSC-WHSR-NATSEC [redacted]  
**Subject:** 22 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities

(b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION:** ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 22, 2020


~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)



(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 1:41 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 23 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 23 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:12:02 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** Webster Stephen EOP USA GOV [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:02 AM  
**To:** #NSC-WHSR-NATSEC [redacted]  
**Subject:** 23 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities

(b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION:** ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**April 23, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

**(S//NF) COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 1:28 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 23 March 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 4:00 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 23 March 2020 1500 EST SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 24, 2020 1:34 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 24 April 2020 0100 SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 24, 2020 4:23 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 24 March 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 24 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 8:36:35 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 24, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations.

[redacted] (b)(1)



**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-; [redacted]  
**Subject:** 24/7 Leadership Parking Spaces  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 9:29:38 AM  
**Attachments:** [Reserved Parking Leadership.jpg](#)

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====

Kash [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Four of the VIP parking spaces located on the left as soon as you enter the LX2 garage are now showing as "24/7 Leadership Parking" (a photo of sign is attached). Please utilize the spaces as needed, we are in the process of having additional physical parking tags/permits made and will get you those as soon as they are available.

As always, if you have any other questions, please let me know. Thank you.

V/R,

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**RESERVED  
PARKING  
24 HOUR  
LEADERSHIP  
PERMIT  
REQUIRED**

**05/07/2018**

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Saturday, April 25, 2020 1:36 AM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 25 April 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, April 25, 2020 3:19 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [redacted]  
**Subject:** 25 April 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 1:34 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 25 March 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
[Redacted]  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 25, 2020 3:57 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 25 March 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 27, 2020 8:18 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 27 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 27 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Monday, April 27, 2020 8:12:04 AM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[redacted]

(b)(3)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

(U) White House Situation Room [redacted] National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 27, 2020

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[Large redacted area]

(b)(1)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~  
(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 4:22 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 27 March 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Wednesday, April 29, 2020 9:44 AM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 29 April 2020 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

=====  
Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted] (b)(6) (b)(3)  
Subject: 29 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:35:44 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.**

**~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room [redacted] (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
April 29, 2020**

**~~(U//FOUO)~~** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5). Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6).

**~~(U//FOUO)~~** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6).

**~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19:** International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 29 February - 2 March 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Monday, March 2, 2020 12:11:13 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.jpg

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

[Redacted]  
NCTC Operations Center  
Threat Management Team Lead  
[Redacted] (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 29, 2020 8:55 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 29 March 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 29, 2020 3:41 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 29 March 2020 1500 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 29 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Sunday, March 29, 2020 8:54:48 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**(U//FOUO)** This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 29, 2020**

**(U//FOUO)** The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**(U//FOUO)** For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)

~~**(S//NF) COVID-19:**~~ International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:17 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 30 April 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 30 April 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
**Date:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:31:31 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.

**(U) White House Situation Room** (b)(5) **National Security (NATSEC) Priorities**  
**April 30, 2020**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (WHSR) [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

~~(S//NF) COVID-19:~~ International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations. Information on state-sponsored influence and disinformation campaigns surrounding the outbreak.

[redacted] (b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

=====  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Monday, March 30, 2020 1:38 AM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 30 March 2020 0100 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Monday, March 30, 2020 10:12 AM  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 30 March 2020 0800 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 9:37 AM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** 31 March 2020 08000 EDT SVTC Notes and Taskings

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

**From:**  
**To:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** 31 March 2020 NCTC Threat Matrix  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 12:06:12 AM  
**Attachments:** image001.jpg

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

Click the below icon for the most recent NCTC Operations Center updates. For additional products and notifications, please visit the [NCTC Operations Center COI Site](#).



[Redacted]

(b)(3)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~  
=====



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: 31 March 2020 White House National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
Date: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 8:59:25 AM

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

**~~(U//FOUO)~~ This information is not to be further disseminated without prior approval from the National Security Council. It is not to be posted online or on SIPRNET.**

**~~(U)~~ White House Situation Room (b)(5) National Security (NATSEC) Priorities  
March 31, 2020**

**~~(U//FOUO)~~ The items listed below are compiled by the White House Situation Room (b)(5) (WHSR)**

[redacted] Please direct any questions regarding the WHSR NATSEC list to the WHSR Watch Floor [redacted] (b)(6)

**~~(U//FOUO)~~ For long-term White House intelligence and operational priorities, please refer to the President's Intelligence Priorities (PIP), which represent the top level of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). If you have any questions regarding the PIP or would like to obtain a copy, please contact the NSC Intelligence Directorate, at [redacted] (b)(6)**

**~~(S//NF)~~ COVID-19: International government responses to COVID-19 to include any additional cases affecting heads of state. Impacts to U.S. citizens abroad to include mandatory quarantine and travel restrictions. Effects on economic sectors, to include the transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and oil industries. Impacts and changes to global military deployments and operations.**

[redacted] (b)(1)



(b)(1)

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

-----  
Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [redacted] Israel defense ministry launches COVID-19 voice-test study - Reuters  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 24, 2020 3:42:38 PM

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED  
=====

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted] (b)(3)

March 24, 2020

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - An analysis of coronavirus patients voices could yield a vocal fingerprint to help detect COVID-19 symptoms in others and prioritize testing and treatment, the Israeli Defence Ministry said on Tuesday.

Starting this week, an Israeli startup company working with hospitals and academic institutions will sample voices of confirmed coronavirus patients through a mobile application in a research project led by the ministry.

These voice samples will be analyzed using an AI (Artificial Intelligence)-based algorithm in order to identify the unique vocal fingerprint, the ministry said in a statement.

The coronavirus affects the respiratory system and signs of distress can be reflected in the patterns of a person's voice and breathing.

Tal Wenderow, President and CEO of Vocalis Health, the company that developed the mobile app, said that the algorithm would be used for remote diagnosis and monitoring.

At this stage, the app would only be used by medical staff together with the patients taking part in the study, but the company's website allows for anyone to take part and send a voice sample to the researchers.

Researchers hope that healthcare systems would be able to use the data to prioritize testing and hospitalization, allowing patients with light symptoms to stay at home.

The ministry said the monitoring system can be conducted from afar, in order to prevent the spread of the disease and overburdening of the national healthcare system.

Initial results of the study were expected within six weeks.

Israel has reported more than 1,600 coronavirus cases and three fatalities.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-israel-study/israeli-defense-ministry-launches-covid-19-voice-test-study-idUSKBN21B2YV>

V/R



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

=====  
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** Deirdre M. Walsh-DNI- (b)(3)  
**To:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNL- (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** 60 Day Study results  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 3:02:46 PM

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

---

Kash,

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[redacted] and I would love the opportunity to walk you through the results of the NSP 60 Day study tomorrow.

If you're good, I've gone ahead and cc'd the EAs to work out a time for all of us.

Thanks!  
Deirdre

Deirdre M. Walsh  
Chief Operating Officer  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[redacted]

---

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

---

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

15 May 2024

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 22 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of documents responsive to item one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002333 – 002650). Upon review, one (1) document is being released to you in part (Bates Page: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002333 – 002334) and two (2) documents are being withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-000201) 002335 – 002650), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(1), which applies to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c);
- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute. Specifically, in this case, that statute is the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,



for

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

**From:** Kashyap P. Patel-DNI- (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-; Corin R. Stone-DNI-; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: SSCI report - volume 4  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 1:52:36 PM  
**Attachments:** 2020-04-10-ICA-Senate.pdf  
2020-04-10-ICA-PubRel\_Redacted.pdf

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(5) I saw that SSCI put it on the internet today. (b)(5) Thanks

kash

**From:** Corin R. Stone-DNI- (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 13, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Richard A. Grenell-DNI- (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner-DNI-; John L. Lombardi-DNI- (b)(3);  
Bradley A. Brooker-DNI-; Shelby L. Pierson-DNI-  
Ryan P. Crumpler-DNI-; James A. Smith-DNI-; Kashyap P. Patel-DNI-; Travis M. Burrs-DNI-  
(b)(3) Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** SSCI report - volume 4

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

(b)(3)

Sir, as we discussed at the staff meeting, attached are the two versions of volume 4 of the SSCI's report. This is the latest volume of a 5-volume Report drafted wholly by the SSCI. It is sent to the IC only for classification review – it is not endorsed by, nor a product of, the IC.

By way of background, over the last two years the SSCI created 5 volumes related to its investigation, covering: Election Security, Social Media, the 2017 IC Assessment (ICA) on Russian Active Measures, Policy Response, and Counterintelligence. Since last June, the IC has reviewed for classification and returned to the SSCI the volumes on Election Security, Social Media and Policy Response. Publicly releasable versions of those three volumes are currently available on the SSCI's website.



Attached is the IC's classification review of the 2017 ICA on Russian Active Measures, and we have not yet received Volume 5, on Counterintelligence, which is apparently over 1000 pages long.

We were also originally informed that the SSCI would draft three shorter reports on the DNC hacking, the FBI's CI investigations, and the Steele Dossier, that we would need to review for classification. We have not received those reports, nor have we heard anything about current status of those reports.

With regard specifically to Volume 4 on the ICA:

The attached (b)(3) version will go on (b)(3) the classified network we run that is accessible by Congress and can only be viewed by Members and those staff with appropriate clearances.

The attached publicly releasable version, which is heavily redacted, could be released to the public by the SSCI, as they have done with the prior three volumes.

In the past we have not commented on these reports publicly, as they are not our work product. We typically return these reports to the SSCI as soon as practicable upon completion. Please let us know if you have any questions.

cc line -- please chime in if I missed any important information.

Thank you,  
Corin

(Email is Unclassified without attachments)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

=====  
Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(3) ~~NOFORN~~ (b)(3)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

13 June 2024

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:


1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of documents responsive to item number two of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002651 – 002952). Upon review, we have determined that the pages must be withheld in full, pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(1), which applies to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c);
- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i), which protects which protect intelligence sources and methods; and
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Koch", with the word "for" written in smaller letters below the signature.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: G8 Meeting  
**Date:** Monday, March 23, 2020 1:13:12 PM

---

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 1:13 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: G8 Meeting [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

As I mentioned to [redacted] just a bit ago, given the extreme sensitivity of what is to be presented, the request from the IC leadership is to only have plus-ones in attendance if their principal is present. I think the plan was to offer a one-on-one makeup for you and the Ranking Member at the next possible juncture. Happy to chat if you wish.

Ryan [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 21, 2020 11:09 AM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** Re: G8 Meeting

Who is requesting plus ones not attend if principal cannot attend?  
As you know, the House is in a weird situation right now with Members back in their districts, and I'm not sure if my boss can make it back in time. Therefore, he would want me to attend, even more so if he can't make it.

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 21, 2020, at 10:56 AM, Ryan Crumpler wrote:

Colleagues –

The ODNI would like to call a Gang of Eight meeting for next Tuesday so that the IC can provide an **extremely sensitive and time-critical notification** to your principals. This meeting really needs to happen before members leave town. We can be flexible on our end for timing on Tuesday to accommodate what I can only imagine are incredibly dynamic calendars. Please advise soonest if your principal can attend.

Also, please note that due the exceptional sensitivity of this particular notification the IC requests that plus ones only attend if their principal is present. Thank you.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[redacted] Liberty Crossing 2  
McLean, VA 22102

(S) [redacted] (U) [redacted]  
(b)(3) (b)(3)

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 11:36 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: DOJ Letter

This is the most recent convo with DOJ. I've got other threads where I'm asking for updates and progress and when we can meet again. The agreement was for me and my counterpart on HSGAC to meet with DOJ again to discuss redaction progress. Obviously, that didn't happen.

-----Original Message----- (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) (Finance)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 9:22 AM  
**To:** 'Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)' (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: DOJ Letter

Why send a half-baked letter that indicates AG Barr has no inclination to redact the information that the Chairmen have requested to be redacted? Further, our understanding was that AG Barr was inclined to redact the vast majority of the footnotes, if not 100% of them. This letter seems to contradict that.

-----Original Message----- (b)(6)

**From:** Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 9:11 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: DOJ Letter

(b)(6)

Leadership wanted to get this to you now and we will continue to work through the remaining issues. When we have more progress on the asks you outline below, I will let you know and we can discuss in person. I understand the ask. We aren't there yet.

Sent from my iPhone (b)(6) (b)(6)

> On Apr 3, 2020, at 9:07 AM, (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6) wrote:

> Well, we've made clear that we've got issues with the other footnote that is 100% redacted (342) and part of 334. And I've been emailing you for weeks asking for updates and when we can come in to review them again so that we can see what kind of progress has been made.

> -----Original Message----- (b)(6)

> **From:** Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) (b)(6)  
> **Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 9:02 AM  
> **To:** (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
> (b)(6)  
> **Cc:** (b)(6) (HSGAC) (b)(6)  
> **Subject:** Re: DOJ Letter

> Right. As the letter says, we are working through the redaction issue with the last footnote. Still a work in progress.

> (b)(6)

>> On Apr 3, 2020, at 7:37 AM, [redacted] (Finance) [redacted] wrote: (b)(6)

>>

>> Thought we were still working through these issues to remove additional redactions. That's how we left the last meeting.

>>

>>>> On Apr 2, 2020, at 11:59 PM, Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) [redacted] wrote:

>>> (b)(6)

(b)(6)

>>>

>>> [redacted]

>>> Attached, please find a letter from the Department in response to one of your recent requests. Please confirm receipt when you are able.

>>>

>>> Thanks,

>>> Chad

>>>

>>>

>>> <Johnson Letter - Footnotes 20200402 w att 2.pdf> <Grassley Letter -


>>> Footnotes 20200402 w att 2.pdf>

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Per your request  
**Date:** Monday, March 16, 2020 8:26:18 PM  
**Attachments:** Resume 1-13-20.pdf

---

Hi Kash:

Here is my resume in pdf format.



(b)(6)



**U.S. Department of Justice**

Office of Legislative Affairs

*Office of the Assistant Attorney General*

*Washington, D.C. 20530*

April 2, 2020

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Grassley:

We write in further regard to matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice (Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

As we described in our letter of February 10, 2020, the Attorney General has determined that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Specifically, in response to your request for the production of unredacted versions of four footnotes in Inspector General Horowitz's report, the Department has undertaken a careful review of the underlying information. Enclosed with this letter are three footnotes with minimal redactions to protect national security interests. As we have discussed with your staff, disclosure of the fourth and final footnote presents unique and significant concerns. Specifically, the redacted information refers to information received by a member of the Crossfire Hurricane team regarding possible previous attempts by a foreign government to penetrate and research a company or individuals associated with Christopher Steele. Nevertheless, the Department continues to review and consider the possibility of further declassification or summary substitution.

We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. Boyd", with a stylized flourish extending to the right.

Stephen E. Boyd  
Assistant Attorney General

[REDACTED]

Hurricane told us that they were unaware of Steele's connections to Russian Oligarch 1, who was the subject of a Crossfire Hurricane case, and that they would have wanted to know about them.<sup>349</sup> Priestap, for example, told us "I don't recall knowing that there was any connectivity between [Steele] and [Russian Oligarch 1]." Priestap told us that he believed it was "completely fair" to say that the FBI should have assessed Steele's relationship with Russian Oligarch 1.

(U) Stuart Evans, NSD's Deputy Assistant Attorney General who oversaw OI, stated that if OI had been aware of the information about Steele's connections to Russian Oligarch 1, it would have been evaluated by OI. He told us: "Counterintelligence investigations are complex, and often involve as I said, you know, double dealing, and people playing all sides.... I think that [the connection between Steele and Russian Oligarch 1] would have been yet another thing we would have wanted to dive into."<sup>350</sup>

#### V. (U) The FBI's Efforts to Assess Steele's Election Reporting in 2016 and 2017

(U) The FBI's assessment of the Steele election reporting began in mid-September 2016 and concluded approximately 1 year later, roughly 3 months after

<sup>349</sup> (U) The Supervisory Intel Analyst and SSA 2 told us that they did not recall reviewing information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for multiple Russian oligarchs in 2015. The Supervisory Intel Analyst explained that he did not recall doing a "deep dive" on Steele's past history as a source and relied in part on Handling Agent 1 for information about Steele. The first access of Steele's Delta file by a Crossfire Hurricane team member (the Supervisory Intel Analyst) occurred on November 18, 2016, after Steele had been closed as a CHS and a month after submission of the first Page FISA application. As described in Chapter Five, the FISA application relied in part on Steele's reporting. In Chapter Four we noted that Steele's frequent contacts with Russian oligarchs in 2015 had raised concerns in the FBI Transnational Organized Crime Intelligence Unit. SSA 1 told us that he was unaware of these concerns, but said he would have found this information useful and would have wanted to know about it while supervising the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Handling Agent 1 expressed surprise that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not access Steele's Delta file earlier. He said that the team should have "turned the file upside down" looking for information 2 months earlier and that he assumed that some members of the team had thoroughly reviewed the file.

<sup>350</sup> [REDACTED] In addition to the information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for multiple Russian oligarchs, we identified reporting the Crossfire Hurricane team received from [REDACTED] indicating the potential for Russian disinformation influencing Steele's election reporting. A [REDACTED] 2017, report relayed information from [REDACTED] outlining an inaccuracy in a limited subset of Steele's reporting about the activities of Michael Cohen. The [REDACTED] stated that it did not have high confidence in this subset of Steele's reporting and assessed that the referenced subset was part of a Russian disinformation campaign to denigrate U.S. foreign relations. A second report from the same [REDACTED] five days later stated that a person named in the limited subset of Steele's reporting had denied representations in the reporting and the [REDACTED] assessed that the person's denials were truthful. A [REDACTED] report dated [REDACTED] 2017, contained information about an individual with reported connections to Trump and Russia who claimed that the public reporting about the details of Trump's [REDACTED] activities in Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false, and that they were the product of RIS "infiltrat[ing] a source into the network" of a [REDACTED] who compiled a dossier of information on Trump's activities. The [REDACTED] noted that it had no information indicating that the individual had special access to RIS activities or information.



~~TOP SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U)

302. (S//NF) According to a document circulated among Crossfire Hurricane team members and supervisors in early October 2016, Person 1 had historical contact with persons and entities suspected of being linked to RIS. The document described reporting ██████████ that Person 1 "was rumored to be a former KGB/SVR officer." In addition, in late December 2016, Department Attorney Bruce Ohr told SSA 1 that he had met with Glenn Simpson and that Simpson had assessed that Person 1 was a RIS officer who was central in connecting Trump to Russia.

(U)

334. (S//NF) When interviewed by the FBI, the Primary Sub-source stated that he/she did not view his/her contacts as a network of sources, ██████████ with whom he/she has conversations about current events and government relations.

(U)

(S//NF) The Primary Sub-source ██████████  
██████████

342. ██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████  
██████████

Declassified by C28W34B64 on 3/6/2020  
This redacted version only.

~~Classified By C28W34B64  
Declassify on: OADR  
Declassify on: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legislative Affairs

*Office of the Assistant Attorney General*

*Washington, D.C. 20530*

April 2, 2020

The Honorable Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Johnson:

We write regarding matters pertaining to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other matters contained in the December 9, 2019 report by Department of Justice (Department) Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

As we described in our letter of February 10, 2020, the Attorney General has determined that it is now in the public interest to release to Congress additional documents and information related to these matters to the extent consistent with national security interests and with the January 7, 2020 order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Specifically, in response to your request for the production of unredacted versions of four footnotes in Inspector General Horowitz's report, the Department has undertaken a careful review of the underlying information. Enclosed with this letter are three footnotes with minimal redactions to protect national security interests. As we have discussed with your staff, disclosure of the fourth and final footnote presents unique and significant concerns. Specifically, the redacted information refers to information received by a member of the Crossfire Hurricane team regarding possible previous attempts by a foreign government to penetrate and research a company or individuals associated with Christopher Steele. Nevertheless, the Department continues to review and consider the possibility of further declassification or summary substitution.

We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance regarding this or any other matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. Boyd", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Stephen E. Boyd  
Assistant Attorney General

[REDACTED]

Hurricane told us that they were unaware of Steele's connections to Russian Oligarch 1, who was the subject of a Crossfire Hurricane case, and that they would have wanted to know about them.<sup>349</sup> Priestap, for example, told us "I don't recall knowing that there was any connectivity between [Steele] and [Russian Oligarch 1]." Priestap told us that he believed it was "completely fair" to say that the FBI should have assessed Steele's relationship with Russian Oligarch 1.

(U) Stuart Evans, NSD's Deputy Assistant Attorney General who oversaw OI, stated that if OI had been aware of the information about Steele's connections to Russian Oligarch 1, it would have been evaluated by OI. He told us: "Counterintelligence investigations are complex, and often involve as I said, you know, double dealing, and people playing all sides.... I think that [the connection between Steele and Russian Oligarch 1] would have been yet another thing we would have wanted to dive into."<sup>350</sup>

#### V. (U) The FBI's Efforts to Assess Steele's Election Reporting in 2016 and 2017

(U) The FBI's assessment of the Steele election reporting began in mid-September 2016 and concluded approximately 1 year later, roughly 3 months after

<sup>349</sup> (U) The Supervisory Intel Analyst and SSA 2 told us that they did not recall reviewing information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for multiple Russian oligarchs in 2015. The Supervisory Intel Analyst explained that he did not recall doing a "deep dive" on Steele's past history as a source and relied in part on Handling Agent 1 for information about Steele. The first access of Steele's Delta file by a Crossfire Hurricane team member (the Supervisory Intel Analyst) occurred on November 18, 2016, after Steele had been closed as a CHS and a month after submission of the first Page FISA application. As described in Chapter Five, the FISA application relied in part on Steele's reporting. In Chapter Four we noted that Steele's frequent contacts with Russian oligarchs in 2015 had raised concerns in the FBI Transnational Organized Crime Intelligence Unit. SSA 1 told us that he was unaware of these concerns, but said he would have found this information useful and would have wanted to know about it while supervising the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Handling Agent 1 expressed surprise that the Crossfire Hurricane team did not access Steele's Delta file earlier. He said that the team should have "turned the file upside down" looking for information 2 months earlier and that he assumed that some members of the team had thoroughly reviewed the file.

<sup>350</sup> [REDACTED] In addition to the information in Steele's Delta file documenting Steele's frequent contacts with representatives for multiple Russian oligarchs, we identified reporting the Crossfire Hurricane team received from [REDACTED] indicating the potential for Russian disinformation influencing Steele's election reporting. A [REDACTED] 2017, report relayed information from [REDACTED] outlining an inaccuracy in a limited subset of Steele's reporting about the activities of Michael Cohen. The [REDACTED] stated that it did not have high confidence in this subset of Steele's reporting and assessed that the referenced subset was part of a Russian disinformation campaign to denigrate U.S. foreign relations. A second report from the same [REDACTED] five days later stated that a person named in the limited subset of Steele's reporting had denied representations in the reporting and the [REDACTED] assessed that the person's denials were truthful. A [REDACTED] report dated [REDACTED] 2017, contained information about an individual with reported connections to Trump and Russia who claimed that the public reporting about the details of Trump's [REDACTED] activities in Moscow during a trip in 2013 were false, and that they were the product of RIS "infiltrat[ing] a source into the network" of a [REDACTED] who compiled a dossier of information on Trump's activities. The [REDACTED] noted that it had no information indicating that the individual had special access to RIS activities or information.

~~TOP SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(U)

302. (~~S//NF~~) According to a document circulated among Crossfire Hurricane team members and supervisors in early October 2016, Person 1 had historical contact with persons and entities suspected of being linked to RIS. The document described reporting [REDACTED] that Person 1 "was rumored to be a former KGB/SVR officer." In addition, in late December 2016, Department Attorney Bruce Ohr told SSA 1 that he had met with Glenn Simpson and that Simpson had assessed that Person 1 was a RIS officer who was central in connecting Trump to Russia.

