

**(SBU) The Secretary's Call Sheet for  
Members of Congress**

**(SBU) Purpose:** You are calling Congressional Leadership and key Members to roll out the Administration's new Iran policy. This includes a decision by the President to not certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), to work with Congress and allies to fix the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to impose additional sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for its support to terrorism.

(b)(5)

**(SBU) Iran Strategy:** These points are cleared with the NSC.

- 

- 

- 

- 

(b)(5)

**From:** Richard Goldberg  
**Sent:** Wed, 3 Jan 2018 17:30:04 +0000  
**To:** Jamie Fly; Hook, Brian H  
**Subject:** Updated CBI approach  
**Attachments:** 1245 Draft New Waiver.docx, Fixing the JCPOA via the 1245 Presidential Waiver.docx

Hi Brian -

The NSC received this last night after I sent to Dubo, but I'll add a bit of commentary. I wrote a much longer memo pitching this a few weeks ago (attached), but I'll summarize quickly.

The D's who support JCPOA but are deep down Iran hawks (think Dennis Ross, maybe Dan Shapiro) are walking themselves into a policy contradiction, which we can take advantage of. That is, they argue we should keep the nuclear deal but impose maximum sanctions on entities (including banks) that are involved in non-nuclear illicit activities. Dennis advocated exactly that in his recent [Hill op-ed](#). When I privately confronted him that his logic necessitates hitting entities that were also waived in the JCPOA (particularly banks, including CBI), he agreed with me. But they don't say this publicly because they know others would not go that far -- think Colin et al.

While I personally believe you have every right under JCPOA to impose sanctions on CBI and regime assets for non-nuclear activities, you may be concerned that the public case for this hasn't been well-established -- and that the media, at the behest of the echo chamber, will get spun up very quickly that POTUS has violated the deal. That would mean you may want to take an escalatory step first that lays the intellectual foundation and prepares our allies for the eventual total move (read Japan/ROK/India). So, there may be a third way forward on CBI for next week that SUPPORTS your current strategic communications efforts with respect to the uprising without stepping into an all-out fight over JCPOA. Treasury's FAQ on the JCPOA (pp. 4-5 of [this linked document](#)) makes clear that under the JCPOA, the US retains the right to add SDN designations for terrorism, human rights abuses, missiles and Syria -- all four to which the administration can credibly claim a Central Bank of Iran connection exists. Furthermore, the CBI is most definitely in violation of secondary sanctions due to its connection to the IRGC.

The Obama administration not only waived FY 12 NDAA, it also moved the CBI to the non-SDN list. Therein lies a middle ground with huge impact. The administration should be able to construct a middle way on CBI for next week that:

- 1) adds CBI back to the SDN list under IRGC/terrorism, human rights and any other programs it finds helpful for strat comm (i.e. message to the Iranian people that the bank is being listed for funding the IRGC, Syria operations and human rights abuses against them -- all of which is the basis of the uprising); and

- 2) waives FY12 NDAA Sec. 1245 with an updated waiver language that adds additional language about the uprising and puts allies on notice to start finding energy alternatives if needed (but the waiver itself can be pointed to as a PR defense against accusations the administration walked away from JCPOA).

I'm attaching a draft NDAA waiver letter to Congress that would act as a strategic communications tool (and legal requirement all in one) to advance the justifications for both actions listed above.

In the end, I think it's very difficult to justify *not* doing something on CBI right now -- it would send the wrong message -- and given many reports that the uprising was in part prompted by the CBI/banking sector's laundering of the people's money, it can fit nicely into the overall narrative if handled correctly. Happy to talk through more -- I'll be in DC this afternoon and all day tomorrow -- can extend if you need me but always available by phone. Jamie may disagree with my "moderated" approach but it's better than doing nothing.

Best,  
Rich

**From:** Lacey, Edward  
**Sent:** Thu, 14 Sep 2017 08:38:34 -0400  
**To:** Hook, Brian H;Tessler, David J  
**Subject:** FW: STATEMENT: More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal

FYI: For the most part, these are the “usual suspects” – i.e., Obama Administration officials, the arms control-at-any-cost-crowd, etc. Notably, no one who I would identify as a compliance/verification proponent.

## **More Than 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Experts Reaffirm Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal**

*Urge the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to continue to fulfill Washington commitments under the multilateral accord.*

**PREFACE**

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

OPTIONS

3 levers

- JT Comm P5+1, quarterly
- IAEA
- Procurement Working Grp  
- meets every 3 mths

- Exec auth question?

- any time, any where inspections  
is the standard w/ IAEA.  
not contained when this deal

B5

B5

B5  
B5



nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

- viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and ~~to~~ refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Fri, 13 Oct 2017 11:19:04 +0000  
**To:** (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6); Nauert, Heather N.; (b)(6); Hook, Brian H.; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** IranStratTPs.docx

We got some edits to the TPs overnight.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:41 PM  
**To:** (b)(6); (b)(6); 'Nauert, Heather N'; (b)(6); Hook, Brian H'; (b)(6); (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6); (b)(6); 'Nauert, Heather N'; (b)(6); Hook, Brian H'; (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM  
**To:** Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Walters, Lindsay E. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Boney, Virginia M. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO; (b)(6); Rayburn, Joel D. EOP/NSC; (b)(6); Bell, Michael S. EOP/NSC; (b)(6); Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC; (b)(6); Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO; (b)(6)  
**Cc:** DL NSC Press; (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.