(U)

334. (~~S//NF~~) When interviewed by the FBI, the Primary Sub-source stated that he/she did not view his/her contacts as a network of sources, [REDACTED] with whom he/she has conversations about current events and government relations.

(U) (~~S//NF~~) The Primary Sub-source [REDACTED]

342. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Declassified by C28W34B64 on 3/6/2020.  
This redacted version only.

~~XX~~  
~~XX~~  
~~XX~~

~~TOP SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (Finance)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: DOJ Letter  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 7:39:12 AM  
**Attachments:** [Johnson Letter - Footnotes 20200402 w att 2.pdf](#)  
[ATT00001.htm](#)  
[Grassley Letter - Footnotes 20200402 w att 2.pdf](#)  
[ATT00002.htm](#)

---

Not good. Tons of redactions.

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)  
**From:** "Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)" [redacted]  
**Date:** April 2, 2020 at 11:57:47 PM EDT  
**To:** [redacted]  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** DOJ Letter (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[redacted]

Attached, please find a letter from the Department in response to one of your recent requests. Please confirm receipt when you are able.

Thanks,  
Chad

RAND PAUL  
KENTUCKY

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 12, 2020

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General of the United States  
United States Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Richard A. Grenell  
Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20501


Dear Attorney General Barr and Director Grenell,

As Chairman of the Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management (FSO) Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, I write to you in regard to your recent work in declassifying information regarding FISA abuses and unlawful unmasking of U.S. persons under the previous administration.

During my prior oversight of this matter, I met several dead ends, and I have many remaining questions in regard to President Obama's administration abusing its authority. Unlawful unmasking of U.S. persons should never be swept aside in hopes of being forgotten in time. While some individuals have claimed that unmasking relating to General Michael Flynn was legitimate, Congress is unable to draw final conclusions without the recent documents that you have declassified.

I hereby request the information you recently turned over to the Department of Justice on this matter, including information about the participants in this abuse, the names of those who were unlawfully unmasked, and the use of that information. Again, the American public entrusts Congress with oversight, and I appreciate your prompt response on this pressing matter.

Sincerely,



Senator Rand Paul, M.D.

U.S. SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN  
CALIFORNIA



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY- RANKING MEMBER  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

May 22, 2020

John Ratcliffe  
Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National  
Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General of the United States  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Director Ratcliffe and Attorney General Barr:

Your offices recently declassified and produced a list of individuals who requested to “unmask” the identity of a U.S. person – Lt. General Michael Flynn – who was referenced in certain foreign intelligence reports. In addition, your offices have been asked to produce a list of individuals who may have received the names of additional Trump campaign and transition officials in response to an unmasking request.


I request that you also declassify and produce the underlying intelligence reports and other materials related to those unmasking requests. Specifically, I ask that you provide the Committee with:

1. All intelligence reports as to which officials made an unmasking request that revealed General Flynn’s name, as listed in the document you provided to Senators Grassley and Johnson on May 13, 2020.
2. The transcripts of General Flynn’s phone calls with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and any FBI reports summarizing their calls, which Senator Grassley and I requested in February 2017, as well as any other intelligence reports concerning these conversations.
3. To the extent you identify other unmasking requests responsive to Chairman Graham’s May 19, 2020 letter, the intelligence reports as to which officials made each request.

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504  
<http://feinstein.senate.gov>

Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Dianne Feinstein". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Dianne Feinstein  
Ranking Member  
Senate Committee on the Judiciary

cc: The Honorable Lindsey O. Graham  
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary



LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
MICHAEL S. LEE, UTAH  
TED CRUZ, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA  
JOSHUA D. HAWLEY, MISSOURI  
THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA  
JOE ERNST, IOWA  
MIKE CRAPO, IDAHO  
JOHN KENNEDY, LOUISIANA  
MARSHA BLACKBURN, TENNESSEE

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND  
AMY KLOBUCHAR, MINNESOTA  
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, DELAWARE  
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT  
MAZIE HIRONO, HAWAII  
CORY A. BOOKER, NEW JERSEY  
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CALIFORNIA

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

May 19, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice


Dear Ambassador Grenell and Attorney General Barr,

As you are aware, on May 13, 2020, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a list of the identity of any official who submitted a request to the National Security Agency at any point between November 8, 2016, and January 31, 2017, to unmask the identity of former National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Ret.). That list contained the identities of 39 officials who made requests to unmask General Flynn's identity.

Given the extensive number of requests for the unmasking of General Flynn's name during this short time period, it raises the question of whether these or other officials sought the unmasking of the identities of other individuals associated with the Trump campaign or transition team. Accordingly, I request that the Committee be provided with a list of the names of any officials who requested, between November 8, 2016, and January 31, 2017, to unmask the identities of those associated with the Trump campaign or transition team, including but not limited to Donald Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner, Corey Lewandowski, Paul Manafort, Steve Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, Sam Clovis, Chris Christie, Carter Page, and George Papadopoulos, and the reason given for any such request. In addition, I request an explanation as to why the list released on May 13th did not contain a record showing who unmasked General Flynn's identity for his phone call with Ambassador Kislyak.

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please have your staff contact Zachary Somers with my committee staff at (202) 224-5445. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

  
Lindsey O. Graham  
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Request from Senator Rand Paul  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:30:31 AM  
**Attachments:** FILE\_1311.pdf  
ATT00001.htm

---

Ambassador-

Please see incoming letter from Sen Paul re: Flynn case.

Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** "Gor, Sergio (Paul)" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 10:35:24 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** Request from Senator Rand Paul

Dear Ryan and Carolyn,

Please find attached a letter from Senator Rand Paul requesting documents relating to recently declassified materials. We appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sergio Gor  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Office of Senator Rand Paul

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Meeting with Attorney General Barr  
**Date:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 4:50:35 PM

Kash,

DOJ will need to following information so you & Mr. Ratcliffe can receive guest parking:

Vehicle:  
Make/Model  
Color:  
Tag/State

Thank You, (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to Deputy Director for Mission Integration

(b)(6)  
(b)(3)

**From:** "Kunasek, Hannah (OAG)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 at 4:16:54 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** "Morell, Clare (OAG)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Meeting with Attorney General Barr

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

H [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

I understand Mr. Ratcliffe and Mr. Patel are planning to drive themselves to DOJ for their meeting with the AG on Monday, May 18<sup>th</sup>. At your convenience, could you please provide the following information so they can receive guest parking:

Vehicle:  
Make/Model  
Color:  
Tag/State

Thank you very much!

Hannah

Hannah Kunasek  
Office of the Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice

(c) [redacted] (b)(6)



**From:** Levi, William (OAG)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re:  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 11:35:09 AM

---

Give me your secure number and I'll try this afternoon (b)(3)

> On Apr 8, 2020, at 11:30 AM, KASHYAPP [redacted] wrote:

>

> Great, can you do a secure call today, would be quick? If so, what's your secure line?

>

> kash

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: Levi, William (OAG) [redacted] (b)(6)

> Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 8:02 AM

> To: KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)

> Subject:

>

> Thanks!

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and AG Barr  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 1:12:00 PM  
**Attachments:** Letter from LOG to Grenell and Barr re unmasking (05-19-20).pdf

Informally sharing as heads up on receipt if you've not yet seen formally on high side...

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 1:00:07 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
[redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and AG Barr

(b)(3) [redacted] - for action, as appropriate.

(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted] (Judiciary-Rep) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:21 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (Judiciary-Dem) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and AG Barr (b)(6)

All,

Attached please find a letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and Attorney General Barr regarding unmasking requests related to the Trump campaign and transition. Please let me know if you have any questions and please confirm receipt of this letter.

Kind regards,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Chief Investigative Counsel  
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary  
[redacted] (direct)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Travis M Burrs, [Redacted] KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Letter from Senator Feinstein  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 8:38:45 AM

AMB - incoming from Sen Feinstein on unmaskings.

Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Judiciary-Dem)" [Redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 at 8:34:33 AM  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Cc:** [Redacted] (Judiciary-Dem)" [Redacted]  
(Judiciary-Rep)" [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Letter from Senator Feinstein

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

All:

Attached is a letter from Senator Feinstein. Please confirm receipt, and if you have any questions, please let me know. Thank you.

Best,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

*Counsel*  
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary  
Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; [Redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Letter from Senator Feinstein  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 8:44:06 AM  
**Attachments:** 2020.05.22 Letter from DF to DNI Ratcliffe AG Barr.pdf

Trying again in hopes the attachment makes it. Sorry not sure what the deal is with my phone.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted]

(b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6) Judiciary-Dem)" [Redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 at 8:34:33 AM  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (Judiciary-Dem)" [Redacted]  
(Judiciary-Rep)" [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter from Senator Feinstein

All:

Attached is a letter from Senator Feinstein. Please confirm receipt, and if you have any questions, please let me know. Thank you.

Best,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

*Counsel*  
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary  
Ranking Member Dianne Feinstein

[Redacted]

(b)(6)




**From:** Bash, John (USATXW)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Galdo, Michael (USATXW); Srinivasan, Karthik (USATXW)  
**Subject:** List of USP Disclosure Requests  
**Date:** Friday, May 29, 2020 3:30:54 PM  
**Attachments:** 2020.05.29 -- List.pdf

---


**PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL  
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS**

Mr. Patel,



Thank you for your assistance,  
John Bash

**John F. Bash**  
United States Attorney  
Western District of Texas




(b)(6)

**From:**  (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Per your request  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 4:19:07 PM  
**Attachments:** Resume 1-13-20.pdf

---

Hey Kash:

See attached. This is slightly updated from the last one you received. Let me know if you need anything else. Thanks.



(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** notice  
**Date:** Monday, March 2, 2020 1:35:22 PM

---

Hey, (b)(6)

I hope, when the time is right, that I will be able to tell [redacted] what is happening. I would hate for her to hear it from someone else. I feel like I owe her that courtesy. Let me know. Thanks.

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 2:31:04 PM  
**Attachments:** Drew Horn Resume.pdf

---

Attached, I'll give you a call back too in a minute.

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting

[redacted] thanks (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 12:04 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Connecting

Hi Kash,

I responded to your email from last night, but Johnny asked me to reach out to this address too.

[redacted] (b)(6)

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President  
Office: [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 2:35:21 PM

---

Let me know if you want me to give you a call, if you need to reach me I'll have my cell on continually (out of the SCIF now) [redacted] (b)(6)

Best,

Drew

[redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting

(b)(6) [redacted] thanks

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 12:04 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Connecting

Hi Kash,

I responded to your email from last night, but Johnny asked me to reach out to this address too.  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President  
Office: [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**From:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Chairman Gowdy  
**Date:** Saturday, February 29, 2020 12:46:19 AM

---

Will do.

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(3)

On Feb 28, 2020, at 7:09 PM, KASHYAPP [redacted] wrote:

I'm in touch. If they reach out to you again, just let me know. Thanks

**From:** "Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 at 6:13:37 PM  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Chairman Gowdy

Hey, you asked me to set up a meeting. I reached out, but they responded since you have been at DNI. Do you still need this meeting?

Jenny Sanderson  
Counterterrorism Directorate  
National Security Council

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Connecting  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 9:54:22 AM

---

Definitely. I'm [redacted] Or would it be easier for me to call you?

Sent from my iPhone (b)(6)

On Mar 4, 2020, at 9:29 AM, KASHYAPP [redacted] wrote:  
(b)(3)

Can you chat real quick? thanks

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 5:03 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Subject:** Connecting (b)(3)

Hi Dennis,

Can you reach out to Kash (cc'd) and find a good time to speak with him on the phone?  
Thanks,

Drew

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President  
Office: [redacted]  
Cell [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** [redacted]@treasury.gov"  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: CONFIRMATION: Secure Phone Call  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:58:51 PM

Thank you. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]@treasury.gov <[redacted]@treasury.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 12:53 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: CONFIRMATION: Secure Phone Call

Good afternoon,  
The number to reach Marshall is: [redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you. (b)(6)

[redacted]

**Executive Assistant to**

A/S Marshall Billingslea

PDAS Paul Ahern

[redacted] (b)(6)

DAS Scott Rembrandt

U.S. Department of the Treasury

(b)(6)

Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

(b)(6) Direct (b)(6) iPhone [redacted] Fax

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 7:02 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted]@treasury.gov (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** [Sender\_Unverified] CONFIRMATION: Secure Phone Call

**\*\* Caution:** External email. Pay attention to suspicious links and attachments. Send suspicious email to [suspect@treasury.gov](mailto:suspect@treasury.gov) \*\*

(b)(6)

Thank you for your prompt reply...yes, that date/time will work for Kash. May I have the secure number for Mr. Billingslea?

Please note I will be on leave 16-17March, therefore if anything changes at the last minute regarding Mr. Billingslea availability, please contact Kash directly (b)(3) or secure (b)(3)

Many thanks,

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6)@treasury.gov <(b)(6)@treasury.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, March 09, 2020 6:01 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: REQUEST: Secure Phone Call

Good evening,

Marshall has time at 3:30pm on March 16<sup>th</sup> to have this secure call with Mr. Patel. Please let me know if this time will not work for Mr. Patel.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

**Executive Assistant to**  
A/S Marshall Billingslea  
PDAS Paul Ahern

(b)(6)

DAS Scott Rembrandt  
U.S. Department of the Treasury  
Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

(b)(6)

Direct (b)(6) iPhone (b)(6)

(b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 10:56 AM

**To:** (b)(6)@treasury.gov

**Cc:** (b)(6) KASHYAPP (b)(3)

**Subject:** [Sender\_Unverified] REQUEST: Secure Phone Call

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**\*\* Caution:** External email. Pay attention to suspicious links and attachments. Send suspicious email to [suspect@treasury.gov](mailto:suspect@treasury.gov) \*\*

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

As a follow-up to our phone call, Mr. Kash Patel, Special Advisor to Acting DNI Richard Grenell (cc'd), would like to schedule a secure telephone call w/Marshall Billingslea. I understand [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Please let me know when we might schedule this call.

v/r

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: Connect  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 1:07:04 PM

---

Thank you –

Kate Todd (b)(6)  
Desk: (b)(6)  
Cell: (but forgot it today) (b)(6)  
Office: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 12:10 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Connect

Thanks,

Kate, my contact info below

Cell: (b)(3)  
Desk at dni: (b)(6)  
Secure at dni: (b)(6)

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(3); Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Connect (b)(3) (b)(6)

Connecting you two

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Connect  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 6:35:46 PM

---

He's with the boss. He called through whsr and I gave him kate todd

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 6:35 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Connect

Thanks, rics trying to get a hold of him

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 at 18:33:55  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Connect

My desk is [redacted] (b)(6) I'll always connect whoever to him

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 6:33 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Connect

What is the office number for pat?

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 at 11:29:38  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] "Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO"  
[redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Connect [redacted] (b)(6)

Connecting you two

**From:** Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Connect  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 7:50:41 PM

---

Monheim [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 12:10 PM (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO

**Subject:** RE: Connect

Thanks,

Kate, my contact info below

Cell [redacted] (b)(3)

Desk at dni [redacted] (b)(6)

Secure at dni [redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted]

**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 11:30 AM

**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** Connect (b)(3)

Connecting you two

From: Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
To: Baehr, James S. EOP/WH/O  
Cc: KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
Subject: Re: [redacted]  
Date: Sunday, March 15, 2020 7:32:14 PM

Adding my  
Dni email. Ping me this week. Thanks

Kash

(b)(6)

On Mar 13, 2020, at 14:46, Baehr, James S. EOP/WHO [redacted] wrote:

>

> Kash, (b)(6)

>

(b)(6) > Not sure if ODNI is still plussing up but [redacted] is a great guy and was on the transition... he's friends with [redacted] as well who can sing his praises.

>

> Attaching his bio and would love to link you up briefly - you'll enjoy knowing him no matter what.

>

> Best,

>

> -----

> James S. C. Baehr

> Special Assistant to the President

> Domestic Policy Council

> O: [redacted]

> C: [redacted] (b)(6)

>

> (b)(6)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [redacted]

> Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 12:03 PM

> To: Baehr, James S. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)

> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [redacted] nfo

>

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

> Jim,

> Thanks for your call this morning! As I mentioned, I am presently an [redacted] I currently hold TS/SCI clearance and access. My primary MOS in the Marine Corps for 34 years, active and reserve, has been in the Intel/counter intelligence field.

> I've had a close relationship with Senator Richard Burr for over 20 years. I have been well acquainted with Rep Devin Nunes for the last dozen years. I have known Rep John Ratcliffe for the last five years, since he was elected to the House from the Dallas area.

> Please let me know if I could meet with appropriate folks to share my experience with and loyalty to the Trump Administration.

> Thanks again, my friend!

> S/F,

> [redacted] (b)(6)

>

> Sent from my iPhone [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]@treasury.gov  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Confirming number for today's call with A/S Billingslea  
**Date:** Monday, March 16, 2020 3:43:20 PM

Apologies, can you call back at [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 3:41 PM

(b)(6)

**To:** [redacted]@treasury.gov>

**Subject:** [Sender\_Unverified] RE: Confirming number for today's call with A/S Billingslea

**\*\* Caution: External email. Pay attention to suspicious links and attachments. Send suspicious email to [suspect@treasury.gov](mailto:suspect@treasury.gov) \*\***

I called in, was put on hold for 8 minutes, and then gave up. Let me know. thanks

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]@treasury.gov <[redacted]@treasury.gov>

**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 1:01 PM (b)(3)

**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted]

**Subject:** Confirming number for today's call with A/S Billingslea

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(e)

Please dia [redacted] and they will connect you with A/S Billingslea. This will enable you all to speak up to a [redacted] Feel free to reach out should there any issues with connecting!

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary  
Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes  
U.S. Department of the Treasury  
Direct [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)



**From:** AS2KTC (b)(5)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: CBP [redacted] Activity  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 9:03:46 AM

(b)(5)

Yep. We'll see how it goes. What's the best ask? Ask for a [redacted] settle for a [redacted]? I am not in the mood to settle given how long this has taken (b)(5)

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 8:34:15 AM  
**To:** AS2KTC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: CBP [redacted] Activity

(b)(5)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks for sending. You saw we got flipped tons secure call instead of meeting

(b)(6)

**From:** "AS2KTC" [redacted]  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 at 02:16:19 (b)(6)  
**To:** "Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "KASHYAPP"  
**Subject:** FW: CBP [redacted] Activity (b)(5) (b)(5)

(b)(3)

FYI. This is related to our efforts at [redacted] Bob is the Deputy at CBP and he's a real pro.

I get these reports every two weeks and relative to the size of the problem, well, you can see for yourself. Bob hears my griping about [redacted] I draw your attention to Bob's comments below in response to the most recent two-week report. (b)(5)

See you both tomorrow (later today).

Ken Cuccinelli

**From:** PEREZ, ROBERT E [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 4:09 PM (b)(7)(c)  
**To:** AS2KTC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: CBP [redacted] Activity (b)(5)

Mr. Deputy – as previously discussed, [redacted]

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Thank you sir.

REP

Robert E. Perez  
Deputy Commissioner  
U.S. Customs & Border Protection

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

**From:** [Redacted]

**Sent:** Monday, March 30, 2020 6:24 PM (b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

**To:** AS2KTC [Redacted]

**Cc:** PEREZ, ROBERT E [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

**Subject:** CBP [Redacted] Activity  
(b)(5)

Deputy Secretary,

Good evening. On behalf of Deputy Commissioner Perez, attached is the latest version of the biweekly [Redacted] SITREP, along with its supplemental materials (CBP biweekly stat report [Redacted] of notable CBP seizures, and a Mexican stat product).

(b)(7)(e)

Among the highlights CBP would like draw your attention to:

[Redacted]

(b)(5)  
(b)(7)(e)

As a courtesy, CBP's Office of International Affairs has shared this same information packet with U/S McCament and A/S [Redacted] from PLCY, [Redacted]

(b)(5)  
(b)(7)(e)

Thank you,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted]  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection  
[Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted]

Office of the Commissioner  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
[Redacted] (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3)  
 From: (b)(6) Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI  
 To: [redacted]  
 Cc: Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHQ; Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHQ; Travis M Burrs; [redacted] KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(3)  
 Subject: Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [redacted] (b)(3)  
 Date: Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:47:40 PM (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

---

Thank you for your assistance.

Best  
Susan

Sent from my iPhone

On May 21, 2020, at 1:14 PM, [redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)  
 [redacted] wrote:

Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief of Staff, [redacted] We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI Ratcliffe will be formally sworn in on Tuesday, 26 May. Thank you.  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

Stephanie L. Sherline  
 Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

<O Badge Form for John Ratcliffe.pdf>  
 <O Badge Form for [redacted].pdf>  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6) (b)(3)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** "Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO"; Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI  
**Cc:** Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO; Travis M Burrs; [Redacted] KASHYAPP; [Redacted] DPS DNI MANAGEMENT  
**Subject:** RE: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS; [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 1:06:18 PM (b)(3) (b)(6)

Thanks so much. Really appreciate you getting this done so fast.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
 Executive Assistant to the DNI  
 [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 1:00 PM  
**To:** Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODN [Redacted] (b)(6)  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO [Redacted] Travis M Burrs  
 [Redacted] KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>;  
**Subject:** RE: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

Good Afternoon, All,

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

The receipt and processing of both DNI Ratcliffe's and CoS [Redacted] badging paperwork has been confirmed by the Secret Service Pass Office. Please go ahead and schedule them each appointments to be badged, as they are not accepting walk-ins at this time. Let me know if you have any questions, or need anything else at all!

Best,

**Ken Carroll**

White House Management Office

O: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
C: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI [Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:48 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO [Redacted] Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO  
 [Redacted] Travis M Burrs [Redacted] (b)(3)  
 [Redacted] KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>; [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Thank you for your assistance.

Best  
Susan

Sent from my iPhone

On May 21, 2020, at 1:14 PM, [redacted] (b)(3)  
wrote: (b)(6)

Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief of Staff, [redacted]. We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI Ratcliffe will be formally sworn in on Tuesday, 26 May. Thank you.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

<O Badge Form for John Ratcliffe.pdf>  
<O Badge Form for [redacted].pdf>

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

## **Kash Patel**

**Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism**  
*The White House*

Kash Patel serves as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council (NSC). He maintains oversight of all Counterterrorism Directorate policy priorities and provides support to senior NSC and White House leadership. An experienced public defender and Department of Justice (DOJ) terrorism prosecutor, Mr. Patel most recently served within the Multilateral Affairs Directorate on the NSC.

At the NSC, Kash oversees a team of dedicated U.S. government professionals responsible for the development of counterterrorism policies to address critical global security threats. These policies have contributed to some of the most consequential counterterrorism successes of the Trump administration, including the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the death of ISIS leader al-Baghdadi, the reform and implementation of numerous sanctions regimes, and the successful recovery of many Americans detained or held hostage abroad.

Prior to joining the NSC, Kash served as the National Security Advisor and Senior Counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee (HPSCI) on Intelligence, where he spearheaded the investigation into the active measures employed by Russia to influence the 2016 presidential election. While in this role, Kash also oversaw congressional oversight of sensitive intelligence and CT platforms around the world for our Intelligence and Special Forces communities. Before his time on Capitol Hill, Mr. Patel served as the DOJ liaison officer to the U.S. Military's Special Forces, assisting in interagency targeting efforts against top global counterterrorism targets.

A native of New York, Mr. Patel now lives in Washington, D.C. He completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Richmond in 2002, earned his law degree from Pace University in 2005, and obtained a Certificate in International Law from University College London Faculty of Laws.

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Call  
**Date:** Saturday, February 29, 2020 12:13:44 PM

---

Absolutely. Talk soon.

On Feb 29, 2020, at 11:59 AM, KASHYAPP (b)(3) wrote:

For sure, can you call (b)(6)

Thanks. Kash

**From:** "Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO" (b)(6)  
**Date:** Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 11:48:44 AM  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash—Could I please give you a call around 1 pm?



**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Call me  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 2:25:06 PM

---

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 2:11 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Call me

Thanks for all the help today, do you have pats email?

kash

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 11:02 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Call me

Hi Kash – heard you're around the complex today. Could you give me a call? Pat was hoping to catch up with you today. [Redacted] (b)(6)

Kate

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Call  
**Date:** Monday, March 16, 2020 6:22:46 PM

---

Hi Kash-- I called earlier but missed you. Can I call you at 4:30?

-----Original Message----- (b)(3)  
**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 3:35 PM  
**To:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Call

Hey sue,

Need a min to chat, you around? Thanks

[redacted] (b)(6)  
-----Original Message----- (b)(6)

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 15, 2020 11:55 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3) Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash,

Hope you're staying safe and healthy. If you have time today, could you please give me a call? [redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
Sue

**From:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: boom  
**Date:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 11:52:10 AM

---

Incredible. That's some marching orders if I've ever heard of one

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 11:41 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC (b)(3)  
[redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: boom (b)(6)


Yea BUDDY!!!

-----  
Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone [redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [redacted]  
-----

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 11:40 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC [redacted] Stewart, Dustin J.  
EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** boom

Potus just started with [redacted] and then [redacted] fucking awesome.  
(b)(5) (b)(5)  
kash


**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: can you take a look  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 1:06:17 PM



(b)(5)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 01, 2020 1:01 PM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** can you take a look

This is pending the phone call sited, but let me know your thoughts:



(b)(5)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: can you  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 1:40:57 PM


---

Sure.

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 01, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** can you (b)(6)

Make this pretty and put in all the fancy accoutrements, while I wait to hear back from Ric? This way, once I finally do, we can just make any quick edits and push out? Thanks

The letter would be going to Grassley, and cc'ing graham as SJC Chair, along with AG Barr



(b)(5)


**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: can you  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 1, 2020 2:05:34 PM  
**Attachments:** 04-01-20\_A-DNI Letter to Sen Grassley\_20-00323\_U.docx

---

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 01, 2020 1:35 PM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** can you [redacted] (b)(6)

Make this pretty and put in all the fancy accoutrements, while I wait to hear back from Ric? This way, once I finally do, we can just make any quick edits and push out? Thanks

The letter would be going to Grassley, and cc'ing graham as SJC Chair, along with AG Barr



(b)(5)

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: can i have 15 min with pat tomorrow?  
**Date:** Monday, May 4, 2020 1:15:40 PM

---

Okay – let's say tomorrow at 4 pm. That ok? If you need to push it back, let me know!

Kate

(b)(3)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 12:55 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: can i have 15 min with pat tomorrow?

Later in the afternoon is better, since it would allow me to swing by on my way home. Thanks much

kash

(b)(6)

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 11:34 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: can i have 15 min with pat tomorrow?

Sure – any particular times? We're relatively open.

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 11:14 AM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** can i have 15 min with pat tomorrow?

Hope all is well on your end. I'll come down to the WH for the meeting. Thanks much

kash

**From:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Bio for NSA  
**Date:** Monday, May 11, 2020 6:40:10 PM  
**Attachments:** Patel Bio.pdf

---

Here's what I have. Essentially the same thing you have but with the big title change and note at the bottom added.

Joe

(b)(3)  
**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 3:55 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: Bio for NSA

Can you shoot me the one that is on file at CT now? thanks

**From:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 2:31 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Bio for NSA

NSA called, via #LEGAL, to request a bio for you. #LEGAL suggested sending your old one from SAP/CT days. Any objections? I'm assuming this is for the Friday meeting, so likely unnecessary.

Joe



**From:** Bradley A Brooker  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Appointed 5 26 20  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 9:46:08 AM

---

Thanks.

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 9:45 AM  
**To:** Bradley A Brooker [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: Appointed 5 26 20

For our records, if you need it.

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 11:11 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Appointed 5 26 20

For SA – paperwork is in order.

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Thomas, Edwin R. III EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 26, 2020 11:03 AM [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** DL-WHO-Exec Clerk [redacted] Ferrer Piran Basualdo, Austin G.  
EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6) Garell, Mason W. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(6) Harris, Shane M. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
Bacon, James A. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6) McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO  
[redacted] (b)(6) Keller, Catherine B. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
Lyons, Derek S. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
Burley, Michael N. EOP/WHO (Associate) [redacted] (b)(6) Nieves, Brian D.  
EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6) Porter, Madison F. EOP/WHO  
[redacted] Toland, Scott R. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Appointed 5 26 20

On Tuesday, May 26, 2020, POTUS appointed the following person:

John L. Ratcliffe, of Texas, to be Director of National Intelligence, vice Daniel Coats, resigned.

*Edwin R. Thomas*  
*Office of the Executive Clerk*  
*The White House*  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: AT  
**Date:** Thursday, May 28, 2020 2:16:59 PM

---

Perfect!

---

Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [redacted]

---

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 28, 2020 2:16 PM [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: AT (b)(6)

Rgr, thanks. [redacted] thanks

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 28, 2020 2:04 PM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6) KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** AT

Just a heads up --- [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(5)  
(b)(6)

---

Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [redacted]

---

**From:** Levi, William (OAG)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Demers, John C. (NSD)  
**Subject:** RE: final draft  
**Date:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:33:46 AM  
**Attachments:** Footnotes.docx

---

Thanks Kash. Adding John for his edits.

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:20 AM  
**To:** Levi, William (OAG) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** final draft

Let me know what you think. Thanks

**From:** Brown, John A. (CD) (FBI)  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Levi, William (OAG) (JMD); Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI); Demers, John C. (NSD) (JMD)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: Footnotes  
**Date:** Friday, April 10, 2020 7:38:32 PM (b)(6)  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(b)(7)(c)

Kash,

Can you advise A/DNI Grenell that we forwarded version 3 to him on the high side a few minutes ago? I tried to call his secure line, but he did not pick up.

Thank you and have a great weekend.

Regards,  
John (b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, April 10, 2020 2:28 PM  
**To:** Brown, John A. (CD) (FBI) [redacted] Levi, William (OAG) (JMD)  
<William.Levi@usdoj.gov>; Bowdich, David L. (DO) (b)(6) [redacted] Demers, John C.  
(NSD) (JMD) [redacted] (b)(7)(c)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(7)(e)  
**Subject:** RE: Footnotes

Thanks very much, appreciate it.

kash (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

**From:** Brown, John A. (CD) (FBI) [redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 10, 2020 2:01 PM  
**To:** Levi, William (OAG) (JMD) <William.Levi@usdoj.gov>; Bowdich, David L. (DO) (FBI)  
[redacted] Demers, John C. (NSD) (JMD) [redacted] KASHYAPP  
(b)(3) [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Footnotes (b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

Gentlemen,

Please see the attached. Please let us know what else you may need in this regard.

Thank you.

Regards,  
John



(b)(6)

**From:** Levi, William (OAG)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Demers, John C. (NSD)  
**Subject:** Re: draft footnote declass letter (b)(5)  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 3:32:44 PM

As we discussed, AG preference is [redacted] but note that [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted]  
[redacted] or some such, so that we aren't opining on declass of material that isn't ours. Happy to look at a next draft when you have it.

On Apr 8, 2020, at 1:48 PM, KASHYAPP [redacted] wrote:  
(b)(3)

Gents,

Will and I discussed a possible joint letter from AG and A/DNI when we respond to Grassley/Johnson request. I've attached a draft, please chop away. [redacted] (b)(5)  
[redacted] but Will and I thought we could get it going, so when we release the declass footnotes on Friday, we can just attach them to the letter. In the alternative, Ric would just sign the letter and send out, so would be good to have your feedback. Thanks much

kash  
<Footnotes.docx>

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

November 21, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 38 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001016 – 001098). Upon review, nine (9) documents are being released in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001017 – 001018, 001037 – 001041, 001044, 001047, 001063, 001065 – 001066, 001068). Twenty-five (25) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001016, 001019, 001023 – 001036, 001042 – 001043, 001045 – 001046, 001048 – 001049, 001067, 001069 – 001082), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges;
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and
- (b)(7)(E) which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

Additionally, the Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemption

(b)(6). The National Security Council withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6). The Federal Bureau of Investigation withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). Exemption (b)(7)(C) pertains to information compiled for law enforcement purposes, release of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others.

We have determined that the remaining four (4) documents must be denied in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001020 – 001022, 001050 – 001062, 001064), pursuant to the aforementioned FOIA exemptions.

An additional 8 documents were referred to another agency, who will respond to you directly (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001083 – 001098).

Finally, the ODNI has processed an additional 235 pages concerning item number one of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Gregory M. Koch". The signature is written in a cursive style. To the left of the signature, the letters "GSK" are written in a smaller, blocky font.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Sunday, May 24, 2020 5:45 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** (b)(3) Accomplishments  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) DNI Grenell Accomplishments.docx

Sir, your accomplishments from the high side are attached.

Travis

UNCLASSIFIED

### **Initiatives by Acting DNI Richard A. Grenell**

- On day one, instituted a hiring freeze with limited exceptions for critical vacancies.
- Eliminated 200 contractor positions representing 15 percent of the total core contractor pool after a zero based review.
- Eliminated 100 positions by terminating vacancy announcements posted for more than 18 months.
- Appointed first female to lead the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).
- Implemented a 15 percent reduction in the NCTC by eliminating duplication of efforts within the center, to include implementing a shared services model with ODNI.
- Established an Intelligence Community-wide working group, leveraging extensive Intelligence Community expertise, to support the U.S. government policy for the decriminalization of homosexuality in the 69 countries where simply being LGBT is a punishable offense.
- Convened national security and counterintelligence experts to examine the process by which LGBT applicants obtain a security clearance without jeopardizing the often delicate relationships with family, friends, and co-workers.
- Finalized and released the National Intelligence Estimate on the future of 1515 through 2021.
- Eliminated 10 government and contractor positions within the National Security Partnerships (NSP) directorate reallocating mission oversight to other components and further streamlining multiple reporting chains.
- Using existing resources, established the Economic and Financial Security Executive, a position responsible for coordinating and leading economic security and financial intelligence-related efforts across the IC.
- Consolidated multiple cyber-related offices into a single, unified U.S. Cyber Executive gaining efficiencies and eliminating duplicative efforts across five previously separate activities and reducing staff by at least five positions.
- Achieved 10 percent or \$19M in total estimated savings resulting from elimination and consolidation of government and contractor resources.
- Directed the Intelligence Community to change the way they protect the identities of U.S. citizens contained within intelligence reporting, forcing consistency to the process and ensuring greater privacy of U.S. citizens.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- Engaged foreign liaison partners and formed a working group to increase intelligence sharing with several key allies on Hezbollah.
- Completed the Intelligence Community review of 53 transcripts totaling over 6,000 pages, from the House Intelligence Committee investigation into alleged Russian collusion in the 2016 election and made the transcripts publically available to increase transparency on the matter.
- Declassified more than three dozen previously redacted footnotes from the DoJ Inspector General's report into IC failures during the Russia collusion investigation.
- Declassified a list of U.S. government officials who requested the unmasking of intelligence reports containing the name of Lt Gen Michael Flynn, the former National Security Advisor from Election Day in November 2016 through the Presidential Inauguration in January 2017.
- Changed the election security briefings process so that the ODNI, not the FBI, leads all future efforts to brief the presidential campaigns on information derived from national intelligence.
- Created a Compartmentation Task Force to synchronize efforts across the IC, protecting our nation's most sensitive intelligence, sources, and methods.
- Appointed ODNI's second in command Principal Executive, a career intelligence professional with over 35 years of experience.
- Hired a career government technology professional to serve as the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer.
- Declassified the former National Security Advisor's email to herself on January 20, 2016.
- Declassified the Flynn/Kislyak transcripts that were in possession of the ODNI for potential public release by incoming DNI.

UNCLASSIFIED

[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6) Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 1, 2020 4:34 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Background, [Redacted] 27 Feb 20.docx  
**Attachments:** Background, [Redacted] 27 Feb 20.docx; ATT00001.txt  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:40 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Bradley A. Brooker - ODNI, OGC  
**Attachments:** Bradley A. Brooker - ODNI

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**Full Name:** (b)(6) Bradley A. Brooker  
**Last Name:** Brooker  
**First Name:** Bradley  
**Job Title:** Lawyer, OGC  
**Company:** ODNI

**Business:**  
**Business 2:**  
**Home:**  
**Mobile:**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

**E-mail:**  
**E-mail Display As:** Bradley A Brooker

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: [redacted] (b)(5)  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 12:34:55 PM

Can you make this?

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 12:06:44 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Hennessey, Millicent S. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [redacted] (b)(5)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

(b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(5)  
(b)(5) Let's meet at 4 p.m. tomorrow. I'll probably run [redacted] tomorrow (instead of Thursday) or [redacted] (b)(5)  
(b)(6) [redacted] After that, let's you and I and [redacted]  
[redacted] sit down. You can bring someone, too. Can do by VTC or we can spread out in a mtg room.  
Best,  
Matt

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 11:28 AM  
**To:** Pottinger, Matthew F. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [redacted] (b)(5)

Matt,

[Large redacted area]

(b)(7)(e)  
(b)(5)



Ken Cuccinelli



(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (Finance)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Grassley, Johnson Request Additional Crossfire Hurricane Records After Declassified Footnotes Reveal Steele Dossier Contained Reported Russian Disinformation  
**Date:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 7:20:48 PM

---

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Grassley Press <Grassley\_Press@grassley.senate.gov>  
**Date:** April 16, 2020 at 6:38:11 PM EDT  
**To:** [redacted] (Grassley)" [redacted]  
[redacted] (Grassley)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (Grassley)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (Grassley)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] (Grassley)" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject: Grassley, Johnson Request Additional Crossfire Hurricane Records After Declassified Footnotes Reveal Steele Dossier Contained Reported Russian Disinformation**

For Immediate Release  
Thursday, April 16, 2020

Grassley, Johnson Request Additional Crossfire Hurricane Records After Declassified Footnotes Reveal Steele Dossier Contained Reported Russian Disinformation

WASHINGTON – Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, sent a letter Thursday to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray requesting all records from the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane team.

“On January 28, 2020, we wrote to Attorney General Barr and requested the declassification of four footnotes in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Since then, we received declassified versions of those and other footnotes, and they reveal disturbing facts about the FBI’s investigation: the Crossfire Hurricane team’s investigative file included at least two intelligence reports stating that key parts of the reporting from Christopher Steele—reporting that “played a central and essential role” in the decision to request FISA orders — were part of a Russian disinformation campaign,” **the senators wrote.**

“The information in the now-declassified footnotes also directly contradicts statements provided by FBI officials in the OIG report. ... We are deeply troubled by the Crossfire Hurricane team’s awareness of and apparent indifference to Russian disinformation, as well as by the grossly inaccurate statements by the FBI

official in charge of the investigation and its supervisory intelligence analyst.

“These recently declassified footnotes raise another issue of significant concern: what other parts of the FBI’s investigation were infected by Russian disinformation? ... The FBI knew that Russian intelligence was targeting Christopher Steele’s company, that Steele relied on sources affiliated with Russian intelligence, and at least two of Steele’s reports were described as the product of a Russian disinformation campaign. Because these facts show the intention, means, and ability to plant Russian disinformation in Steele’s reporting, they suggest that the prevalence of such disinformation in the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation may have been widespread.”

Full text of the letter is below, and it can also be viewed [here](#).

April 16, 2020

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Wray:

On January 28, 2020, we wrote to Attorney General Barr and requested the declassification of four footnotes in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report about the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Crossfire Hurricane investigation.<sup>[1]</sup> Since then, we received declassified versions of those and other footnotes, and they reveal disturbing facts about the FBI’s investigation: the Crossfire Hurricane team’s investigative file included at least two intelligence reports stating that key parts of the reporting from Christopher Steele—reporting that “played a central and essential role” in the decision to request FISA orders<sup>[2]</sup>—were part of a Russian disinformation campaign.<sup>[3]</sup>

The information in the now-declassified footnotes also directly contradicts statements provided by FBI officials in the OIG report. Specifically, William “Bill” Priestap, the Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division who was “ultimately responsible for the [Crossfire Hurricane] investigation,”<sup>[4]</sup> told OIG that “the FBI ‘didn’t have any indication whatsoever’ by May 2017 that the Russians were running a disinformation campaign through the Steele election reporting.”<sup>[5]</sup> The investigation’s Supervisory Intelligence Analyst also told OIG that “he had no information as of June 2017 that Steele’s election reporting source network had been penetrated or compromised.”<sup>[6]</sup> Yet, in January 2017, the FBI received a report that part of Steele’s reporting “was part of a Russian disinformation campaign” and, in February 2017, the FBI received a second report that another part of Steele’s reporting was “the product of [Russian Intelligence Services] infiltrate[ing] a source into the network.”<sup>[7]</sup> We are deeply troubled by the Crossfire Hurricane team’s awareness of and apparent indifference to Russian disinformation, as well as by the grossly inaccurate

statements by the FBI official in charge of the investigation and its supervisory intelligence analyst.

These recently declassified footnotes raise another issue of significant concern: what other parts of the FBI's investigation were infected by Russian disinformation? For example, one footnote explains that Russian Intelligence Services targeted Steele's company for penetration.<sup>[8]</sup> Another footnote shows that, as early as October 2016 and the same time it was preparing its first FISA application, the FBI became aware that one of Steele's key sources was either a Russian intelligence officer or otherwise linked to Russian intelligence.<sup>[9]</sup> In other words, the FBI knew that Russian intelligence was targeting Christopher Steele's company, that Steele relied on sources affiliated with Russian intelligence, and at least two of Steele's reports were described as the product of a Russian disinformation campaign. Because these facts show the intention, means, and ability to plant Russian disinformation in Steele's reporting, they suggest that the prevalence of such disinformation in the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation may have been widespread.

For these reasons, please provide the following no later than April 30, 2020:

1. All intelligence records (*e.g.*, reporting, products, memoranda, *etc.*), foreign or domestic, received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team.<sup>[10]</sup> For any such intelligence record no longer in FBI's possession, please identify the record, the entity that provided the record, and the date of FBI's review.
2. All FBI records (*e.g.*, 302s, ECs, *etc.*) addressing these intelligence products.
3. A list of all intelligence records requested but not received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team.

Please send all unclassified material directly to each Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to each Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although our Committees comply with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, they are not bound, absent prior agreement, by any handling restrictions.

Should you have any questions, please contact Joseph Folio of Chairman Johnson's Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee staff at (202) 224-4751 or Joshua Flynn-Brown of Chairman Grassley's Finance Committee staff at (202) 224-4515.

Sincerely,

Ron Johnson  
Chairman

Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Committee on Finance  
Governmental Affairs

-30-

**From:** Grenell, Richard A (b)(3)  
**To:** Kashyap P Patel; KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** (b)(6) Fwd: (b)(6)  
**Date:** (b)(7)(c) Wednesday, May 20, 2020 8:39:43 AM

Kash, Jump on this. We could bring him home Sunday from Germany.

Ric Grenell

(b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 7:26:14 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c) Boss: you'll see from the FBI e-mail below that there's a CHANCE a (b)(6) might have called our Embassy in Baghdad. Wanted you to be aware given possible transit of Germany eventually. Will keep you informed on what we hear. Best, R.

(b)(6) SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 11:52 AM (b)(7)(c)  
**To:** (b)(6) (FBI); (b)(6) (FBI)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c) (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Cc:** (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov> (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c) **From:** (b)(6) (FBI); (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 11:44 AM (b)(7)(c)  
**To:** (b)(6) (FBI); (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)@state.gov>; (b)(6)  
(b)(6)@state.gov>  
**Subject:** (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

All

FYI

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

An individual claiming to be (b)(6) called the US Embassy Baghdad Duty phone last night. Today LEGAT Baghdad and RSO Baghdad will verify if it is in fact (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

If the individual is confirmed to be [redacted] it is possible, but not yet planned or decided, that he will [redacted] (b)(7)(e)

[redacted] There has been discussions of a variety of possibilities and [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] agents are also tracking the case closely. (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c) For Background (b)(7)(c) has a [redacted] (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e) [redacted] I interviewed [redacted] (b)(7)(e)  
with [redacted]

I will keep you posted on the verification of [redacted] We hope to have more this afternoon.

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

Any Questions please let me know.

thanks

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c) [redacted]

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

[redacted]

Federal Bureau of Investigation

(b)(7)(e) [redacted] (b)(6)  
US Cell [redacted] (b)(7)(c)

German Mobile: [redacted]

US Embassy Office: [redacted]

(b)(7)(e) [redacted] Office: [redacted]  
email: [redacted]

(b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)  
(b)(7)(e)

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(3); KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: M-20-14 Updated Federal Travel Guidance in Response to Coronavirus  
**Date:** Saturday, March 14, 2020 9:07:46 PM

---

Fysa. Believe this may go beyond the guidance you distributed earlier this week.

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

[redacted] office  
 [redacted] mobile

(b)(6)

**From:** "Miller, Julie L. EOP/OMB" [redacted]  
**Date:** Saturday, March 14, 2020 at 4:47:37 PM

[redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** M-20-14 Updated Federal Travel Guidance in Response to Coronavirus

This memorandum provides updated Federal travel guidance in response to coronavirus (COVID-19).

To view this memo, please click: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/M-20-14-travel-guidance-OMB-1.pdf>

This email list is maintained by Arnette White at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). If you should be removed or need someone added, please send a request to

[redacted]  
 (b)(6)

(b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**To:** Deirdre M Walsh [redacted] KASHYAPP; [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: M-20-16 Federal Agency Operational Alignment to Slow the Spread of Coronavirus  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 10:52:31 PM

---

(b)(3) [redacted]  
 (b)(6) [redacted] office mobile

[redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** "Miller, Julie L. EOP/OMB" [redacted]  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 at 10:04:20 PM (b)(6)  
 [redacted]  
**Subject:** M-20-16 Federal Agency Operational Alignment to Slow the Spread of Coronavirus

This memorandum provides guidance on Federal agency operational alignment to slow the spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19).

To view this memo, please click: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/M-20-16.pdf>

This email list is maintained by Arnette White at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). If you should be removed or need someone added, please send a request to [redacted] (b)(6)



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
From: [redacted]  
To: KASHYAPP; [redacted]  
Subject: Fwd: Ranking Member Nunes Letter to Attorney General Barr  
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 4:08:21 PM  
Attachments: Nunes letter to AG Barr - 19 May 20.pdf

Fyi (attached) for A-DNI sit awareness, though he is not copied on the letter itself. Regards, -

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted]  
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 3:43:41 PM (b)(6)  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Ranking Member Nunes Letter to Attorney General Barr

Sure, for DOJ legislative affairs, I'd recommend:

[redacted]

(b)(6)

For WH legislative affairs, I'd recommend:

[redacted]

(b)(6)

Best regards,

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

From: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 3:29:16 PM  
To: [redacted]  
Subject: Re: Ranking Member Nunes Letter to Attorney General Barr

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Hi [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

I am currently in the middle of trying to find POCs for both of those offices. If you wouldn't

mind passing along any contacts you have in those offices, that would be greatly appreciated.

(b)(6) Thank you for your assistance. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

On May 19, 2020, at 3:10 PM, [redacted] wrote:

(b)(6) Thanks, [redacted] I am confirming receipt.

I'm assuming you have separately forwarded this letter to DOJ legislative affairs for Attorney General Barr's attention, and to WH Legislative Affairs for Chief of Staff Meadows' attention, but if you need assistance in that regard, such as POCs there, please let me know.