There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

**FINAL****IRAN STRATEGY TPs*****Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."

## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

## FINAL

### ***Threats from Iran***

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

### ***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.

## FINAL

- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

### ***Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC-backed Houthis launched a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia against an airbase near Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. The missile was intercepted, but the attack illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In early 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by an attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel in the waters off Yemen's western coast.



## FINAL

- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.
  - Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

### ***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.

**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:41:23 +0000  
**To:** (b)(6) Nauert, Heather  
N (b)(6); Hook, Brian H (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy.docx, IranStratTPs.docx

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)

(b)(6) Nauert, Heather N  
(b)(6) Hook, Brian H (b)(6)  
(b)(6) >  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM  
**To:** Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>; Hicks, Hone C. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6) Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>; Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6) <(b)(6)>; Boney,  
Virginia M. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>; Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6) <(b)(6)>; Bell, Michael S.  
EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>; Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>;  
Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>  
**Cc:** DL NSC Press (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.

There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

Final

## Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy

***Q: Why was the Administration unable to certify?***

- (b)(5)

- 

- 

- 

***Q: Are you declining to certify under INARA due to a nuclear-related violation?***

- (b)(5)

- 

***Q: Is declining to certify a violation of the JCPOA?***

- (b)(5)

- 

- 

***Q: Is Iran complying with the JCPOA? If so, how can we not certify under INARA?***

- (b)(5)

-

**Final**

(b)(5)

***Q: Does the President plan to stay in the JCPOA even though the Administration did not certify?***

•

(b)(5)

•

•

***Q: Does President Trump's refusal to recertify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) mean that he will rescind all the waivers previously used to lift nuclear sanctions on Iran and that would collapse the nuclear deal?***

(b)(5)

•

•

•

•

•

***Q: How do you expect Congress to react to the lack of certification? Do you support legislation to reinstate sanctions?***

•

(b)(5)

**Final**

(b)(5)

•

•

•

***Q: Why would the Secretary of State and President give Congress control over such an important foreign policy decision?***

•

(b)(5)

***Q: President Trump has said he does not wish to withdraw from the JCPOA just yet and wishes to fix its flaws, but his decision not to certify lets Congress use “fast track” expedited legislative procedures to destroy the deal by re-imposing all nuclear sanctions. How is wishing to remain in the JCPOA consistent with playing “Russian Roulette” with the agreement by encouraging Congress to collapse it?***

(b)(5)

•

•

d

***Q: So what happens now?***

•

(b)(5)

•

o

y

t

s



Final

***Q: If Iran is not violating the terms of the deal, then why is the Administration declining to recertify it? Is the President making this decision against the advice of his intelligence chiefs?***

- (b)(5)

***Q: There are claims that CIA and other Intelligence Community assessments on Iran have been politicized and that analysts are facing pressure to skew judgments to find Iran out of compliance with JCPOA. Is this the case?***

- (b)(5)
- 

***Q: What does the U.S. Intelligence Community assess about how the Iranian Government will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***

- (b)(5)

***Q: What does the US Intelligence Community assess about how other parties to the agreement will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***

- (b)(5)

#### **ADDITIONAL Q&A**

***Q: Is the President disregarding the advice of his national security advisors?***

- (b)(5)

**Final**

***Q: Secretary of Defense Mattis said the other day that he thinks the JCPOA is in the U.S. national security interest. Does President Trump think his Defense Secretary is mistaken? If not, why has the President decertified Iran under INARA?***

- (b)(5)

- 

- 

***Q. If, as you say, the JCPOA is so bad and Iran is in “default” of its “spirit,” then why isn’t the administration leaving the deal?***

- (b)(5)

- 

***Q: What about our allies? Why are we disregarding them?***

- (b)(5)

- Today’s actions are a matter of implementing domestic law; we are not turning our backs on our allies. That said, the President will always tackle issues based first and foremost on what’s in the best interests of the American people and based on what is required by U.S. law.
- Iran poses a serious threat to the United States and our allies in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The support of our allies around the globe will be critical to implementing the strategy the President outlined. We have already begun discussions with many of our allies on these issues and are eager to move forward as quickly as possible.