Respectfully,

[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Deputy Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20511

(b)(6)  
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]

**Date:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 2:54:15 PM

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**To:** [redacted]

**Subject:** Ranking Member Nunes Letter to Attorney General Barr

Good afternoon [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

I am writing to pass along a letter from Ranking Member Devin Nunes with the House Intelligence Committee to Attorney General Barr.

I would appreciate if you could please confirm receipt of this letter.

Thank you,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Staff Assistant

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

O: [redacted]  
C: [redacted] (b)(6)

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

May 19, 2020

The Honorable William Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Attorney General Barr:

As you are aware, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is ultimately responsible for the Bureau's fulsome compliance with congressional oversight requests. Since the inception of this Committee's investigations into Russian influence in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and related matters in early 2017, Committee Republicans have sent numerous requests to the FBI for documents and information. Many of these requests yielded incomplete and evasive responses that failed to include highly relevant information that now appears to have been in the FBI's possession all along.

For example, on May 16, 2017, a letter sent to Acting Director McCabe requested "[a]ny documents, records, electronically stored information including e-mail, communication, recordings, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents) regardless of form, other than those widely available (e.g., newspaper articles) that reasonably could lead to the discovery of any facts within the [FBI investigation into Russian active measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election] publicly announced parameters."

On May 17, 2017, a letter sent to Acting Director McCabe requested the preservation and production of:

1. "Copies of all documents, records, electronically stored information including e-mail, communication, recordings, data and tangible things, regardless of form, other than those widely available (e.g., newspaper articles) that reference Mr. Comey's dismissal as FBI Director, and that are potentially relevant to the Bureau's counterintelligence investigation; and
2. All documents memorializing conversations between the President and Mr. Comey regarding his activities as Director, to include all memoranda, notes, or other documents regarding such conversations, that are potentially relevant to the Bureau's counterintelligence investigation."

On August 24, 2017, a subpoena was served on Director Wray requiring the production of complete and unredacted copies of "any and all documents including electronic communications referring or relating to any Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) relationship

UNCLASSIFIED

with former British Secret Intelligence Service officer Christopher Steele, and/or the so-called 'Trump Dossier' including, but not limited to:

1. Any and all FD-1023s, Contact Reports, or other documents incorporating, relying on, or referring to information provided by Mr. Steele and/or sub-sources and/or contained in the 'Trump Dossier,' and/or Fusion GPS, if they exist;
2. Any information, if it exists, provided by Mr. Steele as an informant/source (confidential or otherwise), or in any other capacity;
3. Any documents that memorialize compensation paid to, or any other benefits conferred on Mr. Steele and/or sub-sources, if they exist;
4. Any documents, if they exist, that memorialize FBI and/or Department of Justice (DOJ) efforts to corroborate, validate, or evaluate information provided by Mr. Steele and/or sub-sources and/or contained in the 'Trump Dossier';
5. Any and all documented communications, if they exist, concerning Mr. Steele or sub-sources, information provided by Mr. Steele or sub-sources, or information contained in the 'Trump Dossier,' and/or provided by Fusion GPS;
6. Any and all applications (including applications for renewal or extension), if they exist, for court orders submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (whether or not approved by the Court) where information provided by Mr. Steele was utilized;
7. Any and all FISC orders issued, if they exist, based on any information provided by Mr. Steele and/or Fusion GPS; and
8. Any and all additional documents submitted to the FISC, including, but not limited to, pleadings and transcripts, if they exist, based on information provided by and/or created by Mr. Steele and/or Fusion GPS, if they exist."

On March 23, 2018, a letter sent to Director Wray requested unredacted copies of "all documents and communications, including emails and text messages (from any messaging applications) referring or relating to any of the following topics:

1. The Steele dossier, to include any and all information that supported or related to the work undertaken by Christopher Steele;
2. All applications for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act against any person affiliated with the campaign for any candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and any documents and communications pertaining to the processes related to those applications; and
3. All matters where the below named DOJ/FBI officials discussed, referenced, or undertook work regarding Christopher Steele, the Steele dossier, related FISA applications and the application process.
  - a. James Comey
  - b. Andrew McCabe
  - c. Peter Strzok
  - d. Lisa Page
  - e. Sally Moyer
  - f. Bill Priestap
  - g. Greg Brower
  - h. James Baker

UNCLASSIFIED

i. Bruce Ohr”

On June 21, 2019, a letter sent to Director Wray requested the following information after previously unacknowledged information was released regarding contacts between the FBI, State Department, and Christopher Steele pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA<sup>1</sup>):

1. “The date that the FBI was informed about the transmission of information from Christopher Steele to Kathleen Kavalec, including but not limited to the information now known as the Steele dossier;
2. All documents and communications between the State Department and the FBI related to Christopher Steele, his company Orbis, or the information Mr. Steele provided to either the State Department or the FBI;
3. All documents and communications provided to the FBI related to Kathleen Kavalec’s relationship with Christopher Steele, including the date that the FBI was informed about the October 11, 2016 meeting, and all memoranda, notes, or other materials that the FBI received from the State Department related to that meeting;
4. An explanation why all materials related to Kathleen Kavalec’s meetings and/or communications with Christopher Steele were not provided to the Committee in response to its August 24, 2017 subpoena.
5. All documents and communications related to the FBI’s classification review of Kathleen Kavalec’s notes and memoranda related to Christopher Steele, including but not limited to all classified and unclassified information that was not publicly released pursuant to FOIA litigation;
6. All documents and communications related to the FBI’s redaction decisions related to notes, memoranda, and any other materials provided by the State Department; and
7. All documents and communications related to internal FBI discussions about whether to provide these materials to the Committee.”

It is extremely concerning to see multiple instances where information that was not previously provided to this Committee pursuant to the above oversight requests appeared to have nevertheless been in the FBI’s possession. Specifically, information previously withheld from this Committee has been released in reports issued by Inspector General Horowitz,<sup>2</sup> court filings,<sup>3</sup> and has been leaked to the press.

For example, footnote 302 in IG Horowitz’s December 2019 report, *Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation*, discusses a document circulated among Crossfire Hurricane team members and supervisors in early October 2016, which outlined how a key Steele sub-source, referred to as “Person 1,” had “historical contact with persons and entities suspected of being linked to [Russian Intelligence Services (RIS)].” The footnote continues: “The document described reporting that Person 1 ‘was rumored

---

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Email from Kathleen Kavalec to Stephen Laycock (Oct. 13, 2016), <https://foia.state.gov/search/Results.aspx?caseNumber=F-2018-04736>.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice Off. of Inspector Gen., *Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation* (Dec. 2019).

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Handwritten Notes, Document 188, *United States v. Flynn*, No. 17-000232 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2020);

to be a former KGB/SVR officer.” This document clearly falls within the scope of the Committee’s August 24, 2017 subpoena, which required the production of all documents and communications related to Steele and/or his sub-sources, to include “any and all documented communications, if they exist, concerning Mr. Steele or sub-sources, information provided by Mr. Steele or sub-sources, or information contained in the ‘Trump Dossier,’ and/or provided by Fusion GPS.”

Footnote 302 also establishes that Glenn Simpson, the head of Fusion GPS, told senior Justice Department official Bruce Ohr that he “had assessed that Person 1 was a RIS officer who was central in connecting Trump to Russia”—and that Ohr had passed that information to a FBI special agent working on the investigation in December 2016. This communication should have been produced to the Committee in response to the March 23, 2018 request for “all matters where the below named DOJ/FBI officials discussed, referenced, or undertook work regarding Christopher Steele, the Steele dossier, related FISA applications and the application process,” which specifically included Bruce Ohr.

In footnote 342, IG Horowitz revealed that the FBI received information in January 2017 indicating “that RIS may have targeted Orbis” and was also aware of a report from the intelligence community in June 2017 indicating that “two persons affiliated with RIS were aware of Steele’s election investigation in early July 2016.” The Committee should have been made aware of the existence of these two crucial reports, which go to the core of the parameters of the Committee’s Russia investigation.

The information inappropriately withheld from this Committee is so uniformly unfavorable to the FBI that it appears the Bureau was attempting to avoid political embarrassment. There is no excuse for failing to provide this information to the Committee in a transparent and timely process.

I hope that we can return to having a productive, open, and honest oversight relationship with the Bureau. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Devin Nunes  
Ranking Member

cc: Mark Meadows  
Chief of Staff to President Trump

UNCLASSIFIED

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Schedule  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 3:35:06 PM

---

What's the best way for me to schedule a meeting with Grenell?

**From:** Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Secure Call  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 12:14:44 PM

---

Hi Kash,

Are you available for a quick secure call today? We have a sensitive item to coordinate with you. My desk is [redacted] (b)(6)

Best,  
Brandon

**Brandon T. Holt**  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
D: [redacted] (b)(6)



**From:** Steinman, Joshua M. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Droegemeier, Kelvin K. EOP/OSTP; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** (b)(3) [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 4:52:59 PM

---

Kelvin,

Want to connect you to Kash Patel, who works directly for Acting DNI Grenell. They're looking for the latest ground truth on [REDACTED]. Can you sync with Kash and give him a download?

Thanks, (b)(3)

Josh

Joshua Steinman  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
National Security Council -- Cyber  
The White House

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Baj, Sue J. EOP/WHQ; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** ssci docs  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 4:19:47 PM

---

Sue,

Just chatted with Ric, who met with pat earlier. Pat said his team is almost done with the doc review to produce over to SSCI. Ric asked I reach out to you and get a status update, if you don't mind.  
Thanks much

kash

**From:** (b)(3) [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6) "McBride, Emily J. EOP/WHO" (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] Travis M Burrs; [redacted] KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Swearing-in Ceremony - 26 May  
**Date:** Monday, May 25, 2020 11:09:40 AM

---

Emily - we understand Director Haspel was invited to attend DNI Ratcliffe's Swearing-in at the WH tomorrow (12:45) by AMB O'Brien. I have gone ahead and copied her office.  
Thanks

**From:** Wehagen, Robby  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Talk tomorrow?  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 10:13:01 PM

---

Hi Kash,

May we have a call tomorrow morning?

Hope you're doing well.

Robby

Robby Wehagen  
robby.wehagen@fema.dhs.gov  
O: (202) 212-5095 | C:  (b)(6)

**From:** Greenway, Robert C. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** test  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 3:06:17 PM

---

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Thank you  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:41:12 PM

---

Hey Kash – thanks for taking the time this morning and good seeing you outside the WW. I'll send my updated info in a couple of days once I have a chance to update it. Have a good night.

V/r,

[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

---

**From:** Rodriguez-Torres, Roxanna M. EOP/NSC  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** TOC Primer & Draft EO  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 4:36:56 PM  
**Attachments:** - TOC Primer - USCTOC Impetus, Current Status, & Way-forward (NSC).docx  
Executive Order ##### - Declares TOC a U.S National Security Priority & Establishes the USCTOC 2.0.docx

---

Hi, Kash,

(b)(6)

It was SO great hearing you on the call this week! Though I know [redacted] is amazing and has likely shared the EO with you, I figured I would share it as well as the Primer that I updated for our call with APNSA Pottinger, Dr. Nesheiwat, and DepSec Cucinelli.

As always, I hope you find yourself well. Feel free to touch base, if you need anything at all.

Sincerely,

**Roxanna Rodríguez-Torres** | Director for Transnational Organized Crime

National Security Council | The White House [redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** [KASHYAPP](#)  
**To:** [KASHYAPP; Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC](#)  
**Date:** Friday, April 3, 2020 11:46:47 AM  
**Attachments:** [Footnotes.docx](#)

---



**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Update  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 9:58:13 AM

---

Hi Kash—Do you have time to connect today?

Thank you,  
Sue

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Update?  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 11:11:16 PM

---

Hi Kash—Do we have an update?

**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Your call  
**Date:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 5:08:06 PM

---

Kash,

I just saw you had called. Can we talk tomorrow? If you need to talk today, please call my cell.

I'm sorry I missed that meeting earlier today. We can catch up on that as well.

John

John A. Eisenberg

 (b)(6)

**From:** Vu, Anny L. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** JWICS  
**Date:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 9:43:56 AM

---

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**To:** (b)(6) KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** [REDACTED]  
**Date:** Thursday, March 19, 2020 1:07:03 PM

---

What do you think of her? In NSC Leg now and used to work for Issa.  
Also, you should put in a good word with [REDACTED] for her taking the Leg job.  
Alexander B. Gray (b)(6)  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

**From:** (b)(3) Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI  
**To:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO  
**Cc:** (b)(6) Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO; Travis M B (b)(3) KASHYAPP; (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS Carma (b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 1:10:25 PM

---

Thank you Ken for the quick turnaround! I hope you have a good holiday weekend.

Best  
Susan

Sent from my iPhone

On May 22, 2020, at 12:59 PM, Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO wrote:

Good Afternoon, All, (b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
The receipt and processing of both DNI Ratcliffe's and Cos (b)(6) badging paperwork has been confirmed by the Secret Service Pass Office. Please go ahead and schedule them each appointments to be badged, as they are not accepting walk-ins at this time. Let me know if you have any questions, or need anything else at all!

Best,  
**Ken Carroll**  
White House Management Office

(b)(6)

(b)(3) **From:** Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI  
(b)(6) **Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:48 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(3) **Cc:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO ; Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO ; Travis M Burrs ;  
(b)(6) (b)(6) KASHYAPP ; (b)(6)  
(b)(6) **Subject:** Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS (b)(3) (b)(6)

Thank you for your assistance.  
Best  
Susan

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
On May 21, 2020, at 1:14 PM, (b)(6) wrote:

Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief of Staff, (b)(6). We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI Ratcliffe

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

will be formally sworn in on Tuesday, 26 May. Thank you.

[Redacted]

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO (b)(3)  
**To:** Dublin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI; (b)(6) (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO; Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS (b)(3)  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 12:59:43 PM (b)(6)

Good Afternoon, All,

The receipt and processing of both DNI Ratcliffe's and CoS (b)(6) badging paperwork has been confirmed by the Secret Service Pass Office. Please go ahead and schedule them each appointments to be badged, as they are not accepting walk-ins at this time. Let me know if you have any questions, or need anything else at all!

Best,

**Ken Carroll**

White House Management Office

(b)(6)

**From:** Dublin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI

**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:48 PM

**To:** (b)(6)

**Cc:** Carroll, Kenneth P. EOP/WHO ; Szabo, Tommy G. EOP/WHO ; Travis M Burrs (b)(3)  
KASHYAPP (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS (b)(3)

Thank you for your assistance.

Best

Susan

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
On May 21, 2020, at 1:14 PM, (b)(6) wrote:

Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief of Staff (b)(6) We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI Ratcliffe will be formally sworn in on Tuesday,

(b)(3) 26 May. Thank you. (b)(3)  
(b)(6) (b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)



(b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: CV  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 24, 2020 11:51:24 AM

---

Thank you.

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 24, 2020, at 11:29, KASHYAPP wrote:

Thanks, lets see what we can do (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 6:16 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CV  
Here you go my friend.

(b)(6) [Redacted]  
Director for Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office – [Redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 6:55 PM  
**To:** 'KASHYAPP'  
**Subject:** RE: Thank you  
Hey, sorry for the delay...will update CV to reflect this position and send it by Friday.

V/r,  
(b)(6) [Redacted]  
Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office – [Redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:41 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Thank you

Hey Kash – thanks for taking the time this morning and good seeing you outside the WW. I'll send my updated info in a couple of days once I have a chance to update it. Have a good night.

V/r,

(b)(6) [Redacted]

(b)(6) [Redacted]  
Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office – [Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** (b)(6) DL NSC NSA FO Staff; KASHYAPP; [redacted] Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** Re: Meeting Tomorrow  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 11:34:34 AM

Thank you!

**Brandon T. Holt**  
Office of the National Security Advisor

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

On May 13, 2020, at 11:32 AM, [redacted] wrote:

Brandon – Kash will participate via secure phone – here at LX. The number is [redacted] (b)(3)  
Thanks.

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 11:17 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; KASHYAPP ; [redacted] Travis M Burrs (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Meeting Tomorrow

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Hi [redacted]  
Just following up to see if Kash will be at the WH this afternoon or if he plans to dial?

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Many thanks,  
Brandon (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 7:07 AM (b)(3)  
**To:** Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC (b)(3)  
**Cc:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff ; [redacted] (b)(6) KASHYAPP ; [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted] Travis M Burrs

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: Meeting Tomorrow  
Brandon – unfortunately, there has been a change to AMB Grenell’s schedule for today. He has asked that Kash Patel participate instead. I have included Kash on this email. Thanks.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6) PS – So nice to talk to you last night and to know you are happy in your new gig.

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to the DNI

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:03 PM

**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)

**Cc:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff (b)(6)

**Subject:** Meeting Tomorrow

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Hi [redacted]

APDNSA Pottinger would like to schedule a discussion ahead of Thursday's [redacted] (b)(5) meetings. Is AMB Grenell available for a meeting or secure call at 2:00pm tomorrow?

Many thanks,

Brandon

**Brandon T. Holt**

Office of the National Security Advisor

[redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP; [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 9:10:17 PM

Ok - thanks.

**From:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 9:04:19 PM

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Schedule

Yes I will be at wh at 10 for another matter. Thanks

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 21:01:09  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>; [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule (b)(3)

Thanks - but, it looks like you are meeting at 1000?? (b)(6)

**From:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 8:24:03 PM  
[redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Schedule (b)(6)

FYI, 1030 now pushed to next week

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 20:05:55  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

This meeting's getting pushed to next week. We'll still plan on seeing you around 10 am.

Thanks!

Kate

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:42 PM  
**To:** 'KASHYAPP'  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

That's fine. Just really need Grenell here at 10:30 am please!

**From:** KASHYAPP

**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:34 PM

**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO

**Subject:** Re: Schedule

No worries. Also, Ric asked me to swing by and see pat in the morning on My way out to odni, should be there around 10. Hope I can steal a few mins then. Thanks

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)

**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 17:20:00

**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)

**Subject:** RE: Schedule (b)(6)

Emailed her in a separate chain – thanks!

**From:** KASHYAPP

**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:11 PM (b)(3)

**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO ; [redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** Re: Schedule

Hey Kate, adding [redacted] to assist. Thanks much

Kash (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted]

**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 15:35:06

**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)

**Subject:** Schedule

What's the best way for me to schedule a meeting with Grenell?

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 6:31:06 PM

---

I did speak w/Kate and I just sent the Amb an email w/my questions.

**From:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 6:25:02 PM  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

No worries. And sure, I might be good so he can tell you what he wants moved . Thanks

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 18:19:31 (b)(6)  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule (b)(3)

I was going to give him a call so - thanks. Should I call him about what he wishes to do w/the other things?

**From:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 6:15:53 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule (b)(6)

I spoke with Ric, he will be there at 1030. Thanks

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 18:11:50 (b)(3)  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov> (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule

Sorry -was at the grocery store. I will check in w/her.

[redacted] (b)(3)  
**From:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted]  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 5:10:37 PM  
**To:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule

Hey Kate, adding [redacted] to assist. Thanks much  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Kash

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 15:35:06  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Schedule [redacted]

What's the best way for me to schedule a meeting with Grenell?



**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 11:29:03 AM

---

Will do. Also if you ever need anything call my cell [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 11:26 AM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

Just spoke with kate todd, thanks. Can you sync us via email (im kinda marooned out here without all my wh comms, so can't pull peoples contact info).

My direct desk line is [redacted]  
High side is [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 10:59 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

What's your cell? Are you still on campus?

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 8:11 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule

Rgr.

Thanks

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 20:05:55  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

This meeting's getting pushed to next week. We'll still plan on seeing you around 10 am.

Thanks!

Kate

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:42 PM  
**To:** 'KASHYAPP'  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule

That's fine. Just really need Grenell here at 10:30 am please!

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:34 PM  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule

No worries. Also, Ric asked me to swing by and see pat in the morning on My way out to odni, should be there around 10. Hope I can steal a few mins then. Thanks

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 17:20:00  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Schedule (b)(6)  
Emailed her in a separate chain – thanks!

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 5:11 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Schedule  
Hey Kate, adding [redacted] to assist. Thanks much  
Kash (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** "Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 15:35:06  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Schedule  
What's the best way for me to schedule a meeting with Grenell?

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

15 December 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 130 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001099 – 001407). Nine (9) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001100, 001102-001103, 001105-001106, 001109 – 001111, and 001114), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

We have determined that six (6) documents must be denied in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001099, 001101, 001104, 001107-001108, and 001112 – 001113), pursuant to the aforementioned FOIA exemptions.

The remaining 115 documents were referred to other agencies, who will respond to you directly (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 001114 – 001407).

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,



for

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, March 21, 2020 8:38 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Calendar/Schedule  
**Attachments:** R-DSG on 4/9, 2:00-3:00 PM; DC (SVTC) on 3/26, 3:00-4:00 PM

Kash and [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

I came in this morning to complete my T&A and [redacted] (b)(6)  
(b)(6) ) and quickly reviewed email's for upcoming DC's. The two  
attached I have placed on your calendar Kash.

Thank you [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6) for assisting Kash [redacted] (b)(6)

Stay safe please.

v/r [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

*Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 20, 2020 12:39 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call me now

Travis M. Burrs  
[Redacted] (b)(3)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 2:51 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Bio (4).doc  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) [Redacted] Bio (4).doc; ATT00001.txt

Kash,  
Here's a quick bio sketch. I hope to have the opportunity to share more details at your request.

Best regards,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 31, 2020 6:39 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** (b)(6) [Redacted] follow-up

Kash,  
I hope you received my resume, sent March 20. Please let me know what the next step will be.  
Thank you,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:**

[Redacted] (b)(6)

**Sent:**

Friday, March 20, 2020 10:13 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted] resume

**Attachments:**

[Redacted] resume.odt, part 2.pdf; ATT00001.txt

Kash,

As you requested, attached is my resume.

Please let me know the next step.

Best regards,

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

**From:**

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**Sent:**

Tuesday, March 31, 2020 6:38 PM

**To:**

KASHYAPP

**Subject:**

Checking in

Hi Kash,

I hope you're doing well and aren't sick. I just wanted to reach out and let you know that I on-boarded yesterday and am up and running (at least physically) in MI. I was hoping to email you from my new DNI email, but it appears I have to wait to get [Redacted] (b)(3) which is more complicated right now with the reduced staffing due to the virus. I checked out of OVP today, and my [Redacted] email is currently disabled, so I'm using my personal email and phone until I get up on DNI systems. (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

If you're well enough and not too busy, would it be possible to set up a brief phone call tomorrow or Thursday? I synced with [Redacted] via phone yesterday, but wanted to touch base with you and make sure I had your guidance/marching orders going forward. A friend introduced me to [Redacted] several weeks ago, so I've been in contact with him and offered to assist with anything he needs from the complex while John preps (though they seem to have that pretty well in hand.) Obviously, if there's anything I can do for you [Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6) [Redacted]

, please don't hesitate to ask.

(b)(3)

[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Once again, I hope you're doing well and hope to talk to you soon.

Best,

(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 11:02 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Checking in

Hi Kash!

Hope all is well there. I know you're fighting the good fight.

When we spoke you mentioned me checking back with you in a week or so. Any news?

Standing by, ready to serve...

Best,

[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:**  
**Sent:**  
**To:**  
**Subject:**

[Redacted]

Monday, May 11, 2020 9:07 AM  
KASHYAPP  
Checking In

Kash:

Working my 278 this morning. Let me know if you need anything. You can reach me at [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

Best

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Travis M Burrs  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** For action (b)(6)

Here's seven to start (ranked by priority). More to come.