**Final**

***Q: How do you expect Iran to react? Will this lift limits on their nuclear program?***

- (b)(5)
- 

***Q: What do you mean by “fix” the JCPOA? Does this mean renegotiate?***

- (b)(5)
- 
- 

**INTRODUCTION OF NON-NUCLEAR ISSUES**

***Q: Not just Iran, but all other JCPOA parties strongly believe that it’s a mistake to entangle other issues with the nuclear deal itself, and that this could result in the deal’s collapse. You have indicated that you wish Congress to include some missile restrictions in its revision of the INARA legislation. Is this a recipe to collapse the deal by tying it to non-nuclear matters?***

- (b)(5)
-

Final

## VIOLATING THE JCPOA

***Q: Iran has said that President Trump's decertification is a violation of the JCPOA. Why isn't this true?***

- (b)(5)
- 

***Q: In the later years of the JCPOA, the nuclear deal would permit Iran to do things – increasing the size of its nuclear program – that this legislative approach would prohibit. Wouldn't it be a U.S. violation of the deal if we re-imposed sanctions at that point?***

- (b)(5)

## RISK TO IRAN STRATEGY

***Q: Doesn't declining to certify now risk losing European and other international partners' support where you need it most – that is, in addressing the range of Iranian malign activities beyond the nuclear realm that the Trump Administration has highlighted as critical threats?***

- (b)(5)

## IRANIAN VIOLATIONS

***Q: Senior Administration officials have repeatedly indicated that they believe Iran to have violated the JCPOA, including by producing too much heavy water and running too many centrifuges. The IAEA, however, believes Iran to be in compliance, and U.S. intelligence officials appear to agree. Why do officials keep saying Iran has violated the deal?***

- (b)(5)

## Final

(b)(5)

### IAEA ACCESS

***Q: Administration officials have sometimes suggested that Iran is denying the IAEA access to suspect sites, and/or that the IAEA is not doing enough to use its authorities to visit locations where Iran might perhaps be cheating on the JCPOA. Is this true?***

• (b)(5)

***Q: Iranian officials have said that they will never permit the IAEA to visit military sites. Does this mean that the JCPOA is doomed?***

• (b)(5)

***Q: Iran and Russia have said that they do not believe the IAEA has authority to verify Iran's compliance with "Section T" of the JCPOA, which prohibits work on technologies that could contribute to nuclear warhead development. Is this true?***

• (b)(5)

## Final

***Q: IAEA Director General Amano said that the IAEA lacks all of the tools needed to verify Iran's compliance with weaponization restrictions. Doesn't this mean the IAEA can't verify Iran's compliance with the deal?***

- (b)(5)
- 

## AVIATION LICENSING

***Q: The JCPOA commits the United States to licensing civil aviation sales to Iran, yet the Trump Administration has put a "hold" on all such licenses. Isn't that a violation of the deal?***

- (b)(5)

## FTO DESIGNATION

***Q: Why didn't you formally designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist organization?***

- (b)(5) ES.
- 
-



Final

## IRANIAN OFFICIALS' COMMENTS

***Q: Iran has complained that U.S. statements discouraging business investment in Iran violate provisions of the JCPOA in which the United States promised to support the resumption of economic relationships after the lifting of nuclear sanctions. Why do U.S. officials keep discouraging business in Iran?***

- (b)(5)

FINAL

## IRAN STRATEGY TPs

### ***Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

### ***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

### ***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."

## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

### ***Threats from Iran***

(b)(5)

**FINAL**

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.
- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

**FINAL*****Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC supported the Houthis in launching a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia that was expertly intercepted just south of Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. This IRGC-sponsored attack threatened the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In February 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by a terrorist attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel with an anti-ship cruise missile in the waters off Yemen's western coast.
- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.

**FINAL**

- Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.



**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.

**From:** Hook, Brian H  
**Sent:** Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:39:26 -0400  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy.docx, ATT00001.htm, IranStratTPs.docx, ATT00002.htm

Please print this and place in front of Iran binder for tomorrow.

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC" (b)(6)  
**Date:** October 12, 2017 at 4:41:23 PM EDT  
**To:** (b)(6) (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) "Nauert, Heather N" (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Hook, Brian H" <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6)  
**Subject: RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As**

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** 'White, Dana W SES OSD (US)' (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) Hook, Brian H (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM  
**To:** Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>; Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
Walters, Lindsay E. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Boney, Virginia M. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6) Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Rayburn, Joel D. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>  
Bell, Michael S. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO

Cc: DL NSC Press (b)(6)

Subject: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&amp;As

These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.


There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

Final

### Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy


(b)(5)

***Q: Why was the Administration unable to certify?***




(b)(5)

***Q: Are you declining to certify under INARA due to a nuclear-related violation?***




(b)(5)

***Q: Is declining to certify a violation of the JCPOA?***



(b)(5)

***Q: Is Iran complying with the JCPOA? If so, how can we not certify under INARA?***




Final

(b)(5)

A rectangular box that has been completely redacted, leaving it empty.


(b)(5)

***Q: Does the President plan to stay in the JCPOA even though the Administration did not certify?***

A large rectangular box that has been completely redacted, leaving it empty.


***Q: Does President Trump's refusal to recertify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) mean that he will rescind all the waivers previously used to lift nuclear sanctions on Iran and that would collapse the nuclear deal?***

(b)(5)


A large rectangular box that has been completely redacted, leaving it empty.

(b)(5)

***Q: How do you expect Congress to react to the lack of certification? Do you support legislation to reinstate sanctions?***


A rectangular box that has been completely redacted, leaving it empty.