- 1. [Redacted]
- 2. [Redacted] the NSP stand down.
- 3. [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(5)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

15 July 2024

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of documents responsive to both items of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002953 – 003253). In response to item number one of your request, three (3) documents are being released to you in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-000201) 002954 – 002955, 002957 – 002958, and 002962). Additionally, eleven (11) documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002953, 002956, 002959 – 002961, and 002964 – 002977) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protect intelligence sources and methods and identifying information of ODNI personnel, respectively;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns protected communications and communications within or between agencies which are protected by legal privileges; and
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

We have determined that two (2) documents must be withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002963 and 002978 – 002980) pursuant to the aforementioned FOIA exemptions.

Both the National Security Council and Department of Justice withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6). The Federal Bureau of Investigation withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). Exemption (b)(7)(C)


pertains to information compiled for law enforcement purposes, release of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others; and exemption (b)(7)(E) pertains to information which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

In response to item number two of your request, we have determined that 272 pages must be withheld in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 002981 – 003253) pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5). Exemption (b)(1) applies to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, Section 1.4(c).

During the review process, we considered the foreseeable harm standard and have determined that the withheld information is not releasable.

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

  
A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Gregory M. Koch', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right. To the left of the signature, the initials 'GSK' are written in a smaller, cursive hand.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:30 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Amanda J Schoch; [Redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)  
**Attachments:** 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification).pdf

Ambassador –

One more incoming hot off the press addressed to the President on which you were cc'd.

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:21 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (HSGAC)  
**Subject:** 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Ryan, please see the attached letter. We cc'd your boss. Thanks.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
 Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[Redacted]

(b)(6)



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 7, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In an October 17, 2018, classified letter to then Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein, the Judiciary Committee requested answers relating to questions raised by the classified appendix to the Inspector General's report on how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handled the investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton titled, "A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election." Having not received a meaningful response, we reiterated that request to Attorney General Barr in a letter on April 16, 2019. Today, we request that you declassify that appendix so that the American public can have a more complete understanding of what occurred during this investigation.

As we have written about publicly before, this highly classified appendix makes clear that the Obama administration's Justice Department and FBI made serious mistakes during the Clinton investigation. As explained in the unclassified version of the Inspector General's report, the classified report addresses key aspects of that investigation:

The FBI had considered obtaining permission from the Department to review certain classified materials that may have included information potentially relevant to the Midyear investigation. Although the Midyear team drafted a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General in late May 2016 stating that review of the highly classified materials was necessary to complete the investigation and requesting permission to access them, the FBI never sent this request to the Department.

Our paramount concern is that the classified appendix is precisely the type of information that should be made available to the American public because, otherwise, they will not know the full picture of what happened during the investigation. Unfortunately, our Democrat colleagues in Congress appear to view transparency as a one-way street. Although they seek documents and information that they believe will damage your administration, they ignore other relevant documents and information that could possibly be problematic for their political narrative—even though it would provide transparency to the American people. In order to be consistent, both parties should want the same result with respect to this investigation: the public needs to know what happened.

To that end, we request that you declassify, to the fullest extent possible under Executive Order 13526, this classified appendix to the Inspector General's report on the Clinton investigation. We believe that declassification is appropriate at this time because, among other factors, the Inspector General's investigation is closed; the investigation has already been the subject of years of oversight, public hearings, and document productions; and there is a strong public interest in knowing and understanding what really transpired during the Clinton investigation. Together, these outweigh the need to further protect the information contained in the appendix.

Congress and the Executive Branch should not be the only custodians of this information – the public's business ought to be public. Declassification is consistent with the approach that you have taken with documents relating to the Russia investigation, and your call with the President of Ukraine and the related Intelligence Community complaint.

We very much appreciate your time and attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs

cc: The Honorable William Barr  
Attorney General  
Department of Justice

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
 Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 3:50 PM  
 To: KASHYAPP  
 Cc: (b)(6) (HSGAC)  
 Subject: FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)  
 Attachments: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification).pdf

Kash, please see the attached letter. We cc'd your boss. Thanks.

From: (b)(6) (Finance)  
 Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 3:42 PM  
 To: 'Amy.H.Swong' (b)(6) (b)(6)  
 Cc: CEG (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6) (HSGAC)  
 Subject: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Hi Amy,

Hope all is well. Please see the attached letter from Chairmen Grassley and Johnson. Many thanks.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
 Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
 U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

(b)(6)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 7, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

In an October 17, 2018, classified letter to then Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein, the Judiciary Committee requested answers relating to questions raised by the classified appendix to the Inspector General's report on how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) handled the investigation of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton titled, "A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election." Having not received a meaningful response, we reiterated that request to Attorney General Barr in a letter on April 16, 2019. Today, we request that you declassify that appendix so that the American public can have a more complete understanding of what occurred during this investigation.

As we have written about publicly before, this highly classified appendix makes clear that the Obama administration's Justice Department and FBI made serious mistakes during the Clinton investigation. As explained in the unclassified version of the Inspector General's report, the classified report addresses key aspects of that investigation:

The FBI had considered obtaining permission from the Department to review certain classified materials that may have included information potentially relevant to the Midyear investigation. Although the Midyear team drafted a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General in late May 2016 stating that review of the highly classified materials was necessary to complete the investigation and requesting permission to access them, the FBI never sent this request to the Department.

Our paramount concern is that the classified appendix is precisely the type of information that should be made available to the American public because, otherwise, they will not know the full picture of what happened during the investigation. Unfortunately, our Democrat colleagues in Congress appear to view transparency as a one-way street. Although they seek documents and information that they believe will damage your administration, they ignore other relevant documents and information that could possibly be problematic for their political narrative—even though it would provide transparency to the American people. In order to be consistent, both parties should want the same result with respect to this investigation: the public needs to know what happened.

To that end, we request that you declassify, to the fullest extent possible under Executive Order 13526, this classified appendix to the Inspector General's report on the Clinton investigation. We believe that declassification is appropriate at this time because, among other factors, the Inspector General's investigation is closed; the investigation has already been the subject of years of oversight, public hearings, and document productions; and there is a strong public interest in knowing and understanding what really transpired during the Clinton investigation. Together, these outweigh the need to further protect the information contained in the appendix.


Congress and the Executive Branch should not be the only custodians of this information – the public's business ought to be public. Declassification is consistent with the approach that you have taken with documents relating to the Russia investigation, and your call with the President of Ukraine and the related Intelligence Community complaint.

We very much appreciate your time and attention to this request.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs

cc: The Honorable William Barr  
Attorney General  
Department of Justice

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 6:30 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Fyi. (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 08, 2020 6:16 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you for the letter. After reading the letter and request more closely, it looks like they are requesting the DOJ OIG report, not a report completed by the ICIG. I assume that they have copied The Acting Director as a courtesy.

Thanks again for reaching out and have a great day! Please let me know if you have any questions or would like to further discuss.

Best,

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Date:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 at 3:15:00 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Hi, [redacted] (b)(3) Letter attached as discussed. Thank you.  
(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:30 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** RICHARDG (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP ; Amanda J Schoch [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Ambassador –

One more incoming hot off the press addressed to the President on which you were cc'd.

Ryan

(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted] (Finance)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:21 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (HSGAC)  
**Subject:** 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Ryan, please see the attached letter. We cc'd your boss. Thanks.

Very Respectfully,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 12:37 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-05-22 CEG RHJ to ODNI (ICA Declassification)  
**Attachments:** 2020-05-22 CEG RHJ to ODNI (ICA Declassification).pdf

**From:** (b)(6) (Finance)  
**Sent:** Friday, May 22, 2020 12:36 PM  
**To:** 'Ryan Crumpler' (b)(6)  
**Cc:** CEG (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6) (HSGAC)  
**Subject:** 2020-05-22 CEG RHJ to ODNI (ICA Declassification)

Ryan, please see the attached and confirm receipt. Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)  
Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

(b)(6)



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 22, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Dear Ambassador Grenell:

On December 30, 2016, the Intelligence Community produced an assessment titled, "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections" (Assessment).<sup>1</sup> The Assessment contained classified annexes<sup>2</sup> that provided greater detail into the Intelligence Community's process in producing the Assessment and "full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign."<sup>3</sup> At the insistence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a summary of the reporting created by Christopher Steele was included in Annex A.<sup>4</sup> A declassified version of the Assessment was made available on January 6, 2017.<sup>5</sup>

On March 22, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) produced its report that, in part, analyzed the Assessment titled, "Report on Russian Active Measures." A declassified version of this report has not been made public.

In light of the continuing public interest in the Intelligence Community's Assessment, we request that the classified annexes to the Assessment and the HPSCI report be declassified to the fullest extent possible.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs

---

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the U.S. 2016 Election. Vol 4: Review of the Intelligence Community Assessment 6 (Apr. 21, 2020), [https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report\\_Volume4.pdf](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume4.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> Office of the Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence, Intelligence Cmty. Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6, 2017), [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA\\_2017\\_01.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation 177-82 (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Office of the Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence, Intelligence Cmty. Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6, 2017), [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA\\_2017\\_01.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**To:** [Redacted]  
**Cc:** Bradley A Brooker; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Ratcliffe Questionnaire  
**Date:** Monday, April 20, 2020 12:19:26 PM

---

Chad –

Hope you are holding up well! Wanted to close the loop on the Ratcliffe nomination questionnaire issues. One, I think we are okay with the redacted and shortened version of the EARS report cleared by DoJ, so thank you!

Second, the Acting DNI has reviewed the recommendation our career reviewers made on the classification of Rep. Ratcliffe's SSCI hearing questionnaire prior to its submission and on DoJ's subsequent claim that [Redacted] (b)(5)  
[Redacted] The Acting DNI has agreed with the ODNI review that the information involved does not include or provide insight into:

- Which specific FISA authority was used,
- The mechanisms by which the information was collected,
- The specific individual involved,
- When the authorities were used,
- The outcome of the incident in question;

And therefore remains UNCLASSIFIED in its entirety. Because of this lack of detail, the ODNI does not see how national security could be damaged if their information was disclosed and related to unauthorized individuals. As stated in E.O. 13526, some level of damage must be identified for information to reach the threshold for classification. The DNI considers this issue to be closed. Thanks!

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

[Redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV  
**Date:** Sunday, May 17, 2020 8:53:24 AM

---

Much appreciated..

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Saturday, May 16, 2020 6:35 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Awesome, I'm hearing the same. Thanks much

Will follow up with [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** "Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, May 15, 2020 at 19:39:13  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

I'm told it went very well... but will know for sure Monday.

Let me know if you got anything back from [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 9:35 AM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Thanks for pushing on [redacted] (b)(6) looks like he has an interview with [redacted] (b)(6) tomorrow. He'll be a great addition.

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2020 6:55 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

No problem, thank you. Must not be that interested anyway.

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway

On May 13, 2020, at 9:28 PM, KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3) wrote:

I'm not tracking this at all, sorry

(b)(6) **From:** "Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO"  
[redacted]  
**Date:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 at 21:13:45  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Are you tracking [redacted] (b)(6)? Didn't hear back from a VM, and 2 emails...

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:21 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV (b)(6)

Thanks

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

On May 12, 2020, at 7:48 PM, Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6) wrote:

Okay – I emailed him, will do so again...

I think we have other options.

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:16 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

For something Afghanistan focused. [redacted] (b)(5)  
met with him today. He's in town tomorrow and was hoping to get a PPO mtg.

(b)(6) **From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 10:22 AM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

(b)(5)

Is now... [redacted]

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 9:29 AM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Is this guy on your radar? If not, RCO was hoping someone from PPO might meet with him given the strong Grenell recommendation.

Thanks,

Alex

(b)(6)

**From:** Richard Grenell [redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, May 10, 2020 6:22 PM  
**To:** O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO [redacted] Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

(b)(6)

This guy is in town tomorrow from [redacted] I'd like you to meet him to discuss Afghanistan. He's a real leader. [redacted]

(b)(6) [redacted] We should utilize him. [redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** 10. May 2020 at 6:15:25 PM GMT-4  
**To:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** CV (b)(6)

Thanks Ric!

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV  
**Date:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:54:16 AM

---

RCO keeps mentioning her to Ric but not sure if Ric actually knows her.

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:51 AM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV

Rgr, does ric know her?

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:51 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV

Robert thought like head of Protocol or some other senior administrative function. She was supposed to be [redacted] but got screwed over.  
(b)(5)

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:50 AM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV

Yup, on it. As an EA?

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:49 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV

Making sure you have this. Robert thinks she would be awesome [redacted] at ODNI.  
(b)(5)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 27, 2020 8:12 AM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC <Kashyap.P.Patel@nsc.eop.gov>  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [redacted] CV

See CV

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor

National Security Council | The White House

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Alex Gray (b)(6)  
**Date:** February 27, 2020 at 8:10:44 AM EST  
**To:** "Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Fwd: (b)(6) CV

Alexander Gray  
Cell: (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Robert O'Brien (b)(6)  
**Date:** February 27, 2020 at 7:22:58 AM EST  
**To:** Alex Gray (b)(6) Richard Grenell  
**Subject:** Fwd: (b)(6) CV

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 6:56 PM  
**Subject:** CV  
**To:** Robert C. Obrien  
**CC:** (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Rob -

Always wonderful to hear from you and congratulations on an overwhelmingly successful trip to India with the President and First Lady!

Per your request please find attached my current resume. (b)(6)

I am actually going to be in DC Thursday through Saturday of this week. If it would be helpful to meet in person I would be happy to make myself available to you and/or Alex on one of those days. Let me know if you have any additional questions. I am grateful for your consideration.

My best,

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----  
From: **Robert O'Brien** [redacted] (b)(6)  
Date: Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 3:19 PM  
Subject: [redacted]  
To: Gray, Alexander B. FOP/WHO

(b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] Please send your CV to my CoS, Alex Gray (copied). [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(6)



**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: A-DNI w/ the AG, 7 Apr @ 2:00 PM EST, AG's Office, DOJ  
**Date:** Monday, April 6, 2020 11:34:08 AM

Great - Thanks, Travis - so appreciate your help. Glad Clare was able to move the mtg to the afternoon vice the morning.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Monday, April 6, 2020 at 11:27:08 AM  
**To:** [redacted]  
[redacted] (b)(3) "KASHYAPP"  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**Subject:** FW: A-DNI w/ the AG, 7 Apr @ 2:00 PM EST, AG's Office, DOJ

Fysa... The A-DNI is now scheduled to meet w/ the AG tomorrow at 2:00 pm in the AG's office. Plan would be for him to go directly there from the WH. His scheduler copied his protective detail on the email chain below.

Here's the revised schedule for tomorrow (as of now):

Tuesday, 7 April

- 0930-1000 VTC: [redacted] (b)(5)
- 1000-1020 Non-Secure Call w/ Amb Reeker
- 1030-1100 VTC: [redacted] (b)(5)
- 1100 En route to White House
- 1130-1230 [redacted] (b)(5) (Situation Room)
- 1340 En route DoJ
- 1400-1430 Mtg w/ AG Barr, (AG's Office)
- 1145-1500 En route Residence
- 1530-1600 VTC: Consolidated Intel Guidance Briefing  
w/ Kevin Meiners, [redacted] (b)(3) Deirdre Walsh  
(b)(6)

Travis

**From:** Morell, Clare (OAG) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 06, 2020 10:56 AM

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

To:

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: Watson, Theresa (OAG)

[Redacted]

(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted]

(b)(7)(e)

**Subject:** Meeting tomorrow, 4/7 with Acting DNI and AG at 2:00 PM EST

Hi Travis,

Thanks for all your help coordinating this. We are confirmed for tomorrow, April 7 at 2:00 PM for the meeting. I am copying Theresa, the AG's assistant here as well as the AG's detail so that Ambassador Grenell's detail can be in touch with them directly.

Can you let us know whether Ambassador Grenell will need courtyard access for his car/driver or if he will be dropped off at the visitor's center on Constitution Ave? Just let us know so we can inform security.

Thanks again,

Clare

**Clare Morell**

Director of Scheduling

Office of the Attorney General

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Smith, Jared L. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: candidate  
**Date:** Monday, May 11, 2020 3:19:49 PM

---

No pressure *at all*. I think I can place her at FEMA.

Thank you.

**From:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 3:14 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Smith, Jared L. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: candidate

Hey troupe, I can look, but I just cut 15% of the workforce in NCTC, and don't have any SES billets there right now. So may be tough right now. I'll keep looking. thanks

kash

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 11:55 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Smith, Jared L. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: candidate

Kash –

Do you see application for this woman at ODNI – SES spots? Only interest is the Counterterrorism Center in McLean.

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel  
Mobile: (b)(6)  
Office: (b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 10:25 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** Hayley, Jordan A. EOP/WHO Kloster, Andrew R. EOP/WHO

(b)(6)  
[Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: candidate

I can probably stick her at FEMA. I'll reach out – seems she doesn't want a PAS, and is mindful of the executive pay cap.

**From:** Hayley, Jordan A. EOP/WHC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 9:15 AM [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [Redacted] Kloster, Andrew R. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** candidate

Hey Guys,

John wanted me to send to you [Redacted] (b)(6) She is recommended by Newt Gingrich.

She would like to be a Deputy Assistant Secretary at DOD/DOS/DOT, probably doing something with (defense) logistics (?). Attached is her bio (sent this instead of resume) and her vet (all good there). I am also forwarding you all her email expressing what she would like to do at an agency.

Let me know if you have any further questions.

Thanks,

**Jordan Hayley**  
External Relations Coordinator | Presidential Personnel  
Executive Office of the President  
Office: [Redacted] (b)(6) Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Re: Connecting  
**Date:** Monday, March 16, 2020 10:32:44 AM

---

Hey Kash,

(b)(6)

Thanks,

Drew

On Mar 9, 2020, at 9:43 AM, KASHYAPP [redacted] wrote:  
(b)(3)

Its in coord, just stand by. I know its frustrating, but we are on it. Thanks brother

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 9:31 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting

Hey Kash,

[redacted]  
(b)(6)

Thanks,

Drew

(b)(3)  
**From:** KASHYAPP [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 4, 2020 9:29 AM  
**To:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Connecting

Can you chat real quick? thanks

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 5:03 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Connecting

Hi Dennis,

Can you reach out to Kash (cc'd) and find a good time to speak with him on the phone?  
Thanks,

Drew

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President  
Office [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

**From:** Rodriguez-Torres, Roxanna M. FOP/NSC  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. FOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** TOC one-pager  
**Date:** Friday, May 22, 2020 8:11:54 PM  
**Attachments:** - TOC Primer - USCTOC Impetus, Current Status, & Way-forward 200521 (One-pager).docx

---

Hi, Kash,

Attached is a one-pager that conveys the importance of the USCTOC and [REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] With that in mind, we should support a forum that offers departments and agencies an equal voice in determining courses of action that may not directly/immediately benefit their respective office...but will absolutely enhance national security and be for greater good of the American people. I hope this is helpful. Feel free to touch base, should you have any questions.

Sincerely,

**Roxanna Rodríguez-Torres** | Director for Transnational Organized Crime  
National Security Council | The White House [REDACTED]

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

March 14, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request was being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 12 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request. Upon review, we have determined that two (2) of those documents are being release to you in full (Bates pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000120 – 000121, 000123 – 000125). Further, ten (10) documents are being released to you in part (Bates pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000104 – 000119, 000122) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The Department of Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security each withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(6). The Federal Bureau of Investigations withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E):

- (b)(7)(C) applies to information compiled for law enforcement purposes which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
- (b)(7)(E) applies to information compiled for law enforcement purposes which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations.

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 312 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.



If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Koch". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish at the end.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 7:02 AM  
**To:** (b)(6) [redacted]@treasury.gov  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CONFIRMATION: Secure Phone Call

(b)(6)

Thank you for your prompt reply...yes, that date/time will work for Kash. May I have the secure number for Mr. Billingslea?

Please note I will be on leave 16-17March, therefore if anything changes at the last minute regarding Mr. Billingslea availability, please contact Kash directly @ [redacted] or secure [redacted] (b)(3)

(b)(3)

Many thanks,  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]@treasury.gov (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 09, 2020 6:01 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: REQUEST: Secure Phone Call

Good evening,  
Marshall has time at 3:30pm on March 16<sup>th</sup> to have this secure call with Mr. Patel.  
Please let me know if this time will not work for Mr. Patel.

Thank you. (b)(6)

**Executive Assistant to**  
A/S Marshall Billingslea  
PDAS Paul Ahern  
DAS Anna Morris (Acting)  
DAS Scott Rembrandt  
U.S. Department of the Treasury  
Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 10:56 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)

Cc: [redacted] KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
Subject: [Sender\_Unverified] REQUEST: Secure Phone Cal (b)(6)

**\*\* Caution:** External email. Pay attention to suspicious links and attachments. Send suspicious email to [suspect@treasury.gov](mailto:suspect@treasury.gov) \*\*

[redacted] (b)(6)

As a follow-up to our phone call, Mr. Kash Patel, Special Advisor to Acting DNI Richard Grenell (cc'd), would like to schedule a secure telephone call w/Marshall Billingslea. I understand Marshall is currently TDY, expected to return to the office on or about Mon 16Mar.

Please let me know when we might schedule this call.

v/r

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

*ESA to the PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(3)

**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 9:00 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CONFIRMED: pottinger meeting

17March @1100 in Matt's office.

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
*Exec Assistant to PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 7:38 AM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: pottinger meeting

great, I'll follow up with her. Thanks

**From:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 07:34:22  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: pottinger meeting

Kash,

Mercy sakes alive – she is correct, (although a bit snappy LOL) it is not her office, it is Pottinger's office that is not responding. I've just placed a call to his scheduler to inquire about the status of this meeting being scheduled.

v/r

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)  
*Exec Assistant to PDDNI/Principal Executive/Special Advisor  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence*

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** KASHYAPP  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 7:28 AM (b)(3)  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: pottinger meeting

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 at 07:21:59  
**To:** "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov> (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: pottinger meeting

On the contrary, Mr. Patel, I have been quite responsive in providing AS2's availability and we have not yet heard back from DNSA Pottinger's office. Kindly communicate with me on meeting options, and I will ensure this is added to the schedule.

Thank you.

[redacted] (b)(6)  
Office of the Deputy Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security

[redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** KASHYAPP <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 12:50 PM  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** pottinger meeting

**CAUTION:** This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Ken,

The meeting you requested re toc with pottinger is doable, just awaiting on your folks to see if you still want to do it. My ea reached out to yours and wasn't able to get fidelity. Thanks much

kash

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 12:57 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Bradley A Brooker  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes)

FYSA (b)(6)  
(b)(7)(c)

**From:** [redacted] (DO) (FBI)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 12:10 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes)

Hi Ryan,  
Good to hear from you. I received a call from Josh yesterday so I'm aware. We are trying to some responsive materials together - particularly [redacted] Conversations are (b)(7)(e) ongoing today but we will have something responsive soon. I will continue to update you if that works.

Separately, any updates on your end about the path forward for me. I know there's a lot of turmoil at the moment but we haven't talked in a while.

Thanks, (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(7)(c)

FBI  
Office of Congressional Affairs  
[redacted] (b)(7)(e)

On Apr 3, 2020 9:42 AM, Ryan Crumpler wrote: (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(7)(c)

Do you know what DoJ is planning to do in response? Anything you can share would be most appreciated. My leadership is asking. Thanks!

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (Finance) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 02, 2020 1:13 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted]; Ryan Crumpler (b)(6)  
**Cc:** CEG [redacted]  
**Subject:** 2020-04-02 CEG RJ to ODNI (FISA Report Footnotes)

[redacted] and Ryan, (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Please see the attached letter from Chairmen Grassley and Johnson. Senate Security will be sending you the classified letter referenced in the attached letter today. Please let us know if you have any questions. Thank you.