(b)(5)

**Final**


(b)(5)

***Q: Why would the Secretary of State and President give Congress control over such an important foreign policy decision?***




***Q: President Trump has said he does not wish to withdraw from the JCPOA just yet and wishes to fix its flaws, but his decision not to certify lets Congress use "fast track" expedited legislative procedures to destroy the deal by re-imposing all nuclear sanctions. How is wishing to remain in the JCPOA consistent with playing "Russian Roulette" with the agreement by encouraging Congress to collapse it?***

(b)(5)



(b)(5)

***Q: So what happens now?***



Final

***Q: If Iran is not violating the terms of the deal, then why is the Administration declining to recertify it? Is the President making this decision against the advice of his intelligence chiefs?***

(b)(5)

•

***Q: There are claims that CIA and other Intelligence Community assessments on Iran have been politicized and that analysts are facing pressure to skew judgments to find Iran out of compliance with JCPOA. Is this the case?***

(b)(5)

***Q: What does the U.S. Intelligence Community assess about how the Iranian Government will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***

***Q: What does the US Intelligence Community assess about how other parties to the agreement will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***


**ADDITIONAL Q&A**

***Q: Is the President disregarding the advice of his national security advisors?***

Final


(b)(5)

***Q: Secretary of Defense Mattis said the other day that he thinks the JCPOA is in the U.S. national security interest. Does President Trump think his Defense Secretary is mistaken? If not, why has the President decertified Iran under INARA?***



(b)(5)

***Q. If, as you say, the JCPOA is so bad and Iran is in “default” of its “spirit,” then why isn’t the administration leaving the deal?***



(b)(5)

***Q: What about our allies? Why are we disregarding them?***





(b)(5) Final

***Q: How do you expect Iran to react? Will this lift limits on their nuclear program?***

(b)(5)

***Q: What do you mean by "fix" the JCPOA? Does this mean renegotiate?***

## INTRODUCTION OF NON-NUCLEAR ISSUES

***Q: Not just Iran, but all other JCPOA parties strongly believe that it's a mistake to entangle other issues with the nuclear deal itself, and that this could result in the deal's collapse. You have indicated that you wish Congress to include some missile restrictions in its revision of the INARA legislation. Is this a recipe to collapse the deal by tying it to non-nuclear matters?***

(b)(5)


- 
-

Final

## **VIOLATING THE JCPOA**


***Q: Iran has said that President Trump's decertification is a violation of the JCPOA. Why isn't this true?***

(b)(5)

A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redacting the response to the question about Iran's statement on the JCPOA decertification.

***Q: In the later years of the JCPOA, the nuclear deal would permit Iran to do things – increasing the size of its nuclear program – that this legislative approach would prohibit. Wouldn't it be a U.S. violation of the deal if we re-imposed sanctions at that point?***


(b)(5)

A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redacting the response to the question about potential U.S. violations of the JCPOA deal.

## **RISK TO IRAN STRATEGY**

***Q: Doesn't declining to certify now risk losing European and other international partners' support where you need it most – that is, in addressing the range of Iranian malign activities beyond the nuclear realm that the Trump Administration has highlighted as critical threats?***


(b)(5)

A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redacting the response to the question about the risk to Iran strategy from declining certification.


## **IRANIAN VIOLATIONS**

***Q: Senior Administration officials have repeatedly indicated that they believe Iran to have violated the JCPOA, including by producing too much heavy water and running too many centrifuges. The IAEA, however, believes Iran to be in compliance, and U.S. intelligence officials appear to agree. Why do officials keep saying Iran has violated the deal?***

(b)(5)


A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redacting the response to the question about Iranian violations of the JCPOA.

Final




## IAEA ACCESS


***Q: Administration officials have sometimes suggested that Iran is denying the IAEA access to suspect sites, and/or that the IAEA is not doing enough to use its authorities to visit locations where Iran might perhaps be cheating on the JCPOA. Is this true?***



***Q: Iranian officials have said that they will never permit the IAEA to visit military sites. Does this mean that the JCPOA is doomed?***



***Q: Iran and Russia have said that they do not believe the IAEA has authority to verify Iran's compliance with "Section T" of the JCPOA, which prohibits work on technologies that could contribute to nuclear warhead development. Is this true?***



Final

***Q: IAEA Director General Amano said that the IAEA lacks all of the tools needed to verify Iran's compliance with weaponization restrictions. Doesn't this mean the IAEA can't verify Iran's compliance with the deal?***

(b)(5)

#### AVIATION LICENSING

***Q: The JCPOA commits the United States to licensing civil aviation sales to Iran, yet the Trump Administration has put a "hold" on all such licenses. Isn't that a violation of the deal?***

(b)(5)

#### FTO DESIGNATION

***Q: Why didn't you formally designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist organization?***


(b)(5)

Final

## IRANIAN OFFICIALS' COMMENTS

***Q: Iran has complained that U.S. statements discouraging business investment in Iran violate provisions of the JCPOA in which the United States promised to support the resumption of economic relationships after the lifting of nuclear sanctions. Why do U.S. officials keep discouraging business in Iran?***

(b)(5)





FINAL

## IRAN STRATEGY TPs

### ***Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

### ***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

### ***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."

## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

### ***Threats from Iran***

(b)(5)



**FINAL**

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.
- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

**FINAL*****Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC supported the Houthis in launching a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia that was expertly intercepted just south of Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. This IRGC-sponsored attack threatened the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In February 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by a terrorist attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel with an anti-ship cruise missile in the waters off Yemen's western coast.
- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.