Very Respectfully,

[Redacted]

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 6:26 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) Deirdre M Walsh; Beth E. Sanner [Redacted] KASHYAPP; [Redacted]  
**Cc:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (b)(3) (b)(3)  
**Subject:** FW: A-DNI Schedule -- 16-24 April 2020 (b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 6:23 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** A-DNI Schedule -- 16-24 April 2020

Remainder of the Week

Thursday, 16 April

0700 En route Andrews AFB (b)(6)  
 0730 [Redacted]  
 0800 Wheels up en route Los Angeles (5 hrs 30 min – 3 hrs time change)  
 1030 Wheels down LAX  
 1045-1115 En route Residence (b)(6)  
 [Redacted]

Friday, 17 April

No official events.  
 1245-1345 En route [Redacted] (b)(6)  
 1345-1545 Appointment  
 1545-1645 En route Residence  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)

Saturday, 18 April

No official events.  
 [Redacted] (b)(6)

Sunday, 19 April

0815-0845 En route LAX  
 0900 Wheels up en route Andrews AFB (4 hrs 30 min + 3 hrs time change)  
 1630 Wheels down  
 1645-1715 En route Residence

-- Next Week --

(b)(3)  
 (b)(6)

Monday, 20 April

0915-0945 VTC: PDB Review w/ [Redacted]  
 1000-1030 VTC: NIM Stand Up  
 1100-1130 VTC: Senior Staff Mtg  
 1300-1430 VTC: [Redacted], Acting Chief of Staff for Public Affairs  
 (b)(3)  
 (b)(6)



(b)(6)

Break

VTC: Interview w/ [redacted]

Afternoon Call w/ [redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Tuesday, 21 April

0915-0945 VTC: PDB Review w/ [redacted] (b)(3)

1000-1020 Call w/ Amb Reeker (b)(6)

TBD Oval Prep

TBD Oval

(b)(3)

Wednesday, 22 April

(b)(6)

0915-0945 VTC: PDB Review w/ [redacted]

Thursday, 23 April

(b)(3)

0915-0945 VTC: PDB Review w/ [redacted] (b)(6)

1000-1020 Call w/ Amb Reeker

1030-11100 VTC: NIM Stand Up

Friday, 24 April

0915-0945 VTC: PDB Review w/ [redacted]

(b)(3)

TBD Oval Prep

TBD Oval

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** (b)(6) [redacted] (Finance) [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 6:01 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: Evanina Nomination

FYSA

**From:** Hartmann, George (Grassley)  
**Sent:** Monday, May 4, 2020 5:21 PM  
**To:** Hartmann, George (Grassley)  
**Subject:** Evanina Nomination

Good afternoon,

Sen. Grassley today lifted his hold on the nomination of William Evanina for the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. The senator initially put forward his objection to this nomination on June 4, 2018, after the Justice Department failed to keep its promise of granting Sen. Grassley and the Senate Judiciary Committee equal access to certain material being shared with the House of Representatives related to ongoing oversight matters. You can find Sen. Grassley's initial statement for the record on this hold [HERE](#). Below is the statement for the record Sen. Grassley submitted this afternoon upon lifting his hold.

Thanks,

**George Hartmann**

Press Secretary | Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)

[www.grassley.senate.gov](http://www.grassley.senate.gov)

Statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley

Before the United States Senate

May 4, 2020

1

21-cv-02874 (DF-2022-00201) 000112

Mr. President, since June of 2018, I have objected to the nomination of William R. Evanina to be Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (PN192). Today, due to the recent actions by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Attorney General to finally respond to my very longstanding oversight requests, I withdraw my objection to Mr. Evanina's nomination.

When I noticed my intention to object to this nominee in June of 2018, I made it very clear to the public and to the administration my reasons for doing so. I did not question Mr. Evanina's credentials in any way, and I put my statement of those reasons in the Record. I have done that consistently, not only since the rules of the Senate first required every Member to do that but even before that rule was put in place.

At the time, I experienced difficulties obtaining relevant documents and briefings from the Justice Department and ODNI related to the 2016 election controversies. On several occasions, then-Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Rod Rosenstein personally assured me that the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which I was Chairman, would receive equal access to information provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) with regard to any concessions in its negotiations regarding pending subpoenas from that Committee. However, I, and the Judiciary Committee, never received equal access from DAG Rosenstein.

For example, on August 7, 2018, I wrote to the Justice Department and pointed out that the House Intelligence Committee had received documents related to Bruce Ohr that the Judiciary Committee had not received. The Department initially denied those records had been provided to the House Intelligence Committee. After my staff confronted the Department, we eventually received some Bruce Ohr documents. In that same 2018 letter, I also asked for other documents based on my equal access agreement with DAG Rosenstein.

I then learned that the Justice Department took the position that then-ODNI Director Dan Coats prohibited the Department from sharing the requested records with the Committee. Needless to say, it was your typical bureaucratic blame-game.

Then, some personnel changes took place. I voiced my concerns to Acting Director Grenell and Attorney General Barr. Recently, thanks to their commitment to transparency, I have received access to the types of documents that I asked for almost two years ago in June 2018. Moreover, both Acting Director Grenell and Attorney General Barr have gone multiple steps further by declassifying much of the information that I had sought access to. Credit should be given when it is due and Acting Director Grenell and Attorney General Barr deserve that credit here today.

If their predecessors had simply respected legitimate congressional oversight and their agreements with me and the Judiciary Committee from the beginning, Mr. Evanina would have been confirmed long ago.

Now, I also want to remind everyone, especially future administrations, that the Senate Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction extends to the Intelligence Community. In the authorizing resolution that created the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate explicitly reserved for other standing committees, such as the Senate Judiciary Committee, independent authority to "study and review any intelligence activity" and "to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency" when such activity "directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee" (S. Res. 400). The Senate Judiciary Committee has jurisdiction over all federal courts, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). As I understand it, the records at issue here fall into that category.

Let this also be a reminder that when it comes to congressional oversight, I will use all the tools at my disposal to get to the truth of the matter and get access to the records that I believe are necessary to advance my investigations. The Executive Branch must recognize that it has an ongoing obligation to respond to Congressional inquiries in a timely and reasonable manner. As I've said many times before, transparency brings accountability and congressional oversight helps to bring about the sunlight necessary for that to happen.

###

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3) (b)(6) (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 3:04 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: in camera review

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 3:04 PM  
**To:** 'Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)'  
**Cc:** 'Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA)'  
**Subject:** RE: in camera review

Any update here? With respect to the FISA applications, the publicly released versions include many redactions. Have the unredacted versions been sequestered by the court order? If not, we'd like to review them.

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 1:33 PM  
**To:** 'Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)' [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: in camera review

So, what hasn't been removed pursuant to the FISC order? I didn't see any FISA applications, as one example. Our request since August 7, 2018 (attached + HPSCI letter), includes getting access to information DOJ provided HSPCI during the course of negotiations to prevent a subpoena. We want to see as much as possible which includes the attached list and which is not limited to the Gang of 8 material.

(b)(6)

**From:** Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 10:22 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (Finance) <[Redacted]> (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: in camera review

(b)(6)

Thanks for coming by today. What you saw is the extent of the G8 briefing materials and that is what we believe to be at issue here. If you believe there is something else, please let us know specifically. Alternatively, if there's someone else in your office who believes there is something additional that is related to this matter, and that is in DOJ's possession, please have them call us to explain and we will take it from there.

Thanks,  
Chad

(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 4:46 PM  
**To:** Boyd, Stephen E. (OLA) [Redacted] Thorley, Charles A. (OLA) [Redacted]  
**Subject:** in camera review (b)(6) (b)(6)

Stephen and Chad, thanks for setting up the in camera review today. The review consisted of 53 pages, my understanding is that more will be available in the coming days? Please let me know if that is/is not the case.

Thanks,

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 2:16 PM  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Cc:** (b)(6) [Redacted] KASHYAPP; Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and AG Barr  
**Attachments:** Letter from LOG to Grenell and Barr re unmasking (05-19-20).pdf

AMB –  
Please see attached a request from Sen Graham re: unmaskings.  
Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
[Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2 (b)(3)  
McLean, VA 22102

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (Judiciary-Rep) (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:21 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [Redacted] Thorley, Charles A. (OLA)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (Judiciary-Dem) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and AG Barr

All,  
Attached please find a letter from Chairman Graham to Director Grenell and Attorney General Barr regarding unmasking requests related to the Trump campaign and transition. Please let me know if you have any questions and please confirm receipt of this letter.

Kind regards,  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

Chief Investigative Counsel  
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary  
[Redacted] (direct)  
(b)(6)

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
MICHAEL S. LEE, UTAH  
TED CRUZ, TEXAS  
BEN SASSÉ, NEBRASKA  
JOSHUA D. HAWLEY, MISSOURI  
THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA  
JONI ERNST, IOWA  
MIKE CRAPO, IDAHO  
JOHN KENNEDY, LOUISIANA  
MARSHA BLACKBURN, TENNESSEE

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT  
RICHARD J. DURBIN, ILLINOIS  
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND  
AMY KLOBUCHAR, MINNESOTA  
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, DELAWARE  
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, CONNECTICUT  
MAZIE HIRONO, HAWAII  
CORY A. BOOKER, NEW JERSEY  
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CALIFORNIA

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

May 19, 2020

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director of National Intelligence  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice

Dear Ambassador Grenell and Attorney General Barr.

As you are aware, on May 13, 2020, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a list of the identity of any official who submitted a request to the National Security Agency at any point between November 8, 2016, and January 31, 2017, to unmask the identity of former National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn (Ret.). That list contained the identities of 39 officials who made requests to unmask General Flynn's identity.


Given the extensive number of requests for the unmasking of General Flynn's name during this short time period, it raises the question of whether these or other officials sought the unmasking of the identities of other individuals associated with the Trump campaign or transition team. Accordingly, I request that the Committee be provided with a list of the names of any officials who requested, between November 8, 2016, and January 31, 2017, to unmask the identities of those associated with the Trump campaign or transition team, including but not limited to Donald Trump, Donald Trump, Jr., Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner, Corey Lewandowski, Paul Manafort, Steve Bannon, Kellyanne Conway, Sam Clovis, Chris Christie, Carter Page, and George Papadopoulos, and the reason given for any such request. In addition, I request an explanation as to why the list released on May 13th did not contain a record showing who unmasked General Flynn's identity for his phone call with Ambassador Kislyak.

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please have your staff contact [redacted] with my committee staff at [redacted]. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



Lindsey O. Graham  
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein



[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(6) Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; [Redacted] Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** FW: Letter from Chairman Johnson to Acting Director Grenell  
**Attachments:** 2020-05-12 RHJ, CEG Letter to ODNI re Unmaskings.pdf

AMB –

Apologies I thought I had sent this additional letter from Grassley/Johnson yesterday. Please find attached. This is in addition to the Grassley letter I forwarded yesterday.

Ryan

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 12, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

The Honorable William P. Barr  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice

Dear Ambassador Grenell and Attorney General Barr:

Based on recent press reports, it is our understanding that you conducted a classification review and declassified information related to numerous requests to “unmask” the names of U.S. persons who appeared in certain intelligence reporting around the time of the 2016 election through January 2017.

We wholeheartedly agree that transparency is needed more now than ever. One of the most significant unanswered questions about what occurred during the 2016 election is how many Americans were “unmasked,” at whose request, and for what purpose.<sup>1</sup> Your recent decision to declassify dozens of footnotes from the report of the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General about the investigation of the Trump campaign;<sup>2</sup> the declassification and disclosure of transcripts of related interviews by the House Intelligence Committee; and the disclosure of exculpatory information related to the prosecution of Lt. General Michael Flynn, paint a more and more troubling picture of the conduct that we have been investigating since 2017. However, we firmly believe that the best way to resolve these issues is to determine the truth, and to make clear to the American people what did and did not occur.

For these reasons, we respectfully request that you make available to us, as soon as possible, all information regarding the “unmasking” of U.S. persons requested by members of President Obama’s administration around the time of the 2016 election through January 2017.


---

<sup>1</sup> Ron Johnson, *We need answers to questions mainstream media won't ask about Democrats*, The Hill, Oct. 10, 2019, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/465241-we-need-answers-to-questions-mainstream-media-wont-ask-about>; Letter from Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, Senator Graham, Senator Whitehouse to Director Coats (May 26, 2017); Letter from Chairman Grassley to Attorney General Barr and Acting Director Grenell (May 12, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Press Release, IG Footnotes: Serious Problems with Dossier Sources Didn’t Stop FBI’s Page Surveillance (Apr. 15, 2020), <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ig-footnotes-serious-problems-with-dossier-sources-didnt-stop-fbis-page-surveillance->.

Should you have any questions, please contact Joseph Folio of Chairman Johnson's staff at (202) 224-4751 and Joshua Flynn-Brown of Chairman Grassley's staff at (202) 224-4515. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Senate Finance Committee

cc: The Honorable Gary C. Peters  
Ranking Member

The Honorable Ron Wyden  
Ranking Member

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
 (b)(6) Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Friday, April 17, 2020 8:51 AM (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Senate letter to FBI Director  
**Attachments:** 2020-04-16 RHJ-CEG to FBI (Crossfire Hurricane Intel Memos).pdf

Sir –

Sens Johnson and Grassley sent the attached letter to the Director of FBI regarding the IG report on Crossfire Hurricane. They're seeking more information from FBI by 30 April. Specifically:

1. All intelligence records (e.g., reporting, products, memoranda, etc.), foreign or domestic, received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team. 1° For any such intelligence record no longer in FBI's possession, please identify the record, the entity that provided the record, and the date of FBI's review.
2. All FBI records (e.g., 302s, ECs, etc.) addressing these intelligence products;
3. A list of all intelligence records requested but not received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team.

R/  
Travis

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 8:20 PM  
**To:** Travis M Burrs  
**Subject:** Senate letter to FBI Director

Hi Travis - Just marking sure you received this Senate letter to Director Wray today, since it's now posted online by the committees. The Ambassador is cc'd. I'll be back in the office on Monday. Best regards, [Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]  
 Division Chief, Legislative Affairs  
 Director of National Intelligence  
 Washington, DC 20511

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 16, 2020

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Wray:

On January 28, 2020, we wrote to Attorney General Barr and requested the declassification of four footnotes in the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report about the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Crossfire Hurricane investigation.<sup>1</sup> Since then, we received declassified versions of those and other footnotes, and they reveal disturbing facts about the FBI's investigation: the Crossfire Hurricane team's investigative file included at least two intelligence reports stating that key parts of the reporting from Christopher Steele—reporting that “played a central and essential role” in the decision to request FISA orders<sup>2</sup>—were part of a Russian disinformation campaign.<sup>3</sup>

The information in the now-declassified footnotes also directly contradicts statements provided by FBI officials in the OIG report. Specifically, William “Bill” Priestap, the Assistant Director for the Counterintelligence Division who was “ultimately responsible for the [Crossfire Hurricane] investigation,”<sup>4</sup> told OIG that “the FBI ‘didn’t have any indication whatsoever’ by May 2017 that the Russians were running a disinformation campaign through the Steele election reporting.”<sup>5</sup> The investigation's Supervisory Intelligence Analyst also told OIG that “he had no information as of June 2017 that Steele's election reporting source network had been penetrated or compromised.”<sup>6</sup> Yet, in January 2017, the FBI received a report that part of Steele's reporting “was part of a Russian disinformation campaign” and, in February 2017, the FBI received a second report that another part of Steele's reporting was “the product of [Russian Intelligence Services] infiltrate[ing] a source into the network.”<sup>7</sup> We are deeply troubled by the Crossfire Hurricane team's awareness of and apparent indifference to Russian disinformation, as well as by the grossly inaccurate statements by the FBI official in charge of the investigation and its supervisory intelligence analyst.

---

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen, to William Barr, Attorney General (Jan. 28, 2020), <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-grassley-call-for-ag-barr-to-declassify-four-significant-footnotes-in-doj-oig-report-about-crossfire-hurricane-investigation->

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Inspector Gen., Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation 359 (Dec. 2019), <https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf> (“DOJ OIG Report”).

<sup>3</sup> DOJ OIG Report n. 350, Enclosure to Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, to Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen (Apr. 2, 2020), <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Johnson%20Letter%20-%20Footnotes%2020200402%20w%20att%202.pdf>; DOJ OIG Report n. 350, Enclosure to Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Director of National Intelligence, to Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen (Apr. 15, 2020), <https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04-15%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20%28FISA%20Footnote%20Declassification%29.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> DOJ OIG Report at 64.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.* at 194.

<sup>6</sup> DOJ OIG Report n. 342, Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Director of National Intelligence, to Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen (Apr. 15, 2020).

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at n. 350.

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
April 16, 2020  
Page 2

These recently declassified footnotes raise another issue of significant concern: what other parts of the FBI's investigation were infected by Russian disinformation? For example, one footnote explains that Russian Intelligence Services targeted Steele's company for penetration.<sup>8</sup> Another footnote shows that, as early as October 2016 and the same time it was preparing its first FISA application, the FBI became aware that one of Steele's key sources was either a Russian intelligence officer or otherwise linked to Russian intelligence.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the FBI knew that Russian intelligence was targeting Christopher Steele's company, that Steele relied on sources affiliated with Russian intelligence, and at least two of Steele's reports were described as the product of a Russian disinformation campaign. Because these facts show the intention, means, and ability to plant Russian disinformation in Steele's reporting, they suggest that the prevalence of such disinformation in the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane investigation may have been widespread.

For these reasons, please provide the following no later than April 30, 2020:

1. All intelligence records (*e.g.*, reporting, products, memoranda, *etc.*), foreign or domestic, received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team.<sup>10</sup> For any such intelligence record no longer in FBI's possession, please identify the record; the entity that provided the record, and the date of FBI's review.
2. All FBI records (*e.g.*, 302s, ECs, *etc.*) addressing these intelligence products;
3. A list of all intelligence records requested but not received or reviewed by the Crossfire Hurricane team.

Please send all unclassified material directly to each Committee. In keeping with the requirements of Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified documents, provide all unclassified information directly to each Committee, and provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although our Committees comply with all laws and regulations governing the handling of classified information, they are not bound, absent prior agreement, by any handling restrictions.

Should you have any questions, please contact Joseph Folio of Chairman Johnson's Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee staff at (202) 224-4751 or Joshua Flynn-Brown of Chairman Grassley's Finance Committee staff at (202) 224-4515.

---

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at n. 342 (“[Russian Intelligence Services] may have targeted Orbis,” Steele’s company); Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, to Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen (Apr. 2, 2020) (explaining that the FBI was aware of “possible previous attempts by a foreign government to penetrate and research a company or individuals associated with Christopher Steele.”).

<sup>9</sup> DOJ OIG Report n. 302, Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Director of National Intelligence, to Ron Johnson & Charles E. Grassley, Chairmen (Apr. 15, 2020); *see also id.* at n. 339 (“The Primary Sub-source also told the FBI [in January 2017] ... that the subsource who provided the information about the Carter Page-Sechin meeting had connections to Russian Intelligence Service[.]”).

<sup>10</sup> *See, e.g.*, DOJ OIG Report at 385-86 (discussing “the potential for disinformation in the Steele election reporting” and “information [OIG] found in FBI files [they] revised, and that was available to the Crossfire Hurricane team during the relevant time period”).

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray  
April 16, 2020  
Page 3

Sincerely,



Ron Johnson  
Chairman  
Committee on Homeland Security and  
Governmental Affairs



Charles E. Grassley  
Chairman  
Committee on Finance

cc: The Honorable William Barr  
Attorney General, Department of Justice

The Honorable Michael Horowitz  
Inspector General, Department of Justice

Ambassador Richard Grenell  
Acting Director, Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

September 15, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request is being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 77 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000749 – 000945). Upon review, we have determined that five (5) of those documents may be released to you in full (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000917 – 000919, 000926 – 000928, 000936 – 000937, 000941 – 000942). Additionally, 17 of those documents are being released to you in part (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000912 – 000916, 000920 – 000925, 000929 – 000935, 000938 – 000940, and 000943 – 000945) pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The National Security Council also withheld information pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(5) and (b)(6). FOIA exemption (b)(5) applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that is protected by legal privileges.

An additional 55 documents were referred to another agency, who will respond to you directly (Bates Pages: 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000749 – 000911).

Finally, the ODNI has processed an additional 123 pages concerning item number one of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month.



If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely,



*GMK*

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**Sent:** (b)(3) Tuesday, March 24, 2020 12:44 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** (b)(3) [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** Beth E. Sanner; (b)(6) [Redacted] KASHYAPP; Travis M Burrs; [Redacted]  
**Subject:** (b)(3) [Redacted]  
**Attachments:** (b)(6) FW: 2020-03-24 CEG to DNI (Information Sharing)  
 2020-03-24 CEG to DNI (Information Sharing).pdf

Ambassador –

Please find attached incoming correspondence from Chairman Grassley re: IC information for HHS received today.

Ryan

**Ryan P. Crumpler**

Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) [Redacted] Liberty Crossing 2

McLean, VA 22102

(S) [Redacted] (U) [Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(6) [Redacted] (Finance) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:37 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Fysa

**From:** Ryan Crumpler  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:29 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (Finance) (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (HSGAC)  
**Subject:** RE: 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

Thanks. We never got your classified letter BTW. Our lawyers got it from DoJ so we are all set but wanted you to know.  
Thanks.

Ryan (b)(6) (b)(6)

**From:** [Redacted] (Finance) [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 7, 2020 5:21 PM  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [Redacted] (HSGAC) [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 2020-04-07 CEG RHJ to POTUS (Clinton Report Declassification)

(b)(6)

Ryan, please see the attached letter. We cc'd your boss. Thanks.

Very Respectfully, (b)(6)

[Redacted]

Deputy Chief Investigative Counsel  
Chairman Charles E. Grassley  
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 8:54 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: 2 things

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Jones, David M. EOP/WHO"  
**Date:** May 27, 2020 at 08:49:13 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC"  
**Cc:** "Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO"  
**Subject:** Re: 2 things

[redacted] (b)(6)

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 8, 2020 8:18 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: 2020-04-08 CEG et al to POTUS (IC IG removal)  
**Attachments:** 2020-04-08 CEG et al to POTUS (IC IG removal).pdf; ATT00001.htm

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Swonger, Amy H. EOP/WHO"  
**Date:** April 8, 2020 at 8:12:46 PM EDT  
**To:** "Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO" , "Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO"  
**Cc:** "Riley, Sean M. EOP/WHO"  
**Subject:** Fwd: 2020-04-08 CEG et al to POTUS (IC IG removal)

Eric and Kate,

Please see below from Senator Grassley et al regarding the removal of the IC IG.

Amy

Amy Swonger  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Office of Legislative Affairs  
The White House

(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)  
**From:** (b)(6)  
**Date:** April 8, 2020 at 7:52:45 PM EDT  
**To:** "Swonger, Amy H. EOP/WHO"  
**Cc:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** 2020-04-08 CEG et al to POTUS (IC IG removal)

Hi Amy-  
I hope that you are doing well. Please see the attached letter from Senators Grassley, Peters, Collins, Wyden, Romney, Warner, Feinstein, and Tester. Please confirm receipt and send all formal follow-up correspondence to the email addresses copied above.  
Thank you  
Best Regards,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Investigative Counsel  
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 8, 2020

## VIA ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Trump:

According to reports, on Friday, April 3, you placed Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) Michael Atkinson on administrative leave for thirty days pending his removal from office.<sup>1</sup> As you know, Congress created inspectors general to combat waste, fraud, and abuse, and to be independent watchdogs holding federal agencies accountable to the taxpayer. Congress established the IC IG, “to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.”<sup>2</sup> Further, the IC IG and indeed all inspectors general (IG) are designed to fulfill a dual role, reporting to both the President and Congress, to secure efficient, robust, and independent agency oversight. To ensure inspectors general are fully capable of performing their critical duties, and in recognition of their importance both to efficient administration and to the legislative function, Congress set clear, statutory notice requirements for their potential removal.

Specifically, current law requires that you inform the Senate and House Intelligence Committees in writing of the reasons for your removal of the IC IG, at least 30 days prior to that removal.<sup>3</sup> However, in your recent letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee, you stated only that, “it is vital that [you] have the fullest confidence” in those serving as IGs and that “this is no longer the case” with regard to Mr. Atkinson.<sup>4</sup> Further, according to public reports, Mr. Atkinson already was placed on administrative leave, effectively removing him from his position prior to the completion of the statutorily required notice period.<sup>5</sup>

Congressional intent is clear that an expression of lost confidence, without further explanation, is not sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the statute. This is in large part because Congress intended that inspectors general only be removed when there is clear evidence of

---

<sup>1</sup> Sonam Sheth and Charles Davis, *Trump Fired the Intelligence Community Official Who Told Congress About the Ukraine Whistleblower Complaint*, Business Insider, (April 4, 2020) available at <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/trump-fires-intelligence-official-who-handled-whistleblower-complaint-2020-4>.

<sup>2</sup> H.R. 2701, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).

<sup>3</sup> 50 U.S.C. § 3033(c)(4) (stating that, “The [Intelligence Community] Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal”).

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Donald Trump, President of the United States, to Senate Committee on Intelligence (April 3, 2020); see also Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the President of the Senate (June 11, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> See *Supra* note 1.

President Donald J. Trump

April 8, 2020

Page 2 of 3

wrongdoing or failure to perform the duties of the office, and not for reasons unrelated to their performance, to help preserve IG independence.<sup>6</sup> The Senate Committee Report on the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 provides further clarity regarding the high bar that is expected in cases of removal. In that report, the Committee expressed its intent that, "Inspectors General who fail to perform their duties properly whether through malfeasance or nonfeasance, or whose personal actions bring discredit upon the office, be removed." The report also states that, "[t]he requirement to notify the Congress in advance of the reasons for the removal should serve to ensure that Inspectors General are not removed for political reasons."<sup>7</sup>

In 2009, senators of both parties raised similar concerns when the Obama administration removed the IG of the Corporation for National and Community Service, Gerald Walpin, by placing him on administrative leave for 30 days without consulting members of Congress.<sup>8</sup> Like the present notice at issue here, the initial notice of removal for IG Walpin only vaguely noted the President no longer had "the fullest confidence" in him.<sup>9</sup> At that time, the senators affirmed Congress's intent that any notice of removal should clearly outline specific reasons supporting that decision. The senators also reiterated the purpose for the 30 day notice to Congress: to provide an opportunity for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event that the planned transfer or removal is viewed as an inappropriate or politically motivated attempt to terminate an effective inspector general. By placing the IG on 30 days of administrative leave and naming an acting replacement, the administration has already effectively removed that IG and appears to have circumvented Congress's role in this process.<sup>10</sup>

As supporters of the Inspector General community, and as advocates for government transparency and accountability, it is our responsibility to confirm that there are clear, substantial reasons for removal. To that end, we ask that you provide more detailed reasoning for the removal of Inspector General Atkinson no later than April 13, 2020. Please also provide your views on how the appointment of an acting official prior to the end of the 30 day notice period comports with statutory requirements.

Sincerely,



Charles E. Grassley  
U.S. Senator



Gary C. Peters  
U.S. Senator

<sup>6</sup> S. Rep. No. 110-262 at 8 (2008) (reporting on S.2324).

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*


<sup>8</sup> Letter from Charles Grassley, United States Senator, to Barack Obama, President of the United States (June 11, 2009); Letter from Joseph Lieberman, Susan Collins, et al, Chairman and Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, to Barack Obama, President of the United States (June 19, 2009); *see also* Josh Gerstein, *W.H.: Fired IG 'confused, disoriented'*, Politico, (June 16, 2009), available at <https://www.politico.com/story/2009/06/wh-fired-ig-confused-disoriented-023831>.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Staff Report of S. Comm. on Fin. and H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong., *The Firing of the Inspector General for the Corporation for National and Community Service*, at 47 (Comm. Print 2009).

<sup>10</sup> *see Supra* note 4 at 5 (stating that, "[w]hile we hope that this advance notice will encourage useful communication between Congress and the Executive Branch on IG performance and serve as an effective deterrent against improper terminations, we note that the provision does not alter the President's ultimate authorities with respect to Executive Branch employees"); *see also Supra* note 9 at 46.




President Donald J. Trump  
April 8, 2020  
Page 3 of 3



Susan M. Collins  
U.S. Senator




Ron Wyden  
U.S. Senator




Mitt Romney  
U.S. Senator



Mark Warner  
U.S. Senator



Dianne Feinstein  
U.S. Senator



Jon Tester  
U.S. Senator

**From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: All-member briefing  
**Date:** Wednesday, February 26, 2020 7:34:23 PM

---

Kash -

Fysa

Ryan P. Crumpler  
Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3)

[redacted]  
McLean, VA 22102 (b)(3)  
[redacted]

**From:** "Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:05:13 PM  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** "Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** All-member briefing

Ryan,

Sorry for the delay. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(5)

Thank you.

Respectfully,  
Jason S. Smith  
Director for Legislative Affairs  
National Security Council

W [redacted]  
C: [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)  
From: [redacted]  
To: KASHYAPP  
Subject: Fwd: APA (Internal): Meeting with the [redacted] (b)(5)  
Date: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 9:13:16 AM

Here we go.

From: [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Date: Tuesday, 5. May 2020 at 4:54:24 PM

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

To: [redacted]  
Cc: [redacted] "Travis M Burrs" [redacted]

(b)(3)

Subject: FW: APA (Internal): Meeting with the [redacted] (b)(5)

Sir – I will send out another schedule – just making sure you are aware of the 1130 tomorrow in addition to the 1530 [redacted] (b)(5)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]


(b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

[redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Large redacted area] (b)(5)



(b)(5)

**From:** Bacon, James A. EOP/WHO  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Appointed 5 7 2020  
**Date:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 2:44:34 PM

See below. Evanina has been signed by POTUS and appointed. Good to swear in.

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6) **From:** "Thomas, Edwin R. III EOP/WHO"  
 (b)(6)  
**Date:** May 7, 2020 at 2:19:38 PM EDT (b)(6)  
**To:** DL-WHO-Exec Clerk (b)(6) "Ferrer Piran  
 Basualdo, Austin G. EOP/WHO" "Garell,  
 Mason W. EOP/WHO" (b)(6) "Harris, Shane M.  
 EOP/WHO" "Bacon, James A. EOP/WHO"  
 (b)(6) "McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO"  
 > "Keller, Catherine B. EOP/WHO"  
 > "Lyons, Derek S. EOP/WHO"  
 Burley, Michael N. EOP/WHO"  
 > "Nieves, Brian D. EOP/WHO"  
 "Porter, Madison F. EOP/WHO"  
 , "Toland, Scott R. EOP/WHO"  
**Subject: Appointed 5 7 2020**

On Thursday, May 7, 2020, POTUS appointed the following persons:

William R. Evanina, of Pennsylvania, to be Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. (New Position)

Heather Wilson, of South Dakota, to be a Member of the National Science Board, National Science Foundation for a term expiring May 10, 2026, vice Robert M. Groves, term expiring.

Patrick Gelsinger, of California, to be a Member of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, vice Marc P. Lefar, resigned.

Stephen Gilchrist, of South Carolina, to be a Member of the United States Commission on Civil Rights for a term expiring November 29, 2025, vice Karen K. Narasaki, term expired.

*Edwin R. Thomas*  
*Office of the Executive Clerk*

*The White House*



(b)(6)

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: CONFIRMATION: COVID-19 Antibody Testing  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 5, 2020 9:49:53 PM  
**Attachments:** [Consent Form for COVID-19 Antibody Test.docx](#)  
[ATT00001.htm](#)  
[COVID-19 Serology FAQs.docx](#)  
[ATT00002.htm](#)

---

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [redacted] / C: [redacted]

Secure: [redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)  
**From:** White House Management [redacted]  
**Date:** May 5, 2020 at 13:06:21 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** CONFIRMATION: COVID-19 Antibody Testing

Hello Kash,

(b)(6) Your voluntary COVID-19 antibody test has been scheduled for **Thursday, May 7th at 8:15 a.m.** in the [redacted] (EEOB [redacted] (b)(6)

Please arrive *5 minutes* early to your confirmed appointment with your consent form signed (see attached) and refer to the COVID-19 Serology FAQs (see attached) for more information.

(b)(6) Should you have any questions, please contact White House Management at [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] or by email at [redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
White House Management Office

**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
WASHINGTON

**Consent for COVID-19 Antibody Blood Draw and Sharing of the Results**

By signing this form, you consent to federal government personnel drawing and testing a blood specimen. This voluntary procedure will be used for surveillance of the White House Complex.

This test is to determine if you have been exposed to the virus that causes COVID-19. The test will identify if your plasma can limit the growth of the virus that causes COVID-19. The test will NOT determine if you have any immunity to future infections of this disease.

Before signing this consent, you must read the Privacy Act Notice—Health Information sheet.

**Acknowledgement and Consent**

By signing below, I acknowledge that I have fully read, understand, and agree with the terms of this informed consent and I hereby consent to federal government personnel obtaining a blood specimen test and sharing results of that test with appropriate White House personnel.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_  
Print your full name \_\_\_\_\_  
Form of Identification presented: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date/Time \_\_\_\_\_

**Handouts:**

1. Privacy Act Notice—Health Information



**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
WASHINGTON

**Privacy Act Notice –Health Information**

**I. Principal Purposes for Which Information is Intended to be Used**

The COVID-19 antibody blood draw is being administered voluntarily for White House complex surveillance and only to determine if you have been exposed to the virus that causes COVID-19. As part of the testing process, personnel may ask for personally identifiable information (PII) or protected health information (PHI).

**II. Routine Uses of Health Information**

Any PII or PHI which may be obtained and/ or recorded as a result of this testing may be used and disclosed generally as permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule (45 CFR Parts 160 and 164).

In accordance with the above, information in your record may be disclosed, as applicable, to: private physicians for continuity of care purposes, in connection with your medical care; and public health authorities to document and review occupational and environmental exposure data.

Information in your records may be used for other lawful reasons which may include teaching, compiling statistical data, and evaluating the care rendered. Use and disclosure of your records may also occur in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(b) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended.

This all-inclusive Privacy Act Statement will apply to all requests for personal information made for the purposes of administering the COVID-19 antibody blood test and keeping associated health records.

# COVID-19 Blood Test

## Frequently Asked Questions

### The White House is conducting surveillance to understand staff exposure to the virus that causes COVID-19.

- This antibody test will determine if the person's blood can limit the growth of the virus that causes COVID-19.
- This will NOT determine if staff are protected from future infections.

### What does a positive result mean?

If you receive a positive result, you are likely to have been previously exposed to the virus that causes COVID-19. Even if you did not feel sick, your immune system responded to the virus by making antibodies. **We do not know if this will protect you from future infections**, so please continue to follow guidelines to stop the spread of disease, including hand washing and social distancing.

### What does a negative result mean?

A negative result means that we did not find evidence of previous exposure to the virus that causes COVID-19. A negative result **does not** indicate that you do not currently have COVID-19. Your negative result could be because you have never been infected by this virus, or that you had COVID-19 but that there has not been enough time since the infection to develop antibodies.

### What will be learned by this test?

We would like to know what percentage of tested individuals have evidence of prior exposure to the virus that causes COVID-19.

### What cannot be answered by this test?

This test will not indicate whether any staff are protected from COVID-19. It will not indicate whether any person can return to work.

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: call me at [redacted] or secure at [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Monday, April 27, 2020 1:22:50 PM

---

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [redacted] C: [redacted]  
Secure: [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)  
**From:** [redacted]  
**Date:** April 27, 2020 at 11:02:27 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** call me at [redacted] or secure at [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(6)

[redacted]  
Republican Senior Advisor  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
United States House of Representatives  
Office: [redacted] (b)(6)  
TS VOIP: [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: CONGRESS FLAG: Senate Intel report reaffirms IC conclusion that Russian interference was done with the goal of electing Trump  
**Date:** Tuesday, April 21, 2020 11:57:23 AM

---

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [redacted] / C: [redacted]

Secure: [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)

**From:** "Haley, Vincent M. EOP/WHO" [redacted]  
**Date:** April 21, 2020 at 10:56:52 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" [redacted] "Worthington, (b)(6)  
Ross P. EOP/WHO" [redacted]  
**Subject:** FW: CONGRESS FLAG: Senate Intel report reaffirms IC  
conclusion that Russian interference was done with the goal of electing  
Trump

Andrew Desiderio  
@AndrewDesiderio

NEWS: Bipartisan, unanimously-approved Senate Intel report reaffirms IC conclusion about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election — that it was done with the goal of electing Trump.

Story TK w/ @martinmatishak

[https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report\\_Volume4.pdf](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume4.pdf)

<https://twitter.com/AndrewDesiderio/status/1252610216803340289>

.@SenatorBurr: "The Committee found no reason to dispute the Intelligence Community's conclusions."

<https://twitter.com/AndrewDesiderio/status/1252610217877127168>

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: For Review: Draft POTUS Remarks - Swearing In of John Ratcliffe  
**Date:** Monday, May 25, 2020 9:13:11 PM  
**Attachments:** John Ratcliffe Swearing In.docx

FYI. Dustin reviewed and concurred. I responded to StaffSec. All good.

Travis M. Burrs

(b)(3) [redacted] office mobile  
[redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** "Staff Secretary" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Monday, May 25, 2020 at 8:36:12 PM

(b)(6) **To:** "Salvi, Mary E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Miller, Julie L. EOP/OMB" [redacted] "Hahn, Julia A. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Gidley, Hogan H. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Gilmartin, Kayleigh M. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Farah, Alyssa A. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Liddell, Christopher P. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Butterfield, Nicholas W. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Meadows, Mark R. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "DL Chief of Staff Office" [redacted] "Nevins, Kristan K. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Travis M Burrs" [redacted] (b)(3) "DL NSC PaperDeputies" [redacted] "Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Halkey, Richard J. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Pataki, Tim A. EOP/WHO" [redacted] "Veletsis, Alexandra E. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Rollins, Brooke L. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6) "Dumbauld, Cassidy M. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** "Staff Secretary" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** For Review: Draft POTUS Remarks - Swearing In of John Ratcliffe

Attached for your review are draft remarks for the President for tomorrow's swearing-in of John Ratcliffe as Director of National Intelligence. This ceremonial swearing-in is scheduled for 12:45 p.m. tomorrow, May 26.

Please review and send all feedback to STAFF SEC **by 9:30 a.m. tomorrow, May 26.**

Thank you,

STAFF SEC

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: let me know when you are free to chat  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 17, 2020 9:01:10 AM

---

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [redacted] // C: [redacted]

Secure: [redacted]  
[redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6)

**From:** "Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO" [redacted]  
**Date:** March 16, 2020 at 13:54:53 EDT  
**To:** "Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: let me know when you are free to chat

(b)(6)

My cell is [redacted]

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 5:23 PM  
**To:** Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: let me know when you are free to chat

Thanks, What's the best number?

(b)(6) On Mar 13, 2020, at 14:55, Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO  
[redacted] wrote:

Hey Kash – tried you yesterday and today but didn't connect. Give me a call when you're free.

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 4:31 PM  
**To:** Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** let me know when you are free to chat

Wanted to run something by you, per Eisenberg. Thanks much

kash

**From:** RICHARDG  
**To:** Cipollone, Pat A. EOP/WHO  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from SSCI Members; April 20, 2020  
**Date:** Monday, April 20, 2020 3:14:43 PM  
**Attachments:** Grenell\_SSC Members\_20APR20.pdf

FYI

(b)(3)

**From:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted]  
**Date:** Monday, 20. April 2020 at 2:28:31 PM (b)(3)

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**To:** [redacted]  
**Cc:** [redacted] "KASHYAPP" <KASHYAPP@dni.gov>, (b)(3)  
[redacted] "Travis M Burrs" [redacted] (b)(6)

**Subject:** FW: Letter to Acting Director Grenell from SSCI Members; April 20, 2020

Ambassador –

Please find attached incoming correspondence from the SSCI.

Ryan

(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 20, 2020 1:57 PM (b)(3)  
**To:** Ryan Crumpler [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** [redacted]  
[redacted]

(b)(6)

**Subject:** Letter to Acting Director Grenell from SSCI Members; April 20, 2020

All,

Please see the attached letter to Acting Director Grenell from Vice Chairman Warner and Senators King, Bennet, Harris, Heinrich, Feinstein, Wyden, Collins, and Reed, dated April 20, 2020, regarding: Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs).

Confirm receipt and please pass to Acting Director Grenell.



Thank you,

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

Deputy Clerk & Security Officer  
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

[Redacted]

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN  
MARK R. WARNER, VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN

JAMES E. RISCH, IDAHO  
MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA  
SUSAN M. COLLINS, MAINE  
ROY BLUNT, MISSOURI  
TOM COTTON, ARKANSAS  
JOHN CORNYN, TEXAS  
BEN SASSE, NEBRASKA

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA  
RON WYDEN, OREGON  
MARTIN HEINRICH, NEW MEXICO  
ANGUS S. KING, JR, MAINE  
KAMALA HARRIS, CALIFORNIA  
MICHAEL F. BENNET, COLORADO

## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

April 20, 2020

MITCH McCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO  
CHARLES SCHUMER, NEW YORK, EX OFFICIO  
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO  
JACK REED, RHODE ISLAND, EX OFFICIO

CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, STAFF DIRECTOR  
MICHAEL CASEY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR  
KELSEY S. BAILEY, CHIEF CLERK

The Honorable Richard Grenell  
Acting Director  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Acting Director Grenell:


Recent media reporting has discussed the existence of Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs), described as classified documents created by the Executive Branch that include draft proclamations, executive orders, and proposals for legislation to be deployed during an emergency. As reported, no PEADs appear to have ever been invoked, but past documents have purportedly contemplated the suspension of habeas corpus, the detention of U.S. citizens without requisite suspicion of criminal activity, the execution of warrantless searches and seizures, and the imposition of martial law, all of which would raise significant constitutional concerns if implemented.


The President has declared an emergency in light of the coronavirus. In addition, Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 3312 requires that the Director of National Intelligence submit to the congressional intelligence committees any "covered policy document," which is defined to include any presidential directive or other document that "assigns tasks, roles, or responsibilities to the intelligence community or an element of the intelligence community." However, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has not been advised of the existence or substance of any current PEADs, including any PEADs that relate to the Intelligence Community or require classification due to urgent national security concerns.


In our democratic system, emergency powers not expressly enumerated in the Constitution are only available to a president pursuant to statutory authorization by Congress, and these authorities and their exercise are subject to scrutiny by the Courts. If these emergency powers are being contemplated, they should be transparent and made available for Congressional oversight. Accordingly, we request that, at the soonest possible date, you or a designated senior staff member produce to and brief the Committee on the existence and substance of any such PEADs, or, if none exist, that you so state, in accordance with your obligation to keep the Committee fully informed.

Thank you for your attention to this request. We look forward to scheduling this briefing at the soonest possible date.


Sincerely,


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Angus S. King, Jr.


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Vice Chairman Mark R. Warner


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Michael F. Bennet


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Kamala D. Harris

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Martin Heinrich

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Dianne Feinstein

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Ron Wyden

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Susan M. Collins

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Senator Jack Reed

**From:** (b)(3)  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Cc:** Travis M Burrs; KASHYAPP; (b)(3)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Meeting Tomorrow (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:40:48 PM

Sir - per the email below - Matt Pottinger would like to talk to you by secure phone tomorrow at 1400 - to include Julia Nesheiwat and Michael Ellis. I believe this is a follow up to a discussion you had recently w/Ms. Nesheiwat. Please let me know if you would like to take the call at the CP or participate in person at the WH. Thanks.

**From:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 7:18:21 PM  
**To:** "Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "DL NSC NSA FO Staff" (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Re: Meeting Tomorrow

Hi, Brandon - would you mind giving me a call - (b)(6) Thank you.

**From:** "Holt, Brandon T. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 at 7:03:15 PM  
**To:** (b)(3)  
(b)(6)  
**Cc:** "DL NSC NSA FO Staff" (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Meeting Tomorrow (b)(6)

Hi Stephanie,

APDNSA Pottinger would like to schedule a discussion ahead of Thursday's (b)(6) meetings. Is AMB Grenell available for a meeting or secure call at 2:00pm tomorrow? (b)(5)

Many thanks,  
Brandon

**Brandon T. Holt**  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
D: (b)(6)

(b)(5) From: (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(6)  
To: Travis M. Burrs  
Cc: KASHYAPP  
Subject: Fwd: for next week  
Date: Thursday, April 2, 2020 11:24:23 AM (b)(5)

(b)(5) Travis - here is what the current plan is for next week - always subject to change as you know. Looking at the calendar we have discussed for next week - looks like there isn't any damage to what is already scheduled. Just need to find out what time Beth wishes to do the Prep - maybe 1045 or 1100 since the Prep is from 1000-1030 - 7 April. On 10 April - maybe 1030 or 1045 - right after the Reeker Conference Call. (b)(5)

From: "Clemens, Nick J. EOP/WHO" (b)(6)  
Date: Thursday, April 2, 2020 at 10:56:43 AM  
To: (b)(3) (b)(6)  
Cc: "DL WHO Scheduling" (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: for next week (b)(5)

Stephanie, (b)(5)

We are currently planning for the following next week:

Tuesday, April 7, 2020 at 12:00 PM  
Friday, April 10, 2020 at 12:00 PM

Have a great day,

Nick Clemens  
Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

(b)(6)

From: (b)(3) (b)(6)  
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 10:13 AM (b)(6)  
To: Clemens, Nick J. EOP/WHO Haidet, Michael B. EOP/WHO  
Subject: for next week (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(5)

Hi - just checking in to see if you have an idea yet about the schedule for next week. Thanks so much.

(b)(3) **From:** Ryan Crumpler (b)(3)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP; Beth E. Sanner; [redacted]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Senators Cruz, Cotton, and Burr Letter to POTUS on Open Skies  
**Date:** Saturday, March 14, 2020 10:16:42 AM  
**Attachments:** Senators Cruz, Cotton, and Burr Letter to POTUS on Open Skies 20200312.pdf

---

Sir -

Please find attached a letter AMB O'Brien wanted you to see.

Ryan

Ryan P. Crumpler  
 Assistant DNI for Legislative Affairs  
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence

(b)(3) [redacted]  
 McLean, VA 22102 (b)(3)  
 [redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** "Rault, Nick M. EOP/NSC" [redacted]  
**Date:** Friday, March 13, 2020 at 3:53:01 PM  
**To:** "Ryan Crumpler" [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(3)  
 [redacted] (b)(6)

**Cc:** "DL NSC Legislative" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Senators Cruz, Cotton, and Burr Letter to POTUS on Open Skies

Ryan and ODNI Leg Team,

Ambassador O'Brien wanted to share this letter to make sure that Ambassador Grenell saw a copy. Please share as appropriate.

Thanks,

Nick Rault  
 Special Assistant  
 Legislative Affairs  
 National Security Council

U: [redacted] NSTS: [redacted]  
 (b)(6)

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 12, 2010

The Honorable Donald J. Trump  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr. President,

We write to urge you to withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). On March 4 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Defense Department had indefinitely halted recapitalization of the OC-135B observation airplanes that the United States Air Force flies in support of the OST, pending a decision by the administration regarding future participation in the treaty. We call on you to end that participation.

These aircraft are set to undergo millions of dollars in upgrade costs, and then soon afterwards the cost of participation will go from several million dollars to several hundred million dollars because they will have to be replaced. These costs pose an unnecessary burden on our military budgets and on American taxpayers, and would alone justify withdrawing from the treaty.