**FINAL**

- Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.

**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.



**From:** Hook, Brian H  
**Sent:** Fri, 13 Oct 2017 07:40:30 -0400  
**To:** (b)(5)  
**Subject:** Fwd: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** IranStratTPs.docx, ATT00001.htm

Please print for me. Please bring to national press club

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** "Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC" <(b)(6)>  
**Date:** October 13, 2017 at 7:19:04 AM EDT  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) "Hook, Brian H" <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

We got some edits to the TPs overnight.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:41 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) "Hook, Brian H" <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
(b)(6) "Hook, Brian H" <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

From: Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC

Sent: Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM

To: Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Hicks, Hope C.

EOP/WHO (b)(6); Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO

(b)(6); Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO (b)(6)

Walters, Lindsay E. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Boney, Virginia M.

EOP/WHO (b)(6); Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO

(b)(6); Rayburn, Joel D. EOP/NSC (b)(6)

Bell, Michael S. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC

(b)(6); Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO

(b)(6)

Cc: DL NSC Press (b)(6)

Subject: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.

There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

**FINAL****IRAN STRATEGY TPs*****Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."



## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

## FINAL

### ***Threats from Iran***

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

### ***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.

## FINAL

- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

### ***Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC-backed Houthis launched a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia against an airbase near Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. The missile was intercepted, but the attack illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In early 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by an attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel in the waters off Yemen's western coast.

## FINAL

- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.
  - Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

### ***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.

**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.



**From:** (b)(6) on behalf of Hook, Brian H  
**Sent:** Thu, 12 Oct 2017 19:12:52 -0400  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy.docx, IranStratTPs.docx

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:41 PM  
**To:** White, Dana W SES OSD (US) (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Nauert, Heather N  
(b)(6) (b)(6) Hook, Brian H <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6) (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6) Nauert, Heather N  
(b)(6) Hook, Brian H <(b)(6)>  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM  
**To:** Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO (b)(6) Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6); Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6); Walters, Lindsay E. EOP/WHO <(b)(6)> Boney,  
Virginia M. EOP/WHO (b)(6) Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6) Rayburn, Joel D. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Bell, Michael S.  
EOP/NSC (b)(6); Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC <(b)(6)>;  
Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** DL NSC Press (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.

There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

**Official - ~~SBU~~**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

Final

## Questions and Answers on Iran Strategy

***Q: Why was the Administration unable to certify?***

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

***Q: Are you declining to certify under INARA due to a nuclear-related violation?***

- 
- 

(b)(5)

***Q: Is declining to certify a violation of the JCPOA?***

- 
- 
- 

(b)(5)

***Q: Is Iran complying with the JCPOA? If so, how can we not certify under INARA?***

- 
-



Final

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

***Q: Does the President plan to stay in the JCPOA even though the Administration did not certify?***

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

***Q: Does President Trump's refusal to recertify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) mean that he will rescind all the waivers previously used to lift nuclear sanctions on Iran and that would collapse the nuclear deal?***

(b)(5)

[Redacted]

(b)(5)

***Q: How do you expect Congress to react to the lack of certification? Do you support legislation to reinstate sanctions?***

- [Redacted]

Final

(b)(5)

***Q: Why would the Secretary of State and President give Congress control over such an important foreign policy decision?***

(b)(5)

***Q: President Trump has said he does not wish to withdraw from the JCPOA just yet and wishes to fix its flaws, but his decision not to certify lets Congress use "fast track" expedited legislative procedures to destroy the deal by re-imposing all nuclear sanctions. How is wishing to remain in the JCPOA consistent with playing "Russian Roulette" with the agreement by encouraging Congress to collapse it?***

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

***Q: So what happens now?***

Final

***Q: If Iran is not violating the terms of the deal, then why is the Administration declining to recertify it? Is the President making this decision against the advice of his intelligence chiefs?***

(b)(5)

•

***Q: There are claims that CIA and other Intelligence Community assessments on Iran have been politicized and that analysts are facing pressure to skew judgments to find Iran out of compliance with JCPOA. Is this the case?***

(b)(5)

•

•

(b)(5)

***Q: What does the U.S. Intelligence Community assess about how the Iranian Government will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***

•

(b)(5)

***Q: What does the US Intelligence Community assess about how other parties to the agreement will respond to the Administration's decision not to recertify?***

•

**ADDITIONAL Q&A**

(b)(5)

***Q: Is the President disregarding the advice of his national security advisors?***

•

Final

***Q: Secretary of Defense Mattis said the other day that he thinks the JCPOA is in the U.S. national security interest. Does President Trump think his Defense Secretary is mistaken? If not, why has the President decertified Iran under INARA?***

(b)(5)