Of course, the costs of the OST go far beyond wasteful spending, and directly erode our national security by enabling Russian espionage over the United States. The Russians have installed advanced digital technology to enhance those capabilities, and they overfly major and sensitive American cities and infrastructure, including Washington DC and New York City. As Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, then-Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified to Congress in 2016, the OST "allows Russia... to get incredible foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, [and] all of our facilities" which "gives them a significant advantage." In the same year Adm. Cecil Haney, then-commander of U.S. STRATCOM, testified that "given the lack of overhead capability that the Russians have, Open Skies gives them a capability to be able to reconnoiter parts of our country and other nations."

The Russians have even used their privileges under OST to directly target you. In the summer of 2017, they flew their Tupolev Tu-154M spy plane over Bedminster, NJ while you were there, flying at 4,000 feet near your residence. The area is, of course and importantly, subject to Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR). The Russians were permitted to fly through the TFR because of the OST.

The benefits to the United States, meanwhile, are marginal. Even under conditions of good faith Russian implementation, the treaty is at best unnecessary and at worst a threat, since the U.S. does not gain additional intelligence beyond our far more advanced capabilities, while the Russians use their flights to gain a view of the homeland that is otherwise inaccessible to them. The Russians however are not implementing the treaty in good faith, and deny the United States

overflight rights. As Secretary Esper testified, the Russians “have been cheating for many years.”

As Lieutenant General Stewart already told Congress in 2015, “[t]he Open Skies construct was designed for a different era.” It is well past time to withdraw from it.

Sincerely,



Ted Cruz  
United States Senator



Tom Cotton  
United States Senator



Richard Burr  
United States Senator



**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Fwd: Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections  
**Date:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 7:41:47 PM

---

Kash Patel  
Special Assistant to the President &  
Senior Director for Counterterrorism

O: [redacted] // C: [redacted]  
Secure: [redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted]

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** March 10, 2020 at 19:17:30 EDT (b)(6)  
**To:** DL NSC Cyber [redacted] DL NSC INTEL  
[redacted] DL NSC CT [redacted] DL NSC EUR  
**Subject:** RE: Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections

(b)(6)

Hi all,

[redacted]

(b)(5)

<https://www.cisa.gov/protect2020>

Respectfully,  
Jason S. Smith  
Director for Legislative Affairs  
National Security Council

W: [redacted]  
C: [redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 10, 2020 7:50 AM

**To:** Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Subject:** RE: Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections (b)(6)

Jason,

It is Section 6504 – Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections.

Thank you,

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

**From:** Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 09, 2020 4:59 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** RE: Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections

Please send me the NDAA section number you are referring to. [redacted]  
[redacted]

(b)(5)

Thank you.

Respectfully,  
Jason S. Smith  
Director for Legislative Affairs  
National Security Council

W [redacted] (b)(6)  
C: [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(6)

**From:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 9, 2020 12:07 PM  
**To:** Smith, Jason S. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Strategy for Countering Russian Cyber Threats to US Elections

Hi Jason,

[redacted]

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

Thank you,

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC

January 17, 2023

Jason Leopold  
Senior Investigative Report/BuzzFeed News  
1669 Benedict Canyon Drive  
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

Re: Litigation 21-cv-02874, ODNI FOIA Case DF-2021-00201

Mr. Leopold,

This letter is an interim response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 27 April 2021, in which you requested the following:

1. All emails, text messages, including attachments, sent and received by former Principal Deputy to the Acting Director of National Intelligence Kash Patel.
2. All memos, reports, briefing materials sent to and prepared for Kash Patel.

Your request was being processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended. This response addresses the processing of 48 documents responsive to item number one of your aforementioned request. Upon review, we have determined that two documents are being released to you in full (Bates pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000001 – 000002) and 39 documents are being released to you in part (Bates pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000003 – 000045), pursuant to the following FOIA exemptions:

- (b)(3), which applies to information exempt from disclosure by statute, and, in this case, specifically the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(m), which protects identifying information of ODNI personnel;
- (b)(5), which applies to information that concerns communications within or between agencies that are protected by legal privileges;
- (b)(6), which applies to information, the release of which would clearly constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

The remaining seven documents must be withheld in full (Bates pages 21-cv-02874 (DF-2021-00201) 000046 – 000055), pursuant to the FOIA exemptions (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(6):

- (b)(4) applies to trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person that is privileged or confidential.

In addition to the above documents, the ODNI has processed 319 additional pages concerning item number 1 of your request. Those pages were identified as responsive and sent out for consultation with other government agencies this month..

If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Attorney Keri L. Berman of the Department of Justice at (202) 353-4537.

Sincerely, .

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Greg Koch". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Gregory M. Koch  
Chief, Information Management Office  
FOIA Public Liaison

Enclosures

**ENCLOSURE**

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 6:04 PM  
**To:** Gast, Scott F. EOP/WHO  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** 2 things

Scott,

I know you are slammed, but if you could, [redacted] (b)(6)

Per our prior phone call, can you confirm you received [redacted]  
[redacted] And if so, is everything ok on that front.

Also, [redacted]  
[redacted] Can you please touch base?

(b)(6)

Thanks much.

Kash

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 23, 2020 2:57 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Forss, Katelin T. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Best number to get you on?

[Redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

Work line?

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel

Mobile: [Redacted]  
Office: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** Kash Patel [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:50 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** bio

**Kash Patel**

Deputy Assistant to the President &

Senior Director for Counterterrorism

The White House

Kash Patel serves as the Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council (NSC). He leads the CT Directorate in development of Counterterrorism policy for the United States, as well as providing advice to the National Security Advisor and White House leadership. During his tenure, he led some of the President's top priorities which including eliminating ISIS leader Baghdadi and the safe return of numerous American hostages. Prior to this role, Mr. Patel served on the NSC's International Organizations Directorate as Director for Multilateral Affairs.

Before joining the NSC, Mr. Patel served as the National Security Advisor and Senior Counsel for the House Permanent Select Committee (HPSCI) on Intelligence, where he spearheaded the investigation into the Russian active measures campaign to influence the 2016 presidential election. Concurrently, Mr. Patel oversaw sensitive programs for the Intelligence and Special Forces communities, visiting dozens of installations around the world.

He joined HPSCI after his time as a terrorism prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ), leading investigations and prosecutions of Al-Qa'ida, ISIS, and many other terrorists groups. His work spanned numerous continents and across the U.S. Mr. Patel then served as the DOJ Liaison Officer to Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC). At JSOC, he worked with the U.S. Military's tier 1 special forces to conduct global targeting operations against the world's leading terrorists.

Mr. Patel's began his career as a public defender, trying scores of jury trials in state and federal courts ranging from murder to narco-trafficking to fraud.

A native of New York, Mr. Patel now lives in Washington, D.C. He completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Richmond in 2002, returned to New York to earn his law degree in 2005, and obtained a Certificate in International Law from University College London Faculty of Laws in the United Kingdom.

--  
K.P. Patel, Esq.  
Washington, D.C.

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 6, 2020 7:16 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash—I just got back and gave you a call. Please let me know if you want to connect [Redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
Sue

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 16, 2020 10:03 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash—Could we please connect tonight or tomorrow morning? Not urgent but wanted to get back to you on something.

Sue

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 3:37 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call

Kash—Could you please call me? [Redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
Sue

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Sunday, March 15, 2020 11:55 AM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash,

Hope you're staying safe and healthy. If you have time today, could you please give me a call? [Redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
Sue

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 2, 2020 3:08 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call

Kash—Do you have time for a quick call today?

Thank you,  
Sue

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/WHO [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Saturday, February 29, 2020 11:48 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Call

Hi Kash—Could I please give you a call around 1 pm?

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, March 3, 2020 11:02 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call me

Hi Kash – heard you're around the complex today. Could you give me a call? Pat was hoping to catch up with you today.

[redacted]  
(b)(6)  
Kate



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Fink, Andrew L. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 12:05 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Balatan, Joseph A. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Call w/ Sue Bai

Kash,

Sue Bai mentioned that she tried to call you back, but you were not available. Does a time possibly work for you between 12:00pm-2:00pm, to ensure you both connect?

Andrew Fink  
Special Assistant  
National Security Council

O: [Redacted] S: [Redacted] C: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Ellis, Michael J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 6:33 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Call

Hey, are you free for a quick call this evening or tomorrow morning?

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 9:09 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Can you call me secure when you get a chance?

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 14, 2020 12:23 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Can you call me when you get a chance?

Thanks

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

**From:** Chaffetz, Taylor M. EOP/OMB  
**To:** Ray, Paul J. EOP/OMB; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Canceled: HOLD: Call w/ Kash (DNI)  
**Importance:** High

---

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 6:09 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Chairman Gowdy

Hey, you asked me to set up a meeting. I reached out, but they responded since you have been at DNI. Do you still need this meeting?

Jenny Sanderson  
Counterterrorism Directorate  
National Security Council

[Redacted]  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** (b)(3)  
**From:** (b)(6) Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 12:38 PM (b)(6)  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CIA

(b)(5)

Have you at all explored [Redacted] going there?

Trying to read into it...

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel

Mobile: [Redacted]  
Office: [Redacted] (b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 22, 2020 9:30 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Circling-back

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

Kash –

Could you call? (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Looks like [Redacted] for DHS... want to confirm the intent for [Redacted] over there. I think we're happy with an "Acting" plan.

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel

Mobile: [Redacted]  
Office: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:**

**Sent:**

**To:**

**Cc:**

**Subject:**

**Attachments:**

(b)(6)

Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:14 PM

Dubin, Susan J. EOP/ODNI

Travis M Burrs;

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

KASHYAPP;

Completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe & COS

(b)(3)

O Badge Form for John Ratcliffe.pdf; O Badge Form for .pdf

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Ken/Susan – attached are the completed O Badge Forms for DNI Ratcliffe (just confirmed) and his Chief of Staff

We would appreciate your help in getting them expedited, if possible. DNI Ratcliffe will be formally sworn in on Tuesday, 26 May. Thank you.

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

Executive Assistant to the DNI

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Lair, Kate E. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP; Todd, Kathryn L. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Connect

Connecting you two

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [Redacted]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 5:03 PM  
**To:** [Redacted] (b)(3)  
**Cc:** KASHYAPP (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Connecting

(b)(6)

Hi Dennis,

Can you reach out to Kash (cc'd) and find a good time to speak with him on the phone? Thanks,

Drew

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President

Office: [Redacted]

Cell [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Horn, Drew L. EOP/OVP [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 12:04 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Connecting

Hi Kash,

I responded to your email from last night, but Johnny asked me to reach out to this address too. Would love to be of assistance to you if you think I can help with anything.

Very Respectfully,

Drew Horn  
Associate Director of Policy  
Office of the Vice President

Office: [redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Baehr, James S. EOP/WHO [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 1:51 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** [redacted]  
**Subject:** Connection (b)(6)

Bill,

Setting you up with Kash Patel's DNI email for connection.

Best,

-----  
James S. C. Baehr  
Special Assistant to the President  
Domestic Policy Council

O: [redacted] (b)(6)  
C: [redacted]

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Skinner, James B. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 27, 2020 10:51 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** COS Scheduling

Eliza Thurston

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

**James Skinner**

Office of the National Security Advisor

Desk: [Redacted]

Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3)  
[redacted] (b)(6)

---

**From:** Shiller, Scott B. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 23, 2020 6:16 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** CV  
**Attachments:** Scott Shiller CV 2020.pdf

Here you go my friend.

---

Scott Shiller  
Director for Israel, Jordan, and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

---

**From:** Shiller, Scott B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 6:55 PM  
**To:** 'KASHYAPP'  
**Subject:** RE: Thank you

Hey, sorry for the delay...will update CV to reflect this position and send it by Friday.

V/r,

Scott

---

Scott Shiller  
Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office [redacted] (b)(6)  
[redacted]

---

**From:** Shiller, Scott B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 11, 2020 7:41 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Thank you

Hey Kash – thanks for taking the time this morning and good seeing you outside the WW. I'll send my updated info in a couple of days once I have a chance to update it. Have a good night.

V/r,

Scott

---

Scott Shiller  
Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs  
White House National Security Council  
Office [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(6)



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 18, 2020 9:30 AM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** D/NCTC Nom Link

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-nominate-individual-key-administration-post-22/>

-----  
Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [Redacted]  
Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
-----

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, March 16, 2020 6:50 PM  
**To:** McEntee, John D. II EOP/WHO; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Dave Smith resume  
**Attachments:** KP 10-9-19.docx; ATT00001.txt

Thanks,

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 30, 2020 5:26 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Smith, Jared L. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** [Redacted] (b)(6)

Are you still tracking him for something at ODNI?

If there isn't anything viable, let us know.

Respectfully,  
Troup Hemenway  
Presidential Personnel  
Mobile: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Office: [Redacted]

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 5:54 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Smith, Jared L. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** DHS - Earl

Kash – (b)(6)

In a weird turn of events – AS2 sent our DHS WHL a message [Redacted] After having signed off earlier this week...

I'm having them get a "why," but bringing to your SA – and in the event you know of any background.

And thanks on [Redacted] (b)(6)

Respectfully,  
 Troup Hemenway  
 Presidential Personnel  
 Mobile: [Redacted]  
 Office: [Redacted]

(b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT of 1974 as Amended applies - this email and/or email attachments may contain information that is protected IAW DoD 5400.11R and is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO).

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---


**From:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 15, 2020 7:54 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Draft letter

Hi Kash—If you would like to discuss the draft letter transmitted to counsel's office last evening, please feel free to call me [redacted] (b)(6)

Thank you,  
Sue

(b)(3)

(b)(6)



---

**From:** Travis M Burrs  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 19, 2020 2:43 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** DTO: Email from Susan Rice  
**Attachments:** 01-20-2017\_Email from Susan Rice.pdf

Attached.

**To:** Rice, Susan E [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Ried, Curtis R. [REDACTED]  
**From:** Rice, Susan E [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Fri 1/20/2017 12:15:32 PM  
**Importance:** Normal  
**Subject:** Note to File [TOP SECRET, Record]  
**MAIL\_RECEIVED:** Fri 1/20/2017 12:15:33 PM

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~

On January 5, following a briefing by IC leadership on Russian hacking during the 2016 Presidential election, President Obama had a brief follow-on conversation with FBI Director Jim Comey and Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates in the Oval Office. Vice President Biden and I were also present.

President Obama began the conversation by stressing his continued commitment to ensuring that every aspect of this issue is handled by the Intelligence and law enforcement communities "by the book". The President stressed that he is not asking about, initiating or instructing anything from a law enforcement perspective. He reiterated that our law enforcement team needs to proceed as it normally would by the book.

From a national security perspective, however, President Obama said he wants to be sure that, as we engage with the incoming team, we are mindful to ascertain if there is any reason that we cannot share information fully as it relates to Russia.

Director Comey affirmed that he is proceeding "by the book" as it relates to law enforcement. From a national security perspective, Comey said he does have some concerns that incoming NSA Flynn is speaking frequently with Russian Ambassador Kislyak. Comey said that could be an issue as it relates to sharing sensitive information. President Obama asked if Comey was saying that the NSC should not pass sensitive information related to Russia to Flynn. Comey replied "potentially." He added that he has no indication thus far that Flynn has passed classified information to Kislyak, but he noted that "the level of communication is unusual."

The President asked Comey to inform him if anything changes in the next few weeks that should affect how we share classified information with the incoming team. Comey said he would.

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Eisenberg, John A. EOP/WHO [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 24, 2020 6:42 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Bai, Sue J. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Email

Can you forward that email re declassification? Thanks

John A. Eisenberg  
Assistant to the President, Deputy Counsel to the President,  
and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council  
Office: [Redacted] (direct), [Redacted] (main)  
Cell: [Redacted]  
Secure (WW): [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Secure (EEOB): [Redacted]



(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

---

**From:** Sanderson, Jenny EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, April 6, 2020 2:27 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** Jenifer Sanderson  
**Subject:** Farewell....for now

Kash!

Hi stranger! I wanted to let you know that this Friday is my last day ☹️ Stupid COVID is keeping me from saying good-bye in CT fashion but I will be back to give out hugs and high fives when we are finally allowed to!

Thanks for everything! I wish we could have worked together longer. I like your management style and you allowed me to run with stuff...within reason! And you have cool stuff!!! Thank you for being so supportive of things that I wanted to explore and hopefully our paths will cross again soon!

I know COVID has put a damper on hiring everywhere, but do you think there will be any jobs I could qualify for at DNI? I'm going back to USAID until I can find my dream job. I believe they are going to put me on the [Redacted] but it(b)(5) hasn't been confirmed. That would be a really cool job until all of this blows over. But then I do want to get back to CT and/or the military. I need to put all of the cool things I have learned to good use!

I hope you are well and staying healthy! I wish you the best and I'll see you sometime soon.

Jenny

Jenny Sanderson  
Counterterrorism Directorate  
National Security Council

[Redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 12, 2020 11:37 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** Francescon Resume  
**Attachments:** Francescon\_Resume.pdf

Kash –

Attached, please find my resume. Many thanks.

Joe

**Joe Francescon**  
Acting Senior Director for Counterterrorism  
National Security Council

O: [redacted] | M: [redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

---

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [redacted]  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 21, 2020 1:29 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Cc:** DL NSC NSA FO Staff  
**Subject:** Friday secure call

(b)(6)

Kash, you're good to go for the secure call tomorrow. FO, Kash will be ODNI rep. Thanks

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

---

**From:** Hemme, Jake W. EOP/NSC [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, April 3, 2020 11:29 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** From Grenell  
  
**Importance:** High

Grenell wants the following phrase added to the letter: "to rebuild confidence in the IC"

Thanks,

**Jake Hemme**  
Office of the National Security Advisor  
Desk: [redacted]  
Cell: [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 13, 2020 9:14 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

[Redacted]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Are you tracking [Redacted] Didn't hear back from a VM, and 2 emails...

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:21 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Re: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Thanks

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

On May 12, 2020, at 7:48 PM, Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO wrote:

Okay – I emailed him, will do so again...

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:16 PM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

RCO met with him today.

He's in town tomorrow and was hoping to get a PPO mtg.

**From:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 10:22 AM  
**To:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** RE: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Is now..

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Monday, May 11, 2020 9:29 AM  
**To:** Hemenway, John Troup C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

Is this guy on your radar? If not, RCO was hoping someone from PPO might meet with him given the strong Grenell recommendation.

Thanks,

Alex

**From:** Richard Grenell  
**Sent:** Sunday, May 10, 2020 6:22 PM  
**To:** O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO ; Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Fwd: CV

This guy is in town tomorrow from Colorado. I'd like you to meet him to discuss Afghanistan. He's a real leader. He's been on multiple tours there and has a real vision. We should utilize him. You've probably seen him on Fox News a bunch.

Begin forwarded message: (b)(6)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Date:** 10. May 2020 at 6:15:25 PM GMT-4  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** CV (b)(6)

Thanks Ric!

[Redacted] (b)(3)  
[Redacted] (b)(6)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, February 28, 2020 10:49 AM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [Redacted] CV (b)(6)  
**Attachments:** PGrande Resume 2020.pdf; ATT00001.htm

Making sure you have this. [Redacted] (b)(5)

**From:** Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 27, 2020 8:12 AM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** Fwd: [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Peggy Grande CV

See CV

Alexander B. Gray  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor  
National Security Council | The White House

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Alex Gray  
**Date:** February 27, 2020 at 8:10:44 AM EST  
**To:** "Gray, Alexander B. EOP/NSC"  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] Fwd: [Redacted] CV (b)(6)

Alexander Gray  
Cell: [Redacted] (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** Robert O'Brien  
**Date:** February 27, 2020 at 7:22:58 AM EST  
**To:** Alex Gray, Richard Grenell  
**Subject:** Fwd: [Redacted] CV (b)(6)

[Redacted] (b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----  
**From:** Peggy Grande [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 6:56 PM  
**Subject:** [Redacted] CV

(b)(6)

To: Robert C. O'Brien [redacted]

CC: [redacted]

(b)(6)

Rob -

Always wonderful to hear from you and congratulations on an overwhelmingly successful trip to India with the President and First Lady!

Per your request please find attached my current resume. [redacted]

(b)(6)

I am actually going to be in DC Thursday through Saturday of this week. If it would be helpful to meet in person I would be happy to make myself available to you and/or Alex on one of those days. Let me know if you have any additional questions. I am grateful for your consideration.

My best,

[redacted]

(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

(b)(6)

From: **Robert O'Brien** [redacted]

Date: Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 3:19 PM

(b)(6)

Subject: [redacted]

To: Gray, Alexander B. EOP/WHO [redacted]

(b)(6)

[redacted]

(b)(6)

[redacted] Please send your CV to my CoS, Alex Gray (copied). [redacted]

(b)(6)

[redacted]



(b)(3)

(b)(6)

**From:** RICHARDG  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 2:48 PM  
**To:** KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW:

Call me with an update

**From:** Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 12:38 PM  
**To:** RICHARDG  
**Cc:** O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** RE:

Update:

SSCI submitted 140 questions late yesterday; ODNI/Ratcliffe working, and WHCO is standing by for clearing answers in batches, rather than as one package. Eric

**From:** Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO  
**Sent:** Friday, March 27, 2020 7:02 AM  
**To:** RICHARDG  
**Cc:** O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO  
**Subject:** Re:

Agreed! Eric

On Mar 27, 2020, at 6:42 AM, RICHARDG wrote:

Eric, please make sure the staff questions and all paperwork is submitted today. This is important and there should be no excuses for radcliffe's team to not complete everything today. My team is available to help answer questions or provide information.

**From:** "Ueland, Eric M. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Date:** Friday, 27. March 2020 at 5:03:43 AM  
**To:** "O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO" [redacted] (b)(6)  
**Cc:** "RICHARDG" [redacted]  
**Subject:** Re: [redacted] (b)(3)

Good morning—

Thank you. We are all tracking the same week for committee action. Appreciate it! Eric

On Mar 26, 2020, at 9:16 PM, O'Brien, Robert C. EOP/WHO wrote:

Spoke with Chairman Burr today. He is going to try to hold the hearing the third week of April. He did ask that Ratcliffe get his papers and answers to questions into staff asap.

Best, RCO

Sent from my iPad

On Mar 26, 2020, at 6:49 AM, RICHARDG wrote:

Can you call Burr today? McConnell says the senate will be out til April 20. We need Burr to do the hearing for Radcliffe the week of April 20. Get it scheduled now. He should do a voice vote/fast track because of Coronavirus.

>><https://twitter.com/andrewdesiderio/status/1243003445877125120?s=12><<

(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

[Redacted]

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC [Redacted] (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 8:32 AM  
**To:** Patel, Kash P. EOP/NSC; KASHYAPP  
**Subject:** FW: 45 U.S. Citizens Transported Out of Syria

-----  
Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [Redacted]  
-----

**From:** Stewart, Dustin J. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 7, 2020 8:31 AM  
**To:** Francescon, Joseph M. EOP/NSC  
**Subject:** FW: 45 U.S. Citizens Transported Out of Syria (b)(5)

FYSA – believe we have some information on some of the run up on this, [Redacted] Barring where thing stand with Eva’s outreach (SPEHA is checking and owes an answer today), another think to thank them for that could open direct dialogue if that is the route that everyone wants to go.

*Good morning. I just wanted to flag that the Syrian government this morning transported 45 U.S. citizens from Damascus to the Syria-Lebanon border. The AmCits are now en route to the Beirut airport to catch an OpMed flight to Dulles.* [Redacted]

[Redacted] (b)(5)

-----  
Dustin Stewart  
Director for Counterterrorism – Hostage Affairs  
National Security Council  
Phone: [Redacted] (b)(6)  
Cell: [Redacted]  
-----