- 
- 
- 

***Q. If, as you say, the JCPOA is so bad and Iran is in “default” of its “spirit,” then why isn’t the administration leaving the deal?***

(b)(5)

- 
- 

(b)(5)

***Q: What about our allies? Why are we disregarding them?***

- 
- 
-

(b)(5)

**Final**

***Q: How do you expect Iran to react? Will this lift limits on their nuclear program?***

•

•

ents,

I

(b)(5)

***Q: What do you mean by “fix” the JCPOA? Does this mean renegotiate?***

•

•

•

## **INTRODUCTION OF NON-NUCLEAR ISSUES**

***Q: Not just Iran, but all other JCPOA parties strongly believe that it’s a mistake to entangle other issues with the nuclear deal itself, and that this could result in the deal’s collapse. You have indicated that you wish Congress to include some missile restrictions in its revision of the INARA legislation. Is this a recipe to collapse the deal by tying it to non-nuclear matters?***

(b)(5)

•

•

Final

## **VIOLATING THE JCPOA**

***Q: Iran has said that President Trump's decertification is a violation of the JCPOA. Why isn't this true?***

(b)(5)

- 
- 

***Q: In the later years of the JCPOA, the nuclear deal would permit Iran to do things – increasing the size of its nuclear program – that this legislative approach would prohibit. Wouldn't it be a U.S. violation of the deal if we re-imposed sanctions at that point?***

(b)(5)

- 

## **RISK TO IRAN STRATEGY**

***Q: Doesn't declining to certify now risk losing European and other international partners' support where you need it most – that is, in addressing the range of Iranian malign activities beyond the nuclear realm that the Trump Administration has highlighted as critical threats?***

(b)(5)

- 

## **IRANIAN VIOLATIONS**

***Q: Senior Administration officials have repeatedly indicated that they believe Iran to have violated the JCPOA, including by producing too much heavy water and running too many centrifuges. The IAEA, however, believes Iran to be in compliance, and U.S. intelligence officials appear to agree. Why do officials keep saying Iran has violated the deal?***

(b)(5)

-

Final

(b)(5)

## IAEA ACCESS

***Q: Administration officials have sometimes suggested that Iran is denying the IAEA access to suspect sites, and/or that the IAEA is not doing enough to use its authorities to visit locations where Iran might perhaps be cheating on the JCPOA. Is this true?***

(b)(5)

•

***Q: Iranian officials have said that they will never permit the IAEA to visit military sites. Does this mean that the JCPOA is doomed?***

(b)(5)

•

***Q: Iran and Russia have said that they do not believe the IAEA has authority to verify Iran's compliance with "Section T" of the JCPOA, which prohibits work on technologies that could contribute to nuclear warhead development. Is this true?***

(b)(5)

•

**Final**

***Q: IAEA Director General Amano said that the IAEA lacks all of the tools needed to verify Iran's compliance with weaponization restrictions. Doesn't this mean the IAEA can't verify Iran's compliance with the deal?***

(b)(5)

- 
- 

**AVIATION LICENSING**

***Q: The JCPOA commits the United States to licensing civil aviation sales to Iran, yet the Trump Administration has put a "hold" on all such licenses. Isn't that a violation of the deal?***

(b)(5)

- 

**FTO DESIGNATION**

***Q: Why didn't you formally designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a Foreign Terrorist organization?***

- 
- 
- 

S.



Final

## IRANIAN OFFICIALS' COMMENTS

***Q: Iran has complained that U.S. statements discouraging business investment in Iran violate provisions of the JCPOA in which the United States promised to support the resumption of economic relationships after the lifting of nuclear sanctions. Why do U.S. officials keep discouraging business in Iran?***

(b)(5)

•

FINAL

## IRAN STRATEGY TPs

### ***Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

### ***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

### ***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."

## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

### ***Threats from Iran***

(b)(5)

**FINAL**

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.
- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

**FINAL*****Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC supported the Houthis in launching a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia that was expertly intercepted just south of Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. This IRGC-sponsored attack threatened the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca and illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In February 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by a terrorist attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel with an anti-ship cruise missile in the waters off Yemen's western coast.
- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.

**FINAL**

- Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.

**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.

**From:** (b)(6) on behalf of Hook, Brian H  
**Sent:** Fri, 13 Oct 2017 08:18:07 -0400  
**To:** (b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As  
**Attachments:** IranStratTPs.docx

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, October 13, 2017 7:19 AM  
**To:** White (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(6)  
(b)(6); Nauert, Heather N  
(b)(6); Hook, Brian H (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

We got some edits to the TPs overnight.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:41 PM  
(b)(6); (b)(6)  
(b)(6); 'Nauert, Heather N'  
(b)(6); 'Hook, Brian H' (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Sorry, sent two copies of same doc.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:33 PM  
**To:** (b)(6)  
(b)(6); Nauert, Heather N  
(b)(6); Hook, Brian H (b)(6)  
(b)(6)  
**Subject:** FW: Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As

Here are the NSC-cleared TPs and Qs&As. Remember, nothing goes live until the speech!

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Anton, Michael N. EOP/NSC  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 12, 2017 4:31 PM  
**To:** Sanders, Sarah H. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Hicks, Hope C. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6); Shah, Raj S. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Sadler, Kelly J. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6); Walters, Lindsay E. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Boney,  
Virginia M. EOP/WHO (b)(6); Powell, Dina H. EOP/WHO  
(b)(6); Rayburn, Joel D. EOP/NSC (b)(6); Bell, Michael S.  
EOP/NSC (b)(6); Wells, Chris W. EOP/NSC (b)(6)  
Schlapp, Mercedes V. EOP/WHO (b)(6)  
**Cc:** DL NSC Press (b)(6)  
**Subject:** Fully cleared Iran TPs and Qs&As



These are fully cleared. Let's not send them to surrogates tonight though. But I will send to the interagency.

There is, in addition, a Fact Sheet and Timeline in Staff Sec.

**Official -~~SBU~~**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**FINAL****IRAN STRATEGY TPs*****Core Elements of the President's New Iran Strategy***

- The United States' new Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran's destabilizing influence and constraining its aggression, particularly its support for terrorism and militants.
- We will revitalize our traditional alliances and regional partnerships as bulwarks against Iranian subversion and restore a more stable balance of power in the region.
- We will work to deny Iran – and especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) - funding for its malign activities, and oppose IRGC activities that extort the wealth of the Iranian people.
- We will counter threats to the United States and our allies from ballistic missiles and other asymmetric weapons.
- We will rally the international community to condemn the IRGC's gross violations of human rights and its unjust detention of American citizens and other foreigners on specious charges.
- And we will deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon.

***Action against the IRGC***

- Consistent with President Trump's guidance, the Treasury Department is designating the IRGC for support to terrorism under EO 13224 and will apply terrorism sanctions to the IRGC's officials, agents, and affiliates.
  - This Treasury reveals the IRGC's true nature: it is not just a proliferator of threatening weapons systems and human rights abuser – actions for which it has been previously sanctioned by the United States – it is the reason Iran remains the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
  - The IRGC has deeply penetrated the Iranian economy. This new designation is designed to shine a light on the IRGC and the front companies and foundations it relies upon.
  - This action is part of our effort to deny the IRGC the resources to fuel its aggressive actions and those of its proxies.
  - Treasury's actions serve as a stark reminder that companies doing business in Iran must not do business with the IRGC, or else they will lose access to the world's largest economy.

***Decision Not to Certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA)***

- The President was unable to certify that the benefits Iran receives under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal) are "appropriate and proportionate to the measures Iran has taken with respect to terminating its nuclear program."

## FINAL

- The President's decision on INARA is a matter of domestic law and relations between the Executive and Legislative branches; it does **NOT** reflect an intent to immediately withdraw from the JCPOA.
- Given Iran's grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and the Iranian regime's malign behavior outside the deal, Iran is in default of the deal's spirit.
- The deal's greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland. In the meantime, the United States continues to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and will hold Iran strictly accountable for its commitments.

## **BACKGROUND**

### ***The Nature of the Iranian Regime under Supreme Leader Khamenei***

- Henry Kissinger famously said that Iran can't decide whether it is a nation state or a cause. Under Khamenei and his IRGC, the regime has behaved like a cause – the cause of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- For 28 years, Ali Khamenei has been Iran's Supreme Leader. Before that, he held the office of President for 8 years. In that time, he has shaped the Iranian regime in his image.
- Khamenei and his IRGC have pursued a steady policy of spreading a revolutionary ideology aimed at undermining the international state system by force and subversion. His main enemy and rallying point has been and continues to be what he calls the Great Satan, the United States of America.
- Under Khamenei, Iran exports violence, destabilizes its neighbors, and sponsors terrorism abroad. Within Iran, under Khamenei's rule the Iranian government has oppressed its people, abusing their rights, restricting their access to the internet and the outside world, rigging elections, shooting student protesters in the street, and imprisoning political reformers like Mir Hussein Musavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

## FINAL

### ***Threats from Iran***

- The reckless behavior of the Iranian regime, and the IRGC in particular, poses one of the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests and to regional stability.
- The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions.
  - This occurred most recently following the emergence of ISIS from the vacuum created by the Obama administration's ill-considered withdrawal from the region.
- The full range of the Iranian regime's malign activities extends well beyond the nuclear threat, including:
  - Ballistic missile development and proliferation;
  - Material and financial support for terrorism and extremism;
  - Support for the Assad regime's atrocities against the Syrian people;
  - Unrelenting hostility to Israel;
  - Consistently threatening freedom of navigation, especially in the strategically vital Persian Gulf;
  - Cyber-attacks against the U.S., Israel, and America's allies and partners in the Gulf;
  - Grievous human rights abuses; and
  - Arbitrary detention of foreigners, including U.S. citizens, on specious charges and without due process.

### ***The Need for a Comprehensive Strategy***

- The previous Administration's myopic focus on Iran's nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime's many other malign activities allowed Iran's influence in the region to reach a high-water mark.
- Over the last decade and a half, U.S. policy has also consistently prioritized the immediate threat of Sunni extremist organizations over the longer-term threat of Iranian-backed militancy.
- In doing so, the U.S. has neglected Iran's steady expansion of proxy forces and terrorist networks aimed at keeping its neighbors weak and unstable in hopes of dominating the greater Middle East. Recently, the Iranian regime has accelerated the seeding of these networks with increasingly destructive weapons as they try to establish a bridge from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
- The Trump administration will not repeat these mistakes.
- The Trump administration's Iran policy will address the totality of these threats and malign activities by Iran and will seek to bring about a change in the Iranian's regime's behavior.

## FINAL

- It will do so through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran's IRGC.

### ***Countering the IRGC***

- Supreme Leader Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been the hardline elements of the IRGC.
- The IRGC's stated purpose is to subvert the international order. The IRGC's power and influence have grown over time, even as it has remained unaccountable to the Iranian people, answering only to Khamenei. It's hard to find a conflict or a suffering people in the Middle East that the IRGC's tentacles do not touch.
- Unaccountable to Iran's elected leaders or its people, the IRGC has tried to gain control over large portions of Iran's economy and choke off competition, even as it has worked to weaken and undermine Iran's neighbors and perpetuate the chaos and instability in which it thrives.
- The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad's butchering of his own people in Syria and has cynically condoned his use of chemical weapons.
- The IRGC has sought to hijack Iraq's fight against ISIS to wrest control of the government away from constitutional Iraqi institutions and place it in the hands of militant groups under the IRGC's control.
- In Yemen, the IRGC has attempted to use the Houthis as puppets to hide Iran's hand in using sophisticated missiles and explosive boats to attack innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
  - In July 2017, the IRGC-backed Houthis launched a ballistic missile into Saudi Arabia against an airbase near Mecca, the most revered site in Islam. The missile was intercepted, but the attack illustrated the IRGC's reckless disregard for the faith they claim to defend.
  - This is only one of scores of similar missile attacks that the IRGC has enabled the Houthis to conduct.
  - The IRGC has also introduced an unprecedented threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea's Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.
    - In early 2017 a Saudi frigate on patrol west of the port city of Hudaydah was hit by an attack from three suicide boats belonging to IRGC-backed Houthi militias, demonstrating the threat now posed to freedom of navigation in a strategic waterway.
    - In October 2016, the same IRGC surrogates successfully struck a United Arab Emirates vessel in the waters off Yemen's western coast.

## FINAL

- The IRGC has even threatened terrorist attacks right here at home.
  - Senior IRGC commanders plotted the murder of Saudi Arabia's Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Jubeir, on American soil in 2011. But for exceptional work by our law enforcement and intelligence officers to detect and disrupt this egregious act, the IRGC would have conducted this terrorist attack and assassination in our own capital and would have killed not just a Saudi diplomat, but a host of other innocent bystanders at a popular restaurant in Washington, DC.
- It's this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norms that underpin the international order that makes the IRGC so dangerous. The IRGC's behavior threatens all nations and the global economy.
- Our partners in the international community agree with us that the IRGC's reckless behavior threatens international peace and security. They agree that the IRGC is fanning sectarianism and perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that the IRGC is engaged in corrupt economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity.
- For all these reasons, we want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian people.

### ***The Iranian Nuclear Program and the JCPOA***

- The Iranian regime's activities severely undercut whatever positive contributions to "regional and international peace and security" the JCPOA was expected to achieve.
- Even with regard to the nuclear deal itself, the Iranian regime has displayed a disturbing pattern of behavior, seeking to exploit loopholes and test the international community's resolve.
- Iranian military leaders have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites, which flies in the face of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA and the Additional Protocol. Not long ago these same organizations hid nuclear facilities on military sites. This cannot be tolerated; the deal must be strictly enforced.
- All nations must fully support the International Atomic Energy Agency's critical mission and the IAEA must verify Iran's adherence to each and every nuclear commitment in the JCPOA. This includes the IAEA fully utilizing its inspection authorities.
- Given Iran's - at best - grudging and minimal compliance with the specific terms of the JCPOA, and all of Iran's malign behavior outside the scope of the deal, Iran is unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA.



**FINAL**

- The deal's single greatest flaw is that its restrictions sunset over time, leaving Iran free in the future to openly pursue industrial scale nuclear fuel enrichment, an important step in achieving a rapid nuclear weapons breakout capability.
- Based on all of these flaws, it is clear that this was bad deal for the United States. The benefits Iran received as part of the deal are not proportional to what Iran gave up. Therefore, President Trump has decided that his Administration cannot issue a certification to Congress in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).
- Instead of making the certification under INARA, President Trump has directed his Administration to work with our allies and with Congress to explore options for addressing the JCPOA's serious flaws and to find a solution that doesn't allow Iran to enjoy relief from nuclear-related sanctions while expanding its nuclear program or developing ballistic missiles that could threaten our homeland.
- While we do so, we will continue to hold Iran strictly accountable to the agreement's requirements.